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INTRODUCTION 
 
In communication, individuals do not attribute the same informative value to the different 
elements that constitute an utterance, and consequently the discourse. Hence, individuals not 
only consider what they want to communicate, they also consider who the addressee is and 
how his possible mental information state is shaped at a current communicative act (cfr. Por-
tolés 2010:283-284, 2011:51, Krifka and Musan 2012:1). The hypotheses based on the 
knowledge and expectations of the addressee determine the way the interlocutor organizes his 
discourse in order to generate a relevant ostensive stimulus that could be felicitously integrat-
ed in the common ground by the addressee (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986], Lambrecht 
1994:XIII, Krifka 2008:245, and § 1.). Thereby, the individuals differentiate between differ-
ent types of information, e.g. what is considered mutual knowledge or background infor-
mation, what is new information or what is the most important information (cfr. § 2.).  
The information structure is always language-specific. In Spanish, if the interlocutors 
want to highlight new or unexpected information, they have at their disposal different focus-
sensitive mechanisms, as a) prosodic mechanisms; b) syntactical-distributional mechanisms 
or c) by means of a linguistic device, like the focus operator (FO) incluso (cfr. Escandell 
Vidal and Leonetti 2009, Portolés 2007, 2010, Leonetti 2014-2015, and § 3.) in 
 
David habla inglés e incluso chino. 
(‘David speaks English and even Chinese.’) 
 
Due to its procedural meaning the inclusive FO incluso evokes a specific information struc-
ture: it informatively highlights an element of the paradigm as the most relevant element in a 
specific and accessible context (cfr. Rooth 1985, 1996, König 1991, Portolés 2007, 2010, 
2011, DPDE online). The instruction of the FO conventionally triggers a contrastive relation 
between the focus (Chinese) and the alternative (background information, English) and leads 
to the interpretation of a scalar implicature (cfr. Jacobs 1983:8-10, König 1991:10, Iten 
2002:119-120, Portolés 2010:294-295, Cruz and Loureda 2019, and § 4.). 
If the individuals organize their discourse according to their communicative needs, it 
can also be assumed that not all utterances present the same processing effort. Consequently, 
languages have elements that allow to regulate this cognitive effort which involves the con-
 2 
struction of assumptions based on mental representations while using different types of infer-
ential computations (cfr. § 1.).  
Elements with procedural meaning, such as FOs (and discourse particles, in general) precisely 
fulfill this regulation-effect.1 They restrict the inferential processes in an accessible context 
due to their morphosyntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties and guide the addressee to 
the intended communicated assumption, while optimizing the processing effort of utterances 
(cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986], Blakemore 1987, 2002, Portolés 2001 [1998], Wilson 
and Sperber 2002). The procedural meaning of FOs regulates the informative context of the 
utterance: it sets certain rules for the elements with conceptual meaning in an utterance and 
requires the modification of the mental representations formed by specific concepts (cfr. 
Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:84, and § 1.2.). Thus, they encode an inferential route that 
is more efficient in order to obtain a relevant stimulus in communication (cfr. Sperber and 
Wilson 1995 [1986], Blakemore 2002, Wilson and Sperber 2002).  
Following these arguments, FOs are considered to constitute a notable focus of atten-
tion, both in production and in the comprehension of utterances. Theoretical, descriptive and 
contrastive studies on FOs and, in general on discursive particles, provide fundamental anal-
yses of their properties (cfr. among others König 1991, Martín Zorraquino and Portolés 1999, 
Cuartero Sánchez 2002, Portolés 2007, 2009, 2010, Loureda and Acín, 2010). Likewise, dif-
ferent experimental studies conducted with Spanish discourse particles that have examined 
the procedural effect of these devices during processing sustain three main arguments that can 
be attributed to the theoretical described characteristics of the procedural meaning of these 
units (cfr. Loureda et al. 2013, Cruz and Loureda 2019, Loureda et al. in press, and § 5.2.): 
 
– The insertion of a discourse particle provokes different processing patterns. Discourse 
particles control the processing of the utterance in which they are inserted. Therefore, 
the particle requires most of the processing effort in contrast to the other elements under 
its scope. 
– Discourse particles reassign the informative values of the other elements. Discourse 
particles redistribute the relative values of the elements under their scope. 
                                                 
 
1 In this thesis, FOs are considered a subclass of discourse particles, since they constitute an invariable linguistic 
unit and they possess a determined role in discourse: to guide, according to their properties the inferences real-
ized in communication (cfr. Martín Zorraquino and Portolés 1999:4057, Portolés 2001 [1998]:25-26, and § 4.1.). 
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– The insertion of a discourse particle does not provoke higher processing effort for the 
utterance. An utterance with discourse particle does not require more processing effort 
than the same utterance without discourse particle.  
 
Based on these findings, the experimental study in this dissertation aims to provide comple-
mentary information to existing theoretical and descriptive approaches by examining a) if 
there are correlations between morphosyntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of the FO 
incluso and the informative structure of the utterance, b) how the FO affects the elements un-
der its scope, that is, the implicated element of the focusing operation (focus and alternative), 
and c) to what extent the presence of a FO determines the recovery of inferences. 
In order to answer these questions, two experimental methods are implemented: An 
online eye tracking study and an offline comprehension test. While the eye tracking technique 
allows to register eye movements that reflect the processing effort during reading of critical 
stimuli, the comprehension test provides indicators of how readers understand utterances and 
recover the inferences. Both studies complement each other and ensure qualitative and quanti-
tative data on how focusing structures affect the cognitive level of communication (cfr. 
Kintsch and Rawson 2005:214, Lowie and Seton 2013:4). Thereby, this study considers four 
linguistic variables:  
 
– Extension of the alternative (IV A – cross-variable). The conditions of the independent 
variables IV B, IV C, and IV D are analyzed in three different information structures re-
garding the alternative information: implicit alternative, explicit single alternative and 
explicit complex alternative. This variable explores whether different extensions of 
background information lead to different processing and comprehension patterns.  
– Focus marking (IV B). Absence vs. presence of the FO. This variable aims to corrobo-
rate if the insertion of an explicit procedural mark in an unmarked focusing structure fa-
cilitates processing during the construction of an assumption. Likewise, it will be exam-
ined, whether the insertion of a FO determines the comprehension process (cfr. § 7.1.).  
– Position of the FO in relation to the focus (IV C). Preposition vs. postposition of the 
FO. It will be examined to what extend different FO-positions regarding the focus influ-
ence the processing and comprehension of marked focusing structures, and if according 
to their information structure a preferred position can be identified (cfr. § 7.2.). 
– Degree of informativity (IV D). Congruous vs. incongruous relation between procedural 
and conceptual information in an utterance regarding the context. This variable aims to 
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verify whether processing patterns change according to different degrees of informativi-
ty in an utterance (cfr. § 7.3.). 
 
The presented study is part of a research project Discourse particles and cognition that aims 
to identify cognitive patterns of different types of discourse particles in different languages.2 
The aim of the research project is to extend the theoretical and descriptive approaches to dis-
course particles by a cognitive approach and to examine whether different particles determine 
processing differently in different languages. This objective provides insights for general and 
descriptive linguistics, as well as for applied linguistics. The contrastive approach enables the 
identification of similarities and differences between the different language systems.  
 
This dissertation is compounded by 8 chapters. Chapter 1 and 2 provide the theoretical back-
ground on Relevance Theory and Information Structure, notions that are central to the empiri-
cal research of this thesis. Chapter 3 is divided in four main subsections that outline different 
notions related to focusing phenomena, as i.e. focus marking, alternatives and scalarity. Chap-
ter 4 is devoted to the research object of the study: It summarizes the basic notions related to 
FO in Spanish and exclusively addresses the properties of the Spanish FO incluso. Chapter 5 
covers the methodological principles that underlie the experimental study, and presents an 
overview of previous experimental findings on focusing. Chapter 6 provides a detailed de-
scription of all requirements concerning the experimental design and the execution of the ex-
periments, as well as the statistical treatment. The results are outlined in three subsections of 
chapter 7. Each subsection presents and discusses the main results of the eye tracking study 
and the comprehension test of one particular independent variable (IV B, IV C and IV D). The 
results of the cross-variables IV A – Extension of the alternative are discussed in each of the 
other sections. Finally, Chapter 8 offers general conclusions based on the relevant findings of 
the study. At the end, the chapter offers an outline to prospects of further research possibili-
ties.  
                                                 
 
2 All empirical studies are realized within the research group: Discourse particles and cognition of the Center for 
Iberoamerica at Heidelberg University. For empirical evidence of the causal connective por tanto see Narváez 
García (2019), Recio Fernández (2020) and Cuello Ramón (in preparation), for the counter-argumentative con-
nective sin embargo see Nadal (2019) and for a pesar de ello Guillén Jiménez (in preparation), for reformulation 
markers see Schröck (2018) and Salameh Jiménez (2019) and for the FO hasta see Torres Santos (2020). For 
studies, conducted with the German FO sogar see Rudka (in preparation). 
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1. COMMUNICATION AND RELEVANCE 
 
In communication it is important to know more than just the meaning of words and to have 
some knowledge about grammar. In a communicative act like: 
 
(1) Harry: Mary, did you like the chocolates? 
Mary: The ones with nuts.  
 
Mary could have perfectly answered yes or no, but with the given answer she intended to 
communicate Harry something more than the mere fact, that she does or does not like the 
chocolates. Mary’s intention could be to communicate, that firstly, she likes only some of the 
chocolates and not all and, secondly, to specify the category of chocolates to those containing 
nuts and not alcohol, for example. Therefore, in pragmatics it is claimed that Mary’s intention 
is relevant for a successful communication. The comprehension-process involves infering 
conclusions and creating hypothesis about the speaker’s intention (cfr. § 2.1.). In communica-
tion two factors can play a decisive role. One, concerning the speaker: how does the speaker 
need to communicate his intention in order to capture the audience’s attention; and second, 
concerning the hearer: how does the hearer perceive the speaker’s meaning. This leads to the 
assumption that for a successful communication the production of a relevant stimulus and the 
correct comprehension of the same stimulus are crucial.  
Grice (1975:368-369) already pointed out that communication is not a simple process of 
codification (by the speaker) and decodification (by the hearer), but a process of recognition 
of the intentions of the speaker: what is said is not necessarily or automatically what is 
meant.3 Utterances, as Mary’s answer, are linguistically encoded evidence that has to be part-
ly decoded, but they also evoke expectations which guide the hearer to the correct assumption 
given by the speaker: what is actually said and has to be decoded constitutes only a part of 
that what is communicated (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]). Parting from a relevantist 
framework, utterances present ostensive stimuli that have to be interpreted by means of an 
                                                 
 
3 With his studies, Grice opens the way in linguistics from a classical code model to an inferential model where 
the interlocutor provides an intention with a certain meaning and the hearer has to process the meaning by infer-
ring the intention of the speaker (cfr. Grice 1989 [1961]:368-369). For communication models that are based on 
the transmission of information see Jakobson (1974), de Saussure (1983 [1916]) and for the Shannon-Weaver 
Model see Shannon and Weaver (1962). These theories rely on the basis of coding and decoding. The speaker 
encodes the intended message into a signal that has to be decoded by the hearer (cfr. Portolés 2004:85-86, Pons 
2004:18).  
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inferential process (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 2002:249). Harry, by deriving the implicature in 
this specific context, besides of understanding that Mary does not like all chocolates, could 
interfere that the next time that he buys chocolates for her, he should only buy those with 
nuts. Surely, there can be much more implicature to derive, but the fact that the audience 
comes to similar inferences in this specific context leads to the assumption that there must be 
a principle that underlies the inferential communication (cfr. Portolés 2004, Pons 2004).  
Sperber and Wilson (1995 [1986]) proposed the Principle of Relevance by arguing that 
the notion of relevance is sufficient in order to recover the interlocutors meaning (cfr. 
Blakemore 1987, Carston 2002, Portolés 2004, Pons 2004).4 Relevance theory claims that not 
the transmission of information is mainly important, but the relevant presentation and pro-
cessing of a cognitive input. It is described as cognitive-psychological theory5 of communica-
tion (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 2004:608, 625) that aims to describe how the information is 
processed based on an ostensive-inferential process. Ostensive, because in what is said an 
intention to inform is expressed; inferential, because what is said not only needs to be decod-
ed, it presents also a stimulus that evokes an inferential process (cfr. Portolés 2004:92). 
In this inferential process the information that will be conveyed by the speaker should 
be relevant. These relevant inputs “include an external stimulus, which can be perceived and 
attended to, and mental representations, which can be stored, recalled or used as premises in 
                                                 
 
4Grice (1989 [1961) and other neo-gricean scholars, among others, Horn (1969, 1989, 1996), Gazdar (1979), 
Levinson (2000 [1983]) developed the Co-operative Principle that underlie four maxims: Quality (be truthful), 
Quantity (be informative), Relation (be relevant) and Manner (be clear) (cfr. Grice 1989 [1961]:369-372). In 
order to achieve successful communication, the interlocutors obey these maxims. Contrastively, the aim of the 
Relevance Theory was to study the natural behavior of any interlocutor independent of language and culture (cfr. 
Wilson and Sperber 2012:26-27, Portolés 2004:§ 1.). Relevance Theory is based on the assumptions of Grice’s 
studies that utterances evoke expectations, but criticizes several points of the Co-operative principle, e.g. the 
violation of maxims in utterance interpretation; and further claims that the relevance principle is precise enough 
for the inferential process of communication. For a detailed description of Relevance Theory and the discussion 
between Grice’s Co-operative Principle and the Relevance Principle see Sperber and Wilson (1995 [1986]) and 
Wilson and Sperber (1993, 2002). In general, the pragmatic theories came up as a reaction to the structuralism of 
de Saussure and encompass different theories, as the Speech act theory of Searle (1969) and Austin (1975 
[1955]) communication models as the Co-operative Principle of Grice (1989 [1961]). The first pragmatic theo-
ries were normative approaches that did not consider the cognitive part of language process until the Gricean 
model and Relevance Theory were developed (cfr. Verschueren 1999:§ 1.). Moreover, they are also other rele-
vant approaches as the neo-gricean approaches, among others Horn (1969, 1972, 1989, 1996) and Levinson 
(2000 [1983]), as well as other pragmatic approaches, among others Stalnaker (1974, 1991), Fauconnier (1975b, 
1994), Ducrot (1980), Anscombre and Ducrot (1983), Récanati (1987), Moeschler and Reboul (1994). 
5 Cognitive-psychological, because all interlocutors share the same cognitive principle that cognition always 
aims the fulfilling of maximum relevance and, therefore, guides the inferences independently of language or 
culture of the interlocutors. Relevance Theory is not a linguistic theory and is based on the hypothesis that the 
human mind processes the information through representations by realizing computations on specific representa-
tions (cfr. Carston 2000:48, Portolés 2004:90). In this sense Relevance Theory follows at first the work of Fodor 
(1983), but in the last years the hypothesis came up that the mind is not a single organ, but a modular mental 
system. For a detailed discussion of the processes of the human mind in relation to Relevance Theory see Sper-
ber (1994). 
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inferences” (Noveck and Sperber 2004:5). They necessarily rely on the property of relevance 
and should evoke a positive cognitive effect6: 
 
[…] relevance is a potential property not only of utterances and other observable phenomena, but of 
thoughts, memories and conclusions of inferences. In relevance-theoretic terms, any external stimulus or 
internal representation which provides an input to cognitive processes may be relevant to an individual at 
some time. (Wilson and Sperber 2002:250) 
 
So, if e.g. John comes home from a football match and says to his mother in the kitchen I am 
hungry and his mother starts to make him a sandwich then a positive cognitive effect was cre-
ated, by deducing a contextual implicature that implies decoding the utterance and the contex-
tual information.   
The notion of relevance and the cognitive effect are crisscrossed. Inputs that aim to pro-
duce great cognitive effects are more relevant and more worth processing and therefore evoke 
smaller cognitive processing effort (cfr. Noveck and Sperber 2004:5-6). To be relevant is not 
the only characteristic of an input in order to be produced, but the fact that it is the most rele-
vant of a set of possible alternative inputs (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 2002:252). To achieve a 
successful communication, Relevance Theory formulated two main principles. The Cognitive 
Principle: The fulfilment of the maximization of relevance, i.e. the audience can infer the 
most relevant conclusions with the minimum of processing effort (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 
2002:254). The Communicative Principle: The attention of the audience will automatically be 
captured by the most relevant communicative input. Thus, a successful communication de-
pends on the audience perceiving the input as relevant enough to be processed, which means 
that no unjustified effort has to be realized (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 2002:256, Noveck and 
Sperber 2004:6). Therefore, the successful ostensive-inferential communication requires two 
intentions: 
 
– Informative intention: “the intention to inform the audience of something” (Wilson and 
Sperber 2002:255) 
– Communicative intention: “the intention to inform the audience of one’s informative 
intention” (Wilson and Sperber 2002:255) 
                                                 
 
6 The processing of an input in a given context yields cognitive effects modifying the set of assumptions of the 
hearer. Positive cognitive effects can only be described as positive, if they contain a true conclusion. There are 
three main types of cognitive effects: Effects that strengthen, revise or abandon the assumptions. This notion 
allows to differentiate between relevant information and information that only seems relevant. For a more de-
tailed description and standard definition of the notion see Sperber and Wilson (1995 [1986]). 
 8 
To sum up, the more useful the derived conclusions are, the more relevant is the input, thus 
increasing positive cognitive effects. This means, that the more relevant an input is, the less 
effort it will demands during processing (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 2002:252). When the com-
municative intention is fulfilled, the hearer recognizes the informative intention of the speaker 
and a satisfied communication is performed; both intentions are successful. The ostensive 
stimulus acts idealiter as a precise expectation of the intended message and the deduced inter-
pretation are proved under the Criterion of consistency. Subsequently, the deduced interpreta-
tion can be accepted or cancelled. 
 
 
1.1. Semantic underdeterminacy  
 
Parting from Grice’ conclusion what is said is not necessarily what is meant utterances usual-
ly communicate more than that what they linguistically encode (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 
[1986], Carston 1999, 2002, 2004). This semantic underdeterminacy leads to the assumption that 
in order to decode the whole content of an utterance different pragmatic enrichment processes 
have to take place (cfr. Carston 2002:15-74). These pragmatic enrichment-processes are deter-
mined by the relevance principle, since any utterance inhibits the premise “to convey a presump-
tion of its own relevance” (Wilson and Sperber 2004:612), and since communication is an infer-
ential process it is assumed that the hearer will try to interpret the input with the less possible pro-
cessing effort while producing the maximum of positive cognitive effects. If the process is felici-
tous the information can be successfully integrated in the mutual knowledge, otherwise, if the 
information does not produce sufficient positive cognitive effects and the processing surpasses the 
expectations of relevance, the comprehension-process can be abandoned (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 
2004:613, and § 1.2.). 
The comprehension-process implies the decoding of the explicit meaning of the utter-
ance. This decoded message has to be enriched and embedded in a context to achieve a com-
plete interpretation of the speakers input. The decoding of the explicit meaning of a verbal 
input is an automatic and unconscious process of communication.7 The logical form repre-
sents the conceptual semantic representations that the speaker has chosen in order to create a 
                                                 
 
7 “The decoded logical form of an utterance is an important clue to the speaker’s intentions, it is now increasing-
ly recognized that even the explicitly communicated content of an utterance goes well beyond what is linguisti-
cally encoded.” (Wilson and Sperber 2002:260). Parting form a verbal input the hearer starts to create phonetic 
and syntactical representations according to the linguistic structure of the utterance. The interpretation of this 
syntactical and semantic structure is still underdetermined and has to be enriched by the context, combined with 
other available principles and assumptions as well as background framing (cfr. Fauconnier 1994:2). 
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relevant input for the hearer and is part of the “‘explicitly communicated content’ (or EXPLI-
CATURE8)” (Wilson and Sperber 2002:260). The explicature represents the communicated 
proposition which has to be derived, on the one hand, by the decodification calculations and, 
on the other hand, by the recovery of inferences. Thus, the explicature becomes a premise for 
the retrieval of contextual implications and cognitive effects (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 
2002:260). 
During processing, the audience constructs an assumption based on the lexical recogni-
tion of words, the search of coincidences with the entries of the mental lexicon, the syntactic 
and semantic analysis of the utterance, as well as the enrichment of the logical form (cfr. 
Escandell Vidal 2004:81). Pragmatic processes also take place in order to complete the logical 
form: disambiguation processes, saturation processes, reference assignment and pragmatic 
enrichment, among others.9 The result is an assumption on which an inferential process can 
be carried out. After this process, the logical form is transformed into a propositional form: 
the hearer has derived an unambiguous integration of the assumption that can be accepted or 
cancelled a posteriori (cfr. Pons 2004:50, Portolés 2004:148). 
The processing of the explicit meaning (primary process) can be differentiated from the 
processing of inferences (secondary process)10, but the decoding of the explicit meaning of an 
utterance as well as the recovery of the possible implicatures are parts of the same inferential 
process and cannot be seen separately. They are two sides of the same coin: 
 
The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure […] applies in the same way to the resolution of lin-
guistic underdeterminacies at both explicit and implicit levels. The hearer’s goal is to construct a hypoth-
esis about the speaker’s meaning which satisfies the presumption of relevance conveyed by the utterance. 
(Wilson and Sperber 2002:261) 
 
In Relevance Theory the comprehension process encompasses several tasks: One implies the 
construction of the explicature by decoding the explicit content; and another derives the in-
tended contextual assumption (implicated premises). Finally, the intended contextual implica-
                                                 
 
8 In the relevantist framework the explicature is a „proposition recovered by a combination of decoding and 
inferences, which provides a premise for the derivation of contextual implications and other cognitive effects 
(cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]). The explicature can occur in two different forms: logical form (low-level 
explicature) and high-level explicature that involves the propositional form (cfr. Blakemore 1992:62, Wilson and 
Sperber 1993:5-6, Carston 2002:119-121). For discussion of terminology and the pragmatic framework see 
Sperber and Wilson (1995 [1986], 2002), Blakemore (1987), Carston (1987, 2000, 2002), Récanati (2002). 
9 For discussion of enrichment processes see among others Levinson (2000 [1983]), for distinction of pragmatic 
enrichment processes as e.g. free enrichment see Carston (2000, 2002), for saturation processes Récanati (2002) 
and also Portolés (2004:§ 8.4.). 
10 For a more detailed distinction of primary and secondary processes see Récanati (2002), Carston (2004). 
 10 
tions (implicated conclusions can be constructed, but these three sub-tasks do not occur as a 
continuum11: 
 
The hearer does not FIRST decode the logical form of the sentence uttered, THEN construct an explica-
ture and select an appropriate context, and THEN derive a range of implicated conclusions. Comprehen-
sion is an on-line process, and hypotheses about explicatures, implicated premises and implicated conclu-
sions are developed in parallel against a background of expectations (or anticipatory hypotheses) which 
may be revised or elaborated as the utterance unfolds. (Wilson and Sperber 2002:26212) 
 
Grice (1989 [1961]) and other neogricean-linguists (among others, Levinson 2000 [1983], 
Horn 2005) propose another distinction of different types of implicatures. Within what is im-
plicated a distinction is made between conventional and conversational implicatures. In a 
conversation as in (2) the hearer (in this case John’s mother) creates some conclusions accord-
ing to the explicature and the established assumption that leads to the construction of a con-
versational implicature. 
 
(2) John: I am hungry. 
Mother: I’ll make you a sandwich. 
 
Conversational implicatures13 can be derived from the long-term memory: e.g. we know that 
when we are hungry, we have to eat something. Further, conversational implicatures are non-
detachable, i.e. can be cancelled. Recalling example (1) of Mary’s affinity for chocolates the 
conversational implicature The ones with nuts, can be cancelled without contradiction, as e.g. 
Mary: I liked chocolates with nuts, but not these ones, because they also contained raisins.14  
                                                 
 
11 Sperber and Wilson (1987:698) argued that the interlocutors select a specific context for each interpretation-
process. Thus, the interlocutors, on the one hand, determine the context during the interpretation-process, and, on 
the other hand, the context itself restricts the inferential process. Further, they argue, that in each conversation 
the context is basically formed by the former utterance, and therefore, this context is constantly modified or 
extended. The context can be extended in three directions: i) towards other more previous utterances; ii) by en-
riching with the encyclopedic knowledge; and iii) adding more relevant information to the context. Each exten-
sion can lead to more contextual implications. 
12 Emphasis in the original.  
13 The conversational implicatures can be particularized conversational implicatures or generalized conversa-
tional implicatures. The particularized conversational implicatures highly depend on the context whereas the 
generalized conversational implicatures depend on the formal linguistic form of some elements and have pre-
sumptive meaning that is achieved by a heuristic process. For detailed distinction see Horn (1996), Levinson 
(2000 [1983]), Portolés (2004:§ 7.4.) 
14 Conversational implicatures have to be distinguished from semantic entailment (cfr. Portolés 2004:127). 
Whereas conversational implicatures can be cancelled without contradiction, an implication with semantic en-
tailment cannot be cancelled. Julius Caesar was murdered entails Julius Caesar is dead. Therefore, the cancella-
tion is perceived as strange #Caesar was murdered, but he is not dead. The semantic entailment is created by an 
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On the contrary, in the case of conventional implicatures, the implicature is derived by the 
conventional meaning that some elements can contain, e.g. discourse particles, as neverthe-
less, therefore, even, etc.15 
 
(3) Daniel is from Wales; therefore, he is a good football player.  
(4) David plays even cricket.  
 
The conventional instruction of therefore and even evokes that in (3) to be a good football 
player is a consequence of being from Wales triggered by the meaning of the connective 
therefore and in (4) even presupposes that David plays other sports besides cricket (cfr. Grice 
1975, Karttunen and Peters 1979, and § 4.). Conventional implicatures are detachable, since 
two expressions can have different conventional implicatures. They are context independent 
and anchored in the decodification of the meaning on linguistic devices. They do not neces-
sarily derive a logical implicature and are not truth-conditioned (cfr. Portolés 2004:130).16 
From a cognitive perspective, the definition of conventional implicatures by Grice is not 
fully convincing. As Carston (2008:108) pointed out “the conventional or semantic content of 
an utterance comes in two types, the descriptive content, which affects the truth-value, on the 
one hand, and the merely indicative (as in ‘indicating’), which generates implicatures, on the 
other”. The conventional implicature can more exactly be described by the different types of 
meaning proposed by Relevance Theory: the procedural and conceptual distinction of infor-
mation.17 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
extralinguistic content in form of a logical presupposition. The derived logical inference is obtained due to the 
interpretation of a premise that conducts to a conclusion (Caesar was murdered, so Caesar must be dead).  
15 Other linguistic elements that can derive a conventional implicature are e.g. adjectives or verbs, as the verb 
regret, in Martin regrets Paul’s decision to immigrate to Germany. 
16 According to Horn (1969, 1979), Stalnaker (1974, 1991) and Karttunen and Peters (1979) the conventional 
implicatures are also linked to the notion of presupposition. Presuppositions are understood as implicit assump-
tions that are considered as true assumption in discourse. In the example Mary’s sister is a teacher, the presup-
position that Mary has a sister is true. Presuppositions are possible because of the representations that are stored 
in our memories and cannot be cancelled, since they are presented as conventional implicatures. If the utterance 
is negated (Mary’s sister is not a teacher) the presupposition still holds true (cfr. Portolés 2004:130). Therefore, 
an utterance like #John has given up cocaine, but he did not take drugs before is perceived as pragmatically 
strange. Because John has given up cocaine presupposes that he has taken drugs before. 
17 For discussion and different treatments of conventional implicatures and the framework of conceptual and 
procedural meaning see Blakemore (2000), Iten (2000) and Carston (2008:§ 2.3.7.). 
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1.2. Types of meaning: The conceptual/procedural distinction 
 
In order to satisfy the relevance principle, the hearer has to make the input as relevant as pos-
sible and with the minimal processing effort for the hearer. Therefore, the interlocutors have 
different types of information at their disposal: conceptual information (conceptual represen-
tations that have to be manipulated) and procedural information, that encodes how the con-
ceptual information has to be processed (cfr. Leonetti and Escandell Vidal 2004:1727, Wilson 
and Sperber 2012:150). The dichotomy conceptual/procedural18 meaning is based on the 
premise that 
 
[…] not all linguistic elements contribute in the same way to the interpretative process: some do so by 
providing conceptual representations, while others do so by specifying how such representations should 
be combined, among themselves and with the contextual information, to obtain the interpretation of the 
utterance, that is, by imposing restrictions on the inferential process of the interpretation. We say, there-
fore, that certain units encode concepts and others encode processing instructions. (Leonetti and 
Escandell Vidal 2004:1727, own translation19) 
 
The conceptual meaning presents the lexical information of the propositional content of an 
utterance and the procedural meaning encompasses the information on how to process the 
conceptual elements to satisfy the interpretation process of utterances (cfr. Blakemore 
1997:95).20 
                                                 
 
18  The conceptual/procedural dichotomy is associated to the distinction made in generative syntax of Chomsky 
which distinguishes between two categories: lexical and functional. The conceptual meaning corresponds to the 
lexical category, because lexical elements (as e.g. nouns, verbs) that constitute an open class, have descriptive 
character. Whereas the procedural meaning is associated to the functional category: Functional elements are 
presented as a more closed class, they are phonologically and morphologically restricted and in general, do not 
have descriptive character (cfr. Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2000:365). Elements with procedural meaning can 
be interpreted as subclass of the functional category, since functional elements contribute to the interpretation 
process. It can be argued that not all functional elements have procedural meaning, but elements with procedural 
meaning form a part of the functional category (cfr. Cann 2001:§ 2.).  
19 Emphasis in the original. Original citation in Spanish: “[…] no todos los elementos lingüísticos contribuyen 
del mismo modo al proceso interpretativo: algunos lo hacen aportando representaciones conceptuales, y otros, 
por el contrario, lo hacen especificando la manera en que tales representaciones deben combinarse, entre sí y con 
la información contextual, para obtener la interpretación del enunciado, es decir, imponiendo restricciones sobre 
la fase inferencial de la interpretación. Decimos, por lo tanto, que ciertas unidades codifican conceptos y otras 
codifican instrucciones de procesamiento.” (Leonetti and Escandell Vidal 2004:1727) 
20 The distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning is not free from criticism. The main criticism is 
that the distinction cannot be seen as a clear-cut classification. The linguistic items cannot be either conceptual 
or procedural. The invasion of meaning is bidirectional: there are conceptual units that could adopt procedural 
meaning, as e.g. emotional verbs (regret) and there are procedural units, that have some conceptual residuals, 
such as on the other hand. For further discussion and other points of criticism such as categorical vs. continuum 
distinction see Escandell Vidal and Leonetti (2011). 
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Conceptual meaning 
During comprehension the inferential process imposes the construction and manipulation of 
conceptual representations in a determined way. The elements that encode conceptual mean-
ing have, on the one hand, logical properties, they can establish entailment or relations of con-
tradiction. On the other hand, they rely on truth condition21, they can describe mental state of 
affairs. At an abstract level, concepts can be described as files stored in our memory that con-
tain information (cfr. Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2000:365, Wilson and Sperber 2012:157). 
Concepts have primarily two logical properties: Firstly, the concepts are stowed in our memo-
ries as files, in which different related types of information can be stored. Secondly, these 
concepts can imply or contradict each other and they represent constituents of the logical 
form. They are also sensitive to deductive rules that are responsible for the inferential process 
(cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]:72, 85-90, Blakemore 1987:55-57).22 
The information that contains each concept can be distinguished in three different 
types23: logical, encyclopedic and lexical, summarized as follows and provided with the ex-
ample of the concept SHARK (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]:86, Carston 2002:321, 
Pons 2004:39-41, Portolés 2004:§ 12.1., Carston 2008:321-322)24:  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
21 This distinction cannot be seen as determined. Some truth-conditional construction and non-truth-conditional 
can be encoded by concepts or procedural elements (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 2012:150). 
22 However, this does not mean that all properties of conceptual representations are logical. Within non-logical 
properties conceptual representations present mental states or brain states. Mental states present sensations as 
being angry or sad, whereas brain states indicate where in the brain the sensation is located at a certain time (cfr. 
Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]:72). The relevantist approach is to transform the proposition of formal seman-
tics to a cognitive level in order to achieve a complete implicature that combines all types of information (cfr. 
Pons 2004:28). The codified concepts are the basis of the logical form on where the implicatures can be derived 
(cfr. Carston 1999:116), that allows to share some properties with the approach of the modularity of mind (Fodor 
1983). 
23 The notion of concepts is often equaled to the notion of words. However, this relation is a relation of inclu-
sion. The word is part of a concept and the concept always embedded more information of different types. Rele-
vance Theory argues that there are always more concepts than words stored in the memory. This approach re-
jects Fodor’s view that one concept corresponds to one specific word. Nevertheless, Relevance Theory relies on 
Fodor’s principle that encyclopedic concepts encoded by linguistic items are atomic, i.e. unstructured in the 
mind, and that atomic items relate to the mentally represented information, encyclopedic information that can be 
derived by the concept (cfr. Pons 2004:38-39, Wilson and Carston 2007:235). For further discussion see also 
Carston (2002:§ 5.). 
24 The example of the concept SHARK includes three entries, but there are also concept that can lack of one of 
the three entries, as e.g. the concept AND, that presents logical entry, but not an encyclopedic one. Proper 
names, e.g. do not have logical entries. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon see Sperber and Wilson 
(1995 [1986]:83-93), Pons (2004:40-41) and Carston (2008:322).  
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– Logical entry: consists of a set of inference rules and acts over the logical form; it con-
tains a definition of the word that expresses the concept. 
SHARK: rules associated with the use of the concept, as e.g. the use of hyperonym 
and hyponyms (sharks are animals, but not all animals are sharks), definition of 
the word encoded by the concept. A possible output could be: ANIMAL OF A 
CERTAIN KIND. 
– Encyclopedic entry25: provides information about the associated ideas of the concept, as 
e.g. information about the object, events or properties, scientific information, culture-
specific information, personal experience, etc. 
SHARK: ideas associated with sharks (people are frightened, they live in the sea, 
they have a lot of teeth, they attack surfers, etc.), appearance information, behav-
ior information, personal experience and ideas as how to interact with them (if 
there are sharks at the beach, we will not swim, etc.). 
– Lexical entry: information about the phonetic and phonological form, as well as infor-
mation of the syntactical properties of the linguistic form. 
SHARK: pronunciation, grammatical information. 
 
All individuals should have the same logical entry independently of the language, since this 
type is of restrictive character, whereas the encyclopedic entry is infinite and in a process of 
constant update, since it is characterized by variation between individuals and time (cfr. 
Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]:88).26 However, combined with the notion of representation 
and computation it can be argued that, since both are necessary for comprehension and no one 
can exist without the other, that the encyclopedic entry contains representational information, 
it is a set of possible assumptions that have to be modified, whereas the logical entry contains 
computational information, as to say the inference rules that have to be allied on the assump-
                                                 
 
25 The information stored in the encyclopedic entry is often referred to as world knowledge (cfr. Kintsch 1988). 
World knowledge is understood as all general pragmatic knowledge (social, cultural and natural characteristics 
of an idea) which is stored in the long-term memory and has to be retrieved during the communication event and 
which has to be passed into the working memory; so the created assumption can be comprehended successfully 
(cfr. Kintsch 1988:224, Kintsch and Rawson 2005).  
26 The organization of conceptual information is investigated from different perspectives by creating different 
models that coincides in the intention to answer how the information is structured within an entry, among others: 
scenes and frames (cfr. Goffman 1974, Fillmore 2006), mental spaces and frames (cfr. Fauconnier 1994), proto-
type semantics (cfr. Rosch 1973, 1975, Hampton 1993) and from the perspective of artificial intelligence (cfr. 
Minsky 1974, 1988). They share some basic ideas with the proposal of encyclopedic entry of the Relevance 
Theory: Firstly, all notions coincide in the hypothesis that all human individuals developed according to a con-
cept similar stereotypical assumptions and expectations. Likewise, the encyclopedic entry contains, besides fac-
tual assumptions, also assumptions that are enriched to full-fledged assumptions in a determined context (cfr. 
Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]:88). 
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tions of the encyclopedic entry (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]:89-90, Escandell Vidal 
and Leonetti 2000). 
During the interpretation of a concept the hearer does not consider the whole information. 
According to the Relevance Principle, the hearer selects the most relevant encyclopedic as-
sumption of the concept in the specific context. The selected assumptions are premised in 
order to derive the contextual implicature (cfr. Wilson and Carston 2007:§ 4.). At lexical level 
the hearer is confronted with an underdeterminacy of the encoded concepts within a commu-
nicated stimulus. Therefore, the hearer has to make lexical adjustment of the encoded lexical 
items of an utterance. The hearer constructs during the interpretative process ad hoc concepts, 
in other words, concepts for “occasion-specific use” that are derived by the information of the 
encoded concept, the contextual information and the pragmatic expectations (cfr. Wilson and 
Carston 2007:231).  
 The result of an ad hoc concept construction can be achieved either by lexical narrow-
ing or lexical broadening of the linguistic encoded meaning of the concept. Both pragmatic 
processes act during an interpretative process upon specific concepts and strengthen the en-
coded concept, by acting in different directions and different degrees (cfr. Carston 2002:324, 
Wilson and Carston 2007:232). If the encoded conceptual information is underspecified, lexi-
cal narrowing should take place to determine which proposition was intended by the speaker.  
 
Lexical narrowing involves the use of a word to convey a more specific sense than the encoded one, with 
a more restricted denotation (picking out a subset of the items that fall under the encoded concept). Nar-
rowing may take place to different degrees, and in different directions (Wilson and Carston 2007:23427). 
 
(5) I’m not drinking tonight. (Wilson and Carston 2007:325) 
(6) I have temperature. (Wilson 2004:344) 
 
The verb “drink” in (5) conveys the presumption “drink alcohol/drink more alcohol than it is 
allowed for driving”, although only “drink liquids” is encoded. We could derive the implica-
ture: I’m not drinking tonight, therefore I can drive the car and in (6) it is assumed by “tem-
perature” that the speakers’ temperature is above the normal human temperature. In both cas-
es the encoded concept DRINK and TEMPERATURE have to be lexically narrowed to satis-
fy the relevance principle and derive the intended implicature. 
                                                 
 
27 Emphasis in the original. 
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Contrarily, an overspecification of the encoded concept can occur requiring a lexical broaden-
ing28:  
Lexical broadening involves the use of a word to convey a more general sense than the encoded one, with 
a consequent expansion of the linguistically-specified denotation (Wilson and Carston 2007:32729).  
 
(7) This coat costs 1,000 dollars. [‘about 1,000 dollars’] 
(8) The injection will be painless. [‘nearly painless’] 
(Wilson 2004:345) 
 
Both examples reflect an approximation where a word has to be understood as “approximate 
to something”. In a scale where 1,000 dollars or painless constitute the limit the items will 
reach the maximum approximation but will not fully be identical with the literal mean of the 
encoded concepts (cfr. Wilson and Carston 2007:§ 2.). Both pragmatic processes (narrowing 
and broadening) interact in the inferential process and are flexible and highly context-
depending processes.30 In general, a single lexical item always relies on a more general con-
cept that has to be fine-tuned (narrowed or broadened) in a specific context and therefore the 
discursive context and the pragmatic expectations must influence the way in which a lexical 
adjustment has to take place (cfr. Wilson and Carston 2007:327). In order to satisfy the expec-
tation of relevance during communication lexical adjustment is considered as: 
 
[…] a special case of a more general process of mutual parallel adjustment in which tentative hypotheses 
about contextual assumptions, explicatures and contextual implications are incrementally modified so as 
to yield an overall interpretation which satisfies the hearer’s expectations of relevance. (Wilson and 
Carston 2007:34731) 
 
The process of lexical adjustment is as comprehension process always a parallel process and 
not a sequential one. As seen in the examples (7) and (8) the comprehender adopts a specific 
                                                 
 
28 Lexical narrowing and broadening can occur within an interpretative process of a single word. It is argued that 
within lexical broadening mechanism different actions can take place: literal use, loosening of lexical meaning, 
hyperbole, metaphors, approximation and categorical extension. These mechanisms are seen as a continuum with 
fuzzy boundaries and cannot clearly be differentiated between each other. This approach rejects the traditional 
distinction between literal and figurative meaning. For further discussion of this approach see Sperber and 
Wilson (1995 [1986]), Kintsch (2000), Carston (2002), Wilson (2003). 
29 Emphasis in the original. 
30 Empirical evidence has demonstrated the flexibility and context dependency of concepts, e.g. experiments on 
adjective that show that a single concept, such as FRESH can evoke different antonyms depending on the con-
cept as e.g. fresh-rotten or fresh-frozen (cfr. Murphy 1997:237-239). Other experiments in lexical semantics 
have proven that words at a superordinate level (e.g. animal) or basic level (e.g. dog) are easier to process than 
subordinate words (e.g. labrador) (cfr. Rosch 1973, 1975, Rosch and Lloyd 1978). For further discussion see 
Wilson and Carston (2007:§ 2.). 
31 Emphasis in the original. 
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lexical adjustment process in order that he understands immediately that in (7) the coat does 
not cost exactly 1,000 dollars and in (8) that the injection may hurt a bit. Thus, from a rele-
vantist perspective, lexical adjustment relies on four basic hypotheses (Wilson and Carston 
2007:350): 
 
I. Narrowing and broadening are triggered by the search for relevance. 
II. They follow a path of least effort in whatever direction it leads. 
III. They come about through mutual adjustment of explicatures, contextual assumptions and implica-
tions (or implicatures) so as to satisfy the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance. 
IV. They stop when these expectations are satisfied. 
 
To conclude the conceptual meaning of items is flexible and malleable and overall highly 
context-dependent. In any interpretation of an utterance or expression conceptual information 
has to undergo a process of lexical adjustment to satisfy the expectations of relevance. This 
process allows to generate more specific or more general concepts according to the context. 
This process is based on the hypothesis that any mental representation, each encyclopedic 
entry is richer, more detailed than an encoded item can be. Each word is therefore somehow 
polyfunctional and can be adjusted to any contextual need. Individuals are able to communi-
cate numerous concepts, because the mind is capable to store infinite concepts that can be 
related to one lexical item. This property of flexibility of the conceptual meaning allows an 
efficient communication with the minimal possible effort (cfr. Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 
2011:§ 2.2.). As Carston (2002, 2004) pointed out in recent approaches of lexical pragmatics, 
the conceptual meaning corresponds to the information on the propositional content of mental 
representations which are codified by utterances. In an utterance, the linguistic meaning of 
the elements is subspecified and depends highly on the context to derive the intended interpre-
tation, so utterances cannot be considered as consisting of propositions, or to present truth 
conditions. Consequently, only mental representations that are pragmatically enriched can 
have them (cfr. Murillo 2010:243). 
 
Procedural meaning 
The comprehension of utterances leads to an inferential process in which, on the one hand, the 
elements with conceptual meaning have to be adjusted to the context, and on the other hand, 
there must be elements with procedural meaning that help to derive the correct implicature. 
They give instructions on how the elements with conceptual meaning have to be manipulated. 
The elements with procedural meaning do not require a conceptual representation in the 
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memory, as to say they do not have an encyclopedic entry. It can be argued that the procedur-
al meaning is the purest linguistic meaning, it is independent from the world knowledge and 
guides the inferential process during comprehension (cfr. Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2000, 
Blakemore 2002:90-9, Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:84-85): 
 
[…] Instructions operate on conceptual representations. An instruction takes a set of representations – 
linguistically encoded or not – as its input, applies some rules to them and yields a modified set of repre-
sentations as its output. (Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:84) 
 
By combining the interpretation of the conceptual elements and the procedural instruction an 
efficient comprehension is achieved and a greater positive cognitive effect is produced.32  
Instructions operate on the interpretative level during comprehension processing33, as for ex-
ample in (9) where the procedural instruction encoded in the FO even evokes a pragmatic 
scale and the hearer has to interpret that David can do other sports besides playing cricket 
(cfr. §§ 3.1. and 4.2.). 
 
(9) David plays even cricket. 
 
The instruction encoded in even does not represent the reality; it codifies logical states of the 
language. The function of an instruction with procedural meaning “is to put the user of the 
language into a state in which some of the domain-specific cognitive procedures are highly 
activated (and hence more likely to be selected by a hearer using the relevance-theoretic com-
prehension heuristic)” (Wilson 2011:11). As Fodor (1983) indicates conceptual representa-
tions are always accessible to consciousness. The speaker can reflect the content of each con-
cept and can more or less easily explain the concept by using other concepts. The concept 
SHARK can be explained by using other as TUNA or WHALE, etc. Whereas, elements with 
procedural meaning do not have access to a kind of introspective. They cannot easily be de-
fined or represented (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 1993:16, Leonetti and Escandell Vidal 
2004:1729, Wilson 2011:10). Thus, it can be assumed that the “domain-specific cognitive 
                                                 
 
32 Not only words, as e.g. discourse particles, encode instructions, but also specific morphs and syntactical posi-
tions can encode a procedural instruction that guide the inferential process, as well as prosodic mechanisms.  
An item can also encode conceptual information and procedural instruction, but instructions and concepts will 
always have their own properties even though they co-exist in a single item (cfr. Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 
2011:84). 
33 Instructions can operate also on the syntactic level. Operations on the syntactic level are of combinatorial 
nature, as e.g. case-marking. They are usually only relevant to syntactical computation and do not interfere at the 
interpretative level. From a relevantist perspective only the instructions that act at the interpretative level are 
assigned with procedural meaning (cfr. Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:84). 
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procedure” of the procedural meaning is described as a “machine-language” in contrast to the 
conceptual access. Procedural meaning is characterized as being inaccessible to consciousness 
and resistant to conceptualization (cfr. Wilson 2011:10-11). This can lead to the argument 
why the speaker is able to represent in his mind the concept SHARK, but not the concept 
EVEN (cfr. § 1.2.). The human mind disposes of different cognitive mechanism that can be 
activated depending of the state of the user. These specific cues (domain-specific procedures) 
can be of different nature and are activated differently depending on the circumstances of the 
communicated information. Not all of these procedures are linked to communication at the 
same degree, social cognition and language production or parsing among others are decisive 
for the inferential process of comprehension34:  
 
Most languages also have a cluster of procedural items (e.g. punctuation, prosody and various types of 
discourse particles) which are indeed intrinsically linked to communication, and whose function is to 
guide the comprehension process in one direction or another. (Wilson 2011:20) 
 
During the inferential comprehension process different cues are activated in order to guide the 
hearer through the comprehension process, as for instance, the informative structure of an 
utterance, the prosody, elements that allow to relate to referents; and there are also procedural 
elements as discursive particles that have the primarily function to guide the hearer through 
interpretation, restricting the lexical and contextual adjustment and facilitating the interpreta-
tion of the implicatures. 
The function of elements with procedural meaning is to guide the hearer, by providing 
instructions on how to relate the elements with conceptual meaning of an utterance and by 
implying these rules to facilitate the inferential process. Thus, elements with procedural 
meaning are characterized by two basic properties35: asymmetry and rigidity (cfr. Leonetti and 
Escandell Vidal 2004:1729, Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:§ 2.2., Nadal et al. 2016:58-
60). The fundamental asymmetric relation between both types of meaning is characterized by 
the fact that conceptual elements are flexible and malleable and moreover highly context de-
pendent (cfr. § 1.2.) whereas the procedural elements are mostly resistant to any conceptual-
ization and are not adaptable to the context (lack of an encyclopedic entry). The elements with 
procedural meaning require elements with conceptual meaning upon which they can display 
                                                 
 
34 For further discussion of the different domain-specific procedures see Wilson (2011:19-20). 
35 For a theoretical approach see Leonetti and Escandell Vidal (2004), Escandell Vidal and Leonetti (2011), 
Escandell Vidal et al. (2011), Wilson (2011) and for an experimental approach on both properties see Nadal et 
al. (2016, 2017), Loureda et al. (2013), Loureda et al. (2019).  
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their instruction. It is the procedural meaning that acts as a guide during the inferential pro-
cesses and displays the instruction on how to interpret the conceptual meaning. During com-
prehension the conceptual meaning can or cannot satisfy the inferential processes by deriving 
the correct assumptions through the instructions of the procedural elements (cfr. Leonetti and 
Escandell Vidal 2004:1729). In cases, in which the conceptual and procedural meaning gener-
ate a combinatorial conflict (e.g. coercion phenomenon, world knowledge or context con-
flicts) different conflict-resolutions strategies can take place, in which usually the procedural 
meaning imposes its instruction upon the elements with conceptual meaning (cfr. Leonetti and 
Escandell Vidal 2004:1732).  
The property of flexibility and malleability of the elements with conceptual meaning 
occur, because the conceptual representation are files in the memory that require to be contex-
tually enriched by confirmation, cancellation or modification. They have to be adjusted to the 
needs of the context, whereas the elements with procedural meaning are mostly “rigid, mono-
lithic and untransformable” (Leonetti and Escandell Vidal 2004:1731).  
 
They cannot enter into the mutual adjustment process, nor can they be modulated to comply with the re-
quirements of conceptual representations either linguistic communicated or not. The instructions encoded 
by items must be satisfied at any cost for interpretation to succeed. (Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 
2011:86) 
 
In other words, the intrinsic encoded instruction cannot be cancelled even if the instruction 
leads to an incoherent match between conceptual and procedural information in an utterance: 
the derived information “will always be solved obeying the constraints imposed by procedural 
ones [elements]” (Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:85-86). Thus, the examples (10) – (12) 
and (14) are adaptable to the context and to our world knowledge, but (13) and (15) are per-
ceived as pragmatically strange (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998]:22, Montolío 1998:32-33):  
 
(10) Mary is from Wales, therefore she is posh. 
(11) Mary is from Wales, nevertheless she is posh. 
(12) Marcelo is from Brazil, therefore he is a good football player. 
(13) #Marcelo is from Brazil, nevertheless he is a good football player. 
(14) David speaks English and even Chinese. 
(15) #David speaks Chinese and even English. 
 
The meaning in (10) and (11) is adaptable to the procedural instruction of the connectives 
therefore and nevertheless, since in our knowledge being from Wales is not a priori a conse-
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quence of being posh. Whereas example (13) is usually perceived as pragmatically strange 
and it is costly to comprehend due to the fact that it is hardly adaptable to the world 
knowledge (it is assumed that in Brazil there are a lot of good football players). Same scheme 
can be observed in the example (15), where the FO even evokes a scale (English is more dif-
ficult to speak than Chinese) that contradicts the world knowledge. In our world knowledge 
Chinese will be higher rated in a scale of difficulty than English.36 The instructions of there-
fore, nevertheless and even do not vary depending on the context of the utterance, they main-
tain their instruction rigid, independently whether the assumptions of the given relation be-
tween on the one hand the two discursive segment (in the case of therefore and nevertheless) 
or the two concepts (English and Chinese) hold the previous formed premise (as in (12) and 
(14)) (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998]:22). The instruction of a procedural meaning tends to be rig-
id, however this rigidity does not necessarily hold for the interaction between conceptual and 
procedural elements (asymmetric relation). The procedural meaning could impose its condi-
tion to the conceptual meaning and provoke that an assumption have to be created ad hoc to 
the needs of the context. The creation of the possible assumption (in (13) and (15)) can be 
felicitous (probably with major processing effort) or can be cancelled (because the processing 
effort is too high, the relevance principle cannot hold, and thus no positive cognitive effects 
are created). If the assumptions hold the hearer/reader initiates an accommodation process in 
order to satisfy the interpretation determined by the procedural meaning (cfr. Escandell Vidal 
and Leonetti 2011:91).  
Accommodation is here understood as a repair-strategy (cfr. Beaver and Zeevat 
2007:505): The hearer recognizes that the conceptual meaning in relation to the procedural 
meaning are not immediately adaptable to the common ground. In order to satisfy the inter-
pretative process, the hearer initiates an accommodation-process that is “a move a hearer can 
make in order that the cooperative intent of the speaker is realized”. This strategy is motivated 
by the necessity of the interlocutor to “adjust the conversational record to eliminate obstacles 
to the detected plans of your interlocutors” (Beaver/Zeevat 2007: 4). 
In example (15), the FO even can trigger an accommodation process, in which the hear-
er/reader makes an attempt to create an assumption, in which speaking English is more diffi-
cult than Chinese (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998]:§ 5., 2007). Thereby, the interlocutor acts by two 
principles: i) they accommodate what seems most appropriate to fulfil the instruction, but ii) 
fallowing relevance, they will accommodate what is needed (cfr. Thomason 1990, Beaver and 
                                                 
 
36 As long as you part from an eurocentristic view. 
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Zeevat 2007:505-506). The processing effort needed to fulfil the instruction determines the 
accommodation process; in other words, if the processing effort surpasses the principle of 
optimum relevance, the created assumptions can be abandoned. The decision to opt for an 
abandonment or an accommodation process underlies a primer conflict-resolution evaluation 
“if it is clear what must be accommodated in order to repair the context it will be done unless 
they have grounds to object, cooperative interlocutors will accommodate these presupposi-
tions as necessary” (Roberts 2012: 29).   
If the accommodation process is felicitous it must be assumed that the interlocutors in-
vested more processing effort than in the cases where no accommodation process must be 
initiated (as in (14)). The instruction of even (in (14), to create a scale between the elements 
and to highlight Chinese as more difficult than English) does not contradict the world 
knowledge and, therefore, the instruction facilitates the interpretation of the utterance. Con-
ceptual and procedural meaning point in the same direction, whereas in (15) both types of 
meaning are anti-oriented regarding the common ground, i.e. the mutual world knowledge of 
the interlocutors (cfr. Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:98). If no accommodation process is 
initiated and the interlocutor adopts an abandonment strategy the processing effort may be 
less than in the cases where no accommodation process take place due to a possible pro-
cessing breakdown.  
However, any accommodation-process does not necessarily lead to the integration of 
adaptable material in the common ground. The new created assumption to accommodate the 
propositional content and fulfil the instruction, can a posteriori be not acceptable for the hear-
er according to the assumptions stored in the memory and can lead to a cancelation of the 
previous build assumption (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998]:§ 5., and § 7.3.).  
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2. THE INFORMATION STRUCTURE OF UTTERANCES IN SPANISH  
 
We communicate constantly modifying the reality, and communication can be defined as a 
trespassing of information. Individuals inform when the information that is conveyed is as-
sumed to be relevant to the addressee. With the information the speaker aims to modify the 
state of mind of the addressee. This leads to an informative principle: Each communicative 
act is developed under some “behavior rules” that determine the way we communicate (cfr. 
Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:18). Two types of behavior rules can be distinguished (cfr. 
Roberts 2012:3): conventional rules (e.g. syntactic, semantic and phonological) and conversa-
tional rules. Conversational rules can be described by the informative function of communica-
tion and are not primarily linguistic. Thus, it is assumed that an utterance, as in: 
 
(16) Mary Quant inventa la minifalda en 1969. 
(‘Mary Quant invents the miniskirt in 1969.’) 
 
The interpretation of the utterance does not consist of the mere sum of the single words [Mary 
Quant] + [invented] + [miniskirt] + [in 1969], moreover, the distribution of the elements of 
the utterance is also determined for interpretation (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2008:438): 
 
(17) La minifalda fue inventada por Mary Quant en 1969. 
(‘The miniskirt was invented by Mary Quant in 1969.’) 
(18) En 1969 Mary Quant inventa la minifalda. 
(‘In 1969 Mary Quant invents the miniskirt.’) 
 
All utterances contain the same information, they have the same truth-conditions, one of the 
utterances cannot be true if the others are negated. They formulate the same representation of 
the world, but they do not represent the information identically. The different word order im-
poses a strategy to process the meaning of the utterance, this same meaning is related to the 
interpretation of the mind of the addressee by the speaker (cfr. Portolés 2004:275). The 
speaker organizes the discourse in order that the information can be integrated by the hearer 
in the common ground (cfr. Lambrecht 1994:XIII, Krifka 2008:245). 
 
[...] with the term information structure we understand aspects of natural language that help take into con-
sideration the addressee’s current information state, and hence to facilitate the flow of communication. 
(Krifka and Musan 2012:1) 
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The information structure37 is interpreted as the result of the integration process during dis-
course where the intention to inform conditions the structure of the utterance (cfr. Lambrecht 
1994, Portolés 2010:283).  
 
Information structure is that cognitive domain that mediates between the modules of linguistic compe-
tence in the narrow sense, such as syntax, phonology, and morphology, and other cognitive faculties 
which serve the central purpose of the fixation of belief by way of information update, pragmatic reason-
ing, and general inferences processes aspects. (Zimmermann and Féry 2009:138) 
 
What is studied within the information structure is how the information is distributed in an 
utterance, as to say, what patterns exist to construct relevant information.  
 
Thus, it is an essential linguistic mechanism of “context adaptation” that provides instructions about how 
to integrate linguistic information in a set of information that is accessible to the interlocutors –the con-
text in order to optimize the cognitive processes during language processing and comprehension. (Leonet-
ti 2014-2015:5-6, own translation39) 
 
 
2.1. Information management and common ground 
 
Communication, as interchange of information is based on knowledge that is mutually shared 
between the interlocutors. Therefore, the speaker whose intention is to inform of something 
presupposes certain information: “In other words, by organizing the discourse, the speakers 
not only have in mind what they want to communicate, they also consider the mental states of 
                                                 
 
37 Although the concept is much older, the term information structure was introduced by Halliday (1967-1968) 
and followed by the notion of information packaging of Chafe (1976). Both approaches established the modern 
theory of the semantic macrostructural phenomena, that affects the distribution of information at different levels. 
Since then different approaches were developed, as from the Prague School, among others Mathesius (1929), 
Daneš (1970), Firbas (1992) that developed the functional sentence perspective, focusing on the distribution of 
information at sentence level. Other functional approaches as the Functional Grammar proposal of the Amster-
dam School, among others Dik (1989), as well as the approaches of Halliday (1967-1968) integrated the infor-
mation structure in their systemic functional grammars. For an pragmatic approach see Givón (1984), Lambrecht 
(1994), Gundel (2012). More recently the proposals of information structure embrace the notion of focus, as 
proposals from É. Kiss (1998), Hidalgo Downing (2003), Molnár and Winkler (2006), Kenesei (2006) and 
Portolés (2010). Nowadays there is no clear consensus of the definition of information structure since it is stud-
ied from different theoretical and empirical perspectives.  
38 Emphasis in the original.  
39 Original citation in Spanish: “Es, pues, una pieza esencial de los mecanismos lingüísticos de “adaptación al 
contexto”, en el sentido de que contiene instrucciones sobre cómo integrar la información lingüística en el 
conjunto de informaciones accesibles para los interlocutores –el contexto-, con el fin de optimizar el uso de los 
recursos cognitivos en el procesamiento y en la comprensión.” (Leonetti 2014-2015:5-6) 
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the interlocutor […].” (Portolés 2010:283-284, own translation40) The information that is pre-
supposed guides the speaker, through the selection process of explicit information and the 
hearer through how to interpret the communicated stimuli (cfr. Stalnaker 2002:701).  
According to Dik (1989) all what is presupposed is embraced in the pragmatic infor-
mation of any individual. The pragmatic information is compounded by three subcomponents:  
 
– general: World knowledge with all social, cultural, natural characteristics, etc.  
– situational: includes all information that is derived during the communicative act. 
– contextual: embraces what is derived from the linguistic expressions during the com-
municative act.  
 
The pragmatic information of any individual is highly subjective and can differ from individ-
ual to individual. Nevertheless, the individuals share also a high amount of common 
knowledge. Furthermore, every individual presupposes what the interlocutor might know 
about the issue he wants to communicate (cfr. Escandell Vidal 1993:31-32).  
What is presupposed has received the denomination of common ground, mutual 
knowledge, mutual background information, mutual beliefs and mutual assumptions, among 
others, but every concept follows the mutual knowledge hypothesis. All these notions have 
one property in common: mutuality. This central notion of common ground is based on the 
fact that the independent information of each interlocutor is not sufficient in conversation.41 
Moreover, it is not only the shared information, it is the information that the interlocutors as-
sume to be shared by both interlocutors (cfr. Clark 1992:3). Because of this reason, common 
ground is described as a process of continuous modification42 (cfr. Stalnaker 1974, 1991, 
Karttunen 1974, Lewis 1979, Clark 1992). According to the communicative principle, com-
munication is also a transfer of information where “its optimization is relative to the tempo-
rary needs of the interlocutors” (Krifka 2008:245) and based on the assumption that the com-
mon ground is in a constant updating process, it has to be differentiated between the common 
                                                 
 
40 Original citation in Spanish: “Dicho con otras palabras, los hablantes al organizar un discurso no sólo tenemos 
en cuenta aquello que queremos comunicar, sino también los estados mentales que prevemos en nuestros 
interlocutores […].” (Portolés 2010:283-284) 
41 For detailed theoretical discussion of the notion of common ground see Karttunen (1974), Lewis (1979), 
Stalnaker (2002) among others; for an empirical approach on common ground see among others Horton and 
Keysar (1996), Keysar et al. (1998), Hanna et al. (2003), Barr (2008b), mostly studies, on how demonstrative 
and definite references effect common ground. See also Loureda et al. (in press) for incongruencies between 
conceptual and procedural information regarding the common ground, as well as § 7.3. 
42 Since the common ground is mainly a set of concepts it can be argued that it shares the same properties as 
conceptual elements. It is expected that common ground is as well flexible and malleable to the context and in 
infinite continuous change process (cfr. § 1.2.).  
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ground content and common ground management. Common ground content reflects the set of 
assumptions stored in the common ground that have truth-conditional impact, whereas the 
common ground management reflects aspects on the pragmatic interface, i.e. how the com-
mon ground content has to be interpreted (cfr. Krifka 2008:246). 
The information that should be conveyed in an utterance has to be packed and struc-
tured according to the common ground. According to its property of constant updating it is 
expected that (19) sounds logical, but (20) is perceived as pragmatically strange (cfr. Krifka 
2008:245):  
 
(19) I have a scooter, and I have to change the wheels of my scooter.  
(20) #I have to change the wheels of my scooter, and I have a scooter. 
 
In (19) the speaker introduces the information that he has a scooter and the presupposition of 
the second clause adds some new information to the previous generated information. Both 
types of information build up on another, whereas in (20) the information of the first clause 
entails the information of the second clause. Utterances as (20) are perceived as pragmatically 
strange, because they do not rely on the principle of optimal relevance with less processing 
effort. The information is not constructed economically and the effect can most likely be 
counterproductive. The utterance is not structured in a way that it minimizes the processing 
effort. On the contrary, utterances that exceed the information load by using complex con-
struction or overloading the information by presenting the same information more than once, 
are expected to require more processing effort, since the speaker will initiate an accommoda-
tion process in order to try to infer why the information was given in the presented form.  
The information stored in the common ground is not exclusively a set of propositions 
that is mutually accepted by the interlocutor, moreover it contains a set of entities that were 
introduced before (cfr. Krifka 2008:246). These entities, e.g. NP or linguistic elements can be 
explicitly given (cfr. § 1.2.), as in:  
 
(21) John and Ann write novels and even poems. 
 
where the information John and Ann write novels is introduced before the unexpected and 
highlighted information is presented: John and Ann write poems; or the information can also 
be implicitly communicated, as in: 
 
(22) John and Ann write even poems. 
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where it is presupposed (by the procedural instruction of even) that John and Ann write some-
thing else, besides of poems.  
The notion of common ground is not free of criticism: the main argument is that it is 
impossible to set the limits of what is actually mutual knowledge and to what extent the 
speaker can be sure what the hearer will know. Therefore, Sperber and Wilson (1995 [1986]:§ 
1.3.) proposed the concept of mutual cognitive environment, i.e. the set of assumptions that 
both interlocutors accept to be true. But, this concept is also insatisfactory, because it is too 
restrictive, in the sense that interpretations can also be based on shared assumptions that are 
not manifested mutually (cfr. Escandell Vidal 1993:32). The speaker always creates hypothe-
ses about the knowledge of the hearer: Even though communication is not felicitous, this does 
not signify that the assumptions were not true, but that the hypotheses of the speaker was too 
broad.  
In this sense, this work assumes a more impermeable definition of common ground 
without strict delimitations and it will be defended that the common ground depends highly 
on the context, the situation and the hypotheses the interlocutors made from each other.43 It is 
assumed that interlocutors share a core of common ground where the probability of the mutu-
al knowledge hypothesis should be nearly certain, but from the center of the core to the 
knowledge that the speaker presupposes that the hearer does not know there cannot be strict 
limitations, but more diffused areas.   
To sum up, the information packaging conveyed in an utterance is an immediate and 
necessary communicative need of the speaker (cfr. Krifka 2008:244). For felicitous commu-
nication the speaker has to have in mind what he wants to communicate, presuppose what the 
hearer already knows according to the common ground and he has to pack the information as 
relevant as possible in an accessible context. Therefore, the speaker has at his disposal differ-
ent syntactical, semantic and informative mechanisms (cfr. Leonetti 2014-2015:6).44 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
43  Any new information can enter the common ground, if it can be related to some known information, in other 
words, any new information needs an anchor to be stored in the common ground content in order to become part 
of the mutual shared knowledge (cfr. van der Auwera 1981, Escandell Vidal 1993). 
44 The informative function cannot be considered free of criticism and other authors as the functional Amsterdam 
school opt for the distinction: syntactic, semantic and pragmatic functions. Following the approach of Gutiérrez 
Ordóñez (2000 [1997]) and Roberts (2012) the informative function can be assumed to be also a pragmatic phe-
nomenon sharing essential aspects with the Gricean cooperative principle or the Relevance Theory.  
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2.2. Typology of concepts: Giveness, Topichood and Focus 
 
With the application of syntactic and semantic functions45, the speaker is able to construct 
information to represent issues of the world (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2008:439). The syntactic 
functional structures, due to their formal character, do not contain meaning; they are combina-
tory relations and are defined as roles. At formal level the functions act as “placeholders”, 
since they are pure constructive elements (e.g. subject and object). Their function is to organ-
ize the hierarchical structure of an utterance (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:12-13): 
 
(23) La gallina cacarea. 
(‘The chicken clucks.’) 
 
    relation  
La gallina [subject – function x]    cacarea [object – function y] 
 
The syntactic functions relate two elements to each other and establish a relation between the 
constituents. It is not until Fillmore (1968) that a syntagmatic relation of semantic nature is 
incorporated in the functions of language. The elements that constitute a linguistic item pro-
duce syntagmatic relations. Due to their syntactic function any noun could be the subject of a 
verb, but as Fillmore pointed out, this is not always the case, as in the examples:  
 
(24) La gallina cacarea. 
(‘The chicken clucks.’) 
(25) #El pez cacarea. 
(‘The fish clucks.’) 
 
Not any noun can constitute the subject of any verb. There are some strict limits46. The se-
mantic functions act as roles, but on the contrary to the syntactic functions, they contain 
meaning, they refer to entities anchored in the world. They represent a functional organiza-
tion, but not a formal one and rely exclusively on meaning. Any semantic constituent is relat-
                                                 
 
45 For detailed discussion of syntactical and semantic functions see Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]). 
46 This phenomenon does not only occur with nouns, but also with other elements, such as adjectives, etc. For 
further discussion see Fillmore (1968, 2006) and for Spanish see Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]), Escandell 
Vidal (2007). 
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ed to a syntactic constituent and vice versa. They rely on strict formal conditions, whereas the 
informative functions depend on other criteria (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:24).   
In any communicative act47, the speaker has to have in mind what he wants to communicate 
and, thus, has to prepare the utterance in an adequate way to satisfy the informative needs of 
the interlocutor. Thereby, the speaker follows primarily one intention: the intention to inform. 
 
To inform is a semiological activity by means of which a speaker (S) addresses an addressee (A), to mod-
ify its state of knowledge, transmitting to it, by means of some significant tool, data that supposes that it 
is somehow new to the addressee. (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2008:439, own translation48) 
 
Therefore, the speaker has to vary the linguistic form according to what he wants to inform 
about (informative principle, in Relevance Theory terms), and what he wanted the audience to 
focus on (communicative principle). Thereby, he selects what he considers to be relevant (rel-
evant principle) according to the different types of information, as e.g. what is considered 
mutual knowledge, what is background information and what is the most important infor-
mation.  
The informative function constrains the linguistic form and depends on the conveyed 
type of information (cfr. Chafe 1976, Lambrecht 1994, Krifka 2008), it acts upon the syntacti-
cal and semantic functions, and not the other way around. The informative intention of the 
speaker determines the formal construction of the utterance, leading to the assumption that a 
superior reorganization has to be conducted: 
 
They are a «superior» reorganization of those same materials destined to satisfy the informative needs of 
the addressee, either separating what he knows from what he doesn’t know (given/new information), or 
highlighting a constituent (focus), or setting referential and/or truth-conditional limits of the sequence 
(topic/comment). (Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]:17, own translation49) 
                                                 
 
47 As Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]:17), own translation, emphasis in the original) pointed out, “ […], when, 
in a communicative act, the speaker addresses its addressee, not only the components of the langue, the compe-
tence or the code come into account, but a whole series of factors that make up the communicative scheme [...].” 
Therefore, successively the functional and structural linguistic approaches incorporate an informative function of 
discourse. 
Original citation in Spanish: “[…], cuando en un acto comunicativo, un emisor se dirige a su destinatario entran 
en funcionamiento no sólo los componentes de la langue, de la competencia o del código, sino toda una serie de 
factores que configuran el esquema comunicativo […].” (Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]:17) 
48 Empasis in the original. Orginal citation in Spanish: “Informar es una actividad semiológica por medio de la 
que un emisor (E) se dirige a un destinatario (D) para modificar su estado de conocimientos, transmitiéndole, 
por medio de algún instrumento Significativo, datos que supone que de algún modo le son nuevos.” (Gutiérrez 
Ordóñez 2008:439) 
49 Emphasis in the original. Original citation in Spanish: “Son una reorganización «superior» de esos mismos 
materiales destinada a satisfacer las necesidades informativas del que le escucha, bien separando lo que conoce 
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Considering this superior reorganization, communication is oriented to information, to “say 
things of the world” to the addressee, assuming that the speaker considers all available mate-
rial, not only conventional material (syntactic, semantic and phonological functions), but also 
conversational material (informative functions). Following Fuentes (1999:9) it is assumed that 
the informative organization of an utterance is motivated by the suitability of the speaker to 
the addressee. The communicative act does not represent exactly what the speaker wants to 
say, but what he believes the addressee does not know. In order to satisfy this communicative 
need, he arranges his linguistic material hierarchically. 
To conclude, syntactical, semantic and informative functions are all functions of the 
linguistic organization of an utterance underlying one main characteristic: the asymmetric 
relation between them. The informative organization acts upon the syntactical, semantic and 
phonological functions and imposes its restriction to them, and not inversely. The informative 
function does not only display is restriction at sentence level, but also on a macrostructural 
and microstructural level (cfr. Fuentes 1999:9). Any information in an utterance can be split 
by a question-answer set. Any utterance could be the answer of a fictive or real question:  
 
(26) Quién inventó la minifalda? 
La minifalda la inventó Mary Quant. 
(‘Who invented the miniskirt?’) 
The miniskirt was invented by Mary Quant.’) 
(27) Qué inventó Mary Quant? 
Mary Quant inventó la minifalda.  
(‘What invented Mary Quant? 
Mary Quant invented the miniskirt.’) 
 
The question can be previously and explicitly formulated, or implicitly constructed by the 
speaker (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:21, Portolés 2010:284). In communication it is 
assumed that an asked question leads to the immediate intention of answering by following 
the cooperative principle. The intention of immediate answer relies on relevance as an organ-
izing principle in discourse processing. This same principle facilitates the processing and 
storage of information (cfr. Roberts 2012:4). The new information given by an answer will be 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
de lo que desconoce (soporte/aporte), bien resaltando un constituyente (foco), bien marcando los límites 
referenciales y/o veritativos de la secuencia (tópico/comentario).” (Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]:17) 
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added to the common ground content, if it is accepted by the interlocutors.50 At the same time, 
the addition of new information reduces the context set of the common ground. How and 
which assertion inferred by the communicated information will be stored in the common 
ground content is highly context dependent. In this sense, it is reasonable to assume that the 
inferences that are drawn are not only triggered by the discourse segmentation (question-
answer set) but also that the information structure can facilitate the processing of inferences 
(cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986], Roberts 2012). Thus, differences at the informative 
structure level can assist or impede the addressee in processing specific information in a given 
context, and it is assumed that information structure is also a pragmatic phenomenon (cfr. 
Gundel 2012:586). Based on the question-answer set, the information structure of utterance 
relies on different factors:  
 
– Givenness: relation between given and new information; interpreted in the sense that 
givenness is essentially entailed by the context and establishes a binary division be-
tween the new information for the addressee and the given information, understood as 
already present in the common ground. The distinction between given and new infor-
mation relates the discourse with the context and establishes a hierarchical structure of 
the information in the utterance (cfr. Chafe 1976, Prince 1981, Fuentes 1999, Gutiérrez 
Ordóñez 2000 [1997], Krifka 2008, Rochemont 2016) 
– Topichood: relation between topic and comment. The distinction between what is the 
information about (topic or theme) and what is communicated (comment or rheme), in-
terpreted in the sense of Schwarzschild (1999), Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]), 
Rochemont (2016).  
– Focus: understood as a semantic-pragmatic notion expressing that a linguistic item is 
selected from a set of alternatives, and that a specific structure is generated in discourse, 
following Rooth (1985, 1992, 1996), Lambrecht (1994), Portolés (2006, 2007).  
 
The distinction givenness/newness51 is defined as linguistic property of a linguistic expres-
sion. Givenness represents the information that is already present in the discourse, it could be 
                                                 
 
50 A distrnction is made here to other authors that assume that the new information is only integrated in the hear-
ers’ common ground. Krifka (2008) and Roberts (2012) argue that the new information modifies the common 
ground of both interlocutors. The presented study follows the proposals of Krifka (2008) and Roberts (2012). 
For an epistemic distinction see Carlson (1983). 
51 Information structure was firstly associated to the binary set of given and new information. There exists some 
heterogeneity in how the information is formally expressed in an utterance and about the terminology of each 
distinction. For further discussion of the distinction between given and new information see among others 
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explicitly given in an utterance or it could be implicit, e.g. present in the common ground or 
stored in the long-term memory. On the contrary, the new information represents the infor-
mation that was not assumed by the speaker that it was known by the addressee and must be 
always explicitly given in an utterance52 (cfr. Reyes 1985:570, Mendenhall 1990:77, 
Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:20-21, Gundel 2012:585): 
 
The proper definition of givenness must be such that it allows us to say that an expression is given to a 
particular degree e.g. whether it is maximally salient in the immediate common ground or just present 
there, or whether it is given in the general common ground or not given at all. (Krifka 2008:262) 
 
What is new and what is given is always a subjective perspective by the speaker. By interact-
ing with the common ground, the speaker decides what patterns to choose in order to con-
struct a relevant stimulus for the addressee. With the received new information the addressee 
can confirm, modify or correct previous mental representations he has in mind (cfr. Chafe 
1976:41, Prince 1981:232, Krifka 2008:262, Rochemont 2016:41). Given and new infor-
mation have syntagmatical properties and are related to each other in a discourse. The new 
information acts as attribution that is based upon the given information leading to the argu-
ment that there cannot be new information without given53 (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 
[1997]:21, Krifka 2008:262). 
Following the intuitive question-answer set, the given information in the question con-
stitutes what the addressee knows, and the interrogative mark condensates the actual new in-
formation, that is what the addressee wants to know (1a-3a). Thus, different questions can 
evoke different answers according to what the speaker assumes is given and new information 
for the addressee: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Halliday (1967-1968), Chafe (1976), Prince (1981), Gundel (1999), Rochemont (2016) and for Spanish 
Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997], Fuentes (1999), Portolés (2010). 
52 Gundel (1999, 2012) differentiates between relational and referential givenness. Referential givenness indi-
cates new information as a linguistic expressing with non-linguistic information that is established in the ad-
dressee’s mind, whereas relational givenness refers to linguistic expressions in which the new information is 
new in relation to the given information. 
53 Other authors as Rylov (1989:11) sustain that there can exist new information without given (“monorémicas”). 
Following Carlson (1983) and Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]) it is assumed that at the informative level given 
information is always present, but in some cases implicitly given in the common ground, as well as in the ques-
tion/answer relation were the question can only be inferred by the context.  
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Question set 
new information  given information 
1a) ¿A quién 
      To whom  
le regaló un coche María? 
did Mar give a car. 
2a) ¿Qué  
      what 
le regaló María a Juan? 
does María give to Juan? 
3a) ¿Quién 
      who 
le regaló un coche a Juan? 
gave Juan a car? 
 
Answer set 
Given information New information 
1b) María le regaló un coche 
Mary gave a car 
a Juan. 
to John. 
2b) María le regaló a Juan 
Mary gave to John 
un coche. 
a car. 
3b) A Juan le regaló un coche 
John was given a car 
María. 
by Mary. 
 
The different word order in (1b-3b) is conditioned intuitively by the informative function giv-
en by the question. The answers present the given information at the beginning of the utter-
ance (left side) and the new information to the end of the utterance (right side) (cfr. Reyes 
1985:577, Núñez Ramos and Teso Martín 1996:95, Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:20-23).54 
From a syntactical and semantic perspective, the utterances (1b-3b) have an unmarked 
structure, but they inform differently about the issue. On the one hand, in (1b) the new infor-
mation is John and in (2b) the new information is car. From an informative perspective, the 
free word order in Spanish is not at all arbitrary. This is why it would seem strange, that (2b) 
constitutes the answer for the question (1a). The new information is always oriented to the 
informative needs of the addressee, since the constituents obey always the communicative 
necessities of communication ( cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:23-24).  
 
A notion related to the distinction between given and new information is the distinction be-
tween topic and comment.55 Following Krifka (2008:265) the term “topic is the entity that a 
                                                 
 
54 Reyes (1985:577) denominates the distinction between given and new information: “tema/rema”, points out 
that in Spanish according to the natural word order the given information or “theme” corresponds mostly with 
the subject of the utterance and the “rheme” (the new information) with the predicate, that is not always the case, 
but can be seen as an unmarked word order structure.  
55 The first intention to separate the information in topic and comment was made by von der Gabelentz (1869) 
who proposed the terms “psychological subject” and “psychological predicate”. Today “psychological subject” 
mostly refers to given information, topic, ground or theme: referring to the object that the speaker wants to 
communicate. In contrast, “psychological predicate” is today defined as new information, comment, focus or 
rheme referring to what the speaker is thinking about the object (cfr. Krifka 2008:264). 
As happens with the distinction between given and new information, the terminology used for the notion top-
ic/comment is not at all clear. Chafe (1976) defined the term topic as subject of the utterance, creating confusion 
with the grammatical distinction. Whereas the terms theme/rheme of the functional school of Amsterdam (cfr. 
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speaker identifies about which then information, the comment, is given”. This definition 
about topic presupposes that communication is specifically organized insofar that the inter-
locutors can actually answer the question What is the utterance about? Furthermore, this def-
inition leads to the conclusion that there must be a coherence relation between the topic and 
the utterance (cfr. Dik 1989:177-178).  
According to Reinhart (1982) the topic is strictly related to the notion of common 
ground. New information is added to the common ground following a file-card system of enti-
ties, whereas the topic would represent the headline of the entity under which new infor-
mation would be stored in the common ground content (cfr. Krifka 2008:265).  
 
(28) Zidane[topic] jugó con Beckham[comment].  
(‘Zidane[topic] played with Beckham[comment].’) 
(29) Beckham[topic] jugó con Zidane[comment].  
(‘Beckham[topic] played with Zidane[comment].’) 
 
The examples (28) and (29) present the same propositions (both football players played to-
gether in a team) but the informative structure is different and the new information will be 
stored differently in the common ground. Whereas in (28) the new information would be 
stored under the topic ZIDANE, in (29) it would be stored under the topic BECKHAM. Follow-
ing Reinhart (1982) the term topic is further defined by Krifka (2008:265) as: “The topic con-
stituent identifies the entity or set of entities under which the information expressed in the 
comment constituent should be stored in the common ground content.” In a question-answer 
set, the topic56 will be the headline: what the explicit or implicit question is about, whereas 
the comment will be the answer to the question:  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Dik 1989) are very similar to what is here called topic/comment, in order to not establish confusion with the 
Prague School approaches that denominate theme/rheme to given and new information. Other authors as 
Vallduví (1992), Vallduví and Engdahl (1996) denominated the notion of topic “link”. The topic/comment dis-
tinction here fallows the early definition of Hockett (1958), developed by Krifka (2008). For a detailed discus-
sion of the notion topic/comment see Gundel (1974), Gundel and Fretheim (2004), and for Spanish among others 
Gutiérrez Ordóñez (2000 [1997]), Fuentes (1999), Hidalgo Downing (2003), Portolés (2010). 
56 Topic is sometimes put on a level with given information, due to the fact that it can be inferred by the context. 
Even though this occurs in some cases, there are also cases of new topics. Furthermore, utterances normally 
contain just one topic, but utterances with more topics are possible as well. The selection of a topic is a mere 
informative function: the informative functions act upon the topic selection (cfr. Krifka 2008:267).  
 35 
Utterance 
Zidane fue centrocampista. 
Zidane was a midfielder. 
Topic Zidane’s Football position 
Topic question 
Qué posición tenía Zidane? 
Which position had Zidane? 
comment 
centrocampista 
midfielder 
 
The topic/comment distinction is not a mere distinction at sentence level, but at discursive 
level. The topic can be extended to a paragraph or the whole textual unit and can lead to more 
than one comment for each topic (cfr. Portolés 2010:289).57 
 
The notion of focus is also related to the distinction of given and new information. Focus in-
formation presents new or unexpected information that the speaker wants to enhance. In the 
literature of information structure, the focus phenomenon has received different definitions 
and a variation of semantic and grammatical properties (cfr. among others, Rooth 1985, 
Lambrecht 1994, Kenesei 2006, Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2009, Portolés 2010). The most 
common definition of focus is based on Rooth’s (1985) Alternative Semantics Theory: Any 
focus evokes alternatives that are relevant for the interpretation of utterances (cfr. Rooth 
1985, 1992, 1996). Based on this theory, a focus establishes a relation between the selected 
focus information and a set of possible alternatives that previously could be – implicitly or 
explicitly – activated in the discourse (cfr. Rooth 1992, 1996, Kenesei 2006, Selkirk 2007, 
Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2009, Portolés 2009, 2011, Leonetti 2014-2015, and § 3.2.). 
Hence, the focus is a specific type of comment, that is selected among a set of alternatives 
that could also have been the answer of a same type of question, such as the focused element 
(cfr. Portolés 2010:294, 2011:3). As a consequence, a focus relates to a certain type of infor-
mation status and represents pragmatically the most informative element (informativeness, 
cfr. Bolinger 1961, Beaver and Clark 2008:xi, Portolés 2007, 2009, 2010).  
Further, the distinction between focus and alternative has to be differentiated from the 
distinction between focus and background. Both are related to different focus approaches. The 
term background relates to the propositional skeleton proposed by Jackendoff (1972), where-
as the term alternatives refers to the Alternative Semantic approach by Rooth (1985). As Por-
toles (2010:302) pointed out, alternative and background can co-occur. Particularly, in struc-
                                                 
 
57 For a detailed discussion of topic variation in Spanish see Hidalgo Downing (2003) and for the notion of topic 
in relation to discourse particles and informative structure see Portolés (2010, 2011). 
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tures that present a propositional complement, in which an explicit alternative and a focus 
element can be contrasted to a background information58, as in:  
 
(30) Además de por la boca[explicit alternative], la aspirina puede administrarse[background] por vía 
tópica[focus]. (CREA, El Mundo, 01/05/1997; Portolés 2010:302) 
(‘In addition to the mouth[explicit alternative] aspirin can be given[background] as a topical treat-
ment[focus].’) 
 
                                                 
 
58 Other authors have denominated the counterpart of focus also contextual propositions (Kay 1990), or, from 
generative perspective presupposition distinguishing between shared information between the interlocutors (pre-
suppositions) and information that is not presupposed (focus). For a wider view of this dichotomy cf. among 
others Molnár and Winkler (2006).  
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3. THE NOTION OF FOCUS 
 
According to the focus definition by Rooth (1985, 1992, 1996), the focus constituent is an 
explicit element that is highlighted in an utterance as the most informative element. High-
lighting an element might also evoke alternatives. The relation between the focus element and 
the alternative can be of different semantic nature. If no explicit device evokes a contrastive 
relation (as in marked structures triggered by a FO), an additive relation is created (as in un-
marked structures, cfr. § 3.1.). Rooth (1985) indicates that alternatives only evoke in cases of 
focus structures that are marked by prosody, word order or other linguistic focus-sensitive 
elements. Notwithstanding, this thesis argues, that in principle, any focus, independently if it 
is marked by a focus-sensitive mechanism or unmarked presenting the most neutral infor-
mation structure, may evoke alternatives (cfr. Portolés 2010, 2011, Loureda et al. 2015, Cruz 
and Loureda 2019).  
 
 
3.1. Different kinds of focus: unmarked and marked 
 
Two main types of focus structure can be distinguished: Unmarked and marked focus struc-
ture. In a specific information structure an unmarked focus59 may exist “by default”, as in: 
 
Context: 
David was born in Spain and he is a foreign language teacher in Madrid, where he has 
been teaching for many years. He has travelled a lot and speaks different languages, 
such as English and French. 
 
(31) David habla chino[unmarked focus/new information]. 
(‘David speaks Chinese[unmarked focus/new information].’) 
                                                 
 
59 The unmarked focus has received different denominations in the literature according to different theoretical 
perspectives: among others, neutral focus (cfr. Zubizarreta 1999, Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]), informational 
or information focus (cfr. Jackendoff 1972, Roberts 1998, É. Kiss 1998, Kenesei 2006), presentational focus 
(cfr. Rochemont 1986), emotional focus (cfr. Bolinger 1961) verum focus (cfr. Höhle 1988, Escandell Vidal and 
Leonetti 2009), broad focus (cfr. Selkirk 1984), psychological focus (cfr. Gundel 1999) or completive focus (cfr. 
Dik 1989, Andorno 2000). Even though they are all based on slightly different properties they all rely on the 
main unmarked focus function: introducing new or unexpected information that was assumed not to be shared 
between the interlocutors. Some of the named authors include prosodic marking within the notion of unmarked 
focus. However, following Portolés (2007, 2010) and Leonetti (2014-2015), in Spanish it is differentiated be-
tween an unmarked and a marked prosodic structure and the latter is associated to marked focus structure. 
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The unmarked focus60 widens and extends the common ground, since a focus constitutes the 
information that is assumed by the speaker not to be shared by him and the hearer (cfr. 
Jackendoff 1972:230, Selkirk 1984, Rooth 1985:10-15, Rochemont 1986, É. Kiss 1998:245-
246, Kenesei 2006:139-144, Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2009:14). The focus is the element 
that could be the answer to a question related to the topic WHICH LANGUAGES DOES DAVID 
SPEAK? and the background information is condensated in this topic question (cfr. van 
Kuppevelt 1996:394, Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:40, Gundel and Fretheim 2004:176, 
Portolés 2010:284, 294, Beaver and Clark 2008:xii, Leonetti 2014-2015:7). According to the 
topic, the unmarked focus (Chinese) presented as new information can establish an additive 
relation with the known information given in the previous context (English, French) (cfr. 
Portolés 2010:294, 2011:53).61  
Any unmarked focus has primarily identificational value, that can be understood as ad-
ditional value to the focus. By recognizing an element as focus the identificational values en-
sure that a relation between the constituents within an utterance is established (cfr. Jacobs 
1983:128, König 1991:29, Kenesei 2006:139, Cruz and Loureda 2019). “The identification 
can subsist only between items of certain kind: those which have extensions in the world, i.e. 
things, actions, properties and propositions” (Kenesei 2006:139). All elements of the relation 
have to be subordinate to one specific set. Therefore, the identification in this focus structure 
does not exclude all other possible alternative elements of the relevant set, it has an additive 
identificational value, in other words, if the focus element changes, as in: 
 
(32) David habla inglés[focus]. 
(‘David speaks English[focus].’) 
                                                 
 
60 In Spanish a focus is defined as unmarked if it is presented in an utterance in the most neutral word order (or-
der by default (SVO-Structure); cfr. Leonetti 2014-2015:3). The natural position of an unmarked focus in an 
utterance is the right side, as to say, the final position. Besides of introducing information with an unmarked 
nuclear stress and having an identificational value, the unmarked focus does not combine any other focusing 
properties (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997], Fuentes 1999, 2012, Portolés 2010, Leonetti 2014-2015:8). The 
neutral structure does not present specific contextual conditions and can be compatible with mostly every poten-
tial context. From a prosodic perspective, the most neutral form of an utterance has a continuous melodic struc-
ture without any emphasize, stress or specific pitch accent. An unmarked word order structure must therefore be 
the most frequent structure in any language. Acting as baseline, any unmarked structure of an utterance can be 
modified in order to satisfy communicative needs (cfr. Leonetti 2014-2015:3). 
61 Without a specific given context, the focus projection can vary in the sense that the focus changes according to 
the questions that could have been asked, e.g. which languages does David speak? What happened? Neverthe-
less, the given answers will be syntactically identical. Only the focus projection would change, ranging from 
focusing the whole utterance to only considering the direct object, focus of the utterance. The syntax does not 
impose any restriction to the construction of focus structure at an informative level. The different possible inter-
pretations of focus are not codified by grammatical restrictions. They have to be inferred pragmatically by inter-
preting the utterance in the respective context. The hearer/reader has to select ad hoc which focus interpretation 
is the correct one in the specific context (cfr. Leonetti 2014-2015:9). 
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the answer to the topic WHICH LANGUAGES DOES DAVID SPEAK? would be still true, because 
 
English (or Chinese)  A, where A: languages that David speaks 
 
All possible elements belong semantically to the same set of alternatives (David speaks X), 
and the set has to be interpreted according to the context and the common ground of the inter-
locutors during the communicative act (cfr. Rooth 1992:2, Portolés 2006:11). The set can be 
composed by an indefinite number of elements or a smaller number, but it has to contain at 
least one element (cfr. Kenesei 2006:144).  
Moreover, in Spanish, any constituent within an utterance can also be presented as 
marked focus62 by implementing a focus-sensitive mechanism (cfr. Escandell Vidal and 
Leonetti 2009, Portolés 2010, Leonetti 2014-2015): prosodic (cfr. Fant 1986), or syntactical 
mechanisms (cfr. Leonetti 2014-2015:3) or specific linguistic devices, as FOs (cfr. Portolés 
2010). 
In terms of prosodic mechanisms, the emphatic stress over one constituent is the most 
common indicating a focus structure: 
 
(33) David habla CHINO[focus]. 
(‘David speaks CHINESE[focus].’) 
(34) DAVID[focus] habla chino. 
(‘DAVID[focus] speaks Chinese.’) 
 
In the cases of focus structure marked by prosody, the focus has to be processed by the hearer 
on the basis of prosodic enrichment. He has to contrast the focus element (e.g. in (33) Chinese 
to the implicit given alternatives (possible languages that could speak David).63 
In terms of syntactical mechanisms, the modification of an unmarked word order can 
lead to a focus structure with a focus constituent that implies as well a prosodic stress (em-
phatic element).64 The most common word order to mark a focus structure locates the object 
                                                 
 
62 In the literature the marked focus is also called identificational focus (cfr. É. Kiss 1998) and more over con-
trastive focus (cfr. Roberts 1998, Kenesei 2006, Selkirk 2007), since the relation between alternative and focus is 
considered as a contrastive relation. The term marked focus is used here, in order to adopt the most neutral defi-
nition. 
63 For further discussion of prosodic marked focus structure see Fant (1986), Toledo (2008), Escandell Vidal and 
Leonetti (2009), Estebas Vilaplana and Prieto (2008), and for an overview of prosody and focus on different 
European languages see Zubizarreta (1998). 
64 The word order change to the initial position can lead to misleading interpretations since it can be ambiguous 
and can be interpreted as topic of the utterance. If the word order contains a focus structure it has to be combined 
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of an utterance at the beginning, as in: 
 
(35) Juan: David habla inglés[focus]. 
María: Es CHINO[focus] lo que habla David. 
(‘John: David speaks English[focus] 
Mary: It is CHINESE[focus] what David speaks.’) 
 
Further, also lexical mechanisms, as e.g. FO as in English: even, only; in Spanish: incluso, 
hasta or in German: sogar may evoke a specific focus structure in utterances and establish a 
focus-sensitive relation (cfr. Jackendoff 1972) that is a specific informative focus structure 
that modifies the truth-condition of an utterance (cfr. König 1991, Beaver and Clark 2008, 
Cruz and Loureda 2019).  
 
Focus operators may contribute to the exact identification and delimitation of their focus. Focus particles 
are thus one of the formal exponents of focus structure, in addition to prosodic prominence, morphologi-
cal markers, word order and specific syntactic constructions which consistently identify the focus. (König 
1991:13) 
 
By inserting a FO as incluso in an utterance, the additive FO presupposes that the statement is 
true for at least one of the elements of the set of alternatives and expresses that the proposition 
holds for the focused element as well (cfr. König 1991), as in:  
 
(36) David habla incluso[FO] chino[focus].  
(‘David speaks even [FO] Chinese [focus].’) 
 
The adverb incluso syntactically modifies the focus Chinese that is presented as its scope and 
is informatively highlighted in the sense that the hearer/reader has to evoke a set of alterna-
tives65. Since one of the main functions of a focus is its identificational value; one of the func-
tions of the FO must be to clarify the established conventional relation between alternative 
and marked focus (cfr. Kenesei 2006:139, Beaver and Clark 2008, Gotzner 2016:17).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
with a marked intonation in order to avoid ambiguity (cfr. Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:36-38, Escandell 
Vidal and Leonetti 2009:14). 
65 Focus and scope may or may not coincide in an utterance. Utterances with FO present normally a narrow 
scope over one constituent of the utterances, nevertheless, they also can widen their scope over several constitu-
ents or even a complete utterance. In the experimental stimuli of the presented study, focus and scope always 
coincide in one lexical element of the respective utterances. For a wider discussion on the topic focus and scope 
see König (1991). 
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Thus, the marked focus structure englobes the properties of the unmarked focus, but also has 
some different characteristics.66 Both foci, unmarked or marked, share the identificational 
value in the sense that both evoke a relation between the given constituents of the utterance. 
But, while the unmarked focus primarily indicates new information, the marked focus also 
“exhibits an explicit contrast” (cfr. Selkirk 1985, 2007, Kenesei 2006:240) between the focal-
ized element (Chinese) and a complementary subset of alternatives (cfr. Rooth 1985, 1992, 
1996, É. Kiss 1998:245, Gundel and Fretheim 2004, Kenesei 2006:241).67 Contrast is under-
stood here as function of generating an evaluation of two elements with informative value. 
The focus could be contrasted with a potential subset in a given context or with a subset of a 
paradigm that can be explicitly given in the discourse (cfr. Kenesei 2006, Portolés 2009, 
2010, Krifka and Musan 2012), as in:  
 
(37) David habla inglés[alternative] e incluso[FO] chino[focus]. 
(‘David speaks English[alternative] and even[FO] Chinese[focus].’) 
 
Furthermore, following Kenesei (2006:142) the marked focus englobes the function of 
“‘exclusion by identification’ interpreted on some set of individuals in the universe of 
discourse”. It is assumed that any focus – unmarked or marked – may evoke an alternative 
(cfr. Rooth 1985). Nevertheless, the difference between both foci lies in the relation they 
establish with their respective alternatives. In marked focus structure the contrastive relation 
between focus and alternative is given conventionally, whereas in unmarked focus structures, 
by introducing new information the contrast relation is of a different semantic nature which 
can only be recovered by a conversational implicature (cfr. Grice 1975, Kenesei 2006, 
                                                 
 
66 The marked focus is always a narrow focus in the sense that there is an explicit distribution between narrow 
focus and background information. This was not the case in the unmarked focus structure, where the ambiguity 
of focus projection has to be solved by the context (cfr. Leonetti 2014-2015:15). 
67 In the literature the notion of contrast is also understood as exhaustiveness of the focus: what is true in regard 
to the focus has to be negated for the alternative. This difference arises by comparing different focus structures. 
In additive focus structures the focus receives a specific informative status among the other potential alternatives 
and is selected as the most informative element of the utterance. However, that does not imply that a contrast is 
necessarily established in the sense that it negates the alternatives. On the other hand, in exclusive focus struc-
tures (e.g. with an exclusive FO as “only”), a contrast takes place including the negation of the alternative set. 
Following Molnár (2006:201-203), the notion of contrast will be understood here as evaluation strategy between 
possible alternatives and the marked focus. Additionally, contrast is understood as a binary distribution at the 
informative level between focus and alternatives; “(i) contrast always operates on alternatives independently of 
the character of the set (open vs. closed) and the presence of alternatives in the linguistic context and in the situa-
tion; (ii) contrast is always connected to highlighting independently of the accent type […]” (Molnár 2006:212-
213). The comparison of two elements with informative value can occur as a contrast with a subset of a para-
digm that is given in the language or it can also be given as a potential subset in the context (cfr. Molnár 
2006:212-213). 
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Portolés 2007). That is the reason, why unmarked focus structures can be cancelled out 
syntagmatically, as in: 
 
(38) David habla inglés y chino, sin que hablar chino le resulte más complicado que hablar 
inglés.  
(‘David speaks English and Chinese, without speaking Chinese being more complicated 
than speaking English.) 
 
The conventional implicature presented by the marked focus structure englobes not only an 
identificational, but also a contrastive and scalar value and cannot be cancelled out, as in: 
 
(39) #David habla inglés e incluso chino, sin que hablar chino le resulte más complicado que 
hablar inglés.  
(‘#David speaks English and even Chinese, without speaking Chinese being more com-
plicated than speaking English.) 
 
In general, any focus establishes the same operation. It indicates the presence of alternatives 
that are relevant for the interpretation of the utterance. By marking the focus, the interpreta-
tion of the utterance becomes more determined. The marked structure is selected because 
there were no other (unmarked) mechanisms to construct the intended relevant information by 
the speaker. Opting for a marked focus structure is combined with the relevance principle: the 
speaker opts for a marked structure, because he assumes that he cannot create an optimal os-
tensive stimulus with an unmarked structure. Thus, marked focus structures serve different 
proposes, such as correction, cancelation and modification of the intended assumptions. On 
the other hand, the hearer/reader tries to accommodate the focus information and to satisfy at 
any cost the focusing instruction by relying on the information of the context. Even though 
there are no appropriate assumptions to contrast with, the hearer tries to accommodate ad hoc 
the information in the common ground (cfr. Leonetti 2014-2015:17). 
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3.2. Alternatives 
 
The relation between alternative and focus is asymmetric, since it is the focus that establishes 
the relation with the set of alternatives, and not vice versa.68 The alternative is only labeled 
alternative if a focus is present in an utterance. The focus in combination with the discursive 
and situational context determines the interpretation of the set of alternatives (cfr. Portolés 
2010:297). Furthermore, alternative and focus are related to the same topic: 
 
The alternative denotations have to be comparable to the denotation of the expression in focus, that is, 
they have to be of the same type, and often also of the same ontological sort, and they can be more nar-
rowly restricted by the context of the utterance. (Krifka and Musan 2012:8)  
 
Likewise, a focus, either unmarked or marked, necessarily evokes a set of alternatives, upon 
which a relation can be estabished. This relation can be additive in the cases of an unmarked 
focus structure or, in cases of marked focus structure, it can be contrastive (cfr. Cruz and 
Loureda 2019). According to their appearence in an utterance, the alternatives can be 
implicitly given in the discourse or explicitly given in the utterance (cfr. König 1991, 
Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997], Portolés 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011).69 
If the set of alternatives is implicit, the set of alternatives, that has to be recovered 
through the context, can adopt different properties. In the case of an unmarked focus struc-
ture, the focus (A) is a subset of a set of alternatives (B), determined by a relation A ⊆ B 
where the subset of the focus does not have to correspond totally with the set of alternatives, 
but they could also be identical (a total inclusion A = B) (cfr. Kenesei 2006), as in:  
 
(40) David habla chino. 
(‘David speaks Chinese.’) 
 
The unmarked focus (the subset Chinese) can differ of the set of alternatives (David could 
also speak any other language, as e.g. English) or could correspond with the set of alternatives 
                                                 
 
68 Since the properties of the set of alternatives and the relation between focus and alternative are crisscrossed 
with other notions implicated by focus, as e.g. scalarity or properties of different FOs, this chapter aims to pro-
vide a general overview of the properties of the set of alternatives and will refer to other chapters.   
69 Note that the distinction between explicit and implicit alternative in marked focus structure as e.g. with the FO 
incluso does not hold for the whole paradigm of particles. Particles with propositional complement, as e.g. 
además de, aparte de exhibit necessarily an explicit alternative. For further discussion of these particles in rela-
tion to the notion of alternative, see Portolés (2009:50-51). 
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(David does not speak another language). On the contrary, in a marked focus structure (as in 
(41)) the relation is presented as A ⊂ B70, where A is always a proper subset of B and there-
fore the subsets can never be identical. 
 
(41) David habla incluso chino. 
(‘David speaks even Chinese’) 
 
The instruction of the FO obliges the hearer/reader to interpret that, besides the focus element, 
David necessarily has to speak another language, and necessarily, at least one more. An in-
formative scale has to be constructed, in which the focused element is less expected and has 
to be related with possible alternatives that have to be derived from the context.  
If the alternative is explicitly given in the utterance (as in (42)) the relation between the 
alternative and focus is always presented as a proper subset (A ⊂ B), no matter if the focus is 
unmarked or marked in an utterance. In both cases, the explicit given alternative can be relat-
ed to the focus directly and has not to be inferred from the context.  
 
(42) David habla inglés e incluso chino. 
(‘David speaks English and even Chinese’) 
 
The explicit given alternative can be composed by one element (explicit single alternative) (as 
in (42)) or it can be composed by several elements (explicit complex alternative, up to an in-
definite number), as e.g. in (43): 
 
(43) David habla inglés, francés, italiano y [e incluso] chino. 
(‘David speaks English, French, Italian and [even] Chinese’) 
 
From a cognitive perspective it can be assumed that utterances with explicit alternative re-
quire less processing effort, since the whole information for the interpretation of the focus 
structure is presented explicitly and has not to be inferred by the discursive context.71  
                                                 
 
70 Also A ⊊ B, the annotation depends from each author. Here we opt for ⊂ as symbol for a proper subset. An-
notation taken from Halliday (1967). 
71 Sometimes the set of alternatives can be explicitly restricted to a number of two possible elements, as in 
Juan: María, ¿Qué te apetece tomar, vino tinto o blanco? 
Maria: Tinto, por favor.  
(‘John: Mary, what do you want to drink, red or white wine? 
Mary: White wine, please.’)   
 45 
Moreover, the set of alternatives has other characteristics. According to the topic a set can be 
pragmatically relatively open as in (43), where the topic (LANGUAGES) of the set of alterna-
tives is compound by a wide range of elements. In contrast, in closed sets of alternatives the 
elements are limited, as e.g. in (Portolés 2007:136): 
 
(44) Alicia sabe sumar, restar, multiplicar y [e incluso] dividir.  
(‘Alicia can add, subtract, multiply and [even] divide.’) 
 
The set of alternatives is denominated closed, in the sense that the topic ARITHMETIC RULES 
THAT ALICIA KNOWS is composed by a close set of identities, in which the element divide con-
stitutes an extreme value on an informative scale (cfr. Portolés 2007:136). 
To sum up, alternative and focus are related to each other and can be distributed in-
formatively in an utterance, either being informatively equal (unmarked focus structure) or 
being informatively differently distributed (marked focus structure). In the latter case, the 
alternative is always less informative than the focused element (cfr. König 1991:32, Cruz and 
Loureda 2019, and § 3.3.).  
 
Another notion that is related to alternatives is exhaustiveness.72 The exhaustiveness of the 
focus indicates whether the alternatives are negated or included while affirming the focus 
element (cfr. § 4.2.). In cases where the focus is presented as exhaustive, the affirmation of 
the focus negates the presence of alternatives (cfr. É. Kiss 1998, Portolés 2009). In Spanish, 
this is introduced by relative clauses, prosodic marked structures or structures with exclusive 
operators, as in73:  
 
(45) David habla solo chino[focus]. 
(‘David speaks only Chinese[focus].’) 
 
The utterance indicates that David only speaks Chinese and no other language. The exclusive 
FO solo (‘only’) obliges the hearer/reader to reject all other possible alternatives and presents 
the utterance as exhaustive implicature that is conventionalized by the operator. Whereas in 
utterances with non-exhaustive focus the alternative is added and not negated. A non-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
This binary presentation of alternatives is often used in order to correct a previous assumption or in polarity 
questions.  
72 The notion of exhaustiveness is often referred to as including and excluding alternatives (cfr. Portolés 
2009:52-53). 
73 For further discussion of different types of exhaustiveness in focus structures see Portolés (2010). 
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exhaustive additive focus structure can be presented with an inclusive FO as incluso that indi-
cates that one element is selected from the set as the most informative element. Thereby, the 
focus element is informatively added to the (implicit or explicit) alternative(s) (cfr. Portolés 
2010:296-297, and § 4.2.).74  
 
 
3.3. Scalarity 
 
From an informative perspective alternative and focus can be ranged on a scale under one 
topic (cfr. van Kuppevelt 1996:403, Portolés 2007:136).75 For instance, the utterance in (46) 
embedded in the discursive context (adapted from Portolés 2007:136) is based on the question 
what arithmetic rules does Alicia know?  
 
Context: 
Alicia is seven years old and in first grade primary school. 
 
(46) Alicia sabe dividir. 
(‘Alicia can divide.’) 
 
This question, in turn, evokes the topic ARITHMETIC RULES THAT ALICIA KNOWS. The possible 
set of alternatives can be composed by e.g. add, subtract, multiply and divide. On the one 
hand, these elements constitute the comment to the topic and, on the other hand, the elements 
can be ordered due to their informative strength, as e.g. <multiply \ DIVIDE>76. Following 
our world knowledge, to divide is more informative than the other arithmetic rules, since it is 
known that the arithmetic rules are learned in a specific order (addition, subtraction, multipli-
                                                 
 
74 The different relations between focus and alternative indicate that in the case of non-exhaustiveness focus 
structures with relative clauses are acceptable with exclusive operators as only, but cannot be conducted with 
inclusive operators (cfr. Moreno Cabrera 1999:4275, Portolés 2010:296). The notion of exhaustiveness is treated 
in the literature under different denominations: Within the paradigm of FOs distinctions are made between re-
strictive and additive particles (cfr. König 1991), or excluding or including quantifiers (cfr. Sánchez López 2006, 
see also Fuentes 1987).  
75 Focus and scalarity are studied since the thesis of Horn (1972) about scalar implicatures and the studies on 
argumentative scales by Ducrot (1980), as well as the numerous studies on pragmatic scales by Fauconnier 
(1975a, 1976, 1977). For studies of scalar implicatures in the framework of experimental pragmatics see Noveck 
(2001), Noveck and Posada (2003), Noveck (2018). For studies on different kinds of scales in Spanish from a 
pragmatic perspective cfr. the numerous works of Portolés (2004, 2007, 2009). For a detailed perspective on 
argumentative scales see García Negroni (1998, 2003, 2006) and from the perspective of different FOs and their 
influence on scalarity see Schwenter (2000, 2002), Schwenter and Vasishth (2000). 
76 The left element presents the less informative element and the right element corresponds to the most informa-
tive element of the scale. Annotation adopted from Portolés (2007). 
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cation and division). In consequence, there may be children that are able to multiply, but not 
yet to divide (cfr. Portolés 2007:136). The contrast between alternative and focus can be es-
tablished by the shared world knowledge between the interlocutors or it can be evoked by the 
insertion of a FO, as in (47) with single explicit alternative: 
 
(47) David habla inglés e incluso chino.  
(‘David speaks English and even Chinese.’)  
 
The instruction of the operator obliges to assume that speaking English is less informative 
than speaking Chinese. In consequence, this informative relation modifies, if necessary, the 
existing suppositions of the mental representations of the interlocutor (cfr. Portolés 2009:56).  
The notion of informative scales described by van Kuppevelt (1996) allows to isolate 
three subtypes: pragmatic scales, semantic scales and scales evoked by FOs, whereby the 
scales evoked by the FO can occur combined with pragmatic and semantic scales. Additional-
ly, from the perspective of informativeness and argumentation, informative scales can be dif-
ferentiated from argumentative scales. Furthermore, from the point of view of the relation 
between the values: additive and substitutive scales can be distinguished.  
 
Semantic and pragmatic scales 
In semantic scales77 the intern order of the scale occurs due to lexical or grammatical para-
digms of the language, as e.g. with quantifier, as in the scale < some \ ALL > or < something \ 
EVERYTHING >. The information is given by the lexical content of the elements, so the el-
ement on the left can always be included in the element of the right side, which at the same 
time, is the superior element of the scale (cfr. Horn 1972, 1979). Portolés (2007, 2009) visual-
izes the scales as follows: 
 
STRENGTH + 
all – 
some – 
STRENGTH + 
everything –  
something – 
 
                                                 
 
77Semantic scales correspond to the so-called Horn scales and were the first scales studied within the theoretical 
framework of generalized conversational implicatures based on the quantity maxim. They include also scalar 
implicatures and negation. This distinction between semantic and pragmatic scales stems from the description of 
conversational generalized and particularized implicatures and conventional implicature. Semantic scales corre-
spond to the generalized conversational implicatures (due to the fact that they arise from various linguistic ele-
ments) and the pragmatic scales correspond to the particularized conversational implicatures (since they are 
determined by the context) (cfr. Horn 1969, 1972, 1989, Levinson 2000 [1983]). 
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In consequence, Horn (1972) stated that if the weaker element is affirmed, the stronger ele-
ment is negated. So, if it is said Some came to the party last night it implicitly is stated +> not 
all came to the party last night.78 On the contrary, if the stronger element is affirmed the 
weaker element is implicitly given. At the same time, it cannot be affirmed that All came to 
the party last night and negated Some came to the party last night (cfr. Horn 1972).79 Seman-
tic scales exist by default, since the scalar value is inferred by the semantic content of the el-
ements, as e.g. certain conceptual classification quantifiers, intensifiers, etc. A logical relation 
between the elements take place and the use of one element always implies inclusion or ex-
clusion of the other elements of the paradigm (cfr. Horn 1972, 1979, Levinson 2000 [1983]), 
Portolés 2007:136-137). 
In pragmatic scales, on the other hand, a scale is an informative structure that emerges 
from the possibility to order different elements corresponding to the same topic according to 
their informative value that is anchored in the world knowledge of the interlocutors (cfr. 
Portolés 2006, 2007, 2009). In the following example:  
 
Context: 
Peter is a student and lives in Dresden. He likes to travel.  
 
(48) Peter puede viajar a Fráncfort y a Moscú.  
(‘Peter can travel to Frankfurt and to Moscow.’)   
 
We could apply the pattern:  
 
STRENGTH + 
Peter can travel to Moscow -  
Peter can travel to Frankfurt - 
 
The elements presented in the utterance (with informative value) are comments to the topic 
WHERE DOES PETER TRAVEL TO? They form a part of the scalar predication that corresponds 
with the world knowledge: < Frankfurt \ MOSCOW >. According to our world knowledge, it 
can be assumed that travelling from Dresden to Moscow is higher rated in a difficulty scale 
than travelling to Frankfurt. However, in contrast to semantic scales, it would be possible to 
                                                 
 
78 Annotation form adopted from Portolés (2007). 
79 Schwenter (1999:187) argues that in semantic scales the construction of scales where the stronger element is 
affirmed but the weaker element is negated, as e.g. #All came to the party last night, but some did not come or 
#This car is huge, but does not have a normal size are linguistically not acceptable.  
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imagine an accessible context, where the strong element is affirmed, and the weak element is 
negated, as in:  
 
Context:  
Peter is a Student in the seventies. He lives in Dresden and likes to travel. 
 
(49) Peter puede viajar a Moscú, pero no puede viajar a Fráncfort. 
(‘Peter can travel to Moscow, but he cannot travel to Frankfurt.’) 
 
In this example, the context implies that Germany is separated in East and West (before 
1989). Thus, for someone living in East-Germany it was easier to travel to Moscow than to 
Frankfurt in West-Germany. Relying on the context the information in pragmatic scales can 
be accommodated according to our world knowledge in the common ground. Accessible as-
sumptions can be activated in the common ground to get the communicated scalar implica-
ture. The informative value of the elements is not lexically predetermined, but has to be en-
riched by the world knowledge that associates a minor or major informative value to the ele-
ments. 
By inserting a FO in a specific structure, however, the informative order changes. The 
scale order does not depend exclusively on the language itself, as in the case of semantic 
scales, neither from the world knowledge anchored in the common ground, as in the case or 
pragmatic scales. The procedural meaning of the FO forces the reader/hearer to create a spe-
cific scalar structure. Scales evoked by a FO can occur with a semantic structure, as in: 
 
(50) Este ajuste puede ser bueno, incluso perfecto, pero no es garantía de la corrección del 
producto final. (CREA, Geofocus, 2003)80 
(‘This adjustment may be good, even perfect, but it is no guarantee of the correction of 
the final product.’)   
 
or with a pragmatic structure81, as in: 
                                                 
 
80 All examples obtained by the Spanish CREA Corpus are provided with a translation. The translations are not 
part of the corpus and serve only comprehension purposes. 
81 Not all FO, as incluso, can occur in pragmatic scales and in semantic scales, others, as e.g. también. can only 
operate in pragmatic scale. To compare:  
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(51) En las calles del centro se instalan carpas en las que, desde la tarde hasta altas horas de la 
madrugada se baila al ritmo del vals, salsa, rock o incluso rap. (CREA, La Vanguardia, 
30/12/1995) 
(‘In the streets of the center are set up tents in which, from the afternoon until the early 
hours of the morning it was danced to the rhythms of waltz, salsa, rock or even rap.’) 
 
In both structures the insertion of a FO reinforces the information that is given by the lexical 
elements and strengthens the scalar relation in an utterance that necessarily has to be estab-
lished (cfr. Portolés 2007:138).82 Moreover, if a conflict is generated between the conceptual 
meaning of the lexical elements and the procedural meaning of a FO in relation to the context, 
the contradiction becomes more pertinent in scales of semantic nature, since the logical rela-
tion of the elements is altered, as in: 
 
(52) #Este ajuste puede ser perfecto, incluso bueno, pero no es garantía de la corrección del 
producto final. 
 
A generated conflict between the two types of meaning in pragmatic scales (as in (53)) can 
lead to an accommodation-process in the common ground, since a possible accessible context 
could be constructed. Furthermore, the conceptual meaning of the lexical elements can also 
determine the accommodation of the assumption to the common ground.83  
 
(53) # En las calles del centro se instalan carpas en las que, desde la tarde hasta altas horas de 
la madrugada se baila al ritmo del rap, salsa, rock o incluso vals. 
 
Additive and substitutive scales 
The values that are ordered on a scale can have different relations between each other, de-
pending on how the interaction of the elements in the comprehension of the implicature oper-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
David habla inglés y incluso chino. 
David habla inglés y también chino. 
 
(‘David speaks English and even Chinese. 
David speaks English and even Chinese.’) 
 
Ese vestido es feo, incluso horroroso. 
#Ese vestido es feo, también horroroso. 
 
(‘This dress is ugly, even horrific.   
#This dress is ugly, also horrific.’) 
 
 
82 Whereas, in utterances without FO the scalar relation can only be interpreted by means of a conversational 
implicature.  
83 Therefore, it can be expected that closed sets of alternative demand more effort for the accommodation-
process than open sets of alternative (cfr. Portolés 2007, and §§ 3.2. and 3.3.). 
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ates. Within the paradigm of informative scales, the relation can be additive or substitutive. 
Semantic scales are usually defined as substitutive84 (as in (54)), where the stronger element 
substitutes the weaker element.85 
 
(54) Este ajuste puede ser bueno, incluso perfecto, pero no es garantía de la corrección del 
producto final.  (CREA, Geofocus, 2003) 
(‘This adjustment may be good, even perfect, but it is no guarantee of the correction of 
the final product.’)   
 
However, in (55) the focus contrasts with the possible alternative in an excluding mode ac-
cording to one determined set of alternatives. 
  
(55) Juan trajo solo dos panes a la barbacoa.  
(‘John only brought two breads to the barbecue.’) 
 
The element with the major strength substitutes the rest of the set (< two breads \ three 
BREADS >); thus, interpreting the scale as a semantic scale. This scale can be perceived as 
substitutive, because the numbers are semantically anchored in the lexicon. Nevertheless, we 
could imagine a context in which John was requested to bring two breads and six chicken 
fillets. In this case, the lexical paradigm is dominated by the world knowledge and, therefore, 
the scale turns out to be additive and pragmatic (cfr. Portolés 2007:141):  
 
 STRENGTH + 
Two breads and six chicken filets - 
two breads - 
 
                                                 
 
84 The Horn scales are usually interpreted as substitute scales: <some \ ALL>, where the values of the scale sub-
stitute one another and the strongest element implies the weakest element. Van der Auwera (1997:178) argues 
that additive scales can be interpreted as basic scales, since substitute scales can also be interpreted as additive. 
On the contrary Portolés (2007:139) convincingly pointed out that the distinction between additive and substitu-
tive scales should be maintained, since the distinction depends on the interpretation of the set of alternatives and 
at least on the context.  
85 Portolés (2007) argues that the substitutive relation in semantic scales can occur because of a reformulation-
process, in which the speaker corrects the linguistic expression when considered necessary, as e.g. in (56) (cfr. 
Portolés 2007, López Serena and Loureda 2013), In this example, the speaker may presuppose that the infor-
mation Este ajuste puede ser bueno was not sufficient to evoke the correct inference. Therefore, the speaker 
reformulates the argument by adding incluso perfecto. The added argument substitutes the informative inferior 
element on the scale to obtain the preferred inferences < Este ajuste puede ser bueno / ESTE AJUSTE ES PER-
FECTO > (cfr. Portolés 2007:141-143). 
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The hearer/reader has to interpret an addition of both elements, where the element two breads 
is more informative. The inferior value is part of a possible major set (n+1) from the element 
(n), that is to say, the highest element includes the inferior value (in an addition), but does not 
present a substitution (cfr. Portolés 2007:141-143).86 
 
Open and closed pragmatic scales 
The set of lexical elements in an informative scale can either be open or closed. The majority 
of pragmatic scales are composed by an open set of lexical elements implying that no intern 
order is established within the lexical elements of the scale (cfr. Portolés 2007, 2009), as in: 
 
(56) También existieron las "Tardes Deportivas", destinadas a la organización de campeonatos 
de deportes que se pudieran practicar en lugares cerrados, y muy particularmente en 
el "hogar", así se jugaba a las damas, al parchís, al ajedrez e incluso al ping-pong. 
(CREA, Revista Internacional de Medicina y Ciencias de la actividad física y deporte, nº 
4, 03/2002) 
(There also existed the "Sports Evenings", in which sports activities were organized, that 
could be practiced inside, and very particularly at "home", thus it was played checkers,  
parcheesi, chess and even ping-pong.) 
 
In this specific example, the elements of the scale (damas, parchis, ajedrez, ping-pong) are 
interchangeable without provoking an informative alteration. The elements of the alternative 
build a unit which is contrasted to the focus element. Although, the alternatives are usually 
not ordered internally according to their informativeness (cfr. Portolés 2009), there are cases 
where the change of one alternative element in a set causes pragmatic strangeness, as in (57) 
and (59) in which the world knowledge obliges an intern-closed specific order of the lexical 
elements (closed scales):  
 
(57) #Alicia sabe multiplicar, restar, sumar e incluso dividir.  
(‘Alicia can multiply, subtract, add and even divide.’) 
(58) Alicia sabe sumar, restar, multiplicar e incluso dividir.  
(‘Alicia can add, subtract, multiply and even divide.’) 
 
                                                 
 
86 Pragmatic scales are not always additive, as e.g. John is only a politician +> John is not a senator. Here the 
instruction of the exclusive FO can be interpreted as a substitutive relation (John is nothing else but a politician) 
(cfr. Portolés 2007:141-142).  
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(59) # Juan tenía una mano imbatible, tenía caballo, sota y rey.  
(‘John had an unbeatable hand, he had king, queen and even ace.’) 
(60) Juan tenía una mano imbatible, tenía sota, caballo y rey.  
(‘John had an unbeatable hand, he had queen, king and even ace.’) 
 
Summing up, scales are primarily understood by a binary order, alternative (single or com-
plex) vs. focus (cfr. Portolés 2007, 2009). The intern order of the elements of a complex alter-
native seems to be secondary in communication, except in the cases, in which the conceptual 
meaning of the elements of the alternative is highly determined by the world knowledge and 
imposes a rigid intern order of the scale (as in (58) and (60)) or in the cases in which the con-
text imposes to process an increasing scale (cfr. § 3.2.). 
 
Additive culminative and non-culminative scales 
The informative value of the elements that constitute a scale can be differently distributed. 
Thus, additive relations between alternative and focus can be culminative or non-culminative. 
In non-culminative scales a mere addition takes place in which  
 
[…] the upper value of the scale consists of adding a new element to a lower value. In a specific context, 
the appearance of the lower value (n) implies that the upper value is negated (+ > ‘not given n + 1’) and 
the upper value (n+1) pragmatically implies the lower value (⇒ ‘n’). (Portolés 2007:145, own 
translation87) 
 
In the example (61) the scale conventionally introduced by the relative adverb también (‘al-
so’) is arranged in the way that the superior value is the result of the addition of the other el-
ements, that is why the elements of the scale can be interchangeable (as in (62), cfr. Portolés 
2007:145, Loureda et al. 2013:82): 
 
(61) [La nutria] Se alimenta de ciprínidos, truchas[alternative] y también devora cangrejos y 
serpientes de agua[focus]. (CREA, La Vanguardia, 30/10/1995) 
(‘[The otter] It feeds on cyprinids, trout and also devours crabs and water snakes.’) 
 
                                                 
 
87 Original citation in Spanish: “En las escalas aditivas no culminativas, el valor superior de la escala consiste 
simplemente en añadir un nuevo elemento a un valor inferior. En un contexto determinado, la aparición del valor 
inferior (n) implicita que no se da el superior (+> ‘No se da n+1’) y el valor superior (n+1) entraña 
pragmáticamente que se da el inferior (⇒ ‘n’)” (Portolés 2007:145) 
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(62) Se alimenta de cangrejos y serpientes de agua[alternative] y también devora ciprínidos y 
truchas[focus]. 
(‘It feeds on crabs and water snakes and also devours cyprinids and trouts.’) 
 
In (61) it is not indicated that devora cangrejos y serpientes de agua is informatively more 
relevant than ciprínidos, truchas, but that both elements together are informatively more rele-
vant than ciprínidos, truchas:  
 
STRENGTH + 
ciprínidos, truchas + cangrejos y serpientes de agua – 
ciprínidos, truchas – 
 
In (62) the strength-scheme has the same pattern (but inversed), since there is no indication 
that assigns different informative values to the elements of the scale.  
On the contrary, if the additive FO también is replaced by a FO that indicates culmina-
tivity, as e.g. incluso or hasta, as in: 
 
(63) Se alimenta de ciprínidos, truchas[alternative] e incluso/y hasta devora cangrejos y serpientes 
de agua[focus]. 
(‘It feeds on cyprinids, trout and even devours crabs and water snakes.’) 
 
the scale pattern changes informatively. The conventional instruction of the adverb incluso or 
hasta assigns different informative values to the elements of the scale. Besides the additive 
value, as in the case with también, incluso and hasta add a culminative value to the scale. It 
indicates that the focused element is also more informative than the set of alternatives, that is 
cangrejos y serpientes de agua is more informative than ciprínidos y truchas. Therefore, in 
additive culminative scales two syncretic orders take place: the additive value (n + 1) and the 
culminative value (the last element of the scale is more informative than the other given ele-
ments. The elements in culminative scales are not interchangeable without modifying the in-
formative strength pattern (cfr. Portolés 2007:145-146, Loureda et al. 2013:82): 
 
STRENGTH + 
 ciprínidos, truchas + 
cangrejos y serpientes de 
agua –                          
ciprínidos, truchas – 
 
 
+ 
STRENGTH + 
CANGREJOS Y 
SERPIENTES DE  
AGUA –                          
ciprínidos, truchas – 
 
 
= 
STRENGTH + 
 ciprínidos, truchas + 
CANGREJOS Y 
SERPIENTES DE AGUA –                          
ciprínidos, truchas – 
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Further, in Spanish, culminative scales can be interpreted as endpoint-marking scales or non-
endpoint-marking scales, due to the fact that culminative scales can be introduced by different 
FOs, as incluso and hasta (cfr. Schwenter 2002:3).88 Incluso is defined as a relative-operator 
and non-inherently-endpoint-marking, as in: 
 
(64) El delantero del Santos y de la selección de Brasil Neymar despierta el interés de muchos 
equipos en Europa, como el Real Madrid, Barcelona e incluso el Chelsea. (La Republica, 
2011) 
(‘Santos and Brazil striker Neymar has aroused the interest of many teams in Europe, in-
cluding Real Madrid, Barcelona and even Chelsea.’) 
 
In this example incluso marks the focused element (el Chelsea) as more informative in a scale 
(Real Madrid, Barcelona), but does not have to present it as the last element of a scale. It can 
be expected that there exist other football clubs that were also interested in the football player 
Neymar. Thus, an endpoint and a non-endpoint marking combination is possible, as in:  
 
(65) El delantero del Santos y de la selección de Brasil Neymar despierta el interés de muchos 
equipos en Europa, no solo del Real Madrid o del Barcelona, incluso el Chelsea y hasta el 
Paris St. German muestran interés.  
(‘Santos and Brazil striker Neymar has aroused the interest of many teams in Europe, in-
cluding Real Madrid, Barcelona, even Chelsea, and even Paris St. German.’) 
 
Whereas, the FO hasta89, defined as absolute-operator that inherently marks an endpoint does 
not allow a repetition of the operator, since hasta “absolutely” marks the endpoint of a scale 
(cfr. Schwenter 2002:3).90  
 
(66) #El delantero del Santos y de la selección de Brasil Neymar despierta el interés de 
muchos equipos en Europa, no solo del Real Madrid o del Barcelona, hasta el Chelsea y 
hasta el Paris St. German muestran interés.  
                                                 
 
88 Other languages do not have the distinction between end-point and non-end-point-marking scales, as e.g. Eng-
lish where incluso and hasta are commonly considered translations of even and “Even in English may, but need 
not, mark an endpoint of a pragmatic scale.” (Schwenter 2002:2).  
89 Incluso and hasta share some properties. Both particles have an additive (all elements of a scale have to be 
added) and a scalar value (the last element of the scale is presented as more informative). The difference be-
tween them lies in the endpoint-marking property (cfr. Schwenter 2002:4). For an overview of the FO-paradigm 
see § 4. 
90 The absolute value marks – depending on the context – the last element of the scale. However, this element 
does not have to be identical with the absolute possible element of a scale (cfr. Schwenter 2002, Portolés 2006). 
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(67) El delantero del Santos y de la selección de Brasil Neymar despierta el interés de muchos 
equipos en Europa, como el Real Madrid, Barcelona y hasta el Chelsea.  
 
By marking a focus structure with hasta, only an absolute endpoint-marking can be interpret-
ed in relation to the context since the instruction of hasta does not allow another interpreta-
tion. In general, relative operators essentially mark an element as more informative than an-
other within the paradigm of a pragmatic scale. Whereas, absolute operators not only mark an 
element as more informative, they also mark the position of the focused element in the prag-
matic scale, marking the element always as endpoint-element (cfr. Schwenter 2002:9-10). 
 
Informative and argumentative scales 
Informative and argumentative scales present a theoretical problem, since the informative 
scales are based on the informativeness and argumentative scales are constructed relying on 
the argumentative strength of the elements (cfr. Ducrot 1980, Anscombre and Ducrot 1983, 
Portolés 2007).91 Following the framework of the Argumentation Theory not all arguments 
have the same argumentative strength: in the same context, a certain linguistic expression can 
be sufficient to guide the argument to a determined conclusion, while another expression can 
be insufficient or lead to an anti-oriented direction (cfr. Israel 1996:629, Portolés 2007:146). 
Within the discursive dynamic, the arguments can point in the same direction, but present 
different kinds of strength and therefore affect the information structure, as in: 
 
(68) Rosa tiene hambre. Se va a preparar un bocadillo. 
(‘Rose is hungry. She is going to prepare a sandwich.’) 
 
The arguments can also be anti-oriented. In such a case the presence of a discourse particle, as 
e.g. Spanish: pero; would be appropriate to mark the argumentative orientation, as in: 
 
(69) Rosa tiene hambre, pero no se va a preparar un bocadillo. 
(‘Rose is hungry, but she is not going to prepare a sandwich.’) 
 
                                                 
 
91 Informative and argumentative scales are based on different theoretical approaches. Informative scales are 
defined in the framework of the Gricean model and studied from the perspective of generalized conversational 
implicatures relying on paradigmatic relations (cfr. Grice 1975, Horn 1979). Argumentative scales rely on syn-
tagmatic relations in order to describe possible discursive continuity. For a wider discussion of argumentative 
scales see Ducrot (1980) and for Spanish García Negroni (1998, 2003, 2006) and Portolés (2007). 
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In general, argumentative scales are presented when various arguments with the same orienta-
tion and the same topic are ordered according to their argumentative strength (cfr. Ducrot 
1980:19). Regarding a specific topic, different arguments can be expressed to guide the pros-
ecution of a discourse in one direction. These phenomena affect the use of some particles, 
especially argumentative markers (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998]:89-93, 2007:146-147), but can 
also determine FOs, as incluso in:  
 
(70) Aseguró que los primeros pobladores del mundo, al consumir hongos sin saber de sus 
efectos en el organismo humano, sufrieron alucinaciones, intoxicaciones e incluso la 
muerte. (CREA, ABC, 04/10/1982) 
(‘He assured that the first inhabitants of the world, when consuming mushrooms without 
knowing their effects on the human organism, suffered hallucinations, intoxications and 
even death.’) 
 
The conclusion of the utterances could be “Without expertise, mushrooms can be dangerous” 
and each element on its own points in this specific direction:  
 
a. He assured that the first inhabitants of the world, when consuming mushrooms without 
knowing their effects on the human organism, suffered hallucinations. Without expertise, 
mushrooms can be dangerous. 
b. He assured that the first inhabitants of the world, when consuming mushrooms without 
knowing their effects on the human organism, suffered intoxications. Without expertise, 
mushrooms can be dangerous. 
c. He assured that the first inhabitants of the world, when consuming mushrooms without 
knowing their effects on the human organism, suffered death. Without expertise, mush-
rooms can be dangerous. 
 
Each of the arguments point to the same conclusion, but the strength changes between them. 
It is considered to be more dangerous to suffer death than hallucinations. Incluso obliges to 
recognize the focused element (suffered death) as the element with major argumentative (and 
also informative) strength (cfr. Portolés 2007:146-147). 
From an informative perspective, not all utterances, lexical units or linguistic construc-
tions have the same degree of informativity according to the contextual effects of determined 
linguistic segment. As a consequence, the informative strength highly depends on the context 
and it is the context that sets limitations to the informativity of the elements. The informative 
strength can correspond to a lexical paradigm or can be conditioned by the world knowledge 
 58 
and the mental representations that are accessible during the communicative act in the com-
mon ground. As indicated by Portolés (2001 [1998]:96-97, 2007:146-150), the notions of ar-
gumentative scales and informative scales do not exclude each other. Both perspectives are 
licit. The decision to adopt an informative or an argumentative perspective depends on wheth-
er syntagmatic relations and the discursive prosecution or paradigmatic relations and their 
contextual effects are examined (cfr. Portolés 2007:146-150). 
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4. THE FOCUS OPERATOR PARADIGM IN SPANISH 
 
 
4.1. Focus operators and the paradigm of discourse particles 
 
Theoretical approaches and classifications of discourse particles are especially complex due 
to the diversity of elements that compose this group. Throughout the history of modern Span-
ish grammars, discourse particles have become more and more the center of attention while 
moving from the linguistic surface to the text as a unit, and to communication itself (cfr. 
Martín Zorraquino and Montolío 2008 [1998]). In consequence, Discourse Analysis and Text-
linguistics propose several approaches to the classification of these units emphasizing mainly 
the theoretical functions of different connectives. Early pragmatic approaches define dis-
course particles as coherence markers (cfr. Schiffrin 1987, Fraser 1990, Schourup 1999) and 
try to classify particles according to their connective function they could adopt in discourse 
(cfr. Fraser 2006:200-201). These approaches define the functions and the combinatory rela-
tions between particles and their interaction with the discourse, but they do not clarify how 
these units affect inferential processes. FOs, as well as other particles were not considered, 
since they do not connect discursive segments and do not exclusively operate beyond sen-
tence level.  
From a relevantist perspective, units that encode inferential routes are defined relying 
on their main property: procedural meaning (cfr. § 1.2.). Recent works that assume a func-
tional approach attribute to these units the role of inferential restriction in communication (cfr. 
among others, Portolés 2001 [1998], Blakemore 2002, Loureda and Acín 2010, Borreguero 
Zuloaga and López Serena 2011, Aschenberg and Loureda 2011). According to this perspec-
tive, discourse particles due to their fundamental procedural meaning encode an inferential 
route that is more efficient in order to obtain a relevance stimulus during the communication-
process (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986], Wilson and Sperber 2002, Blakemore 2002) 92:  
                                                 
 
92 That does not mean that discourse particles may not appear at textual level as coherence markers (cfr. Martín 
Zorraquino and Montolío 2008 [1998]:26). Moreover, discourse particles and other units with procedural mean-
ing act in the interface between pragmatic, semantic and grammar. Levinson (2000 [1983]:143) (from a neo-
gricean perspective) argues that the pragmatic instruction of discourse particles acts upon the linguistically en-
coded information. Thus, different aspects of discourse markers, as the dimension of connective function or the 
fact, that some particles also have residual conceptual meaning interfering with the discourse ensures that many 
factors have to be considered in order to study these types of units (cfr. Murillo 2010). For a theoretical discus-
sion on which types of units can be considered particles (markers), and the different classifications following a 
grammar or a relevantist analysis, see Murillo (2010:254-256). 
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Since the degree of relevance increases with the number of cognitive effects derived and decreases with 
the amount of processing effort required for their derivation, the use of an expression which encodes a 
procedure for identifying the intended cognitive effects would be consistent with the speaker’s aim of 
achieving relevance for a minimum cost in processing. (Blakemore 2002:79) 
 
Thus, discourse particles guide the communicative processes that are necessary to reach the 
communicated assumption. They assure an inferential route and guarantee a major efficiency 
in the attainment of relevance. However, Blakemore (2002:2-7) further defends that a purely 
cognitive theoretical framework, such as Relevance Theory, cannot fully justify a study that is 
solely concentrated on the functional classification according to their discursive connection 
(cfr. Blakemore 2002:2-7).93 Relevance Theory does not provide an adequate argument for 
the differences that may occur between particles of the same paradigm (e.g. FO-paradigm: 
también, incluso, hasta), since in the same utterance they can lead to very different implica-
tures. Moreover, it does also not provide arguments on how the same particle can activate 
different inferential routes in different discursive units and different contexts (polyfunctional-
ism) (cfr. Murillo 2010:259).94  
Consequently, in order to classify the particles as conventionally encoded inferential el-
ements, it becomes necessary to enrich the relevantist approach with other semantic and dis-
cursive theories (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998]:76-77). Following Portolés (2001 [1998]), Argu-
mentation Theory95 seems capable to fill this gap in the study of discourse particles. The main 
objective of Argumentation Theory is to demonstrate that it is not only the aspects behind the 
linguistic signs that condition the progression of the discourse, but that the use of one or an-
other linguistic unit influences the continuation of the discourse (cfr. Anscombre and Ducrot 
1983), as e.g. in the following examples:  
 
                                                 
 
93 The intention of Blakemore was to connect the conventional implicatures of Grice with Relevance Theory and 
to attribute to discourse particles an inferential instruction. Since propositions are linked to inferential processes, 
there must be elements that restrict the inferential processes in order to guide and to minimize the processing 
effort (cfr. Blakemore 1987, 1997, 2000, 2002). 
94 For a wider discussion of the limitations of Relevance Theory and their repercussion in the literature especial-
ly in interaction with discourse particles see among others Blakemore (2002), Carston (2002, 2004), Wilson 
(2004), and for Spanish Portolés (2001 [1998], 2004), Escandell Vidal (1993), Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 
(2000), Pons (2004). 
95 The Argumentation Theory of Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) as a semantic and linguistic theory focuses on 
the syntagmatic relations between utterances or discursive segments and could therefore act as a complementary 
approach to cognitive and communicative pragmatic theories. Within the framework of Argumentation Theory 
different aspects of argumentation are of relevant interest, as e.g. the orientation of arguments, the argumentative 
strength, argumentative operators or argumentative scales among other (cfr. Anscombre and Ducrot 1983). 
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(71) Rosa tiene mucha hambre. Se va a preparar un bocadillo.  
(‘Rose is very hungry. She is going to prepare a sandwich.’)  
(72) #Rosa tiene mucha hambre. No se va a preparar un bocadillo.  
(‘#Rose is very hungry. She is not going to prepare a sandwich.’)  
 
The example of (72) provoke strangeness due to the fact that the topic progression does not fit 
with the discursive continuation evoke by the first discursive segment of the utterance, since 
its linguistic content is oriented towards an argument which contradicts the second segment 
(cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998], 2007). However, if the linguistic expression changes (without 
changing truth-condition), as e.g. mucha hambre (‘very hungry’) to un poco de hambre (‘a bit 
hungry’) the argumentation pattern of the utterance does not result in complete strangeness 
(cfr. Portolés 2007:146):  
 
(73) Rosa tiene poca hambre. No se va a preparar un bocadillo.  
(‘Rose is a bit hungry. She is not going to prepare a sandwich.’)   
 
In consequence, any linguistic material conditions the continuation of discourse. A discursive 
segment with a certain linguistic form favors some other discursive segments and back-
grounds others. Therefore, discursive segments can act as co-oriented or anti-oriented argu-
mentative relations. These argumentative structures can be determined by the lexical material 
itself (as in (73)) or, they can be marked by different linguistic mechanisms (lexical, syntag-
matical or syntactical), such as, certain discourse particles that due to their instructional char-
acter can co-orient or anti-orient the discourse. This becomes evident, e.g. in (74) where the 
introduction of sin embargo (‘however’) does not result as a pragmatic strange utterance, 
since the instruction of the particle marks the relation as counter-argumentative (cfr. Portolés 
2007:146-148): 
 
(74) Rosa tiene mucha hambre. Sin embargo, no se va a preparar un bocadillo.  
(‘Rose is very hungry. However, she is not going to prepare a sandwich.’)  
 
In the framework of Argumentation Theory not only the argumentative orientation is relevant 
for the continuation of the discourse, but also the argumentative strength of the discursive 
arguments (cfr. § 3.3.). During discourse, argumentation occurs because, while constructing 
the first assumption of an utterance, certain propositional continuations are activated more 
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automatically than others. Subsequently. the assumptions, following the Relevance Principle, 
have most contextual effects, which in turn determines the communicative continuation.  
As Portolés (2001 [1998]:76) pointed out, both theories, Relevance and Argumentation 
Theory, share the argumentative nucleus of human inferential capacity, and emphasize the 
importance of this type of processes in order to generate the assumptions in the mind. The 
differences between them lie in the analysis: While Relevance Theory is concerned with ex-
amining the inferential processes from proposition to implicature, Argumentation Theory ana-
lyzes the impact of the linguistic material pursuit of discourse (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998]:76-
77). 
 
Based on these two theories, different types of classifications arouse for Spanish discourse 
particles.96 Most of them rely on the common accepted definition of Portolés (2001 
[1998]:25-26; own translation97):  
 
                                                 
 
96 In Spanish, most of the common classifications classify these units according to their instructional character, 
as e.g. The Dictionary of Spanish Discourse particles (Diccionario de partículas discursivas del español [online] 
http://www.dpde.es). Briz et al. (2006) define four basic categories: a) Connectives: argumentative connectives 
(as e.g. además, encima); reformulation markers (e.g. es decir); structural markers (e.g. por un lado… por otro 
lado); b) modal markers, as e.g. intensification or atenuation (e.g. bueno, tío); c) focusing, understood as high-
lighting-strategy (as e.g. también, incluso, ni siquiera); d) control of contact between speaker and hearer (e.g. 
¿eh?).  
Based on this approach Pons (2006) classifies these units in three more general functional categories: interac-
tional level, modal markers and connectives (argumentative function and metadiscursive function).  
The functional approach of Loureda and Acín (2010) combines a linguistic and a cognitive approach and three 
categories are defined: modality; modal markers can intensify, attenuate, show what has been said as evident or 
be committed to the fidelity of what has been said.“ […] Markers that englobe all tasks that organize the dis-
course (structural, formulative, argumentative and informative) in order to communicate the hearer a given men-
tal state” (Loureda and Acín 2010:24, own translation. Original citation in Spanish: “[…] marcadores, que 
asumen tareas de organización (estructural, formulativa, argumentativa e informativa) del discurso para 
comunicarle al oyente un estado mental dado.”). Discourse markers can operate at different levels: at formula-
tion level (e.g. es decir), at structural level (e.g. por un lado/por otro lado), at argumentative level (as e.g. con-
nectives or argumentative operators, as sin embargo, por tanto and at informative level (as e.g. FOs, as incluso, 
hasta) and control of contact; articulating the conversational control between speaker and hearer.  
Discourse particles are also classified against the background of written and spoken language. Following 
Bazzanella (1995), Borreguero Zuloaga and López Serena (2011) define three categories (partial similar to the 
categories of Pons (2006)): interactional level that includes all particles that occur in oral discourse in order to 
guide the conversation; metadiscursive units, subordinate in units that structure the discourse and units that for-
mulate the course of the conversation; cognitive function, divided in three subcategories: a) logical-
argumentative function, b) referential function, c) modality function. 
For a wider overview beyond the Spanish paradigm, see Fischer (2006). For the denomination discussion of 
these units see Portolés (2015:692-694) and Blühdorn et al. (2017).  
97 Emphasis in the original. Original citation in Spanish: “Los marcadores del discurso son unidades lingüísticas 
invariables, no ejercen una función sintáctica en el marco de la predicación oracional y poseen un cometido 
coincidente en el discurso: el de guiar, de acuerdo con sus distintas propiedades morfosintácticas, semánticas y 
pragmáticas, las inferencias que se realizan en la comunicación.” (Portolés 2001 [1998]:25-26) 
 63 
Discourse markers are invariable linguistic units, they do not exercise a syntactical function at utterance 
level and they possess a determined role in discourse: to guide, according to their different morphosyntac-
tic, semantic and pragmatic properties, the inferences realized in communication. 
 
This definition is based on the semantic criterion of procedural meaning since these elements 
primarily guide the inferences in discourse (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998], Escandell Vidal et al. 
2011, and § 1.2.). From a morphological perspective, particles are invariable linguistic units, 
in the sense that particles usually transform to one lexical unit, as e.g. además, etc. They pro-
ceed two processes: lexicalization and grammaticalization, as e.g. incluso, where a new added 
value based on the original meaning to include is attributed. Another criterion in this defini-
tion is of syntactic nature. It is commonly accepted that discourse particles are not integrated 
at sentence level since there are marginal elements. Particularly, FOs cannot fulfill this last 
criterion since due to its adverbial value they are integrated in the utterances and can modify 
the truth condition of utterances. The adverbial value of FOs constrains the integration in a 
propositional content provoking that the FO does not have full sentence independency. FOs, 
as e.g. incluso modify the syntagma of an utterance, as in (75) where chino is the direct object 
of the verb: 
 
(75) David habla incluso chino. 
(‘David speaks even Chinese.’) 
 
Thus, FOs have to be differentiated from other particles, since they are more integrated in an 
utterance structure, than e.g. connectives. Nevertheless, they share also some notable proper-
ties with other discourse particle groups and are, furthermore, considered in this study a sub-
group of discourse particle. Following Portolés (2010:297-298) FOs, such as incluso, hasta or 
solo act as invariable units that guide due to their fundamental procedural meaning and con-
strain the inferential processes in communication aiming to guide the hearer/reader by mini-
mizing processing efforts to the expected assumptions (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986], 
Blakemore 1987, 1992, Portolés 2001 [1998], Carston 2002, 2004, Murillo 2010, Escandell 
Vidal and Leonetti 2011, Nadal et al. 2016). According to that definition, FOs, as well as 
modal adverbs or connectives can be considered as subtypes of discourse particles (cfr. 
Portolés 2010:297-298), even though they operate on the edge of a functional category, but 
they trigger and guide the inferences necessary to reconstruct the implicit meaning of the ut-
terance.  
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4.2. Characteristics of focus operators 
 
FOs can encode different operations in a focus structure, and thus, inhibit different character-
istics.98 All FOs of the FO-paradigm, either exclusive or inclusive, have three main character-
istics in common (cfr. König 1991:33):  
 
A. Informativity 
FOs add new or unexpected information to an utterance with a specific degree of informativi-
ty. Thereby, the FO changes the informative strength of an utterance and evokes a specific 
information structure that activates an informative scale99. However, by adding a FO, as e.g. 
incluso, a difference is generated in the interpretation of the utterance (cfr. Jacobs 1983:8-10, 
König 1991:10, Iten 2002:119-120, Portolés 2010:294-295, Cruz and Loureda 2019). To 
compare: 
 
(76) La abuela sabe utilizar un móvil. 
(‘Grandma can use a mobile phone.’) 
(77) Incluso la abuela sabe utilizar un móvil.  
(‘Even Grandma can use a mobile phone.’) 
 
Utterance (76) may not convey more than the literal given information that the mentioned 
Grandmother can use a mobile phone. Utterance (77), in turn, additionally conveys some ex-
tra information: a) other people apart from the grandmother can use a mobile phone; b) it is 
not likely that the Grandmother uses a mobile phone, and also c) the information that the 
                                                 
 
98 FOs are studied since the thesis of Horn (1972) followed by other numerous publications in this research field, 
see among others, Fauconnier (1975a, 1975b, 1976, 1977), Horn (1979), Ducrot (1980), Anscombre and Ducrot 
(1983), Jacobs (1983). Kay (1990) was one of the first authors describing the phenomenon for one single ele-
ment, even, followed by Lycan (1991) and Iten (2002). For a wider overview of FOs across languages see König 
(1991), Guerzoni (2003), Giannakidou (2007), Gast and van der Auwera (2011). For Spanish, see Schwenter and 
Vasishth (2000), Schwenter (2002), Portolés (2007, 2009, 2010), Borreguero Zuloaga (2014), Loureda et al. 
(2014), Loureda et al. (2015), Nadal et al. (2016), Cruz and Loureda (2019).  
Within the adverb paradigm, FOs can be distinguished as a subclass and have received different denominations 
through literature, as focus particles (cfr. König 1993, Schwenter 2002, Iten 2002), focus adverbs (cfr. Portolés 
2007, 2009), scalar (additive) operators (cfr. Kay 1990, Gast and van der Auwera 2011) and focus-sensitive 
particles (cfr. Krifka 2008, Beaver and Clark 2008). This work opts for the term focus operator following Gast 
and van der Auwera (2011:4): “We prefer the more general term ‘operator’ because many of the relevant items 
do not exhibit properties typical to adverbs, and even the term ‘particle’ is too specific, as it entails that the items 
in question are (uninflected) words.”  
99 FOs activate a specific relation between alternative and focus in a pragmatic informative scale. Depending on 
the semantic nature of the FO it either activates an exclusive relation or an additive (culminative or non-
culminative) relation (cfr. § 4.2.).  
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Grandmother uses a mobile phone is contrary to the expectations of the hearer/reader (cfr. 
Iten 2002:119-120). The information conveyed in (77) is anchored in the instruction of the 
operator. Henceforth, any utterance with FO entails informatively the same utterance without 
FO. Consequently, the utterance Grandma can use a mobile phone is semantically underde-
termined in relation to the utterance with FO (Even Grandma can use a mobile phone) (cfr. 
Portolés 2004:145-147). The FO endows the focus element the ability to add ad hoc a new 
information to the common ground, to modify or to correct informatively the previous as-
sumptions (cfr. Portolés 2004, Krifka 2008).100 
 
B. Procedural meaning 
What all FOs, as other discourse particles, have in common is their fundamental procedural 
meaning (cfr. Loureda et al. 2013:77-78, Loureda et al. 2015, Nadal et al. 2016). According 
to Blakemore (1997:95) the procedural meaning in an utterance represents the information on 
how to process the lexical elements with conceptual meaning, and how to constrain the infer-
ential computations carried out when processing the discourse sequence. Although, the utter-
ances with FO entail more information, they restrict the inferential process in order to guide 
the hearer/reader to the expected cognitive effects while at the same time regulating the pro-
cessing effort (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986], Blakemore 1987, 1992, Portolés 12001 
[1998], Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2000, Carston 2002, and § 1.2.). 
 
C. Positional variability 
FOs share also the property of positional variability in an utterance structure. This property is 
correlated to another: FOs interact with the utterance interpretation:  
 
It is a striking property of the relevant expressions that the contributions they make to the meaning of a 
sentence varies with their position in a sentence and with the location of the sentence stress (nuclear 
tone). In other words, these expressions interact with the focus-background structure of a sentence. 
(König 1993:978) 
 
Different positions of the operator combined with a nuclear stress lead to different possible 
interpretations101 (cfr. Jacobs 1983:8-10, König 1991:10), as in: 
 
                                                 
 
100 The alternative can adopt different characteristics (cfr. § 3.2.). 
101 This interaction with the utterance structure is precisely the property that differs FOs from discourse particles 
(cfr. § 4.1.). 
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(78) Hasta la ABUELA sabe utilizar un móvil.  
(‘Even Grandma can use a mobile phone.’)  
(79) La abuela hasta SABE UTILIZAR UN MÓVIL.  
(‘Grandma even can use a mobile phone.’) 
(80) La abuela sabe utilizar hasta UN MÓVIL.  
(‘Grandma can use even a mobile phone.’)  
 
In (78) it can be interpreted that it was not expected that the Grandmother would have a mo-
bile phone (being a possible set of alternatives: father, mother, uncle, etc.), since Grandma 
constitutes the endpoint of a possible informative sale, whereas, in (80), the interpretation of 
the utterance leads to another set of alternatives. Due to the position of the FO only the direct 
object mobile phone is marked as focus element and has to be contrasted to a different possi-
ble set of alternatives as e.g. radio, TV, etc. The examples illustrate that “[FO’s] position in a 
sentence depends to a certain extent on that of the focus, and the contribution they make to the 
meaning of a sentence is equally affected by the selection of focus.” (König 1991:12) In the 
examples illustrated so far, the prosodic prominence and the focus element are located in the 
same element and are correlated to each other. However, FOs not always act upon a single 
focus element. They can be associated to more than one focus:  
 
(81) Incluso la ABUELA [focus marked by FO] sabe utilizar un MÓVIL [focus marked by a prosodic mechanism]. 
(‘Even GRANDMA [focus marked by FO] can use a MOBILE PHONE [focus marked by a prosodic mecha-
nism].’) 
 
In this case, besides of the focus marked by the operator (Grandma), the nuclear stress high-
lights the contrastive focus (mobile phone) (cfr. König 1993:978, Portolés 2006:13).  
Usually, the FO highlights the whole following syntagma as the focus, as in   
 
(82) Sarah incluso [juega al rugby]focus. 
(‘Sarah even [plays rugby]focus.’) 
(83) Sarah incluso juega al [rugby]focus. 
(‘Sarah even plays [rugby]focus.’)  
 
Relying on a neutral prosodic mechanism, the focus usually corresponds to the maximum 
category that is determined by the operator, as in (82), where the set of alternatives can be 
composed by write poems, learn Spanish, etc. However, some FOs, as incluso, allow that the 
focused element does not constitute the most proximate element, as in (83), where rugby is 
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presented as focus within the syntagma. By modifying the focus element, the set of alterna-
tives changes: the possible set of alternatives can be composed by football, basketball, etc. 
Thus, the focus constitutes only a part of the syntagma that is determined by the operator. The 
text portion played rugby constitutes the scope of the utterance. Scope is understood as “por-
tion of the sentence which expresses one of the two propositions related by the semantic 
translation of the operator” (Kay 1990:93). The scope sets the limitations which a focus struc-
ture can reach. It can also determine the focus interpretation and does not have to correspond 
with the marked focused element (cfr. Karttunen and Karttunen 1977, Karttunen and Peters 
1979, Horn 1979, Jacobs 1983, Taglicht 1984, Kay 1990, König 1991).102 In this sense, FOs 
identify and delimit the focus of an utterance.103  
 
However, FOs have also differing characteristics. The first distinguishing criterion within the 
FO-paradigm constitutes whether the FOs encode an inclusive (as e.g. también, incluso or 
hasta) or an exclusive relation (as e.g. solo or ni siquiera). Within the inclusive operators, it 
can be differentiated between culminative (scalar, as incluso and hasta) and non-culminative 
(non-scalar, as también) FOs. The culminative operators can further be divided into relative 
operators, when the FO does not inherently mark the end-point of an informative scale (in-
cluso), and absolute operators, when the FO does inherently mark the end-point of an in-
formative scale (hasta). 
 
D. Inclusive and exclusive operators 
Additive or inclusive operators include the alternatives as part of the focus paradigm. The 
alternative elements can be considered as possible values that interact with the focus, as e.g. 
también (‘also’) in (84) where the elements of the alternative and the focused element consti-
tute an additive relation, in which all values are valid.  
 
                                                 
 
102 Since the present study will not discuss the distinction between focus and scope from an empirical and exper-
imental perspective, no further discussion will be provided. For a more detailed discussion on this subject see 
Taglicht (1984), Kay (1990), König (1991:§ 3.1.), Portolés (2010) In this study the term scope is implemented as 
stated in König (1993:979): “The focus of a particle can be defined as that string of expressions which is set off 
from the rest of the sentence by prosodic prominence and which is specifically affected semantically by the par-
ticle […]. It is, however, not only the focus that the contribution made by particle to the meaning of a sentence 
depends on. Focus particles are also scope-bearing elements, so that their contribution to sentence meaning also 
depends on the scope they take within a sentence.” 
103 Besides, to prosodic prominence, word order morphological markers that could also identify a focus structure, 
FO seems to be the clearest devices in order to identify a focus element (cfr. Rochemont 1986:109, König 
1991:13-14). 
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(84) [Sartre y Camus] Ambos tenían el mismo público. Camus era más moralista, más poeta, 
más idealista, y también más humano; amaba la vida […]. (CREA, El País, 15/05/1980) 
(‘[Sartre y Camus] Both had the same audience. Camus was more of a moralist, more of a 
poet, more of an idealist, and also more of a humanist; he loved life [...].’) 
 
STRENGTH + 
más moralista, más poeta, más idealista – 
más humano –  
 
Whereas restrictive or exclusive operators reject any possible alternative, that is, it has to be 
interpreted that none of the possible alternatives can be considered for the focus interpreta-
tion, as e.g. solo (‘only’), in: 
  
(85) Hijo de notario, se quedó sin madre a los siete años y detestaba a su padre. […] De su 
padre sólo le interesaba la herencia. (CREA, 22/11/1994, La Vanguardia) 
(‘Son of a notary, he was left without a mother at the age of seven and hated his father. 
[…] His father's inheritance was the only thing that interested him.’) 
 
E. Scalar value: culminative and non-culminative operators 
Inclusive operator can possess a scalar value, and can be distinguished between culminative 
FOs (hasta, incluso) and non-culminative FO (también) as illustrated in the following exam-
ples (cfr. König 1991:37, Portolés 2006:16-17, Loureda et al. 2013). In Portolés (2006:6):  
 
(86) Alicia sabe multiplicar e incluso dividir.  
(‘Alicia can multiply and even divide.’) 
(87) #Alicia sabe dividir e incluso multiplicar. 
(‘#Alicia can divide and even multiply.’) 
 
the FO incluso marks an element (the focus, dividir in (86) and multiplicar in (87)) as higher 
rated than the alternative in an informative scale. In (87) the strength pattern is displayed, as 
 
STRENGTH + 
Dividir – 
Multiplicar –  
 
The strangeness provoked in (87) lies in the instruction of the operator incluso that obliges the 
hearer/reader to create an informative scale that is contrary to the assumption that are based 
on our world knowledge:  
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STRENGTH + 
Multiplicar – 
Dividir –  
 
If in the example (89) the culminative operator is replaced by a non-culminative operator 
(también), the strangeness dissolves. Non-culminative operators do not force the hearer/reader 
to create an informative scale, where one element is higher rated than the other (only an addi-
tive relation is evoked) and therefore, both elements are interchangeable. 
 
(88) Alicia sabe multiplicar y también dividir.  
(‘Alicia can multiply and also divide.’) 
(89) Alicia sabe dividir y también multiplicar. 
(‘Alicia can divide and also multiply.’) 
 
F. Relative and absolute operators 
All culminative operators possess an additive value, since they add information to the com-
mon ground. Furthermore, they also have a scalar (culminative) value, since the focused ele-
ment is presented as more informative than the alternative, as in: 
 
(90) David habla inglés e incluso chino.  
(‘David speaks English and even Chinese.’) 
(91) David habla inglés y hasta chino.  
(‘David speaks English and even Chinese.’) 
 
In both examples the same strength pattern can be found:  
 
STRENGTH + 
Inglés + 
CHINO – 
Inglés – 
 
But whereas in (90) the focus element (Chinese) is the element of the utterance that was not 
expected, it does not necessarily constitute the last element of the scale. It could be the case 
that David speaks another language that is even less expectable than Chinese (as e.g. Na-
huatl). On the contrary, in the utterance with the FO hasta the focused element is necessarily 
marked as the last element of the informative scale (cfr. Schwenter and Vasishth 2000, 
Schwenter 2002, and § 3.3.).  
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Schwenter and Vasishth (2000) differentiate between relative FOs (incluso) and absolute FOs 
(hasta). They point out that incluso requires a contextual proposition (in terms of Kay 1990) 
and requires a referent in the contextual discourse. Hasta, on the contrary, does not require 
this condition. Hasta, because of its property of end-point marking can occur in unspecified 
contexts. Scales evoked by incluso present the focus in an expectable context (without a sur-
prising effect), whereas in scales evoked by hasta the surprising effect is indispensable. The 
element marked as focus is less expectable and surprising for the hearer/reader and further, 
corresponds with the end-point of an informative scale (cfr. Portolés 2006), as in: 
 
(92) No nos la podemos jugar porque nos puede pasar lo de la reciente Eurocopa y hasta Raúl 
es capaz de enviar un penalti a las nubes. (CREA, 2001, La Razón) 
(‘We cannot risk it, because it can happen to us as in the recent European Championship 
and even Raúl is able to send a penalty to the clouds.’) 
 
In this example Raúl, best striker of the Spanish national football team, constitute the last el-
ement of the informative scale without the necessity of a referent in the preceding context, 
whereas in (93) the scalar model with incluso fails informatively because no referent is given 
in the preceding discourse (cfr. § 3.3.).104  
 
(93) #No nos la podemos jugar porque nos puede pasar lo de la reciente Eurocopa y incluso 
Raúl es capaz de enviar un penalti a las nubes. 
(‘We cannot risk it, because it can happen to us as in the recent European Championship 
and even Raúl is able to send a penalty to the clouds.’) 
 
 
4.3. Specific properties of incluso 
 
From an informative perspective, incluso105 as focus-sensitive operator106 has a primarily ad-
ditive and scalar value. It is additive in the sense that its instruction indicates that the infor-
                                                 
 
104 Another difference between incluso and hasta is affected in substitutive scales, where incluso can eliminate 
the lower value in a substitutive scale, but hasta cannot (cfr. § 3.3.). Example adopted by Portolés (2006:85):  
  
Los datos del paro son malos, incluso/#hasta muy malos.  
(‘The unemployment data are bad, even very bad.’) 
 
105 In the study of incluso different definitions have arisen from different theoretical perspectives, among others 
Fuentes (1987), Herrero Blanco (1987), García Negroni (1998), Cuartero Sánchez (2002), Santos Río (2003), 
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mation of the utterance is valid for all elements of the paradigm, including the focused ele-
ment. Furthermore, its scalar value denotes that some kind of order or scale is evoked among 
all the elements of the paradigm (cfr. König 1991, Portolés 2007, Schwenter and Vasishth 
2000, Ferrari et al. 2011). 
 
“[Incluso] highlights one element of the discourse as less expected than another (explicitly given or, more 
often, implicit) and, consequently, creates a scale on which the highlighted element is understood as more 
informative.” (DPDE online, s.v. incluso, own translation107) 
 
Thus, incluso marks one element of the discourse as less expected than another. The other 
elements (alternative) are not excluded (as in the case of restrictive FO, as e.g. solo (‘only’)). 
Thereby, the focus element is added to the alternative elements (additive value), that can be 
explicit (as in (95)), or implicit (as in (94)) in the context (cfr. Portolés 2007, 2009, DPDE 
online), as in: 
 
(94) David sabe incluso chino. 
(‘David speaks even Chinese.’) 
(95) David sabe inglés e incluso chino. 
(‘David speaks English and even Chinese.’) 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Portolés (2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) and Yates (2006). For a more detailed overview of different definitions 
and dictionary entries see Yates (2006). 
106 Incluso operates within the limits of the functional category of discursive particles. They function as discur-
sive particles insofar as they guide the way information is interpreted, and summon a pragmatic scale and a giv-
en informational-argumentative structure. However, they also bare an adverbial value, a fact that conditions its 
integration in the propositional content of the utterance. As a consequence of this, the particle may not manifest 
as much independence as in other cases where either prosodically, or graphically (by means of punctuation 
marks) the unit in which incluso appears is delimited (cfr. § 4.1.). This leads to two different types of incluso 
(cfr. Fuentes 1987, Herrero Blanco 1987, Cuartero Sánchez 2002). On the one hand, incluso as a connective, 
where it is detached from its host member, usually separated from it by a comma, and forms an independent 
intonational group, and, on the other hand as studied in this work, as FO. In this case, incluso is syntactically 
integrated in the utterances and modifies the phrase or clause under its scope, with which it shares a melodic 
contour (cfr. Portolés 2004, 2007, 2009, DPDE online, Fuentes 2009). Due to the extent of this study, the work 
exclusively concentrates on incluso as a FO, not on its use as a connective. For the connective use of incluso see 
Fuentes (1987), Flamenco García (1999), Montolío Durán (1999). 
From a diachronic perspective incluso as FO is a modern discourse particle (Cano 1982), since this definition of 
incluso is not existent in the Academic dictionary of 1884 and Andrés Bello does not mention incluso as adverb 
function. It is not until 1970 that the dictionary Diccionario de la Real Academia Española incorporates the use 
of incluso as adverb. In former editions incluso was only presented as participle of the verb incluir. The use of 
incluso does not become frequent until the second half of XIX century. For a diachronic perspective see Yates 
(2006:77), Cuartero Sánchez (2002). 
107 Original citation in Spanish: “[Incluso] destaca un elemento del discurso como menos esperable que otro 
(expreso o, lo que es más frequente, sobrentendido) y, en consecuencia, crea una escala en la que ese elemento 
destacado se comprende como más informativo.” (DPDE online, s.v. incluso) 
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Consequently, incluso always evokes a scale between the focused element and the alternative 
in which the focus element is informatively higher rated than the alternative element(s) (cfr. § 
3.3.). The focused element can eliminate or strengthen the existing assumptions in the com-
mon ground of the interlocutors, or even force them to create a new contextual effect ad hoc 
which could not have been established without the lower value of the scale (cfr. Portolés 
2006:45).  
Besides of the informative function described sofar, other different features can be de-
fined for the FO incluso: 
 
A. Argumentative function 
Incluso can adopt an argumentative function. This function is additive and the introduced syn-
tagma confirms the expectation of the hearer/reader (cfr. Anscombre 1973, Portolés 2006):  
 
(96) Se roban los datos de los clientes sin su conocimiento para poder manipularlos mejor, a 
veces incluso con fines políticos perversos, como acabamos de saber a través 
del escándalo Facebook. (CREA, El País, 06/05/2018) 
(‘Customers’ data is stolen without their knowledge in order to manipulate it, sometimes 
even for perverse political ends, as we just learned from the Facebook scandal.’) 
 
The syntagma for perverse political ends confirms the expectation: data was manipulated; 
and represents an argument that is stronger than its preceding segment. Both arguments lead 
to the same conclusion (stolen data is problematic) and can be ranged in an argumentative 
scale (cfr. § 3.3.). 
 
B. Violation of expectations 
Usually the information introduced by incluso confirms the expectations an interlocutor has in 
mind, but in exceptional cases it can also violate them, as in:  
 
(97) El espectáculo se llama “Barcelona, París, Caracas”, hora y media ininterrumpida de 
trapecismo interpretativo que invita a lanzarse al vacio, incluso sin red. (CREA, La Van-
guardia, 30/01/1995) 
(‘The show is called "Barcelona, Paris, Caracas", an uninterrupted hour and a half of in-
terpretative trapeze that invites one to throw oneself into the void, even without a net.’) 
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It is expectable that people who are not trapeze artists most likely do not risk their lives, and 
thus the focused information violates the expectations of the hearer/reader108.  
 
C. Contextual effects 
In some cases, the introduced element by incluso does not confirm or violate the expectations, 
but rather evokes some contextual effects that are not possible without the introduced infor-
mation by the operator (cfr. Portolés 2006): 
 
(98) La cena contó con un agradable ambiente y se vio acompañada incluso con baile. 
(CREA, El Diario Vasco, 31/01/2001) 
(‘The dinner had a pleasant atmosphere and was even accompanied by dancing.’) 
 
Without the inserted element there is no expectation that a dinner necessarily includes danc-
ing. The introduced element evokes some contextual effects that the hearer/reader has to pro-
cess additionally. This specific use of the FO is frequently applied for determining elements 
that depend on the context. Consequently, it gives access to a specific context and leads to the 
construction of ad hoc concepts (cfr. Portolés 2006:27). 
 
Besides these instructional functions, incluso has some further syntactical and semantic prop-
erties:  
 
a) Incluso can occur in any position in an utterance (cfr. Cuartero Sánchez 2002). 
This positional variability is correlated to another property: the interaction with the ut-
terance interpretation. Different positions of the FO lead to different interpretations (cfr. 
Jacobs 1983:8-10, König 1991:10, and § 4.), to compare:  
 
(99) Incluso la abuela habla inglés.  
(‘Even grandma speaks English.’) 
(100) La abuela habla incluso inglés.  
(‘Grandma speaks even English.’) 
 
                                                 
 
108 The concepts of violation of expectations proposed by Fillmore (1965) is not free of criticism. Anscombre 
(1973) proposes a more argumentative meaning for meme in French. The violation of expectations is not a main 
function of incluso, but in some contexts incluso can assume this function. For a more detailed discussion of this 
property and FOs see Fraser (1969, 1971), Horn (1969), Cuartero Sánchez (2002), Yates (2006). 
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In these examples, the topic changes according to the FO-position. Example (199) leads 
to the interpretation that not only the grandmother can speak English (e.g. topic FAMILY 
MEMBERS), and in (100) the topic is changed to: LANGUAGES GRANDMOTHER SPEAKS.  
 
b) Incluso can be eliminated without changing the syntactic order of the utterance (cfr. 
Cano 1982, Portolés 2006). 
The utterance with incluso always informatively entails the utterance without the FO.  
 
(101) La abuela habla incluso inglés.  
(‘Grandma speaks even English.’) 
(102) La abuela habla inglés. 
(‘Grandma speaks English.’) 
 
By inserting the FO, additional information is added to the interpretation process. The 
FO conditions the semantic interpretation, but not the grammatical structure of the ut-
terance. This is why, the FO does not determine the syntagma, but only modifies it. This 
is proved, in the sense, that by eliminating the FO the utterance does not become un-
grammatical (cfr. Portolés 2006:42-43). 
 
c) Incluso can occur in postposition regarding the focus element (cfr. Fuentes 1987:169, 
Cuartero Sánchez 2002:69, Portolés 2006:42, and § 7.2.). 
From a syntactical perspective incluso usually precedes the syntagma it modifies, as in:  
 
(103) De entrada, se le relacionó con los avestruces; más tarde se le vinculó con los buitres, 
cisnes, gallináceas e incluso con el pájaro bobo; […]. (CREA, Biológica, nº24, 09/1998) 
(‘At first, he was related to ostriches; later he was linked to vultures, swans, gallinaceae 
and even to the booby bird; […].’) 
 
Even though, more rarely, incluso can be postponed to its focus (cfr. Fuentes 
1987:169)109, as in: 
 
 
                                                 
 
109 The postposition of the FO is the less frequent and it is often used for reformulation strategies (cfr. Fuentes 
1987, López Serena and Loureda 2013). 
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(104) [daño cerebral] Con la corteza prácticamente intacta, la joven veía, oía, olía incluso. 
(CREA, El Mundo, 26/05/1994) 
[Brain damage] With the cortex practically intact, the young woman saw, heard, even 
smelled. 
 
d) Incluso cannot be negated (cfr. Martínez 1992, Portolés 2006). 
 
(105) #La abuela ni incluso sabe inglés. 
(‘Grandma not even speaks English.’)  
 
Ni siquiera is considered the negative counterpart of incluso. It inhibits also a scalar 
value, but creates an inversed informative scale, as in: 
 
(106) La abuela ni siquiera sabe inglés. 
(‘Grandma not even speaks English.’)  
 
e) Incluso can occur isolated in a conversational turn (cfr. Cuartero Sánchez 2002, 
Portolés 2006). 
This use of the FO incluso is rarely use in oral conversation.110 Example from (Portolés 
2006:39): 
 
(107) R: En un debate parlamentario vivo y tenso se pueden producir abucheos, pasa en todos 
los parlamentos.  
P: Hablamos de insultos. 
R: Incluso. También ocurre en todos los Parlamentos (en El Pais Domingo, 22/5/1994) 
(‘R: In a lively and tense parliamentary debate there can be booing, it happens in all par-
liaments.  
Q: We are talking about insults. 
A: Even. It also happens in all parliaments.’) 
 
f) Incluso does not have to be the most proximate element to the focus (cfr. Portolés 2006). 
Usually the focus marked by an operator follows syntactically the operator, but incluso 
does not necessarily require this characteristic (cfr. § 4.2.). Only in cases in which the 
                                                 
 
110 Fuentes (1987:168) does not consider this function as a proper function of incluso.  
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FO is postponed to the focus element, necessarily the operator has to be the most prox-
imate element to the focus.  
 
(108) Ana y Marta visitan Sevilla e incluso en invierno GRANADA[focus]. 
(‘Anne and Martha visit Seville, and even in winter GRANADA.’) 
(109) Ana y Marta visitan Sevilla y en invierno GRANADA[focus] incluso.  
(‘Anne and Martha visit Seville, and in winter GRANADA even.’) 
(110) #Ana y Marta visitan Sevilla y GRANADA[focus] en invierno incluso.  
(‘#Anne and Martha visit Seville, and GRANADA in winter even.’) 
 
g) Incluso admits an incisor with a coordinate sentence (cfr. Yates 2006:89). 
 
(111) Alemania y México son socios cercanos en la construcción de cuestiones globales del 
futuro, incluso, y sobre todo, en el G20, bajo la presidencia de Alemania. (Centro Alemán 
de información para Latinoamérica, June 2017)  
(‘Germany and Mexico are close partners in developing future global issue, even, and 
above all, in the G20, under the chairmanship of Germany.’) 
 
h) Incluso can occur as independent phonic unit with its own melodic contour and can be 
separated by pauses from the adjacent sequence (cfr. Yates 2006:83). 
 
(112) Hemos viajado en avión para un par de desplazamientos largos -tan largos como de 
Madrid a Moscú-, pero básicamente hemos circulado en tren, sin dejar de probar el barco 
fluvial, la bicicleta e, incluso, el carro tirado por un burro. (CREA, La Vanguardia, 
02/09/1995). 
(‘We have travelled by plane for a couple of long journeys – as long as from Madrid to 
Moscow – but basically we have travelled by train, while still trying out the river boat, 
the bicycle and even a wagon pulled by a donkey.’) 
 
i) Incluso is often introduced by the copulative conjunction y (‘and’) (cfr. Cano 
1982:250). 
 
(113) La fortaleza de la peseta ha contribuido entre otros motivos a desplazar el turismo a estas 
islas a nuevos destinos como Grecia, Turquía, Portugal, Túnez e incluso el Caribe. 
(CREA, ABC, 06/08/1989) 
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('The strength of the peseta has contributed, among other reasons, to the circumstance that 
the tourism to these islands is displaced to new destinations, such as Greece, Turkey, Por-
tugal, Tunisia, and even the Caribbean.’) 
 
j) Incluso admits different grammatical units as focus elements (cfr. Yates 2006:93-96). 
Different grammatical units can compose a focus to incluso as among others, noun 
phrases, adjective phrases or gerunds111. 
 
Noun phrase 
(114) Por esta razón, las hormigas tejedoras, […] eligen presas bastante grandes, como pájaros, 
ranas, lagartos, culebras e incluso murciélagos. (CREA, Muy Interesante, nº 192, 
05/1997) 
(‘For this reason, weaver ants, […] choose fairly large preys, such as birds, frogs, lizards, 
snakes and even bats.’) 
 
Adjective phrase 
(115) Yo he llevado desde entonces una vida normal e incluso agradable […]. (CREA, Javier 
Marías, Corazón tan blanco, Barcelona, Anagrama, 1994) 
(‘I have since then lived a normal and even pleasant life […].’) 
 
Gerund 
(116) Durante los primeros veinte minutos, la iniciativa del juego estuvo repartida, sin un claro 
dominador, pero con la sorpresa de ver a los gallegos incluso presionando. (CREA, La 
Vanguardia, 30/10/1995) 
(‘During the first twenty minutes, the game was balanced, without a clear dominator, but 
with the surprise that the Galicians were even pressing.’) 
                                                 
 
111 For a detailed overview of grammatical units which admit incluso as focus see Yates (2006:93-96). 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1. Eye movement approach 
 
Studying eye movement behavior provides insight into cognitive processes since it is assumed 
that eye movements are directly related to mental activity, and therefore reflect cognitive ef-
fort during a specific task. Eye movement studies allow to observe when and how different 
processing and comprehension strategies take place (cfr. Just and Carpenter 1980, Sandra 
2009a, 2009b). The relation between eye perception and cognition rests on two basic assump-
tions (cfr. Just and Carpenter 1980:330): 
 
– Immediacy Assumption. Eye movements depend on the cognitive environment. In nor-
mal conditions, the eyes fixate the elements that are informative for the individual. 
“[…] A reader tries to interpret each content word of a text that is encountered, even at 
the expense of making guesses that sometimes turn out to be wrong. Interpretation re-
fers to processing at several levels such as encoding the word, choosing one meaning of 
it, assigning it to the referent, and determining its status in the sentence and in the dis-
course.” (Just and Carpenter 1980:330). The interpretation of text constituents starts 
immediately while starting the fixation of the area.  
– Eye-mind assumption. The fixation on an area of interest is limited by the processing 
time needed for that area. The eyes remain fixated on a stimulus until it is processed, 
considering also the information that was processed during previous stimuli or context 
depending factors.  
 
Taking under consideration both assumptions, eye movements can be linked to mental activi-
ty during language processing. They provide an optimal indicator of different levels of infor-
mation processing from word identification to processing of sentence structures and allow to 
establish conclusions on complex cognitive processes (cfr. Sandra 2009b:306). In this sense, 
two main different eye movements are differentiated: fixations, i.e. moments where the eyes 
remain relatively still on a stimulus, and saccadic movements, i.e. the movement between two 
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fixations that can be executed forwards or backwards (cfr. Rayner 1978, Duchowski 2007, 
Holmqvist et al. 2011, Figure 1).112  
 
Figure 1: Eye movements during reading 
 
The human eye can reach a visual field of about 200°, but perceives only 2° with the highest 
acuity. To compensate the limited degrees of acuity, humans have to move their eyes very 
quickly over a stimulus (cfr. Richardson et al. 2007:323). By looking straight on an stimulus 
(e.g. an utterance or text) the visual field can be divided into three regions (cfr. Rayner and 
Sereno 1994:58, Rayner 1998:374, Figure 2): 
 
– Foveal region: the region with the highest acuity, equivalent to 2° of the visual angle 
around the point of fixation. This region permits the most detailed processing of infor-
mation.  
– Parafoveal region: equals 5° of the visual angle at each side of the foveal region. Dur-
ing reading, readers can still extract some useful information, as e.g. the identification 
of the next word to the right of the actual fixation.  
– Peripheral region: region that lies beyond the parafoveal region. In this region the per-
ception of information during reading is minimal. The reader cannot extract any useful 
information for the comprehension, except some formal characteristics as punctuation, 
end of line, etc.113 
 
                                                 
 
112 Eye movements can differ if the text is read in silence or aloud. In reading aloud fixations are longer and 
saccades tend to be shorter (Rayner 1998:375). The descriptions and definitions of the majority of factors de-
scribed in the following chapter are mainly for silent reading. 
113 In this work, the regions of the visual field are based on the cognitive task of reading. For other visual as-
pects, the different regions can gather different value, e.g. in other research fields, as face recognition or danger 
detection during driving, where the peripheral region is of great interest.  
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Figure 2: Visual field 
 
In reading research, the perceptual span114 refers to the amount of useful information that can 
be extracted from one single fixation (cfr. Rayner 2009:1462-1465).115. “When reading, for 
instance, the perceptual span is asymmetric, stretching 3 degrees from the point of fixation 
into the direction of reading, and hardly 1 degree backwards.” (Holmqvist et al. 2011:381) In 
European languages, the degrees equal 3 to 4 letters to the left and 14 to 15 letters to the right 
of the fixation (cfr. McConkie and Rayner 1975, 1976, Rayner et al. 1980, Figure 3).116 
 
Figure 3: Perceptual span 
                                                 
 
114 Also called functional field of view, useful visual field, functional visual field or visual span. In reading re-
search, the term perceptual span is the most common (cfr. Rayner 1975, Holmqvist et al. 2011:381, Rayner et 
al. 2012).  
115 In order to define the amount of useful information different experimental studies were realized using the 
gaze-contingent moving-window paradigm consisting in that the reader can only extract information from the 
window-area and all other text portions are substituted by xxx. The extension of the window-area changes in 
order to prove when the reading task is interrupted. Different experimental studies lead to various conclusions 
about the perceptual span during reading. 
116 By modifying the moving-window paradigm (parafoveal magnification) Miellet et al. (2009) proved that the 
extension of the perceptual span does not vary (maximum of 14 letters), even if the size of the letters increases 
(to compensate the acuity loss in the parafoveal region) beyond the foveal region of the fixation. The limitations 
of the perceptual span result from the difficulty to maintain the sufficient attention during ongoing processing 
constraints, and do not derive from an acuity loss in the visual field (cfr. Rayner 2009:1464-1465). Nevertheless, 
the 14-15 characters of perceptual span to the right of a fixation hold mostly for skilled readers. The actual word 
identification span is more limited reaching only from 7-8 characters, and is sufficient to completely identify a 
word (cfr. Keating 2014:73). 
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The perceptual span is oriented horizontally and not vertically. Therefore, no previous infor-
mation from other lines is accessed through a fixation (cfr. Inhoff and Briihl 1991, Inhoff and 
Topolski 1992, Pollatsek et al. 1993). The dimension of the perceptual span depends on dif-
ferent factors, as e.g. different writing systems (cfr. Rayner 2009:1465). 117 Reading skills as 
well as reading difficulties (e.g. dyslexia) and text complexity influence the dimension of the 
perceptual span.  
 
Fixations and saccadic movements  
“Fixations are eye movements that stabilize the retina over a stationary object of interest” 
(Duchowski 2007:44), that is, when the eye maintains the visual gaze relatively still on a 
stimulus118. Normally, 90% of reading is spent on fixations and the remaining time belongs to 
saccadic movements (cfr. § 5.1.). Fixations reflect the cognitive effort during a mental task. 
The assumption is that a higher number of fixations and/or longer duration times of fixations 
are an index of processing difficulties (cfr. Hyönä et al. 2003, Rayner and Liversedge 2004, 
Coulson and Matlock 2009). Typically, fixations on a word are about 225-250 ms long, but 
can range also between 50-600 ms depending on various oculometric and linguistic factors 
(cfr. Rayner 2009:1460). Normally each word is fixated, but short words (less than three 
characters) have a higher probability to be skipped and longer words (more than seven charac-
ters) have a higher probability to be fixated more than once. Fixations are the main indicator 
of cognitive processing during reading since they are correlated to engagement of attention 
and cognitive effort (cfr. Rayner 2009, Rayner et al. 2012, Eckstein et al. 2017).119 
                                                 
 
117 As e.g. for Hebrew, Arabic systems that are read from right to left being as well asymmetric to the left side of 
the fixation (cfr. Rayner 2009:1465). For further discussion of factors that influence the dimension of the percep-
tual span, see, for different writing and reading systems among others Pollatsek et al. (1981), Liu et al. (2002), 
Rayner et al. (2009). For an overview of the influence of different reading skills see Häikiö et al. (2009), for 
dyslexic readers see Rayner et al. (1989), and for the influence of age in reading see Laubrock et al. (2006), 
Rayner et al. (2006). 
118 The eyes are never completely still while fixating a stimulus. In order to prevent that the stimulus becomes 
blur the eyes are in a constant movement. Three types of micromovements can be distinguished: tremor, also 
called nystagmus, that seems to be needed to maintain the retina cells constantly activated. Drifts and microsac-
cade are longer movements that are related to control mechanisms of the oculomotor system conducted by the 
nervous system. To avoid drifting the eye conducts microssacades to return to the last eye position (cfr. Rayner 
1998:374). 
119However, there is an ongoing debate whether during a saccade information is processed or not. It is often 
argued that since a saccadic movement is so fast that the visual input during the movements is nearly suppressed 
(saccadic suppression) and therefore new information can only be acquired during fixations. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that cognitive processing is interrupted during saccadic movements (cfr. Irwin and Carlson-
Radvansky 1996, Irwin 1998, Rayner 2009:1458). 
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During reading constant movements are made, called saccades120. The velocity of these 
movements can reach up to 500° per second and the saccades have a duration of approximate-
ly 30-50 ms, extending between 7 to 9 characters.121 The main function of saccades is to move 
the eyes between areas of interest: if during a fixation the necessary information is processed, 
a saccadic movement will be started in order to fixate the next target (cfr. Rayner 1978, 1998).  
 “The primary function of a saccade is to bring a new region of text into foveal vision for de-
tailed analysis […]” (Rayner and Balota 1989:265). Regressions or regressive saccadic 
movements fulfill this function, while conducting movements in the contrary direction to 
normal reading. The majority of saccadic movements are progressive saccades, only 10% to 
15% are regressive. They are conducted to reread more efficiently passages or target words 
that were already read once. Two main regression movements exist: a) in-word regression, 
short regressive movements within a word, and b) between word regressions, backward 
movements that go beyond a word limitation, to a previous fixated word (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 
2011:264). Since regressions are normally a few characters long, those who are beyond 10 
characters space and beyond a word limitation indicate cognitive processing difficulty (cfr. 
Rayner 1998:375, Richardson et al. 2007:330). Diverse studies have shown that high-skilled 
readers can accurately isolate the location that causes the difficulty and make very precise 
regressive movements to that position (cfr. Kennedy and Murray 1987, Murray and Kennedy 
1988). 
 The control and quality of eye movements is determined by two main decisions: when 
to move the eyes? and where to move the eyes? During reading it was shown that “across 
large segments of text, there is typically no correlation between how long the eyes remain 
fixated and how far they move (cfr. Rayner and McConkie 1976). This has generally been 
taken to suggest that these two decisions are made somewhat independently.” (Rayner 
2009:1468-1469) The decision where to move the eyes next is mainly determined by long-
level properties of the text, whereas the decision when to move they eyes to continue reading 
                                                 
 
120 Saccadic eye movements are not the only oculometric movements. Three other types have to be distin-
guished: Pursuit eye movements that can occur when the eyes follow the target on the screen. They are usually 
notably slower than saccades. Vergence eye movements are inward oriented, i.e. directed towards each other, 
helping to fixate a nearby target. Vestibular eye movements stabilize the stimulus on the retina. However, sac-
cadic movements are the most relevant parameter in reading research, since they reflect the main movement 
during two fixations (cfr. Rayner 1998:374). 
121 The mentioned properties of saccades are exclusively described for reading tasks. The velocity, duration and 
span of saccades vary between tasks, e.g. reading task or visual task. During scene perception the duration of 
fixations and saccadic movements increases (cfr. Rayner 1978). 
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is influenced by lexical properties of the fixated target word (cfr. Rayner 1998:384, 
2009:1469).122 
 
Where to move the eyes? In most alphabetic languages the landing position of the next fixa-
tion is highly driven by low level properties as e.g. word length and space information and not 
by semantic properties. The saccade length is determined, on the one hand, by the length of 
the fixated word, and, on the other hand, by the word to the right of the ongoing fixation (cfr. 
Just and Carpenter 1980:337, Juhasz et al. 2008, Rayner 2009:1469). The most extended sac-
cades are registered if the word to the right of the current fixation is either very long or very 
short. If the word next to the fixation is short (2 to 4 letters), a skipping effect can occur pro-
longing the next saccade to the word n + 2 (the word n + 1 is processed by parafoveal vision). 
If the next 11 characters to the right of a fixation are composed by one single word the sac-
cade will be longer, as when the 11 characters consists of two words (5 letters each with a 
space between, cfr. Juhasz et al. 2008, Rayner 2009).123 The main effects associated with the 
decision of where to move the eyes are:  
 
– Landing position effect. The information obtained by the demarcation of words during 
parafoveal vision influences the landing position of the next fixation. In reading re-
search two main positions can be distinguished (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:358): The 
preferred viewing location tends to be between the beginning and the middle of a word 
                                                 
 
122 These determined questions in eye moving research lead to different serial attention models. As Reichle et al. 
(2003:459) pointed out, “Historically, the models have most often been classified as being either oculomotor or 
cognitive/processing; that is, with respect to whether or not language processing plays a prominent role in guid-
ing the eyes during reading. Proponents of the oculomotor models claim that properties of the text (e.g., word 
length) and operating characteristics of the visual (e.g., acuity) and oculomotor systems (e.g., saccade accuracy) 
largely determine fixation locations. An auxiliary assumption of this view is that fixation durations are deter-
mined largely by where in a word the eyes have fixated. In contrast, proponents of the processing models tend to 
emphasize the role of language processing in guiding eye movements during reading. According to this view, the 
decision about how long to fixate is determined by ongoing linguistic processing, whereas the decision about 
where to fixate is jointly decided by linguistic, visual, and oculomotor factors.” For reading research the current-
ly used model is the EZ-Reader model (cfr. Reichle et al. 2009) that underlies the assumption that eye move-
ments are influenced by cognitive processes (cfr. Reichle et al. 2003:450). The described factors for eye move-
ments in this work for the paradigm of where and when to move the eyes are based on this model (cfr. Reichle et 
al. 1998). For a more detailed discussion of the EZ-Reader and other types of models see Reichle et al. (2003) 
and Reichle (2011). 
123 The demarcation of words is another property that influences the landing position of the next saccade. Spaces 
between words act as guides in order to control the mechanism of the saccadic movements. Reading is always 
more effective if the text is presented with spaces between the words. Removing those spaces, decreases the 
reading speed by 30-50% (cfr. Pollatsek and Rayner 1982, Morris et al. 1990, Rayner 1998). Even in reading 
systems that are not provided with spaces between words, as Thai or Chinese, it was proved that the insertion of 
spaces would facilitates reading (cfr. Kohsom and Gobet 1997, Bai et al. 2008). This goes in the same line as 
studies with three-lexeme compound words in German that demonstrate that if the lexemes are separated by 
spaces the total reading speed increases (cfr. Inhoff et al. 2000).  
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(cfr. Rayner 1979:24). It was proven that readers try to fixate the center of a word in or-
der to reach the optimal viewing position: landing position in a word where the pro-
cessing time is minimized (cfr. Rayner 1979, O’Regan and Lévy-Schoen 1983, 
McConkie et al. 1988, O’Regan and Jacobs 1992). Nonoptimal position landing is nor-
mally corrected by two mechanisms: a) either the word is refixated, or b) the current 
fixation tends to be longer (cfr. Vitu et al. 1990, Rayner and Well 1996, Reichle et al. 
2003:449).124 
– Skipping effects. If words are skipped, it can be assumed that they are processed by par-
afoveal vision (cfr. Rayner and Morrison 1981, Kliegl et al. 2007, Rayner 2009:1471). 
The skipping effect is mainly driven by word length and contextual constraints: Words, 
shorter than 4 letter and with a high predictability are much more likely to be skipped 
(cfr. Drieghe et al. 2004, Drieghe et al. 2005, Drieghe et al. 2007). 
 
When to move the eyes? The decision when to move is highly dependent of the current dura-
tion of the fixation. It was shown that the “the ease or difficulty associated with processing 
the fixated word strongly influences when the eyes move” (Rayner 2009:1472). In turn, the 
duration of a fixation is mainly driven by the complexity of the word or fragment that has to 
be processed, but also other lexical factors can influence the fixation duration. The lexical 
factors that highly influence processing time are (cfr. Rayner 2009:1472):  
 
– Word frequency. A high frequency word facilitates the cognitive effort during pro-
cessing and fixation durations tend to be shorter (cfr. Inhoff and Rayner 1986, Schilling 
et al. 1998, Rayner et al. 2006). 
– Age of acquisition. Words that are acquired and stored in the mental lexicon at an early 
age, are more frequent in their use and therefore these words receive shorter fixations 
durations (cfr. Juhasz and Rayner 2006). 
– Word predictability. The predictability of word is driven by the context and the seman-
tic relations between the fixated word and the prior words. The higher the predictability 
                                                 
 
124 Another effect that is correlated with the optimal viewing position is the inverted optimal viewing position 
effect: If only a single fixation is realized on a target word at the optimal viewing position, this fixation tends to 
be longer than if the fixation falls at the end of the target word. This counter-intuitive effect could occur due to 
mislocated fixations and parafoveal processing (cfr. Rayner 2009:1471).  
Moreover, not only undershoots of the oculomotor system (fixation at the end of a word) or overshoots (fixation 
at the beginning of a word) affect the landing position of single fixations on a word. Word frequency also affects 
single fixations of a target word, independently where the single fixation falls. High-frequency words always 
receive longer fixations than low-frequency words. For further discussion of the inverted optimal viewing posi-
tion effect see Nuthmann et al. (2005, 2007), Rayner et al. (2006), Vitu et al. (2007). 
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the shorter is the fixation (cfr. Ehrlich and Rayner 1981, Carroll and Slowiaczek 1986, 
Morris 1994, Kliegl et al. 2004). 
– Word familiarity. The higher the familiarity of words the higher the probability that the 
word receives shorter fixation durations (cfr. Chaffin et al. 2001, Williams and Morris 
2004). 
– Phonological properties of words. The phonological properties on a word that are high-
ly influenced by word familiarity and frequency can produce differences in the fixation 
durations (cfr. Jared et al. 1999, Ashby et al. 2005). 
– Ambiguity. The number of meaning of a word can produce variation during their pro-
cessing. The smaller the number of possible meanings of a word the shorter fixation du-
ration will be (cfr. Binder and Morris 1995, Binder et al. 2001).125  
 
 
5.2. Previous experimental findings on focusing  
 
The aim of this review of experimental eye movement studies that are concerned with focus 
and focusing operation during online sentence processing is to provide a panoramical view of 
results that precise not only what effects are conducted by focus structures, but also at what 
stage of processing the focusing operation is detected and carried out.  
A considerable number of experimental studies have investigated the role of focusing at 
different levels: from individual word level to complex sentence processing and comprehen-
sion (mostly silent reading studies). Concluding results relying on different offline studies 
prove processing benefits associated to focus structures (cfr. Filik et al. 2011:926) 126:  
 
 
                                                 
 
125 Besides, the mentioned lexical factors, different syntactic factors as well as the integration of information in 
the discourse can affect fixation duration, as e.g. words that are crucial for syntactic disambiguation, as well as 
high order text comprehension tend to have higher fixation durations, shorter saccades and frequently regressive 
saccadic movements (cfr. Rayner 2009:1473, Rayner et al. 2012:569).  
126 Since this dissertation is concerned with the effects that a FO may adopt during online sentence processing, it 
will not provide a detailed overview on FO acquisition studies or studies in speech comprehension. For acquisi-
tion the studies conducted by Berger et al. (2007), Höhle et al. (2009), Berger and Höhle (2012) should be 
mentioned. The main finding of these studies is that the acquisition of FOs starts early in language acquisition 
and that children (under 4 years) are able to express exclusivity or inclusivity by using correctly different FOs. 
Speech comprehension results reveal that comprehension is easier when focused information is marked by pros-
ody and the prosodic contour of focus influences the interpretation of ambiguous utterances. For a detailed dis-
cussion see Bock and Mazzella (1983), Birch and Rayner (1997), Birch and Clifton (2002). 
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– Focus information is more easily perceived than non-focused information. The studies 
conducted by Cutler and Fodor (1979) were among the first that proved that focusing 
structures guide the reader during processing. In the phoneme monitoring experiment, 
the participants were able to detect phonemes faster when the information was present-
ed in focus position. Consequently, they conclude that the attention is directed more ef-
fectively to the focus information. IF there is no other guidance, as e.g. a FO, the pro-
cessing is driven by the focused element.127 Following studies also have proven this ef-
fect as Langford and Holmes (1979), Sturt et al. (2004), Lowder and Gordon (2015). 
– Anomalies are more likely to detected when they occur in focus position. Based on the 
previous works of Cutler and Fodor (1979) newer studies found out that readers detect 
faster and more often grammatical, syntactical and semantical anomalies when they oc-
cur in focus position (cfr. Baker and Wagner 1987, Bredart and Modolo 1988). Fur-
thermore, Sturt et al. (2004) proved with a text-change detection task that participants 
more easily detect a semantically similar word replacement, when the change occurs in 
focus position.  
– Information in focus is recalled better. Studies on syntactically marked focus structures 
using recognition tasks indicate that focus strengthens the memory trace of concepts 
(cfr. McKoon et al. 1993, Birch and Garnsey 1995, Birch et al. 2000, Osaka et al. 2002, 
Sturt et al. 2004). Furthermore, other studies claim that by marking a focus syntactically 
or prosodically not only the focus item is enhanced, but all elements of the focusing op-
eration, that is, also the set of alternatives (cfr. Fraundorf et al. 2010, Gotzner 2016).128 
                                                 
 
127 Different eye movement studies (mostly change-detection tasks) are conducted at word level in order to ex-
amine the influence of syntactical focus and non-focus information with confronting results (cfr. Birch and 
Rayner 1997, Morris and Folk 1998, Ward and Sturt 2007, Birch and Rayner 2010). However, Birch and Rayner 
(2010) found out that controversial focus effects were due to confounding variables of the experimental design. 
By controlling confounding variables, the focused items received shorter fixations than non-focused items (on 
the contrary to other studies, where the focus items either received longer fixation durations or no differences 
could be detected between the conditions). Concluding, it can be argued that shorter fixations on focus indicate 
that the syntactical marking of is accessed more quickly during reading and that focus operations are detected 
early (during first-fixation duration), but affect also regressive eye movements at a later stage of processing. See 
Filik et al. (2011) for further discussion of how syntactically marked focus influences processing at word level.  
128 Focus always leads to a more fine-grained interpretation of an event, since focus information guides the hear-
er more precisely to the correct assumption. In this regard, an ongoing debate discusses whether in focus struc-
tures the focus element is enhanced and therefore, leads to a more shallow processing of the background infor-
mation (the possible alternatives, granularity account, Sanford et al. (2006)) or whether the focus structure en-
counters all elements of the focus operation (focus and alternatives), in other words, that focus marking not only 
identifies the focus itself, but also the alternatives (as presumed by alternative semantics theories, contrast repre-
sentation account, Fraundorf et al. (2010)). The granularity account holds for all studies that examined that in-
formation in focus position is remembered better than in non-focus position (cfr. Osaka et al. 2002, Sturt et al. 
2004, Ward and Sturt 2007), since in these studies the focus activation leads to less activation (e.g. higher fixa-
tion durations) of alternatives. Nevertheless, these studies investigate at word level by providing one sample in 
which the information is in focus position (marked syntactically) or in non-focus position. Therefore, these stud-
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By conducting delayed recall experiments Spalek et al. (2014) and Gotzner (2016:§§ 
3.2. and 3.3.) found out that a) explicitly given alternatives are recalled better when a 
FO (in these cases, German nur (‘only’) and sogar (‘even’)) is inserted in the utteranc-
es, and b) the focused element is remembered better than the alternative elements.  
– Focus guides ambiguity resolution, ellipsis processing, and referent identification. 
Findings show that presenting the information with a marked focusing structure facili-
tates processing during disambiguation, ellipsis processing and referent identification 
(cfr. Gordon and Hendrick 1997, 1998, Klin et al. 2004, Foraker and McElree 2007, 
Almor and Eimas 2008). 
– FOs not only facilitate focus detection, but also influence the activation of set of alter-
natives. By employing a lexical decision paradigm, it was demonstrated that the reader 
a) detects faster the focus as a word when the focused element is marked by a FO, and 
b) the set of alternatives is activated not only by the focusing operation itself, but also 
by contextual information (cfr. Byram-Washburn 2013:§ 2.4., Gotzner 2016:§ 3.2.).  
 
On the basis of these studies and results it becomes clear that focus can generate a processing 
benefit. But so far, it was not examined how focusing structures that are marked by a FO in-
fluence actual sentence reading processing by observing eye-movement behavior. 
FOs, such as only, also or even are focus-sensitive items that are associated to the focus 
by marking it precisely as marked focus of an utterance. Consequently, any FO exerts its ef-
fect over all constituents of the focusing operation by redefining their informative values and 
thus, it evokes a specific information structure in the utterance. Furthermore, the exact focus 
operation depends on the respective instruction of each operator (cfr. § 4.).  
Much of the existing research on FOs and their influence during sentence online processing is 
realized for English for the exclusive operator only, especially in the area of structural ambi-
guities. It is assumed that the insertion of an operator leads to a better guidance during pro-
cessing of ambiguities (cfr. Ni 1996, Paterson et al. 1999, Clifton et al. 2000, Liversedge et 
al. 2002, Filik et al. 2005). The studies examined whether using a FO indicates a contrastive 
relation in an utterance, and whether it reduces the comprehension difficulties by restricting 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
ies do not consider the contrastive effect a focus can reach within a sentence. On the contrary, the contrast rep-
resentation account assumes that all elements of the focusing operation are encoded and activated more richly. 
By contrasting various prosodically marked foci they conclude that the encoded information (when highlighted 
by a contrastive pitch accent) focus and alternatives are encoded and stored in the long-term memory. For the 
contrast representation account see also the studies carried out by Braun and Tagliapietra (2010), and Husband 
and Ferreira (2016). 
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the possibilities during partly syntactical ambiguous utterances (cfr. Filik et al. 2011:932-
933), as in:  
 
(117) The businessmen loaned money at low interest were told to record their expenses. 
(118) Only the businessmen loaned money at low interest were told to record their expenses. 
 
In both cases the phrase loaned money at low interest is ambiguous and the disambiguation 
cannot be realized until were told. Frazier and Rayner (1982) argue that in utterances without 
FO readers normally use a main clause analysis to process the ambiguity. Further, the reader 
is confronted with difficulties while processing the disambiguation area, since they have to 
change to a relative clause construction in order to derive correctly the presented assumption. 
However, by inserting a FO as only the disambiguation difficulties are reduced to a minimum, 
due to two main factors: a) the utterance with the FO becomes much more determined at se-
mantic level, and b) it is assumed that the reader will interpret and contrast two different sets 
of businessmen and anticipate the disambiguation by modifying the focus item. Consequently, 
readers will initiate directly a relative clause analysis to resolve the ambiguity (cfr. Ni 1996). 
The studies presented so far are not free of criticism, as e.g. Paterson et al. (1999) argue that 
the critical stimuli were not consistent through the experiment and that the disambiguation 
region were too large (two words, were told) and, therefore could provoke confounding re-
sults. In reaction Paterson et al. (1999) replicated the experiment hypothesis, but with rede-
signed critical stimuli, using only one word in the disambiguation region, as e.g. invited in:  
 
(119) Only teenagers allowed a party invited a juggler straightaway. 
(120) Only teenagers who were allowed a party invited a juggler straightaway. 
 
The results of the experiment show that readers have difficulties resolving the ambiguity 
which results in longer fixation duration for the area that provokes the disambiguation (invit-
ed) independently of the presence of only. However, this does not signify, that no FO-effect 
was found. Higher fixation durations during reanalysis were found for the area following the 
disambiguation in utterances without FO. Concluding, they argued that the insertion of only 
facilitates at least the reanalysis of ambiguous utterances. For the disambiguation of utteranc-
es, it seems that the FO provokes a late effort-saving effect during processing.  
The different studies have shown that the disambiguation of utterances is tied to more 
processing effort and depends on which analysis (main clause or relative clause) is adopted by 
the reader. When the critical items are manipulated, in the sense that only one analysis is ac-
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cessible, then the focus benefit effect occurs late during processing and facilitates reanalysis. 
The less predisposed an analysis is for the reader, the more immediate is the focus benefit 
effect in order to facilitate the structural decision. The insertion of only creates a contrastive 
focus structure in an utterance and reveals a relevant effect during online sentence processing. 
These findings give rise to the hypothesis that other focus-sensitive operators could also pro-
voke processing benefits.  
Moreover, Filik et al. (2009) conducted a study to examine the influence of only and 
even in order to compare their instructive function under the variable of congruency. They 
investigated how processing changes when the instruction of the FO in relation to the lexical 
items is co-oriented (congruous relation) or anti-oriented (incongruous relation) to the com-
mon ground, as in: 
 
(121) Only students taught by the best teacher passed the examination in the summer. 
(122) #Only students taught by the worst teacher passed the examination in the summer.  
 
According to the world knowledge and without any discursive context, the reader interprets 
that it is more likely to pass the examination when the students are taught by the best teacher 
(as in 121). The information given in (121) is more felicitous in relation to the world 
knowledge than in (122). Whereas by inserting even, the felicitous relation is reversed:  
 
(123) #Even students taught by the best teacher passed the examination in the summer. 
(124) Even students taught by the worst teacher passed the examination in the summer.  
 
The insertion of even varies the interpretation of utterances. Even indicates that the following 
information is unexpected, and according to the instruction of even utterance (124) becomes 
now felicitous in relation to the common ground. The utterance becomes pragmatically more 
acceptable, since the accommodation to the common ground can be realized with less pro-
cessing effort. Different eye movement evidence could be gathered from this study (cfr. Filik 
et al. 2009:682):  
 
– In utterances containing only or even: Shorter reading times are observed when the in-
formation of the utterance is congruous with the instruction given by the FO and the 
common ground.  
 90 
– Utterances with only: The incongruency is detected already during an early stage of 
processing (first pass reading time) on the area of interest passed the examination 
(which is the first area in the utterance where the incongruency can be detected). 
– Utterances with even: The incongruency emerges also during first-pass reading time, 
but seems to be detected more slowly during processing, since effects can only be ob-
served at the area of interest (in the summer) that is post-positioned to the target area of 
interest passed the examination (spill-over effects). If the utterance was congruous the 
reader tends to execute regression to the FO. The authors assume that this late effect of 
reanalysis of the operator may be due to higher-order language processing that is pro-
voked by the instruction of the operator. Even evokes a re-evaluation of all elements of 
the utterance in order to build the correct assumption. It is argued that this re-evaluation 
is only made when the information has a possibility to be felicitously interpreted.  
– Utterances without FO: In order to validate the findings utterances without only or even 
are considered as control variable. No differences are observed in reading times and no 
regression effect is found leading to the conclusion that the observed effects in utteranc-
es with FO are due to the insertion of the operator.  
 
The spill-over effect in utterances with the inclusive operator is also observed in a study con-
ducted by Gerwien and Rudka (2019) with the German inclusive operator sogar (‘even’). 
They perform a two-alternative force choice task to examine how sogar impacts participants’ 
expectations about the focus; and subsequently, they observe viewing behavior in a visual 
world paradigm experiment. The experiment is based on four conditions resulting from cross-
ing the factors a) presence/absence of the FO, and b) magnitude of expectation change 
(high/low) induced by sogar, as e.g. in 
 
(125) Sie hat Hunde, Katzen und [sogar/niedliche] Meerschweinchen. 
(‘She has dogs, cats, and [even/cute] Guinea pigs.’)  
(126) Er behandelt Hunde, Schildkröten und [sogar/kranke] Elefanten. 
(‘He treats dogs, turtles, and [even/sick] elephants.’) 
 
In the visual world experiment participants receive an auditory input, as (125) and (126) that 
was combined with a visual input, as illustrated in Figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Stimulus example 
(adapted from Gerwien and Rudka (2019) 
 
Results of the visual world experiment show that the instruction encoded in sogar is integrat-
ed into a situation model immediately, but that updating an initially built model becomes cog-
nitively more demanding in the presence of sogar as the degree of expectation changes. Filik 
et al. (2009) and Gerwien and Rudka’s (2019) findings reveal relevant parallel behavior. In 
both studies, the effect of the FO is detected early and integrated, but its effect is conducted a 
posteriori (higher reanalysis or more attention in the area of the second noun of the alterna-
tive). 
The presented results show that a) different FOs possess different procedural infor-
mation, leading to different focusing strategies (cfr. Filik et al. 2009). Furthermore, the inser-
tion of a FO has a relevant effect during online processing, not only at an early stage of pro-
cessing, but, moreover, during the reconstruction of the previous assumption (reanalysis) (cfr. 
Filik et al. 2009, Gerwien and Rudka 2019). 
Within focusing structures another recent research field is concerned with the role of the 
alternative and how alternatives are affected by focus and different FOs and to what extend 
different contextual factors influence the construction of a set of alternatives (cfr. Kim 2012, 
Byram-Washburn 2013, Gotzner 2016).  
Kim’s (2012) experimental study employs a visual world paradigm (similar to the ex-
periments conducted by Gerwien and Rudka (2019), in which different auditory stimuli with 
and without the FO only are presented to the participants, as e.g.  
 
(127) Mark has some candy and apples.  
(128) Jane [only] has some oranges. 
 
While listening to the auditory stimulus a visual display with four items is presented on the 
screen. The visual display contains pictures of oranges, a cohort competitor with the same 
phonological onset (oars) and two other unrelated pictures (pencils and gloves). The partici-
pants are asked to choose and click on the element that Jane has according to the auditory 
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stimulus. Findings show that when the FO only is inserted in the auditory stimulus, partici-
pants disambiguate faster the target element form the competitor. The author argues that the 
participants are using the semantic alternatives (candy and apples) from the preceding context 
to predict the upcoming focus. However, it could also be argued that the instruction of the 
operator restricts the interpretation possibilities in the sense that only guides in relation with 
the conceptual information of the context the expectations of the reader and, therefore, a faster 
detection of the focused element can be executed (cfr. Kim 2012:§ 3.2.). 
Moreover, Kim (2012) contrasts two different FOs: only and also. Results of the eye 
movement patterns demonstrate that in the stimuli with only participants fixate more frequent-
ly a subset member of a semantic category (apple: fruit), whereas in the case of also partici-
pants are more likely to fixate the superset of a category (picture with different fruits) (cfr. 
Kim 2012:§ 4.2.). To sum up, different eye gaze patterns are related to the different instruc-
tions attributed to only and also that are manifested in the different expectations they evoke 
concerning the upcoming focus. While reading the FO, independently of its instruction, par-
ticipants activate a set of alternatives that have to be contrasted in different ways (according 
to the instruction of the FO) with the focused element of the utterance.  
In particular, various eye tracking studies in Spanish have investigated the procedural 
impact of discourse particles (cfr. § 1.2.). Three main arguments can be attributed to the theo-
retical described characteristics of the procedural meaning of these units (cfr. Loureda et al. in 
press):   
 
– The insertion of a discourse particle provokes different processing patterns. It was ob-
served that particles control the processing acting as inferential guide of the utterance. 
– Discourse particles reassign the values of the other elements. Different experiments 
have shown that the instruction of any particle conditions the value of the other ele-
ments by redistributing their relative values within the limits of a superior function. 
– The insertion of a discourse particle does not provoke higher processing effort for the 
utterance. The insertion of the particle does not signify that the processing effort are el-
evated in comparison to the same utterance without particles.  
 
Eye tracking experiments conducted on FOs demonstrate that the insertion of a FO as e.g. 
hasta or incluso does not elevate the processing effort of the utterance since no relevant ef-
fects in the comparison of the means per word of the utterances are observed (under 4%, trivi-
al effects, cfr. Cruz and Loureda 2019, Torres Santos 2020, Loureda et al. in press, and § 
 93 
6.6.). Moreover, it was also demonstrated that the insertion of a FO provokes an effect at the 
element under its scope, while reducing always the processing effort for the focus element:  
 
Total reading time  
(mean per word) 
areas of interest 
mean of the 
utterance 
focus  
operator 
focus 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y chino. 234.37 ms – 262.44 ms 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso chino. 225.07 ms 239.04 ms 244.33 ms 
Difference 
3.97% 
trivial effect  
6.90% 
medium effect 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y chino.  304.18 ms – 368.94 ms 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y hasta chino. 312.07 ms 360.84 ms 307.12 ms 
Difference 
-2.53% 
trivial effect 
 
20.13% 
very large effect 
Table 1: Comparison of areas of interest – total reading time  
(adapted from Loureda et al. (in press) 
 
In concordance with the study realized by Filik et al. (2009), this feature is particularly rele-
vant and demonstrates three main findings. Under normal conditions (congruency between 
procedural instruction of the operator and common ground, without syntactical ambiguities 
and embedded in preceding context (cfr. Loureda et al. in press)129:  
 
– The insertion of an operator does not provoke more cognitive effort in the processing of 
the whole utterance, even though the utterance with operator is informatively more 
complex as the same utterance without hasta or incluso.  
– In utterances in which elements of conceptual meaning are conducted to interact with 
elements with procedural meaning, the FO not only selects the focus as highlighted el-
ement (cfr. Rooth 1995, Portolés 2007, 2010, DPDE ss.vv. incluso and hasta), it also 
determines how the conceptual representations have to interact informatively with each 
other.  
– The instruction of the FO restricts the processing effort of the marked focus in contrast 
to an unmarked focus. In utterances without FO the assumption is primarily recovered 
through the focus element (higher processing effort for the unmarked focus, Table 1). 
On the contrary, when the FO is inserted in the utterance, it is the area of the FO from 
which the assumption is recovered, minimizing at the same time the processing effort of 
the marked focus (cfr. § 6.1.2.).  
 
                                                 
 
129 See Loureda et al. (in press) for a detailed overview discussion of these phenomena for other discourse parti-
cles. 
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This overview has shown that focus structures have a wide-ranging influence throughout dif-
ferent stage of processing. Summarizing three main benefits can be attributed to focus struc-
tures:  
 
– Focus information activates a processing benefit.  
– FOs control online utterance processing. 
– Alternatives contribute to focus prediction, and consequently facilitate processing. 
 
The actual research is not only concerned about the resulting benefit effects of using a focus-
ing structure, it is also interested in how and when a determined focusing structure effects 
utterance processing. Diverse eye movement studies, either using the reading paradigm or the 
visual world paradigm have demonstrated, by investigating different variables (among others, 
presence/absence, congruency/incongruency), that focusing operations tend to be detected 
early during processing, but display their complete effect at a later stage of processing (during 
reanalysis).  
The presented study in this thesis aims to contribute to this research field by considering 
all main elements of the focusing operation. Mostly the studies concentrate on how one single 
element of the focusing operation (either focus, operator or alternatives) influences the focus-
ing operation, but not on how the interplay of these three components act during utterance 
processing. Additionally, the study aims to investigate focusing structure from a different the-
oretical approach and opts for a pragmatic-relevantist perspective in the interpretation of the 
findings.  
Furthermore, from this review it becomes apparent that most investigations are con-
ducted for English (some for German), but, only eye movement studies realized within the 
research group Discourse particles and cognition are published so far for Spanish FOs. This 
thesis aims to contribute to the preceding research relevant findings on how the Spanish FO 
incluso (‘even’) influences online processing during reading. Finally, the challenge is to inte-
grate the findings into the existing research.  
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6. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
In Pragmatics, the experimental approach is a recent method in order to gather quantitative 
observations about a specific linguistic feature130: 
 
[…] two general remarks with respect to experimental methodology are in order. First, each experiment is 
an attempt to understand a particular phenomenon by marking a highly controlled design for collecting 
data on that phenomenon. In this design, researchers manipulate one or more factors that they assume to 
affect a mental representation or the access speed to that representation […]. (Sandra 2009b:304-305) 
 
In this sense, the use of quantitative methods in the present study of experimental research 
and the use of inductive statistical analysis of data has three goals (cfr. Gries 2013:3-4):  
 
– Description. The data and the results must be reported as accurately as possible.  
– Explanation. Hypotheses are created from existing theories which then serve as the ba-
sis for the interpretation of the results. 
– Prediction. Parting from the data it should be possible to predict whether new data, ob-
tained under the same experimental conditions in an enlarged participant sample, will 
show the same effects and, thus, the results will be generalizable to the whole popula-
tion. 
 
The aim of this study is to prove experimentally whether different focus structures demand 
different cognitive patterns; and whether there are existing correlations between the morpho-
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of the Spanish FO incluso and the informative 
structure of utterances. Additionally, it will be described to what extend the presence of the 
FO incluso determines the processing effort of utterances and the recovery of inferences.  
                                                 
 
130 Experimental Pragmatics uses psycholinguistic methods to create an experimental approach to pragmatic 
theories, which try to explain “how linguistic properties and contextual factors interact in the interpretation of 
utterances.” (Noveck and Sperber 2004:1) In a broader sense, the experimental turn in Pragmatics aims to inves-
tigate how communication works cognitively and to test hypotheses that until then rely heavily on intuition (cfr. 
Sperber and Noveck 2007). Early studies concentrate mostly on scalar implicatures (cfr. Noveck 2001, 
Papafragou and Musolino 2003, Noveck and Reboul 2008). Although, there is still today an ongoing debate on 
this issue, other research objects have become of interest in the Experimental Pragmatics approach, including 
irony, metaphor, metonym, reference and word learning (cfr. Noveck 2018). More recently, studies on how pro-
cedural meaning can determine utterance processing and comprehension has become center of interest (cfr. 
Nadal et al. 2016, Recio Fernández et al. 2018, Cruz and Loureda 2019, Nadal and Recio Fernández 2019). See 
Noveck (2018) for a broader discussion of different research areas in Experimental Pragmatics and also Loureda 
et al. (2019). 
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Therefore, two different experimental methods are implemented: an online method using the 
eye tracking technique (self-paced-reading experiment) and an offline comprehension test.  
 The online method eye tracking is an indirect technique131 that allows to observe cogni-
tive activity while performing a specific task, as e.g. during reading132 by recording the eye 
movements (cfr. Keating 2014:69). The main assumption in regard to eye movements (more 
specifically fixations) is that they are unconscious and happen automatically (cfr. § 5.1.). In 
this regard, they reflect ongoing mental processes with a minimal delay of time via chrono-
metric parameters, as e.g. reading times (cfr. Richardson et al. 2007:5, Sandra 2009b:307). 
Eye tracking allows to obtain data of any individual designed area (e.g. words, utterances or 
paragraphs) And, thus, it provides a useful technique to visualize “cognitive processes that 
cannot be directly accessed.” (Keating 2014:69). 
 However, the main limitations of online eye tracking studies are that they do not 
provide any evidence about the comprehension of a specific stimulus. Offline methods, as 
comprehension tasks, can provide a complementary method, since they are mainly oriented 
towards the result of a communication process. This method involves a conscious decision 
task and does not reflect sensible and immediate effects during processing, since it is 
conducted with a certain time delay (cfr. Keating and Jegerski 2015:2, Mertins 2016:17). 
                                                 
 
131 Offline/online methods indicate to what extend mental and/or neuronal processes are involved during a task 
activity. Offline methods do not reflect directly mental processes, but the result of a communication process. The 
task usually consists of a conscious decision with a temporal delay, and therefore it indicates a consequence after 
an immediate automatized process. Likewise, online methods have an immediate access to mental processes and 
reflect unconscious and automatized processes. The time delay of online processes can be minimal or inexistent, 
dividing the online methods in two types of techniques: direct, neuroscience-based techniques for the immediate 
recording of brain activity (brain imaging, as e.g. fMRI, EEG, ERP and PET) (cfr. Coulson and Matlock 
2009:96, Sandra 2009b:307), and indirect, chronometrically-based techniques in which brain activity is observed 
by parameters or indicators that underlie the perceptual systems (as e.g. eye tracking, reaction time studies) (cfr. 
Sandra 2009a:166, 2009b:307, Loureda et al. in press). For a detailed discussion of advantages and disad-
vantages of offline and online methods see Kintsch and Rawson (2005:213). 
The experimental study of this thesis relies on the online technique eye tracking, where the registered eye 
movements reflect the processing effort during the reading of critical items in real time, and on an offline task, 
where the comprehension test provides information on how the participants derive the implicatures of the critical 
items. The implementation of both techniques in the study ensures qualitative and quantitative data on how dif-
ferent focus structures have an effect at cognitive level. Both data, qualitative and quantitative, are useful in 
experimentation. Quantitative data supports pre-formulated theoretical claims that are, likewise, obtained by 
qualitative research (cfr. Kintsch and Rawson 2005:214, Lowie and Seton 2013:4). 
132 This also can be scene perception or visual search. For a detailed overview description of these research fields 
in relation with the eye tracking technique see Duchowski (2007), Rayner (2009), Holmqvist et al. (2011). In 
Language research two main modalities are developed with the eye tracking technique: Reading experiments, 
where the participants read in silence or aloud word or text stimuli and experiments with the visual world 
paradigm, where participants sees real or ficticious objects on a screen while being exposed to auditory stimuli. 
In both modalities, the eye tracker records eye movement during the task and records where and how long the 
participant’s gaze is fixated on the areas on interest (cfr. § 5.2.). 
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Both methods are used complementary in this study, since the convergence of these two 
methods provides a more accurate picture of cognitive behavior during processing and for 
comprehension (cfr. Kintsch and Rawson 2005:213, Sandra 2009b:305,).  
 
 
6.1. Independent Variables and hypotheses 
 
The online and offline experimental studies of this dissertation encompass four independent 
variables (IV): IV A – Extension of the alternative (cross-variable), IV B – Focus marking, IV 
C – Position of the focus operator in relation to the focus, IV D – Degree of informativity. 
The aim is to investigate to what extent the cognitive effort changes, whether a FO is present 
or absent in an utterance (IV B), whether the position of the FO in relation to the focus 
(preposition or postposition of the FO) evokes different processing patterns (IV C), and 
whether the processing load varies when the degree of informativity is altered in an utterance 
(IV D). These three independent variables are crossed with the IV A in order to examine 
whether the processing patterns change according to the extension of the alternative (cfr. 
Appendix A.). 
 
6.1.1. Extension of the alternative – Independent Variable A (cross-variable)  
The aim of the IV A is to assess to what extent the processing of utterances differs when the 
alternative is not syntagmatically given (implicit alternative) and has to be derive throughout 
the discursive context; or the alternative is explicitly given and has to be contrasted directly 
with the focus element in order to derive the conventionally marked pragmatic scale. In the 
case of explicit alternative, the alternative can be composed by one element (single alterna-
tive) or by two elements (complex alternative). 
 
Context 
Ana y Marta son profesoras de lenguas extranjeras en Madrid, donde llevan muchos 
años dando clase. Han viajado mucho juntas y hablan distintas lenguas, como el inglés y 
el francés. 
(‘Anne and Martha are foreign language teachers in Madrid, where they have been 
teaching for many years. They have travelled a lot together and speak different lan-
guages, such as English and French.’) 
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Critical item with implicit alternative (a1) 
Ana y Marta saben incluso chino.  
(‘Anne and Martha know even Chinese.’) 
 
Critical item with explicit single alternative (a2) 
Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English and even Chinese.’) 
 
Critical item with explicit complex alternative (a3) 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso chino.  
(‘Anne and Martha know English, French and even Chinese.’) 
 
The IV A is designed as cross-variable of the experimental study and is an integral component 
in all other IVs. The three conditions of the IV A are investigated in order to prove two main 
structures: implicit structures that are assumed to require more processing effort according to 
their semantical underdeterminacy, and explicit focus structures that are expected to demand 
less processing effort due to the informative guidance of the conceptual and procedural 
elements of the utterance. The results of the cross-variable IV A are not discussed isolated, 
but always in combination with the other IVs. Nevertheless, general hypotheses can be 
formulated.  
 
Processing 
The insertion of an alternative determines semantically the utterances and, hence, processing 
will also be determined, since the explicit given alternative is contrasted more directly to the 
focus element in order to create an informative pragmatic scale. By extending the elements of 
the alternative (complex alternative or lexical chain) the processing of utterances will even be 
more facilitated. On the contrary, if the alternative is implicit the contrast has to be 
established based on the mental representations133 that are stored in the memory and have to 
be activated by the discursive context. 
                                                 
 
133 Mental representations are understood as an internal cognitive representation of the external environment. 
During information processing, mental representations are units that relate the memory system and the human 
mind. They are the final result during processing and likewise, they are the material that ensures the ongoing 
communication. The construction of a mental representation depends on the combination of an external input (in 
language comprehension visual or auditory) and the internal cognitive information of the individual, as to say, 
the stored assumption in the mind (cfr. van Dijk and Kintsch 1983:5, Portolés 2007:60-63). 
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This phenomenon can be applied primarily to the conditions that present focus structures in 
which the manipulation mainly affects the procedural device (cfr. §§ 6.1.2. and 6.1.3.). When 
the manipulation of the independent variable also affects the conceptual elements of the 
utterance (cfr. § 6.1.4.), the explicit alternative (single or complex) may be obstructive, since 
the interaction between the alternative information and the focus element leads to a 
contrastive relation that is anti-oriented to the common ground.  
 
Hypothesis IV A-1a134: The presence of alternatives facilitates the construction of the 
ostensive communicated assumption in the IV B and IV C. 
It is expected that the processing decreases with the increase of conceptual information (as in 
the a3-conditions). This will be observable specially in the total mean of the utterance (global 
level) across parameters.  
 
Hypothesis IV A-1b: The presence of alternatives hampers the construction of the ostensive 
communicated assumption in incongruous condition of the IV D. 
It is expected that the processing increases with the increase of conceptual information (a2 
and a3 conditions). This will be observable specially in the total mean of the utterance (global 
level) across parameters.  
 
Comprehension 
As during processing, the insertion of an alternative will encourage the comprehension 
process in order to facilitate the deduction of the inferences in the focus structures that are co-
oriented to the mental representations. If the information of the utterance contradicts the 
world knowledge comprehension will became more obstruct.  
 
Hypothesis IV A-2a: The insertion of an alternative will not hamper the comprehension 
process in the variables IV B and IV C. 
 
                                                 
 
134 All formulated hypotheses represent the alternative hypotheses (H1), the respective null hypotheses (H0) are 
not formulated here, but they constitute always the logical opposite of H1. If the result confirms H1 a dependency 
is established between the conditions of the independent variables and the dependent variables, that is, the distri-
bution of the observed data for both conditions is not due to random factors. If H0 rejects H1 than there is no 
assurance that the obtained data at the dependent variables are linked to the differences described in the inde-
pendent variables (cfr. Gries 2013:18-19). 
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Hypothesis IV A-2b: The insertion of an alternative will hamper comprehension in the 
variable IV D.  
 
6.1.2. Focus marking – Independent Variable B  
The IV B – Focus marking aims to assess to what extent processing and comprehension of 
utterances differ when the utterance has an unmarked focus (b1, absence of FO) or a marked 
focus (b2, presence of FO). Moreover, in the case of marked focus it will be also investigated 
to what extent the procedural meaning of the FO incluso guides the reader towards the 
intentionally communicated assumptions. The IV B is tested in combination with the three 
cross-conditions of the IV A – Extension of the alternative: 
 
IV A – Extension of the  
alternative 
IV B – Focus marking 
a2 - explicit single 
alternative 
a3 - explicit complex alterna-
tive 
b1 - absence of the focus operator 
b1a2 - Ana y Marta saben 
inglés y chino.  
b1a3 - Ana y Marta saben 
inglés, francés y chino. 
b2 - presence of the focus operator 
b2a2 - Ana y Marta saben 
inglés e incluso chino. 
b2a3 - Ana y Marta saben 
inglés, francés e incluso chino. 
Table 2: Conrete token set – utterances with explicit alternative IV B/IV A135 
 
When the alternative is explicitly given (explicit single or explicit complex alternative, Table 
2), in the utterances with unmarked foci (b1a2 and b1a3) a mere addition has to be made be-
tween the explicit alternative and the focus, whereas in utterances with marked foci (b2a2 and 
b2a3) the insertion of a procedural mark evokes a contrastive relation between the elements of 
the utterance. Within a discursive context in utterances with unmarked focus, a focus can exist 
“by default” (b1a2 and b1a3), and relying on the topic WHAT LANGUAGES KNOW ANA AND 
MARTA? new information can be identified (unmarked focus chino) (cfr. van Kuppevelt 
1996:394, Gutiérrez Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:40, Gundel and Fretheim 2004:176, Portolés 
2010:284, Cruz and Loureda 2019, and § 3.1.). In regard to this topic, a mere additive relation 
is established between the known information given explicitly in the previous context and the 
new information, the unmarked focus (cfr. Kenesei 2006:137). 
On the contrary, in utterances with marked foci, the inserted FO activates a contrastive 
relation and highlights an element belonging to a paradigm as the most relevant in a specific 
and accessible context (cfr. Rooth 1985, König 1991, Rooth 1996, Portolés 2007, 2010). An 
evaluated pragmatic scale has to be built to generate a comparison of two elements with in-
                                                 
 
135 The presented examples belong to one concrete token set belonging to a set of 15 concrete token set. See § 
6.4., and Appendix B. for an overview of all types of experimental items.  
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formative value which in the case of the utterances with explicit alternative is presented as a 
subset of a paradigm that is given in the discourse (cfr. Rooth 1985, 1992, 1996, É. Kiss 
1998:245, Gundel and Fretheim 2004, Kenesei 2006:241, and § 3.1.). 
The main difference between implicit and explicit alternative concerns the set relation 
of a paradigm to the focus. If the alternative is explicit (a2, a3), the set of the alternative is 
presented as a subset of a paradigm in which all items of the set are of the same kind and 
could have been focused as well, whereas, if the alternative is implicit (a1, Table 3), the alter-
native has to be derived from the context. The insertion of a FO obliges to generate a contrast 
between the focus element and a potential subset of the given context (cfr. Kenesei 2006, 
Krifka and Musan 2012, and § 3.2.). 
 
IV A – Extension of the  
alternative 
IV B – Focus marking 
a1 – implicit alternative 
b1 - absence of the focus operator 
b1a1 - Ana y Marta saben 
chino.  
b2 - presence of the focus operator 
b2a1 - Ana y Marta saben 
incluso chino. 
Table 3: Concrete token set – utterances with implicit alternative IV B/IV A 
 
Descriptive and theoretical arguments ensure the idea of two main focusing structures: un-
marked (b1) and marked (b2, cfr. Cruz and Loureda 2019): Unmarked focus structures en-
courage a primarily identificational function, that is, new information is identified and related 
to an explicit subset of alternatives (a2 and a3) or to a potential subset given in the discourse 
(a1, cfr. § 3.1.). Furthermore, marked focusing structures present more informative load due 
to the insertion of a conventional device and evoke a paradigmatic contrast in addition to the 
identificational function of unmarked structures. However, it is expected that the possible 
extra processing effort that can derive from the additional informative load in marked struc-
tures will be compensated due to a more guided inferential process. 
 
Hypothesis IV B-1: If the FO generates a control and acceleration effect in a marked focus 
structure, compensating the possible additional effort, then utterances with marked focus 
structure will not register higher total processing effort than unmarked utterances.  
No higher differences for the marked utterance will be registered in the AOI lexical mean per 
word in the total reading time.  
  
Hypothesis IV B-2: Unmarked and marked focus structures are considered two types of 
focusing operations, implying two different intern processing patterns: one conceptual 
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(additive relation, all b1 conditions) and one procedural pattern (contrastive relation, all b2 
conditions). 
 
Hypothesis IV B-2a: Conceptual patterns will be oriented to the right-side of the utterance, 
since the assumptions are constructed based on the conceptual elements and no explicit 
contrast has to be made between alternative and focus.  
The assumption will be recovered with major processing effort for the focus element across 
parameters. Since focusing is detected early higher processing times are expected for the 
focus area already during the first-pass reading time that could be transferred to the second-
pass reading time and to the accumulative parameter total reading time (cfr. § 5.2.).  
 
Hypothesis IV B-2b: Procedural patterns are expected to be determined by the instruction of 
the FO. The FO articulates the information in the marked utterance while demanding more 
processing effort than all other conceptual elements of the utterance, but also by regulating 
the processing of the construction of the assumption (cfr. Loureda et al. 2015, Cruz and 
Loureda 2019). 
The regulation effect of the FO will facilitate processing. The FO absorbs processing effort 
from the other conceptual elements and requires higher processing effort in order to regulate 
the interpretation of the utterance. The impact of the conventional device will be visible in the 
comparison of the lexical mean, where the procedural element and the subject were excluded. 
It is expected that if the FO redistributes the values of the other conceptual elements of the 
utterances, there will be processing differences in the lexical mean between the conditions. 
Further, in the comparison of the focusing areas the elements of the marked utterances will 
require less processing effort than the elements of the unmarked utterance across parameters. 
Independently whether the utterances are processed as conversational implicature (b1) or 
conventional implicature (b2) it is expected that differences appear regarding the implicit or 
explicit alternative. 
 
Comprehension  
It is assumed, that the FO guides the inferential process conventionally by restricting the 
interpretation possibilities of the utterance during comprehension. In consequence, not only 
different processing patterns will be expected, but also different inferential processes during 
comprehension.  
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Hypothesis IV B-3: Unmarked utterances do not conventionally lead to a contrastive 
implicature, i.e. this type of utterances does not present a sufficient minimum stimulus to 
automatically activate an inferential contrastive process, in contrast to marked utterances 
that will lead to a contrastive implicature.  
In this regard, this will be reflected in a major heterogeneity between the answer possibilities 
(yes/no/unable to say), whereas for the b2-conditions a higher proportion of yes-answers is 
expected, independently of the extension of the alternative. On the contrary, for the b1-
conditions a major homogeneity is expected between the answer possibilities due to 
increasing interpretation variety and the absence of a procedural mark.  
 
6.1.3. Position of the focus operator in relation to the focus – Independent Variable C  
The IV C – Position of the FO regarding the focus has as its objective to analyze to what 
extend a position-shift of the FO (c1) effects the processing and comprehension of utterances. 
Therefore, two positions (b2, preposition of the FO, and c1, postposition of the FO) are 
isolated and tested in combination with the three cross-conditions of IV A – Extension of the 
alternative.  
 Since a position shift of a FO in an utterance can provoke a difference of the scope and 
consequently change the meaning of the whole utterance (cfr. Cuartero Sánchez 2002:68, 
NGLE 2009-2011:§ 40.4, § 40.8h, Loureda et al. 2014:99, DPDE online, s.v. incluso), this 
variable only isolates two positions of incluso. Thereby, it is controlled that the change of 
position does not include a change of scope. In all cases, the operator displays solemnly its 
instruction to the object of the utterance and has an unambiguous semantic scope (cfr. 
Loureda et al. 2014, and § 4.2., Table 4)136: 
 
IV A – Extension of the                                               
alternative 
IV C – FO-Position  
a1 – implicit alter-
native 
a2 – explicit single 
alternative 
a3 – explicit com-
plex alternative 
b2 – preposition of the FO  
b2a1 - Ana y 
Marta saben 
incluso chino. 
b2a2 - Ana y Marta 
saben inglés e 
incluso chino. 
b2a3 - Ana y Marta 
saben inglés, francés 
e incluso chino. 
c1 – postposition of the FO 
c1a1 - Ana y Marta 
saben chino 
incluso. 
c1a2 - Ana y Marta 
saben inglés y chino 
incluso. 
c1a3 - Ana y Marta 
saben inglés, francés 
y chino incluso. 
Table 4: Concrete token set IV C/IV A 
 
                                                 
 
136 The b2-conditions is considered the neutral structure with FO. They correspond with the unmarked position 
in IV C and in IV D-Degree of informativity with the structure where the instruction of the FO does not contra-
dict the world knowledge (cfr. § 7.3.). 
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Although both positions, unmarked and marked, introduce the same instruction, in which the 
presented informative structure has to be interpreted as contrastive scale, it is expected that 
the marked position will demand more processing effort (independently of the extension of 
the alternative), since this position is syntactical and informative less common and the focus 
operation cannot be processed ad hoc, but has to be processed a posteriori after reading all 
the conceptual elements belonging to the focusing operation.  
 
Utterances with preposition of the FO  Utterances with postposition of the FO 
processing effort for the construction of the first as-
sumption  
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
confirmation, modification or cancelation of the pre-
vious build assumption 
processing effort for the construction of the first as-
sumption 
+ 
additionally, processing effort for the reidentification 
and reevaluation of the elements of the focusing oper-
ation (during second-pass) 
+ 
 
confirmation, modification or cancelation of the pre-
vious build assumption 
Figure 5: Processing route IV C 
 
Hypothesis IV C-1: A postposition of the focus operator in relation to the focus leads to more 
processing effort. 
Differences in the dependent variables will be observable in the area of the total mean (global 
level of the utterance) with increasing values in the marked structure. Since FOs are syntacti-
cally more embedded in the utterance differences will already be observable during the first-
pass reading time at utterance level, and display also their effects at the later stage of pro-
cessing (second-pass reading time). Further, this will be reflected in the cumulative parameter 
total reading time. Differences are also expected to arise in the local areas of the elements 
belonging to the focusing operation, with higher processing effort for these areas in the utter-
ance with postpositional FO. These differences will also be observable across the three pa-
rameters.  
 
Comprehension 
In both positions, the FO introduces the same instruction and obliges the reader to interpret a 
contrastive scale. Although, this can lead to different processing patterns, in comprehension 
no differences should be observable, since the offline comprehension test only reports the 
product of a specific task. 
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Hypothesis IV C-2: The instruction of the focus operator in both conditions evokes a contras-
tive implicature, and, thus, no differences will be observable between the conditions.  
In both utterances, similar answer-distributions will be observable with a major heterogeneity 
between the answer possibilities (yes/no/unable to say). The heterogeneity will exhibit higher 
portions of yes-answers. 
 
6.1.4. Degree of informativity – Independent Variable D  
The IV D – Degree of informativity aims to assess to what extent the processing of utterances 
differs when the relation between procedural and conceptual information in an utterance are 
co- or anti-oriented to the context information and the common ground. Two conditions are 
differentiated: b2, utterances where the conceptual elements and the procedural device point 
to the same informative direction (congruous relation) and do not contradict the contextual 
information and d1, utterances where the conceptual units and the instruction of the FO are 
opposed to each other and, therefore, present an incongruous relation regarding the contextual 
information. Moreover, this variable intents to investigate to what degree the property of 
rigidity of the FO determines the processing and the comprehension of utterances (cfr. § 1.2.). 
As in all other IVs, the tested conditions are combined with the cross-variable IV A. 
 In both utterances, the grammatical and semantic structure not only codify the relation 
between the constituents that where necessary to build up the propositional content, it is also 
codified, anchored in the FO, the exact way in which the different elements have to be related 
to each other within a discursive model. In the b2- and d1-conditions the instruction of the FO 
is the same and the different organization of the conceptual elements have to be adjusted to 
the instruction, thus creating two different pragmatic scales in which the elements have to be 
ranged according to their informative value (Table 5): 
 
IV A – Extension of  
the alternative 
IV D –  
Degree of informativity  
a1 – implicit 
alternative 
a2 – explicit 
single 
alternative 
a3 – explicit 
complex alter-
native 
b2 –congruous relation 
b2a1 - Ana y 
Marta saben 
incluso chino. 
b2a2 - Ana y 
Marta saben 
inglés e incluso 
chino. 
b2a3 - Ana y 
Marta saben 
inglés, francés 
e incluso chino. 
d1 – incongruous relation 
d1a1 - Ana y 
Marta saben 
incluso inglés. 
d1a2 - Ana y 
Marta saben 
chino e incluso 
inglés. 
d1a3 - Ana y 
Marta saben 
chino, francés e 
incluso inglés. 
Table 5: Concrete token set IV D/IV A 
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In both conditions, the instruction of the FO conducts to the construction of an informative 
scale. The difference between the conditions lies in the relation between conceptual and pro-
cedural information according to the provided context. Assuming that the utterances of the 
b2-conditions are adaptable to the context (Chinese is more difficult than English) and that 
the utterances of the d1-conditions contradict the information stored in the common ground 
(English is more difficult than Chinese), it is expected that two different strategies will be 
conducted in order to integrate the information in the common ground (cfr. Portolés 
2007:146, Loureda et al. 2013:82). While the information of the b2-conditions will be inte-
grated by activating adaptable assumptions in the common ground (or if necessary creating an 
assumption ad hoc) (cfr. Beaver and Zeevat 2007, Escandell Vidal et al. 2011), another pat-
tern will arise for the d1-conditions, in which a different inferential route has to be construct-
ed based on an accommodation-process that leads to a modification or a cancelation of the 
assumptions (cfr. Portolés 2001 [1998]:262-263, and §§ 1.2. and 2.1., Figure 6): 
 
Utterance with congruous relation Utterance with incongruous relation 
processing effort for the construction of the first as-
sumption  
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
integration of the final assumption to the context  
processing effort for the construction of the first as-
sumption 
 
+ 
 
repair strategy by modification or cancelation of the 
first assumption 
+ 
integration or rejection of the final assumption to the 
context 
Figure 6: Processing route IV D 
 
Hypothesis IV D-1: Utterances with incongruous information in relation to the context re-
quire more reanalysis effort than congruous utterances. 
Differences in the dependent variable will become visible in the area of the total and lexical 
mean of the utterance with increasing values for the utterances with incongruous relation. 
Since it is assumed that repair-processes are executed at a later stage of processing differences 
between the conditions will become more apparent during the second-pass reading time. Nev-
ertheless, it is not excluded that differences will be reported also at the first-pass and the total 
reading time. Further, local differences are expected for the elements of the focusing opera-
tions (FO, focus and also alternative) between the conditions, demanding more processing 
effort for the focusing areas of the utterance with incongruous relation. The differences in the 
d1-conditions are expected to vary in relation to the cross-variable IV A where major differ-
ences will be observed if the conceptual information is extended (a3) in contrast to utterances 
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with single alternative (a2) or implicit alternative (a1), since more information has to be con-
sidered during the accommodation-process.  
 
Comprehension 
Even though in this variable in one condition the conceptual meaning and the procedural 
meaning are anti-oriented according to the context, it is assumed that the rigidity property of 
incluso will oblige the reader to the deduction of inferences. The comprehension task asks 
specifically for the instruction of the operator, therefore if the instruction of the FO is rigid it 
will determine the comprehension process by guiding the reader to the communicated infer-
ences, independently whether the in the utterance is co- or anti-oriented regarding the com-
mon ground. 
 
Hypothesis IV D-2: The rigidity of the focus operator conditions the comprehension of utter-
ances. The deduction of inferences is determined by the instruction; hence no differences will 
be observable between the conditions.  
Similar answer-distributions will be observable for both conditions. The answer distribution 
will be heterogeneously with a higher portion of yes-answers (similar to IV C). 
 
 
6.2. Dependent Variables and areas of interest 
 
In the presented eye tracking study fixations are used as principal metric of processing effort. 
The observed fixation times are analyzed in different ways to gather a more fine-grained 
overview of the cognitive behavior during reading. Therefore, dwell times are calculated to 
obtain different cumulative eye tracking parameters that are used as dependent variables of 
the current research: Total reading time, (Figure 7), first-pass reading time (Figure 8) and 
second-pass reading time (Figure 9, cfr. Hyönä et al. 2003, Holmqvist et al. 2011:190). 
 The total reading time137 corresponds to the sum of the duration of all fixations on an 
area of interest (from now on AOI; cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:389) and, therefore reflects the 
total time that is needed to extract the whole information of a specific AOI (Figure 7, sum of 
fixation 6+7+10 on the AOI incluso).  
                                                 
 
137 Total reading time, also called total dwell time, gaze duration, cumulative dwell time, glace duration, total 
viewing time, total viewing time, total fixation time, fixation cycle, and also time in zone, see Holmqvist et al. 
(2011) for further discussion of differences in terminology and specific definitions of these parameters.  
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Figure 7: Total reading time 
 
Assuming that processing during reading (lexical, syntactical, semantical and pragmatic in-
formation) is realized via parallel mechanisms and not serial mechanisms (cfr. Escandell 
Vidal 2004, Escandell Vidal 2005, Egorova et al. 2013), this measure encompasses not only 
the construction of the first assumption (at microstructural level), but also the recovery of the 
assumption during reanalysis. This measure reunites early and delayed effects, and provides 
an overview of the cumulative cognitive effort during reading. It reflects the effort needed to 
complete the assumption given by an ostensive stimulus (cfr. Inhoff and Radach 1998). Thus, 
the total reading time does not allow to distinguish between the effort needed for the construc-
tion of the initial assumption and the reanalysis in which the initial assumption has to be con-
firmed, enriched or corrected:  
 
Total dwell time seems to be sensitive to linguistic processes that operate after the word has been identi-
fied, the measure should be refined by separation dwell time during first reading from dwells on the same 
word in subsequent readings (Holmqvist et al. 2011:389). 
 
First-pass and second-pass reading times are more fine-grained measures and reveal detailed 
information about the construction and the reanalysis of the communicated assumption (cfr. 
Inhoff and Radach 1998, Hyönä et al. 2003, Holmqvist et al. 2011). 
 The first-pass reading time138 encompasses the duration of all fixations on an AOI be-
fore the reader leaves this AOI, in other words, it corresponds to the first visit or first reading 
on an AOI (Figure 8, sum of the fixations 6+7 at the AOI incluso): 
                                                 
 
138 First-pass reading time is also known as first pass dwell time, first pass gaze duration, first-pass fixation time 
or duration of the first fixation (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:309). 
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Figure 8: First-pass reading time 
 
During first-pass reading time the construction of the assumption at an early state of 
processing takes place. The reader constructs an assumption based on the lexical recognition 
of words, the search for matches with entries in the mental lexicon, the syntactic and semantic 
analysis of the utterance and the enrichment of the logical form (cfr. Escandell Vidal  
2004:81, Holmqvist et al. 2011:390). In this way, the reader forms an assumption on the basis 
of which an inferential process can be carried out. 
 The second-pass reading time139 corresponds to the re-reading time of an AOI once it 
first has been abandoned (cfr. Hyönä et al. 2003:316, Figure 9, fixation 10 on the AOI 
incluso):  
 
Figure 9: Second-pass reading time 
 
The second-pass reading time is a measure that acts as indicator of possible difficulties during 
reading (cfr. Rayner and Sereno 1994, Hyönä et al. 2003, Holmqvist 2011). It reflects the 
time needed for confirmation and readjustment of the communicated assumption because 
second-pass reading movements were made voluntary, when necessary for the interpretation 
of the communicated assumption.  
 Even though, no symmetrical correlation between the measures and processing levels 
can be defended (cfr. Escandell Vidal 2004, Pulvermüller et al. 2009, Egorova et al. 2013), 
many authors argue that subsequent reading times after the first-pass reading time reflect 
                                                 
 
139 Also referred to as second-pass dwell time, look-back fixation time or second-pass fixation time (cfr. 
Holmqvist et al. 2011:309). 
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delayed effects of processing (cfr. Rayner and Sereno 1994, Rayner 1998, Hyönä et al. 2003, 
Holmqvist et al. 2011, Nadal et al. 2017, Cruz and Loureda 2019), as to say, they reflect the 
reconstruction or reanalysis of the assumption: a confirmation, modification or cancelation of 
the previous assumption realized with the aim of optimizing the effort of the inferential 
process.140 In Figure 10 it can be observed how higher-order processing affects eye movement 
when the presented information in the utterance contradicts the common world knowledge:  
 
Figure 10: Regression path 
 
The FO incluso forces the reader to adapt the conceptual meaning to the instruction. The 
adaptation evokes numerous regressions to the areas that are involved in the focusing 
operation (mostly regressions back to the alternative and to the FO). The higher effort 
demandes (retrieved from the second-pass reading measure) is attributed to the reconstruction 
of the communicated assumption (cfr. § 7.3.). 
 
The assignment of AOIs141 is relevant in order to extract and calculate correctly the different 
measures to analyze the eye movement behavior of different conditions. Each AOI represents 
a region of the critical stimulus (condition of independent variable) about which information 
is gathered using the dependent variables (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011, Hessels et al. 2016). 
The selection of the AOIs of this study is chosen according to the research hypothesis and 
other specific factors (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:188-189, Hessels et al. 2016:1695): 
 
– each AOI is a homogeneous semantic area; 
– between each AOI there is a margin of one-character space; 
                                                 
 
140 The EZ-Reader model also supports this idea (cfr. Reichle et al. 1998, Reichle et al. 2003, Reichle et al. 
2009). They argue that low-order ongoing cognitive processes influence eye movement during reading and are 
executed somehow via serial mechanism, but “posit that higher-order processes intervene in eye movement con-
trol only when “something is wrong” and either send a signal to stop moving forward or a signal to execute a 
regression.” (Reichle et al. 2003:450). Therefore, it is assumed that delayed measures as second-pass reading 
time, or other measures that include regression durations reflect the time needed for reanalysis in order to derive 
correctly the communicated assumption.  
141 As it happens with various eye tracking terminology there is also no standard terminology for the term areas 
of interest. They are also known as region of interest, interest areas or zones. Following Holmqvist et al. 
(2011:187) the term areas of interest is used in this study, since it is the most established in eye tracking reading 
studies.   
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– there are no overlaps between the AOIs;  
– the minimal AOI size is measured according to oculometric acuity and the precision of 
the recorded data; 
– arbitrary AOIs are avoided; 
– In order to achieve comparability between the AOIs, each area is calculated for an aver-
age word with a fixed average number of characters (cfr. § 6.6.).  
 
The precise assignment of AOIs provides a clear scheme of different focusing patterns ac-
cording to different experimental conditions. In this study, two global and three local AOIs 
are defined. The local AOIs represent the main focusing areas in an utterance: alternative, FO 
and focus. In relation to the AOI alternative, the utterance could be composed by a minimal 
set: an explicit single alternative (one lexical element), as in: 
 
Ana y Marta saben inglés[alternative] e incluso[FO] chino[focus].  
(‘Anne and Martha know English[alternative] and even [FO] Chinese[focus].’)  
 
or by an explicit complex alternative (two lexical elements), as in:  
 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés[alternative] e incluso[FO] chino[focus].  
(‘Anne and Martha know English, French[alternative] and even [FO] Chinese[focus].’) 
 
In cases with complex explicit alternative a mean was calculated between both lexical 
elements to ensure that all areas can be compared regardless of the number of words. 
 Furthermore, to the analysis of the focusing areas, two global AOIs are isolated: times 
for an average word of the utterance (total mean) and for an average word with conceptual 
meaning (lexical mean).142 Both means are legitimate, but allow different observations. The 
total mean takes into account all elements of the utterance and allows a global view of the 
processing of focusing structures, as e.g. the global differences of a position-shift of the FO 
(cfr. § 7.2.) or when the degree of informativity is manipulated (cfr. § 7.3.). The lexical mean, 
however, excludes the processing time observed for the procedural element during the 
                                                 
 
142 In both means, elements with purely designatory value (as proper names, subject of the utterances) are ex-
cluded from the calculation. They do not have a logical entry and do not have the capacity to represent a reality. 
Thus, their function during the construction of a communicated assumption is merely identificatory (cfr. § 1.2.).  
Further the conjunction y/e was also excluded. Words under 4 characters have a high probability to be skipped 
(cfr. Drieghe et al. 2004, Drieghe et al. 2005). Indeed, during data treatment it was observed that the conjunction 
y/e was skipped 92% of the cases (cfr. § 5.2.). 
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construction of a mental representation and reflects the processing effort of the conceptual 
elements providing the net lexical value of an utterance (cfr. Cruz and Loureda 2019). 
Therefore, this mean provides insights of the effect that the procedural mark may have on the 
conceptual elements. For the analysis of the IV B – Focus marking where utterances with and 
without procedural mark are compared, the lexical mean is of special interest, since it allows a 
neat comparison of utterances with different number of words (cfr. § 7.1.).  
 
AOI Example Description 
single explicit alternative (ALT) 
complex explicit alternative (ALT) 
inglés  
inglés, francés 
Element that precedes the focus 
operator  
focus operator (FO) incluso 
procedural element that marks 
the focus as marked focus 
Focus (F) chino 
Element that could be unmarked 
or marked by the operator  
total mean (TM) 
Ana [y] Marta saben 
inglés [e] incluso chino 
Average of all words of the 
utterance 
lexical mean (LM) 
[Ana y Marta] saben inglés 
[e incluso] chino 
Average of all words of the 
utterance (except subject ele-
ment and focus operator) 
Table 6: Overview of the areas of interest 
 
 
6.3. Pre-test – Norming study 
 
The aim of the experimental study is to prove to what extent the focusing structures marked 
by the FO incluso influences processing during reading. Therefore, two norming studies were 
designed in order to corroborate previous linguistic intuition (cfr. Sperber and Noveck 2007, 
Noveck 2018) and to select the definitive and most clear critical stimuli for the eye tracking 
reading study and the comprehension test (cfr. Appendix E.).  
In order to prove the adaptability of the pragmatic scales in relation to the world 
knowledge, in a first step, 30 different scale topics were tested. 50 participants143 were asked 
to order elements of a list according to their world knowledge, i.e., 
 
Ordene los elementos, según su conocimiento del mundo. 
(‘Classify the given elements according to their difficulty in learning.’) 
 
                                                 
 
143 All native Spanish speakers and of the same population as the actual participants of the eye tracking reading 
experiment and comprehension test (cfr. § 6.5.). The study was executed with the application LimeSurvey 2.0 
and distributed electronically via email.  
 113 
(Rango: 1=menos presente en el conocimiento del mundo - 5=más presente en el conocimiento 
del mundo) 
(‘(Range: 1=less present in the world knowledge – 5=more present in the world knowledge)’) 
 
inglés francés chino italiano alemán 
1 3 5 2 4 
 
The results were statistically analyzed using the χ2 - squared test to discard the possibility that 
different given answers were due to chance (cfr. § 6.6.). The most homogenous scale order 
results were selected across participants. From 30 different scale topics, 20 final scale topics 
were chosen. Furthermore, each scale was reduced to three items that correspond to the alter-
native elements and the focus item. 
The second norming study144 (again, sample size: 50 participants, Spanish native speak-
er) was conducted to verify the scale orders of the 20 selected scales of the first norming 
study and to select the 15 final stimuli. In this study, the participants were asked to range the 
items according to a given context (cfr. Appendix E.), as i.e.,  
 
Ordene los elementos: Ana y Marta son profesoras de lenguas extranjeras en Madrid, 
donde llevan muchos años dando clase. Han viajado mucho juntas y hablan distintas 
lenguas como… 
(‘Classify the elements: Ana and Marta are foreign language teachers in Madrid, where they 
have been teaching for many years. They have travelled a lot together and speak different lan-
guages such as...’) 
 
inglés chino francés 
1 3 2 
 
Again, after a the χ2 - squared analysis, the final selection of the experimental items was car-
ried out due to three categories: It was differentiated between scales that are evoked by the FO 
and have little to no world knowledge, which means that without the instruction of the parti-
cle no significant order was established by the participants; and scales with predominant 
world knowledge, which means that, even without the instruction of the particle, these scales 
                                                 
 
144 In both norming studies the participants received instructions and were told afterwards of the purpose of the 
test. Both studies were designed using a counterbalancing model and pseudo-randomization (cfr. Arunachalam 
2013:224, Keating and Jegerski 2015:18). 
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were ordered internally by the participants. Moreover, the test revealed that some scales do 
not follow a specific internal order, but one element of the scale is recognized as more in-
formative. There were no significant results for an internal pre-order of the elements of the 
alternative, even though one element was always labelled as focus. We decided to add to the 
binary division of Portolés (2007)145 a third group of scales that could be adapted to world 
knowledge. However, in the statistical analysis of the eye tracking results the scale-variable is 
treated as random effect, since no statistical differences could be detected between the three 
scale-groups, as to say, no differences in the eye movement behavior could be observed ana-
lyzing the eye movements across the three established groups (cfr. § 6.6.). This leads to the 
conclusion that pragmatic scales are processed similar independently of the relation of the 
conceptual information to the world knowledge.   
 
 
6.4. Material and design  
 
The experimental study146 has been designed according to conventional guidelines of experi-
mental research in psycholinguistics to avoid undesirable noise in the data and to obtain statis-
tically analyzable results (cfr. Sandra 2009a, Arunachalam 2013, Gries 2013, Keating and 
Jegerski 2015, Seltman 2018). Therefore, the experiments fulfill three main requirements (cfr. 
Gries 2013:47):  
 
– Knowledge of the object of research. The experiments were designed in order that the 
participants do not know or capture during execution what is being investigated (learn-
ing effect).  
– Control of undesirable effects. The design was controlled for any possible undesirable 
or confounding effects.  
– Statistically analyzable and interpretable results. The design was accomplished in order 
that the observable values are generalizable after statistical treatment.  
 
                                                 
 
145 Portolés (2007) argues that in pragmatic scales the intern scale order is either binary, generating a contrast 
between the element of the alternatives (independently how many they are) and the focus element, or no order is 
established between the elements that constitute the scale (cfr. § 3.3.). 
146 For both studies, eye tracking reading study and comprehension test, the same experimental design was used 
to guarantee the comparability of the two complementary studies.  
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The experimental material was provided as follows. Each condition of the independent varia-
ble is composed by two items: one critical item and one consecutive item to control wrap-up 
effects (cfr. Keating and Jergerski 2015:5)147:  
 
Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino. Les gusta hablar en sus lenguas extranjeras. 
          critical item              consecutive item 
 
The utterances are presented in simple present tense and had a plural subject.148 All critical 
items have similar world knowledge and evoke an informative pragmatic scale (cfr. Portolés 
2007, 2009, 2010). Furthermore, each item presents the most possible neutral syntactic SVO-
structure and an informative focus structure. In this focus structure, the focus element always 
presents new information (cfr. Portolés 2010). Each focus structure can be provided with 
three different types of alternative extension): Implicit alternative, explicit single alternative 
or explicit complex alternative (cfr. § 6.1.1.). The alternative, implicit or explicit, had already 
been presented to the participants previously by a first slide that provided the participants 
with some context acting as background information for the critical item.149 All experimental 
items have the same syntactical and informative structure that allows to attribute the cognitive 
overload that can occur e.g. in the second-pass reading time to the difficulties that can arise 
during the reconstruction of the communicated assumption. 
 Other possible hidden variables and undesirable effects at utterance level are controlled 
to avoid false results, such as word frequency (all words in the utterance belong to high or 
very high frequency ranges (all words were among the 5,000 most frequent words in 
Spanish150, cfr. Almela et al. 2005) or word length (all words had between two and three 
syllables, cfr. § 5.2.). Furthermore, there was no possibility of ambiguity (polysemic and 
                                                 
 
147 Since the latter region of the critical item also coincides with the focusing area, the necessity of implementing 
a consecutive utterance was even more crucial to minimize possible wrap-up effects (cfr. Just et al. 1982, 
Keating and Jegerski 2015). The wrap-up effect (longer fixations at the end of an utterance or a paragraph) leads 
to different intra- and inter-clause integration processes, such as connection of proposition or searching for refer-
ents (cfr. Just et al. 1982:345). No data or analysis will be provided of the consecutive utterance, but it was 
previously proven that no spill-over effects are atached to this region that could correspond to the critical item.  
148 Simple Present to avoid confounding variables due to past or future tenses. Plural subject is implemented in 
order to guarantee that the participants are already guided in their eye movements when starting to read the fo-
cusing structure (starting at the alternative).  (cfr. § 5.2.). 
149 In order to seek a natural situation and to control every feature of the environment, all critical stimuli are 
embedded in a discursive context. It was proven that reading times differ in regard to utterances that are read 
with and without context. Utterances without a preceding context require more processing effort since the inte-
gration in the common ground has to be made ad hoc (cfr. Altmann and Steedman 1988, Grodner et al. 2005). 
150 Low frequency words can provoke longer or more fixations that can be observed already in early measures 
(as in first-pass reading time), therefore, high frequency words are selected in this study to ensure that the results 
between conditions were not due frequency factors (cfr. § 5.2.). 
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homonymous words are also avoided) within the utterances because of the specific context 
provided (cfr. Clifton et al. 2007, and § 5.2.). All words have a simple morphology and 
belong to general Spanish (to avoid diatopical effects). 
 The experiment study was created as within-subject design151 and was designed with 
three independent variables (IV): IV B – Focus marking; IV C – Position of the focus 
operator; IV D – Degree of informativity. Each of them was crossed with a fourth 
independent variable: IV A – Extension of the alternative. IV B has three experimental 
conditions152, IV C and IV D have two experimental conditions, and, IV A has three 
experimental conditions. Each condition is represented by one experimental item that 
corresponds to one level of the independent variable (as e.g. in IV B Focus marking: absence 
(b1) or presence (b2) of the FO). Two experimental items that are experimentally contrasted 
and analyzed in one independent variable constitute an experimental set and are lexically 
matched, that is, they differ only in one element (cfr. Arunachalam 2013:222, Gries 2013:48, 
Keating and Jegerski 2015:8, Loureda et al. in press, and § 6.1.).153 
 The number of conditions determines the number of versions of the experiment (the 
experiment should have as many versions as it does conditions, Gries 2013:48) The presented 
experiment is designed with a total amount of 15 conditions. All conditions of a version 
constitute a token set (cfr. Gries 2013:46-48).154 Concluding, 15 conditions lead to 15 
versions and to a total amount of 225 experimental items (cfr. Appendix C.). These 225 
                                                 
 
151 In contrast to a between-subject design in which it is relevant how the different participant groups behave 
under one specific condition and where each participant is exposed to just one condition. Whereas, in a within-
subject design it is not relevant to analyze the particular differences between participant groups, but moreover, 
the differences between conditions. Within-subjects design has the advantage that the hidden variable of the 
participant’s behavior does not influence the data. The data obtained between the conditions can be attributed to 
the research hypotheses (cfr. Arunachalam 2013:223). 
152 IV B has three experimental conditions: absence/presence of the FO and adjective restriction. The third 
condition allows to investigate to what extend the insertion of a conceptual restriction by an adjective determines 
the inferential processes during communication in comparison to an unmarked focus (condition absence of FO) 
and a marked focus (condition presence of FO). The insertion of the third condition was part of a substudy and 
will not be reported in this work. See Cruz and Loureda (2019) for a detailed discussion of the findings.  
153 The experimental set is lexically matched, because they have the same lexical elements and e.g. in IV B only 
the insertion of the FO incluso manipulates the critical item. The lexical matching preserves the internal con-
sistency of the critical items and guarantees the comparability of the experimental set (cfr. Keating and Jegerski 
2015:8). 
154 A token set encompasses all conditions of one version, that is, all experimental items of one topic or theme 
(e.g. world languages, beverages, etc.). Gries (2013:46) distinguishes between schematic token set which is a 
schematic tabular representation of all experimental conditions (cfr. Appendix A.) and concrete token set which 
represents the same scheme as the schematic token set, but with concrete items (cfr. Appendix C.). Normally, 
any study has one schematic token set and at least as many concrete token sets as the experiment has conditions 
(15 concrete token sets, in this study). 
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critical experimental items are distributed in 15 different experiment lists with a 
counterbalanced design (Latin square design155, cfr. Winer 1962, cfr. Appendix B.).  
 The counterbalanced design ensures that each experiment list is organized in a way that 
no condition or version (token set) is repeated in any experimental list in order to avoid order-
learning effects, and to prevent that participants develop specific reading strategies or become 
aware of the purpose of the research (cfr. Sandra 2009a:171-173, Gries 2013:47, Keating and 
Jegerski 2015:8-9).  
 In each experimental list the 15 critical items are balanced with 30 filler items in a ratio 
1:2.156 “The purpose of these noncritical items is to obscure the critical items and thus the 
specific research objectives from participants.” (Keating and Jegerski 2015:15). They 
minimize task effects by misleading the participants attention, i.e. showing different 
syntactical structures to avoid that specific utterance structures become predictable. The filler 
items157 belong to the same token set and are thus topic related to the critical items, but are 
presented in different syntactical structures. Besides the filler items, each critical item is 
contextualized. The context is composed by a photograph of the subjects of the critical item 
and provides a short description (cfr. § 6.4.). This context slide also accounts as distractor 
item. Context, critical item and filler items are embedded in a sequence block (cfr. 
Arunachalam 2013:224, Gries 2013:51, Keating and Jegerski 2015:18; Figure 11)158: 
 
 
Figure 11: Sequence block 
 
                                                 
 
155 Latin Square present an n x n array that is composed by n different elements. Each n occurs exactly once in 
each row and column (cfr. Winer 1962) 
156 It was proven that if the number of filler items is less than 50%, then the predictability of the experiment 
increases notably. Therefore, in this study opts for a 1:2 ratio and doubles the filler items in relation to the criti-
cal items.   
157 All filler items are kept constant across experiment lists, since they are not manipulated or analyzed and to 
control possible hidden effects due to lexical features. 
158 To avoid undesirable eye-related technical effects, such as visual corrections in the first fixation of each 
utterance, all critical items have a previous fix-cross. The fixation cross is set at the same position where the first 
letter of the first word of the stimulus is presented in order to prevent misleading fixations due to landing 
position effects (cfr. Keating and Jegerski 2015).  
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The sequence blocks were shown to the participants in a pseudo-randomized159 order to avoid 
undesirable effects with regard to the participants’ reading attention (cfr. Arunachalam 
2013:224, Sandra 2009a:171). Before the experiment starts with the actual experiment 
sequence blocks, the participant is provided with instruction (cfr. § 6.5.) and three practice 
sequence blocks that are topically unrelated to the experimental items. 
 
 
6.5. Participants, apparatus and procedure 
 
Participants 
Data was gathered from 300 participants accurately (20 participants for each experiment list, 
see cap Experiment Design).160 The participant-variable was controlled for (cfr. Arunachalam 
2013:225, Keating and Jegerski 2015:5, 27)161:  
 
– Native language. All participants are Spanish native speakers.   
– Age. All participants are between 18 and 40 years (mean age: 21.4, median: 20). 
– Gender. male (42.32%) and female (57.68%). 
– Education. All participants have a high level of education. At the time of the 
experiment, they all were university graduates or students so as to guarantee a 
homogenous group.162  
                                                 
 
159 That is, the experiment lists were manipulated so that the same sequence block always appears in a different 
position in the list, but the internal order of the sequence block remains untouched. That was provided, because 
“[…] data from any cognitive task are potentially affected by both (lack of) task familiarity and fatigue effects, 
which would most likely occur towards the beginning and the end of an experimental session respectively.” 
(Keating and Jegerski 2015:17). The pseudo-randomization is realized with the software program Mix (cfr. van 
Casteren and Davis 2006) to avoid repetition priming.  
160 The experiment was conducted with a total amount of 348 participants from whom 48 were discarded before 
saving the experiment-run due to technical problems or because they do not fulfill the participants requirements 
(as e.g. age, education, etc.): 23 participants were discarded due to bad calibration values, 18 were discarded for 
non-possible eye recording due to oculometric factors (as extreme myopic or hyperopic glasses) and 7 partici-
pants because they did not fulfill the requirements (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:141). 
161 The homogeneity of the participant variable is crucial for the success of the study. The aim of the 
homogeneity is that characteristics of the participants do not influence as hidden variable the outcome of the 
study. Therefore, according to each experiment properties, the sample should be controlled for undesirable 
effects, as e.g. reading techniques (cfr. Baddeley et al. 1975), different linguistic skills (cfr. Keating and Jegerski 
2015:27) or all kind of sociocultural and personal differences (cfr. Arunachalam 2013:225, see also Loureda et 
al. in press for an overview). 
162 All experiment lists were carried out at the Faculty of Philology, Translation and Communication of the Uni-
versity of Valencia, Spain, between 1st of February until 30th of march 2015 and 1st of September until 14th of 
October 2015. 
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– Naivety. All participants have naïve character, i.e. they did not know or could not 
predict the purpose of the study. Furthermore, they were no researchers in the linguistic 
field. 
– Reading speed. The individual reading speed of each participant was controlled by 
statistical methods. 
– Visual disorder. None of the participants present extreme visual disorders that could 
interfere with the eye tracking technique (normal or minimal corrected to normal 
vision). 
 
Personal information (as name, age, gender, origin, language skills, etc.) was collected, but 
treated as random effect for the data analysis. All participants gave their written consent to 
participate in the study. After the experiment was concluded they were told about the actual 
purpose of the study.163 
 
Eye tracking 
Data was recorded with a remote EYE TRACKER RED 500 from SMI Research (Sensomotor-
ic Instruments). The trails are shown on a computer screen where three characters equal 1° of 
visual angle. The system records eye movements with a sampling rate of 500 Hz and an accu-
racy of 0.4°. The experiment was programmed with the software SMI Experiment Suite 360° 
and for running the experiment the software iView X was used. The data export was conduct-
ed by the software SMI BeGaze (including the Reading package, needed for elaborating read-
ing experiments). In the laboratory the participants sat approximately 70 cm away from the 
monitor and the recording was binocular (an average was automatically calculated).  
 Eye tracking data is very sensitive to external factors, therefore the laboratory was set-
tled in order to avoid possible undesirable effects: only artificial neon light was used to mini-
mize the effect on data recording, since with the lightness the pupil size may change and for 
optimal data recording, brightness and small pupils are required (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 
2011:140).  Furthermore, the critical items were presented in a specific font and size, because 
eye lids and lashes could sometimes occlude the pupils; and eye movements are then recorded 
                                                 
 
163 Before the experiment started the participants were informed of the procedure they had to perform and that 
they could leave the experiment at any time if they feel uncomfortable. They were also informed that the results 
gained in the study will be published, but that no individual eye movement behavior will be analyzed across 
participants and that only means of all participants are relevant for publication. Finally, they were also told that 
their personal information remains confidential. All participants were compensated with a monetary payment. As 
Bowen and Kensinger (2017) show participant expenses allowance has to main advantages: On the one hand, it 
motivates to actually participate in the study, and, on the other hand, it maintains the concentration during the 
experiment performance at a constant high-level.    
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with less accuracy (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:119-121). In a previous study, different fonts 
and sizes were tested in order to provide the stimuli in an optimal manner. The results reveal 
that the critical items can be recorded with an optimal accuracy if presented in Font Calibri, 
size 72 pt. and with a margen between the lines of 28 pt164.  
 The task was designed as neutral as possible regarding the experimental and control 
conditions (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:132). Participants were asked to read silently the pre-
sented items on the screen and to move on after reading the stimuli.  
The instructions were presented to the participants on the screen before the practice trials 
started.165 Four main instructions were given to the participants:  
 
– Information about the reading experiment 
– Silent reading, at natural pace 
– Continuation by pressing the space bar. Each participant decided independently when to 
move on to the next stimulus in order to reduce inferences from the person conducting 
the experiment (self-paced reading method).166  
– No unnecessary moves, chin and forehead rest was used 
 
After the instructions and successful calibration167, the participants were shown three practice 
sequence blocks. After reading the practice trials they had an opportunity to ask final compre-
hension questions. Then, after a quick validation of the calibration the actual experiments 
started. The duration of the experiments was between 20-30 minutes, depending of the read-
ing speed of each participant.  
 
 
                                                 
 
164 The margin between lines is particular necessary for the AOI design to provide that the AOI margins do not 
overlap. 
165 This guarantees that all participants read the same instructions and that the experiment is not influenced by 
possible different instruction given by the experimenter. Thus, all possible experimenter effects can be negated 
(cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:77). 
166 To prevent that the participants, spend too much time at a stimulus, a time threshold was programmed. After 
5000 ms the stimulus will disappear automatically and the experiment continues. When a time threshold was 
activated, the stimulus was considered an outlier.  
167 Calibration is used to guarantee the exact recording of the pupil and corneal reflection. A nine-point calibra-
tion was done automatically by the software iView X. The nine points are distributed on the screen in the areas 
where the stimulus would appear (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 2011:129). A two-colored strategy (white point with 
intern red point) was used to facilitate calibration and provide the most accurate recording. The camera calcu-
lates the accuracy between the calibration point and the actual eye fixation. The average deviation should not 
differ more than 0.5° to guarantee accurate landing positions during reading. The validation guarantees the accu-
racy. A maximum of three calibration procedure were conducted for each participant; and the best calibration 
was always used. Only when calibration and validation was successful the experiment was started. 
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Comprehension test 
While the eye tracking experiment permits to observe the decoding strategies of the utterance 
and the reconstruction of the communicated assumption, the complementary comprehension 
test allows to analyse participants’ comprehension of the considered utterances. 
For the comprehension test the exact same material with the same experiment design was 
used as for the eye tracking experiment. 15 counterbalanced and pseudorandomized experi-
ment lists are created and programmed with the open-source software LimeSurvey 2.0. (cfr. 
Appendix F.) 
 The purpose of the experiment was to verify whether the critical item read in the eye 
tracking study was understood correctly. After reading the context trial and the critical stimuli 
(e.g. Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino/ (‘Anne and Martha know English and even 
Spanish’)) the participants were asked to answer a question, e.g. 
 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que inglés. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to know Chinese than English’) 
 
Sí 
(‘yes’) 
No 
(‘no’) 
No puede saberse 
(‘unable to say’) 
   
 
This type of question asks whether there is a sufficient minimum ostensive stimulus to trigger 
a scalar contrastive implicature according only to the explicit given information in the 
utterance. By using the mouse, the participant selects only one of the possible answers:   
 
– yes, which is equivalent to recognizing a contrastive implicature in the stimulus;  
– no, which is equivalent to not recognizing a contrastive implicature in the utterance; 
– unable to say, which is equivalent to recognizing an insufficient or weakly determined 
conventional stimulus in the utterance to achieve the contrast.  
 
To determine the association or independence of two qualitative variables we use the the χ2 - 
squared test, which contrasts two hypotheses of an independent variable: a null hypothesis or 
hypothesis of independence of the variables (H0) and an alternative hypothesis or hypothesis 
of association of the variables (H1, cfr. § 6.6.). The data and the results are presented after 
each discussion of the respective independent variable of the eye tracking study.  
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6.6. Data handling and statistical treatment 
 
After data collection a first quality check was made by examining the recorded data in the 
BeGaze Software in order to prepare the data for the export and thus for statistical analysis. 
All trials of the experiment in which track loss occurred were discarded or manipulated before 
the data analysis started. If the track loss occurs during the first-pass reading time the cells in 
the data report are left blank as missing data and discarded for the analysis. In contrast, miss-
ing values in the second-pass reading time are replaced with zeros to reflect that no rereading 
was made (cfr. Keating 2014:82). When the data was not accurately recorded the complete 
trails were removed before statistical analysis.  
 The exported data files (one Excel file per experiment list) contain much more infor-
mation than needed for the analysis of the independent variables and data segmentation was 
realized to conduct and facilitate a precise statistical analysis. After data segmentation some 
necessary information has to be added manually to the files, as token set information, more 
detailed condition information, or AOI adjustments in the complex alternative and other met-
ric parameters (first-pass reading time, first fixation, etc.).  
 In a second step, a statistical outlier handling was conducted. After a first consistency 
check where no consistencies in the data could be found, the detected extreme values were 
excluded by implementing a specific outlier handling. Based on theoretical evidence extreme 
values are excluded when (cfr. Pickering et al. 2000, Reichle et al. 2003, Recio Fernández et 
al. 2018):  
 
a) Any first skip. The mean per word was = 0 ms  
b) Any fast reader. When the mean per word was < 80 ms in the first-pass reading 
time and the second-pass was also < 80 ms;  
c) Any slow reader168. The mean per word was > 800 ms in the total reading time.  
 
The total amount of AOI observations was 19,915. The outlier handling was based on the 
AOI condition total mean of the utterance (4,454 observations). Of these observations, 564 
                                                 
 
168 The terms fast reader and slow reader correspond to a specific observation. In these cases, only the observa-
tions are discarded that belong to fast or slow reader, rather than all observations of the respective participant are 
discarded. This method ensures, that only specific data observation is eliminated and the data loss is minimized. 
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observations are considered extreme values (12.7%), most of which are due to technical 
problems related to the eye tracking software. Of the 564 extreme values: 
 
a) 91 observations (2%) were attributed to first skip,  
b) 559 observation (12.5%) to fast readers  
c) 8 observation (0.2%) to slow readers  
 
The statistical analysis169 of the study was carried out using generative additive mixed models 
(GAMM)170.The models were computed with the statistical software R (R Core Team 2018, 
cfr. Baayen 2008, Baayen et al. 2008, Fahrmeier et al. 2013, Bates et al. 2015, Kuznetsova et 
al. 2016). GAMM assume that the linear predictor depends on (unknown) smooth functions 
of some predictor variable and focuses on these smooth function inferences. Thus, the model 
correlates a univariate response variable Y, to a predictor variables X (cfr. Wood 2017). 
Therefore, GAMM are more flexible in terms of repeated measures (missing-at-random 
definition), since the data does not have to be perfectly balanced allowing missing values and 
outlier handling.171 Additionally, the analysis allows to include both, random and fixed effects 
(cfr.Barr 2008a:457, Holmqvist et al. 2011:93, Cunnings 2012:370).172 
 In this study, nine models were fitted for each dependent variable (total reading time, 
first-pass reading time, second-pass reading time, total amount of models: 27). The data 
reflects the values that are assigned by the GAMM for cumulative processing times per word 
in each area under consideration, so that all AOIs per condition are defined as fixed effects. 
The incorporated random effects (in order to guarantee that the found effects are due to the 
manipulation of the independent variable) to control hidden variables that could arise, e.g., 
because of repeated measurements, are: 
 
                                                 
 
169 Developed in collaboration with the statistical consulting Laboratory (StabLab) of the Ludwig-Maximilian 
University of Munich.  
170 The generative additive models are estimated using the R function “gam” and “predict.gam” from the 
package “mgcv” (cfr. Wood 2017). 
171 In contrast e.g. to ANOVA analysis that requires a normal distribution. For mixed models a normal distribu-
tion is not necessarily required, since the model holds for unbalanced data (cfr. Cunnings 2012:372). Currently, 
it is settled as the most appropriate statistical treatment for different psycholinguistic reading data analysis (cfr. 
Bowden et al. 2010, Baten et al. 2011). 
172 “A random factor is one for which we sample non-exhaustively from a larger population, with the goal of 
generalizing to that population […]. A fixed factor is an independent variable that we want to include in our 
analysis, that is, the manipulation of interest.” (cfr. Arunachalam 2013:226) 
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– participant-variable (individual reading speed). Variance of the participant variables is 
controlled to minimize the heterogeneity of the participants (cfr. Holmqvist et al. 
2011:85). 
– token-set. To ensure that the different topics of the sets do not interfere. 
– word length. Each AOI was predicted assuming a fixed average number of characters 
per word of 6.35 to guarantee the comparability between different AOIs.  
 
For each model one hypothesis is tested: whether the reading times between the total mean of 
the utterance differ between conditions. According to the high number of hypothesis tests 
across models all p-values are corrected using the Holm-Bonferroni Method to reduce the 
possibility of getting erroneous results (i.e., Type I error, cfr. Holm 1979, and Appendix D.). 
 The fact that each computed model contains more than one pairwise comparison and the 
fact that p-values do not reflect the magnitude of the differences between two tested 
conditions (Type M(agnitude) error) encourages an analysis for an interpretation of the data 
based on the effect magnitude and estimated relevance (cfr. Vasishth et al. 2018:2). In order 
to interpret the obtained estimate values, an effect-scale was developed based on theoretical, 
empirical and statistical evidence (Table 7). The minimum magnitude for differences between 
conditions is set on 5%. However, based on empirical evidence of different reading studies 
(cfr. Cruz and Loureda 2019, Nadal and Recio Fernández 2019, Loureda et al. in press) a 
margin of 1% is given to describe small tendencies of differences between conditions. Upon 
5% to 9,99% are taken as a medium effect, those from 10% to 19,99% indicate large effects 
and differences over 20% are considered very large effects. 
 
Scale  Effect 
> 20% Very large effects 
 10% – 19.99% large effects 
5% – 9.99% medium effects 
4 – 4.99% small effects 
< 3.99% trivial effects 
Table 7: Effect scale – Magnitude 
 
Comprehension test 
For the statistical analysis of the comprehension task a χ2 test was applicated. The statistical 
hypothesis test assumes that the sampling distribution of the test statistic represents a χ2 distri-
bution when H0 is true. The χ2 test was implemented to determine whether there are signifi-
cant differences between two qualitative conditions of one variable, that is, whether there are 
significant differences between the observed answer frequencies comparing two conditions, 
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e.g. b2a2 vs. c1a2. If the observed results differ significantly from the theoretical defined 
conditions, H0 is rejected and H1 can be affirmed true concluding that the compared condi-
tions are related to each other. On the contrary, the veracity of H0 is confirmed and it is af-
firmed that the variables are independent. As it is standard in social science, for the study an 
alpha value of .05 was taken as reference with a critical value for the rejection of H0 of 5.991 
(=X2crit; being H1 affirmed at a value equal or superior to 5.991(X
2
obt ≥ X2crit), cfr. Pagano 
2011:452). 
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7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The analysis of the results encompasses the three main IVs: IV B – Focus marking (cfr. § 
6.1.2.), IV C – Position of the focus operator in relation to the focus (cfr. § 6.1.3.) and IV D – 
Degree of informativity (cfr. § 6.1.4.). The cross-variable A – Extension of the alternative will 
be examined in each of the main IVs (cfr. § 6.1.1.), starting always with the analysis of the 
utterances with explicit alternatives (single and complex alternative) and, henceforth, 
presenting the data for the utterance with implicit alternative. In each discussion of the IVs the 
data of the processing (eye tracking study) will be treated first and subsequently the data for 
comprehension will be discussed.  
 
 
7.1. Focus marking  
 
The analysis of the IV B – Focus marking aims to assess to what extent utterances with 
unmarked (b1) and marked focus (b2), with the same SVO-Structure, but with different 
informative schemes, differ during processing and comprehension. It will be also examined to 
what extent the insertion of the FO guides, according to its properties, the reader towards the 
intentionally communicated assumptions and the recovery of inferences (cfr. § 6.1.2.).   
Regarding the cross-variable IV A it will be examined whether implicit and explicit 
alternative structures interfere in the processing of utterances. It is assumed that implicit 
structures require more processing effort due to their semantical underdeterminacy, and that 
explicit focus structures demand less processing effort due to the informative guidance of the 
conceptual and procedural elements of the utterance.  
 
7.1.1. Utterances with explicit single alternative 
 
b1a2 – Ana y Marta saben inglés y chino.  
b2a2 – Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino. 
 
When the alternative is explicitly given in form of a minimal set in the utterances, the focus 
information has to be related directly to the background information in order to construct an 
additive relation in the utterance with unmarked focus, or a contrastive relation in utterances 
with marked focus. The insertion of the FO incluso evokes a direct contrastive relation be-
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tween the focus and the explicit alternative, i.e. the FO activates a pragmatic scale between 
two informative values in which the alternative is presented as a subset of a paradigm that is 
given in the discourse (cfr. Rooth 1985, 1992, 1996, É. Kiss 1998:245, Gundel and Fretheim 
2004, Kenesei 2006:241).  
 
Global Comparison  
By examining the cumulative reading values of the total reading time of each utterance, 
globally no relevant differences were registered for the lexical mean (< 4%, trivial effect, 
Table 8) which reflects the processing effort of the conceptual elements and provides the net 
lexical value of the utterances allowing the direct comparison between both conditions (cfr. 
Cruz and Loureda 2019 and § 6.2.). This result reveals a relevant finding: Even though 
unmarked and marked structures present different informative relations that theoretically rely 
on different syntactic and semantic processes, they globally require analogous processing 
times. Adding a FO implies adding more procedural information, but this added information 
does not lead to more cognitive effort for the whole utterance.  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a2) 
Marked condition 
(b2a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference   
  % 
Lexical mean 234.55 ms 243.46 ms 8.91 ms 
3.80% 
trivial effect 
Table 8: Total reading time – global comparison – IV B with explicit single alternative 
 
In order to get a more differentiate picture of the processing effort during reading the time 
corresponding to the construction of the first assumption (first-pass reading time) can be 
separated from the reconstruction or reanalysis (second-pass reading time). The analogous 
processing effort that was observed in the total reading time is also found during the first-pass 
reading time (< 4%, trivial effect, Table 9), indicating that during the construction of the first 
assumption none of the structures demand more cognitive effort.  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a2) 
Marked condition 
(b2a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Lexical mean 181.75 ms 185.14 ms 3.39 ms 
1.87% 
trivial effect 
Table 9: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV B with explicit single alternative 
 
Re-reading strategies (second-pass reading time) of the whole utterance draw a different 
picture: The data observed for the lexical mean present a large increase for the marked 
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utterance, which means that 10.68% more processing effort is required for marked structures 
(Table 10).  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a2) 
Marked condition 
(b2a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference      
% 
Lexical mean 52.36 ms 57.95 ms 5.59 ms 
10.68% 
large effect 
Table 10: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV B with explicit single alternative 
 
In particular, the findings indicate that a marked structure triggers higher reanalysis effort of 
the conceptual elements of the utterance, what can be considered as an indicator of contrast, 
since the parameter of the lexical mean during the second-pass reading time reveals precisely 
the cognitive effort during the processes of confirmation, enrichment or correction of the 
conceptual elements that were driven by a procedural mark.  
 The insertion of the FO incluso conventionally evokes a contrast relation between the 
explicit alternative and the focus element. The added procedural information to the utterances 
activates more cognitive effort during the reanalysis of the assumption (large increases in the 
second-pass reading time, Table 10) in relation to an unmarked structure. The findings are 
theoretically justified, because the insertion of incluso conventionally affects, due to its 
properties of asymmetry and rigidity (cfr. § 1.2.) the contrast relation between the lexical 
elements of the utterance (alternative and focus). A contrastive scale is tied to more reanalysis 
since a scale is not constructed “by default” by the reader: An explicit instruction is required 
to subsequently reidentify the lexical elements: The reader reevaluates the elements of the 
focusing operation in order to establish a contrastive relation. 
 Nevertheless, the higher processing effort for the marked structure during the reanalysis 
is not reflected in the total reading time, which leads to the conclusion that this processing 
effort can be considered as “additional regulatory effort” to establish a contrastive scale 
triggered by the FO. The insertion of the FO adds more procedural information to an 
utterance, but, simultaneously, the instruction guides the reader to the correct assumption 
while minimizing the processing effort at global level to the effort of an unmarked structure 
(cfr. Cruz and Loureda 2019).   
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
The analogous reading times in the global comparison do not necessarily mean that the inter-
pretation of the utterances is derived according to similar processing strategies. The insertion 
of the FO provokes a redistribution of the informative values for the areas of the focusing 
 129 
operation (alternative and focus) in the cumulative parameter, showing medium increases for 
the focusing elements in the marked utterance: The marked alternative (225.90 ms) requires 
6.29% more processing effort than the unmarked alternative (212.54 ms, medium effect). 
Likewise, the marked focus (245.78 ms) demands 7.27% more processing effort than the un-
marked focus (229.13 ms, medium effect, Table 11):  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a2) 
Marked condition 
(b2a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference  
 % 
Alternative 212.54 ms 225.90 ms 13.36 ms 
6.29% 
medium effect 
Focus operator - 263.37 ms - - 
Focus 229.13 ms 245.78 ms 16.65 ms 
7.27% 
medium effect 
Table 11: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV B with explicit single alternative 
 
By way of explanation, the relative values of the respective marked focusing areas increase if 
a conventional device affects directly the elements. Thus, the utterance with unmarked focus 
constitutes a minimal form for an unmarked focusing operation (additive relation) that is 
processed without major cognitive effort for the local areas, whereas the processing of an 
utterance in which a procedural regulation acts upon other elements tends to generate local 
major cognitive effort. According to the focusing areas, the findings reveal three relevant 
claims: 
 
– Focus. The relative effort for a focus increases if there is a procedural instruction that 
acts upon it (Table 12). The additional effort indicates that in utterances with marked 
focus a contrastive scale has to be built in order to derive the correct assumption. The 
conventional mark displays its instruction directly upon the focus element and obliges 
to reevaluate the element to fulfil the instruction.  
– Focus operator. In marked structures the FO, being the most demanding element dis-
plays its regulatory function to determine the processing effort of alternative and focus 
(contrast activation). Both conceptual elements are processed in relation to the instruc-
tion of the FO. The balancing effect of the FO on the focusing areas ensures a guided 
processing of a contrastive inferential route in marked structures, whereas in unmarked 
structures it is assumed that no contrastive implicature is activated and a simple additive 
operation is performed. Concluding, in normal focusing conditions without further 
remarks, at global level the processing value of the FO constitutes the maximum limit 
for the processing effort for the focus and the alternative (see also similar studies, 
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Loureda et al. 2013, Loureda et al. 2015, Cruz and Loureda 2019, cfr. Table 8 and Ta-
ble 11).  
– Alternative. As occurs in the focus area, in marked structures, the role of the alternative 
is more relevant than in unmarked structures, suggesting that the instruction of the FO is 
also displayed to the area of the alternative. This is theoretically sustainable because it 
is assumed that a marked alternative is only activated in structures, in which the FO ob-
ligatorily activates a contrast. Only in these cases, the alternative is labelled effectively 
as “marked alternative”, whereas in unmarked structures the “unmarked alternative” is 
only activated if other contextual factors trigger it (Table 11). 
 
During the construction of the first assumption, the comparison of both foci presents a 
medium effect (192.79 ms vs. 182.23 ms, -5.48%, medium effect). Considering that already 
during the construction of the first assumption the FO is the most effort demanding area, it 
can be argued that the instruction of the conventional device produces an immediate 
regulatory-effect upon its scope in order to fulfil the contrastive relation exhibit by its 
instruction, suggesting that the instruction of the focusing operation is displayed early during 
processing.  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a2) 
Marked condition 
(b2a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Alternative 163.35 ms 169.30 ms 5.95 ms 
3.64% 
trivial effect 
Focus operator - 217.38 ms - - 
Focus 192.79 ms 182.23 ms -10.56 ms 
-5.48% 
medium effect 
Table 12: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV B with explicit single alternative 
 
On behalf of the alternatives no relevant effects are found (163.35 ms vs. 169.30 ms; < 4%, 
trivial effect, Table 12) during the first-pass reading time. This finding is also theoretically 
defendable, since the alternative, either conventional or possible as a conversational 
implicature, can only be labelled as alternative after the processing of the focus or in relation 
to the instruction of the FO. The data of the first-pass reading time only reveal the processing 
of the first reading and does not include re-reading times. Therefore, possible effects at the 
alternative area are mainly displayed during later measures (second-pass reading time) or 
cumulative parameters (total reading time, see also Cruz and Loureda 2019).  
 
The major processing effort for the elements of the marked structure that become apparent 
during the total reading time is mostly due to higher processing effort generated in the 
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second-pass reading time in which the alternatives (48.54 ms vs. 55.99 ms) differ 15.35% 
from each other (large effect) and the foci (35.59 ms vs. 44.16 ms) 24.08% (very large effect, 
Table 13): 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a2) 
Marked condition 
(b2a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 48.54 ms 55.99 ms 7.45 ms 
15.35% 
large effect 
Focus operator - 46.01 ms - - 
Focus 35.59 ms 44.16 ms 8.57 ms 
24.08% 
very large effect 
Table 13: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV B with explicit single alternative 
 
In both focusing areas (alternative and focus) the elements of the unmarked structure require 
notably less processing effort than the elements of the marked structure. These results support 
the findings of the total reading time and argue that in unmarked utterances a compensation 
strategy (“check and balances”-strategy) is performed: the reader seems to re-read the focus-
ing areas to check whether the function initially assigned during the first-pass still holds in 
order to recover properly the information for a mere additive relation. Furthermore, during the 
recovery of a contrastive relation a different strategy seems to be carried out in utterances 
with marked focus (Table 13). The additional effort for the alternative and focus area origi-
nates at the FO173: the conventional function forces an integration towards the procedural in-
struction. Therefore, the reader, induced by the FO, pursues a different strategy (“check and 
reevaluate”-strategy) during the second-pass reading time. The focusing areas affected by the 
instruction are reconsidered to check and reevaluate background and scope of the contrastive 
relation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
173 The early activated instructional value of the FO arises due to its rigid characteristic, since the instruction is 
not a flexible element it is not exposed to changes and, therefore, is faster accessible. The FO constitutes the 
most effort demanding area (already during first-pass reading time), but also reflects its impact during later 
measurements. The fact, that differences between the other focusing areas are observable during second-pass 
reading time (for the focus already slightly during first-pass reading time) demonstrate that the FO is the element 
that conventionally marks a contrastive relation and is a starting point from which an inferential process is acti-
vated (see also Cruz and Loureda 2019). 
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7.1.2. Utterances with explicit complex alternative  
 
b1a3 – Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y chino.  
b2a3 – Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso chino. 
 
The informative scheme of utterances with explicit complex alternative is analogous to the 
scheme of utterances with explicit single alternative. Consequently, two different processing 
patterns are expected: One, conventionally marked by the instruction of the FO, and, another 
unmarked pattern, that underlies an additive relation. As in utterances with single alternative, 
the explicit alternative is presented as a subset of a paradigm in discourse (cfr. § 7.1.1.). It is 
assumed that the conceptual enrichment of the alternative determines the processing of the 
focusing operations, depending on the informative utterance structure. In unmarked structures 
a complex additive relation is evoked in which the insertion of new information in a set of 
alternatives can be tied to higher processing effort. Whereas the conceptual enrichment in 
marked utterances interplaying with the co-oriented instruction of the FO can facilitate the 
processing effort for the recovery of a contrastive implicature.  
 
Global comparison 
The increase of conceptual information in form of a complex alternative in the respective 
utterances provokes slightly different results at the global level of processing (total reading 
time) in comparison with utterances with single alternative. The values of the lexical mean 
present a small effect in the comparison (-4.97%, small effect, Table 14), supporting a 
theoretical claim: The insertion of a FO, implying that more procedural information is 
introduced to an utterance, not only does not add extra effort to the utterance, but, in 
combination with a lexical chain-alternative, it can actually minimize the processing effort of 
the other conceptual elements of the focusing operation (approx. 5%).  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a3) 
Marked condition 
(b2a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Lexical mean 242.37 ms 230.33 ms -12.04 ms 
-4.97% 
small effect 
Table 14: Total reading time – global comparison – IV B with explicit complex alternative 
 
The differences observed in the lexical mean during the total reading time are also observable 
in the first-pass reading time (-6.31%, medium effect, Table 15). During the construction of 
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the first assumption, the conventionally evoked contrastive relation in utterances with high 
semantic saturation (given by the explicit set of alternatives) is realized with minor processing 
effort in comparison to utterances where the assumption can only be derived by the 
conceptual elements. The findings indicate that in utterances with marked focus the 
construction of a complex additive relation is activated at an early stage, since the integration 
of new information within a set of alternatives in a paradigm generates major processing 
effort (Table 15). In utterances with marked focus, in turn, the FO activates an immediate 
“processing-benefit effect” during the construction of the first assumption. In line, with the 
conceptual information of the complex alternative, the instruction displays its function ad hoc 
upon the conceptual elements under its scope and provokes a saturated guided processing 
minimizing to a maximum the processing effort of the whole utterance (observable during the 
total reading time, Table 14). 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a3) 
Marked condition 
(b2a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Lexical mean 196.49 ms 184.09 ms -12.40 ms 
-6.31% 
medium effect 
Table 15: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV B with explicit complex alternative 
 
The effects observed in the first-pass reading time (and partly in the total reading time), are 
levelled out during the recovery of the first assumption (second-pass reading time). No 
differences are registered for the lexical mean (< 4%, trivial effect, Table 16): 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a3) 
Marked condition 
(b2a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Lexical mean 45.49 ms 45.94 ms 0.45 ms 
0.99% 
trivial effect 
Table 16: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV B with explicit complex alternative 
 
The insertion of more conceptual information in combination with a procedural mark does not 
signify more processing effort neither during the construction of the first assumption (Table 
15) nor for the recovery of the assumption during second-pass reading time (Table 16). If the 
conceptual information and the procedural instruction are co-oriented to the world knowledge, 
a processing-benefit is activated.174 This is theoretically sustainable since both linguistic 
                                                 
 
174These findings are divergent to the results provided by the analysis of utterances with explicit single alterna-
tive (cfr. § 7.1.1.). In utterances with explicit single alternative, the insertion of a FO generates higher processing 
effort for marked utterances during second-pass reading time. The processing effort is attributed to the instruc-
tion of the FO, that affects conventionally the contrast relation between the constituents and obliges to reevaluate 
the elements in order to fulfil the instruction. The single alternative cannot be considered a device that facilitates 
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devices are not opposed to the mental representations that are stored in the memory and, thus, 
guide the reader to the same scalar interpretation, so that only slight confirmation of the 
assumption becomes necessary during the reanalysis (cfr. § 7.3.).  
A similar reanalysis pattern is found for unmarked utterances: Even though, the 
integration of new information in the background information provokes immediately higher 
processing effort in order to process a complex additive relation (Table 15), no higher 
reanalysis effort is required, since no modification or cancellation of the first assumption has 
to be made. During the recovery of the assumption, the reader is guided, either by a 
conceptual device (unmarked structure) or by the combination of a conceptual and procedural 
device (marked structure). The added procedural mark ensures guided processing in order to 
recover correctly the communicated assumption and minimizes the processing effort to the 
levels of an unmarked structure.  
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
The comparison of the lexical mean already gave a hint that the insertion of incluso in these 
types of utterances provokes different processing values for the focusing areas (Table 14). In 
fact, the insertion of a FO in utterances with complex alternative provokes a processing 
benefit for the areas of the focusing operation in the total reading time. The marked 
alternative (226.35 ms) requires 4.04% less processing effort (small effect) than its 
counterpart in unmarked utterances (235.87 ms, Table 17), likewise the marked focus (244.33 
ms) needs 6.90% less processing effort than the unmarked focus (medium effect, Table 17): 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a3) 
Marked condition 
(b2a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Alternative 235.87 ms 226.35 ms -9.52 ms 
-4.04% 
small effect 
Focus operator - 239.04 ms - - 
Focus 262.44 ms 244.33 ms -18.11 ms 
-6.90% 
medium effect 
Table 17: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV B with explicit complex alternative 
 
A FO affects directly the elements of the focusing operation by determining their processing 
effort. If the conceptual information of these areas is co-oriented to the contextual information 
and to the instruction of the FO (in marked utterances), the processing effort of these areas 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the processing, since it has to be reevaluated in order to be redefined as part of a focusing operation. Even 
though, the instruction of the FO is the same in the comparison of the utterances with complex alternative, pro-
cessing patterns are reversed, indicating that the increase of conceptual information in combination with the 
presence of the FO leads to a more guided processing already during the construction of the assumption resulting 
in minimized reanalysis effort.  
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decreases, in comparison either to utterances without a procedural mark (Table 17) or either, 
to utterances with less conceptual information (cfr. § 7.1.1., Table 11). In other words, in 
combination with the conceptual information of the alternative, the additional procedural in-
formation of the FO does not mean extra cognitive effort for the focusing areas (neither at 
global level, Table 14) in comparison to an unmarked structure. The FO (239.04 ms) displays 
its regulatory function and determines the processing effort of alternative and focus in order to 
establish a contrast relation in which a marked focus not only has to be integrated in a given 
set of alternatives, but the reader has to interpret its scalar value. The effect of the FO and the 
co-oriented lexical information of the alternative ensure a guided processing to construct and 
recover the communicated assumption with less processing effort. On the contrary, by ab-
sence of a conventional device, the interpretation of an additive relation is tied to more pro-
cessing effort for the constituents of the utterance (Table 17), which is an indicator that the 
integration of new information (unmarked focus) constitutes a complex cognitive operation.  
 
During first-pass reading the patterns of the total reading time for the focusing areas are re-
peated: Again, the alternative of the marked utterance (184.71 ms) demands 4.21% less pro-
cessing effort than the unmarked alternative (192.82 ms, small effect), and the marked focus 
(199.61 ms) even demands 10.47% less processing effort than the unmarked focus (222.95 
ms, large effect, Table 18): 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a3) 
Marked condition 
(b2a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Alternative 192.82 ms 184.71 ms -8.11 ms 
-4.21% 
small effect 
Focus operator - 189.85 ms - - 
Focus 222.95 ms 199.61 ms -23.34 ms 
-10.47% 
large effect 
Table 18: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV B with explicit complex alternative 
 
The elevated processing effort for the alternative and the focus in unmarked structures reveals 
that complex additive operations are executed early during processing and that the integration 
of new information in a given set of alternatives is realized in situ while processing the 
unmarked focus. This major processing effort in the focusing areas is trespassed to the whole 
processing of the utterance. The lexical chain of the complex alternative acts thereby as 
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device in order to construct the complex additive relation and, hence, requires more 
processing effort.175  
Contrarily, in marked structures, the insertion of the FO seems to regulate and control 
the processing effort of the focusing areas (“regulatory-effect” of the FO) leading to the 
construction of the first communicated assumption with minor processing effort for both areas 
in comparison to unmarked structures. With the results of the analysis of the utterances with 
explicit single alternative in mind (cfr. § 7.1.1., Table 13), it can be hypothesized that the 
instruction of the FO will display its whole function during later stages of processing, since 
the instruction of the FO obliges the reader to modify the assumption by re-evaluating the 
informative value of the focusing elements in order to interpret the contrastive scale.  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a3) 
Marked condition 
(b2a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 42.48 ms 41.15 ms -1.33 ms 
-3.13% 
trivial effect 
Focus operator - 49.23 ms - - 
Focus 38.78 ms 44.10 ms 5.32 ms 
13.72% 
large effect 
Table 19: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV B with explicit complex alternative 
 
The insertion of the FO in an utterance with complex alternative produces an immediate 
global effect during first-pass reading time (no higher values for the marked utterances (Table 
18), that remains also during the reanalysis. The instruction forces the construction of a 
contrastive scale and this operation is tied to slightly more processing effort at the area that is 
directly affected by the FO: the focus. Further, the alternatives do not differ from each other 
during reanalysis: (42.48 ms vs. 41.15 ms, -3.13%, trivial effect, Table 19), that is, both 
require the analogous processing effort in order to be recovered.  
The marked focus (44.10 ms), otherwise, seems to play a decisive role during the 
recovery of the communicated assumption: It demands 13.72% more processing effort than 
the unmarked focus (38.78 ms, large effect, Table 19). The higher processing effort for the 
marked focus originates in the instruction of the FO, the most effort demanding area during 
the second-pass reading time. The FO entails the instruction to articulate the phoric relation 
                                                 
 
175 While processing the second element of the alternative it is assumed that parafoveally the reader already 
detects the following conjunction and possibly part of the focus (interpreted by higher processing effort for the 
second element of the complex alternative), i.e. while processing the complex alternative already an additive 
relation has to be performed triggered by the syntactical and semantic structure of the complex alternative result-
ing in higher processing effort for this area during first-pass reading time. These findings are not detected in 
utterances with single alternative; it is assumed that a single alternative does not solemnly constitute a sufficient 
stimulus to trigger an additive relation on its own. In order to perform an additive relation, the processing of 
alternative and focus are required.  
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between alternative and focus and, thus, obliges the reader to insert a marked focus within a 
set of alternatives.176  
 
The different processing patterns observed in the analysis of utterances with complex alterna-
tive across parameters support the theoretical claim that was already formulated in the analy-
sis of the utterances with single alternative. Independently of the extension of the alternative, 
two main focusing patterns can be described: unmarked and marked.  
It can also be defended that during reanalysis, a compensatory strategy (“check-and-
balances-strategy”) is performed in unmarked structures. Re-reading is only executed to check 
whether the complex additive relation assigned during first-pass reading time, still holds for 
the recovery of the communicated assumption. On the contrary, marked structures execute a 
different strategy of reanalysis. The additional extra effort for the marked focus is triggered 
by the instruction of the FO. It forces an integration towards the procedural instruction and 
obliges to redefine and reevaluate the informative values of the focusing areas (check-and-
reevaluate-strategy), and, when necessary, modifies or corrects the first assumption. However, 
this reanalysis effort is only produced at the focus area and do not transcendent to the utter-
ances level.  
The difference between explicit single and complex alternative lies precisely in the 
function that inhibit the conceptual information. Findings reveal that extending the conceptual 
information can produce two different effects, according to the presence or absence of the FO.  
Without FO the extended complex alternative evokes a complex additive relation that is tied 
to major global processing effort, whereas in combination with a procedural mark it supports 
the instruction of the FO and minimizes the processing effort of contrastive relations.  
In conclusion, the results obtained across the three parameters, support relevant theoretical 
claims for utterances with explicit alternative (single and complex):  
 
a) The added procedural information provokes a regulatory-effect that minimizes the 
processing effort in marked utterances to the level of an unmarked structure (dur-
ing total reading time, Table 11 and 18) 
                                                 
 
176 In the analysis with explicit single alternative the reader relies primarily on the two constituents (mainly on 
the alternative) to recover the contrastive assumption. The FO forces to reevaluate both constituents and contrast 
them with each other (alternative and focus demand higher processing effort, Table 13). In utterances with com-
plex alternative the operation seems slightly different. The reader does not contrast two single elements to each 
other, but integrates a marked focus in an already given set of alternatives (only local higher processing effort for 
the focus, Table 13).  
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b) (Complex) additive relations are activated early (Table 18), whereas contrastive 
relations seem to be recovered mainly at later processing stages (Table 19). 
 
7.1.3. Utterances with implicit alternative  
 
b1a1 – Ana y Marta saben chino. 
b2a1 – Ana y Marta saben incluso chino. 
 
Considering that utterances with implicit alternative are semantically highly underdetermined, 
it is expected that they present different processing patterns of focusing operations according 
to the absence or presence of the FO that differ from the patterns observed in the utterances 
with explicit alternatives.  
In unmarked structures, new information has to be identified and integrated within the 
discursive context in order to establish an additive relation, whereas in marked utterances 
additionally a scalar structure has to be codified as conventional implicature. 
 
Global comparison 
By comparing the values of the lexical mean in the total reading time relevant effects are 
detected. The marked utterance requires 9.40% less processing effort than the unmarked 
utterance (medium effect, Table 20).  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a1) 
Marked condition 
(b2a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Lexical mean 254.69 ms 230.74 ms -23.95 ms 
-9.40% 
medium effect 
Table 20: Total reading time – global comparison – IV B with implicit alternative 
 
These first findings of the total reading time reveal that in utterances with implicit alternative, 
unmarked and marked utterances with different informative schemes present different 
processing patterns. It demands less processing effort to establish a contrastive relation 
between a marked focus and the mental representations that are activated by the discursive 
context. These findings partly corroborate the results of the analysis of the comparisons with 
utterances with explicit alternatives (cfr. §§ 7.1.1. and 7.1.2.): inserting a FO implies adding 
more procedural information, but this added information does not lead to more cognitive 
effort for the whole utterance. Considering the utterance with single explicit alternative as a 
baseline pattern for focusing operations, the processing patterns vary according to the lexical 
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saturation of the utterance. The construction of an additive relation, either as integration in a 
given discursive context (Table 20) or either as integration in an explicit set of alternatives 
(lexical chain, Table 14) is tied to more processing effort at utterance level. The insertion of a 
FO, on the contrary, provokes in these conditions a processing benefit (approx. 10%) by 
regulating the processing effort of the respective focusing elements at global level.  
 
In both implicit structures, the reader has to draw on his mental representations and rely on 
the discursive context in order to construct, either an additive relation or a contrastive relation. 
The different informative schemes lead to different processing patterns at the total reading 
time, that are also repeated during the construction of the first assumption: The marked 
utterance (173.40 ms) demands 14.37% less processing effort than its unmarked counterpart 
(202.51 ms, large effect, Table 21).  
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a1) 
Marked condition 
(b2a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Lexical mean 202.51 ms 173.40 ms -29.11 ms 
-14.37% 
large effect 
Table 21: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV B with implicit alternative 
 
The insertion of new information in a underdetermined utterance is tied to more processing 
effort, suggesting that the construction of an additive relation is an ad hoc process.177 In 
marked utterances, the FO (169.05 ms, Table 24) activates its “regulatory-effect” in order to 
minimize the processing effort of the whole utterance providing a guided processing. 
Independently of the extension of the alternative, the findings so far reveal that the 
processing effort of contrastive relations becomes apparent mostly during reanalysis, 
indicating that contrastive focusing operations are mainly operations of later processing 
stages. The results of the second-pass reading time of utterances with implicit alternative 
corroborate this finding. Once more, the added procedural information activates more 
processing effort during second-pass reading time. The marked utterance requires more 
reanalysis of the assumption, observable in the lexical mean (51.84 ms vs. 57.05 ms, 10.11% 
large effect, Table 22). The FO (70.41 ms, Table 25) acts as axis from where a specific focus 
relation has to be processed and restricts the interpretation possibilities for the assumption. 
Therefore, it demands the most processing effort during reanalysis in comparison with the 
                                                 
 
177 These findings are, as well, analogous to the findings of the comparison with complex alternative (Table 15). 
In both comparisons (implicit and complex alternative) the unmarked utterance requires more processing effort 
during the first-pass reading time indicating that additive relations are more processing intense than contrastive 
relations during the construction of the first assumption.  
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other constituents, while implying its “regulatory-effect”.178 Without explicit conceptual 
information the reader concentrates his attention to the area of the instruction, since there is 
no other anchor (conceptual or procedural) to recover the information and to establish a 
contrastive relation. 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a1) 
Marked condition 
(b2a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Lexical mean 51.84 ms 57.05 ms 5.21 ms 
10.11% 
large effect 
Table 22: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV B with implicit alternative 
 
The cognitive higher processing effort for marked structures during the recovery of the as-
sumption is theoretically justified. The additional reanalysis effort can be defined as light 
“additional regulatory effort” that is required to establish the contrastive scale. The results 
confirm the regulatory-effect of the FO, since the major processing effort during reanalysis 
does not transcend to the global processing of the utterance. Thus, the instruction of the FO 
guides the reader to process the correct assumption, while minimizing the processing effort at 
global level.  
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
In the study of utterances with implicit alternative the analysis of the focusing areas is limited 
to the area of the focus. The insertion of a FO provokes a “regulatory-effect” at utterance lev-
el, and further, triggers a redistribution of the elements implicated in the focusing operation. 
The first finding of the comparison between foci reveals that an unmarked focus demands 
more processing effort than a marked focus. By identifying and processing the focus as un-
marked focus of the utterance the reader does not interpret more than the informative constit-
uents of the utterances excite. In an utterance as Ana and Marta speak Chinese, the reader has 
to process that Ana and Marta speak one language. He has to add new information to his 
common ground relying on the discursive context. The high underdeterminacy allows wide-
ranged interpretation possibilities, that is, the construction of an additive relation between the 
                                                 
 
178 The FO of the marked utterance with implicit alternative is not only the most effort demanding area within 
the utterance structure, but also in comparison to the respective FO of the utterances with explicit alternative. 
The FO of the implicit structure demands at least 40% more processing effort than the FO of the explicit struc-
tures (to explicit single alternative: 46.01 ms vs. 70.41 ms, 52.16%; and to explicit complex alternative 49.23 ms 
vs. 70.41 ms, 42.21%, both very large effects). These data indicate that without further conceptual remarks, the 
reader relies mainly on the area of the instruction in order to recover the contrastive relation. Contrarily, if the 
alternative where explicitly given, the reader distributes the processing effort between the focusing areas (cfr. §§ 
7.1.1. and 7.1.2.)  
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unmarked focus and the background information of the context can be executed in different 
ways. Thus, this complex additive relation is performed with major cognitive effort in the 
total reading time at utterance level, but also at local level of the focus area (246.84 ms vs. 
210.84 ms, -14.58%, large effect, Table 23) indicating that if no other linguistic mark exhibits 
a specific informative structure, the focus becomes the area from where the relation is pro-
cessed.179 Whereas, in the utterances with marked focus, the FO becomes the axis from where 
the focusing operation is processed; and activates a “regulatory-effect” upon the focus (mini-
mizing its effort). 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a1) 
Marked condition 
(b2a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Focus operator - 240.34 ms - - 
Focus 246.84 ms 210.84 ms -36.00 ms 
-14.58% 
large effect 
Table 23: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV B with implicit alternative 
 
The pattern observed in the total reading time for the foci is repeated during the construction 
of the first assumption in the first-pass reading time (205.17 ms vs. 171.69 ms, -16.32%, large 
effect, Table 24) and, further, during reanalysis in the second-pass reading time (40.98 ms vs. 
38.52 ms, -6.00%, medium effect,  Table 25). 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a1) 
Marked condition 
(b2a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Focus operator - 169.95 ms - - 
Focus 205.17 ms 171.69 ms -33.48 ms 
-16.32% 
large effect 
Table 24: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV B with implicit alternative 
 
 
AOI 
Unmarked con-
dition (b1a1) 
Marked condition 
(b2a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference       
% 
Focus operator - 70.41 ms - - 
Focus 40.98 ms 38.52 ms -2.46 ms 
-6.00% 
medium effect 
Table 25: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV B with implicit alternative 
 
The observations of the first-pass reading time correspond to the results found in utterances 
with complex alternative: during the construction of the first assumption the unmarked focus 
                                                 
 
179 The same pattern can be observed in complex alternative utterance (cfr. § 1.2.). The absence of lexical infor-
mation, as well as a high semantical saturation evokes complex additive structures. The integration of an un-
marked focus in background information that is given by the context, as well as the insertion of this new infor-
mation in an already explicit given lexical chain are tied to local and partly also to global effort.  
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demands more processing effort than the marked focus. Analyzing these findings jointly it 
can be argued that without a procedural device the construction of a complex additive 
structure is a) a relation that is established early during processing, and b) tied to more 
cognitive effort for the unmarked focus. Otherwise, the insertion of a conventional mark that 
can directly act upon the focus during first-pass reading time, regulates and, subsequently, 
minimizes the processing effort of the focus element. 
 
The “regulatory-effect” of the FO becomes apparent during the second-pass reading time: The 
FO (70.41 ms, Table 25) as the most effort demanding area, displays its instruction upon the 
other conceptual elements of the utterance (higher processing effort for the marked utterance 
in the lexical mean, Table 22). It forces the reader to readjust the conceptual elements that are 
necessary to establish the contrastive relation. However, this readjustment-process is not 
performed at the focus area, but at the area of the FO, since without further conceptual 
information the FO is the area that dominates the specific focusing information structure.180 
The minimal higher processing effort during the reanalysis attributed to the FO does not have 
either a global nor local impact in the result of the whole utterance processing. This finding 
corroborates the results of the analysis of the explicit alternative that different informative 
schemes lead to different processing strategies. Thereby, the focusing operation can be 
executed by different strategies: one conceptual (unmarked additive relation) and one 
procedural (marked contrastive relation).  
 
7.1.4. Comprehension 
The comprehension test provides some evidence of the participants’ comprehension of the 
experimental utterances and is considered complementary to the eye tracking reading study. 
When unmarked and marked structures evoke different informative assumptions and pursue 
different strategies during processing, it is expected that both types of structures would lead to 
different comprehension patterns, independently whether the alternative is implicit or explicit 
in the utterance (cfr. § 6.1.2.). Whereas, in marked structures the contrastive scalar 
                                                 
 
180 These findings are divergent to the results obtained by the analysis of utterances with explicit alternative 
(single or complex, cfr. §§ 7.1.1. and 7.1.2.). By inserting explicitly more conceptual information that has to be 
contrasted with the focus, the reader distributes its attention to all focusing areas to recover the contrastive rela-
tion. The reader redefines and reevaluates the constituents of the focusing operation (mainly the alternative, but 
also the focus) to establish an informative contrast. By absence of an explicit alternative the reader returns to the 
instruction to recover the contrastive relation between the focus and the information given in the discursive con-
text.  
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implicature is conventionally marked by the FO, in unmarked utterances the contrastive 
relation can only be recovered as conversational implicature. 
 During the comprehension test the particpants, after reading the critical stimulus, have 
to answer to a question that asks exactly about the interaction between procedural and 
conceptual meaning. The answer possibilities are yes, indicating that the stimulus is sufficient 
to recover a contrastive implicature; no, indicating that the stimulus is not sufficient; and 
unable to say, which is equivalent to recognizing an insufficient or weakly determined 
conventional stimulus in the utterance to achieve a contrastive relation. 
The results show that independently whether the alternative is explicit (single or com-
plex alternative) or implicit, the utterance with marked focus presents a sufficient stimulus to 
derive a contrastive implicature (mostly yes-answers: 90% yes-answers for the single alterna-
tive, 88% for the complex alternative, and 87% for the implicit alternative, Table 26), while 
those with unmarked foci do not constitute a minimum stimuli that activate a contrastive in-
ferential path (see yes-proportion in the unmarked utterance, Table 26):  
 
b1a2 b2a2 
Ana y Marta saben inglés y chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English and Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English and even 
Chinese.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que inglés. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to know Chinese than English’) 
 
explicit single alternative yes no unable to say 
unmarked utterance 7% 73% 20% 
marked utterance 90% 7% 3% 
χ2 test 309.5 > 5.99; p < .05 
 
 
b1a3 b2a3 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English, French and 
Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English, French and even 
Chinese.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to know Chinese than the other mentioned languages’) 
 
explicit complex alterna-
tive 
yes no unable to say 
unmarked utterance 3% 83% 14% 
marked utterance 88% 7% 5% 
χ2 test 307.47 > 5.99; p < .05 
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b1a1 b2a1 
Ana y Marta saben chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know even Chinese.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que otras lenguas. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to know Chinese than other languages’) 
 
implicit alternative yes no unable to say 
unmarked utterance 13% 60% 27% 
marked utterance 87% 9% 4% 
χ2 test 312.9 > 5.99; p < .05 
Table 26: Comprehension test results – IV B/IV A 
 
The comprehension strategies of both types of utterances support the findings of the eye 
tracking study concluding that marked focus structures and unmarked focus structures consti-
tute different explicatures, which activate different inferential paths. The procedural meaning 
of the FO conventionally imposes its instruction on the lexical elements of the utterance and 
guides the reader to a scalar implicature (heterogenous answer proportions with a major yes-
answer proportion), whereas in unmarked utterances the communicated stimulus is not suffi-
cient to interpret a contrastive relation (more homogenous answer distribution). The results 
lead to the conclusion that a FO is indispensable, in case interlocutors want to communicate a 
contrastive scale. The enrichment of the conceptual information in utterances with complex 
alternative does not constitute an independent sufficient stimulus to evoke a contrastive rela-
tion.  
 
7.1.5. Final Discussion  
The analysis of this independent variable has shown that alongside with descriptive and theo-
retical arguments, there are experimental arguments, that support the claim that structures 
with semantic and syntactic different properties lead to different processing strategies.  
The confirmation of the first hypothesis of the IV B (cfr. § 6.1.2., confirmation of the 
hypothesis IV B-1) leads to a first focusing conclusion: An utterance with marked focus does 
not present major global processing effort than an utterance with unmarked focus. The FO 
generates a regulation and acceleration effect that compensates the additional effort for the 
insertion of the procedural information. This effect can either equal the processing effort be-
tween unmarked and marked structures (cfr. §§ 7.1.1. and 7.1.2.) or either facilitate the pro-
cessing of marked structures insofar that unmarked utterances become even more processing 
effort demanding. (cfr. § 7.1.3.). 
Furthermore, at the macro level two different processing strategies can be defended: one 
conceptual (unmarked) structure and one procedural (marked) structure (cfr. § 6.1.2., confir-
mation of the hypothesis IV B-2) 
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Unmarked structure. In unmarked structures an additive relation has to be constructed be-
tween the constituents. Additive relations tend to be constructed early by generating higher 
processing effort during early measures. During the construction of the first assumption, at 
utterance level, unmarked structures require more or similar processing effort than marked 
structures indicating that additive relations are resolved in situ. Further, it is observed that the 
management operation of the common ground that have to be performed in order to interpret 
an additive relation starts and is resolved mostly at the focus area (cfr. § 6.1.2., confirmation 
of the hypothesis IV B-2a). During reanalysis, unmarked structures do not claim above-
average cognitive effort. In utterances with explicit alternative (single or complex) a compen-
sation strategy is performed during reanalysis. The reader activates a “check-and-balances-
strategy” between alternative and focus in order to confirm whether the first assumption still 
holds to recover the correct assumption. 
Depending of the extension of the alternative, additive relations can become more or 
less complex. Without explicit background information or when the conceptual information is 
presented as lexical chain, the assumption is recovered with major processing effort for the 
focusing areas and/or at the areas of the lexical mean. On the contrary, in utterances with sin-
gle explicit alternative, in which a simple addition has to be established between the alterna-
tive and the focus, the processing of the unmarked utterances decreases. 
 
Marked structure. The procedural pattern is determined by the instruction of the FO. The 
FO articulates the information in the utterances. Albeit, more procedural information is added, 
the processing effort of the other conceptual focusing areas becomes more controlled. In order 
to confirm, enrich or correct the lexical elements that are triggered by the instruction, the 
reader affords more time during reanalysis in marked structures, by implementing a “check-
and-reevaluate-strategy” (cfr. § 6.1.2., confirmation of the hypothesis IV B-2b).181 However, 
all possible additional effort is levelled out over the course of utterance processing (compari-
son of the total mean). Therefore, the additional effort generated by the FO is defined as “ad-
ditional regulatory-effort”, which are used to control the quality of the first assumption and to 
ensure a guided processing in order to interpret a contrastive relation with the minimal effort. 
Subsequently, the findings sustain another theoretical described claim, namely, that perform-
                                                 
 
181 The conventionally triggered contrast between the alternative and the focus becomes mainly apparent in the 
utterance with single explicit alternative, where the marked utterance is more effort demanding in all AOIs (cfr. 
§ 7.1.1.). If the lexical information is semantically more saturated, the additional effort for the reanalysis be-
comes apparent only in the area of the focus (cfr. § 7.1.2.), and if the background information is only implicitly 
given the additional reanalysis effort transcend to the lexical mean (cfr. § 7.1.3.). 
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ing a contrastive relation is an operation that can start early (FO acts immediately upon the 
focus during first-pass reading time), but is executed mostly at later processing stages (during 
second-pass reading time). The FO is the element that affects the lexical relation between the 
conceptual elements and this process can only be activated after the processing of the FO. 
Nevertheless, an additional property was observed regarding the FO leading to another con-
clusion: The focus operator generates a regulation and acceleration effect that compensates 
the additional processing effort that the lexical contrast of the affected units (alternative and 
focus) produces. The processing effort of the focus operator constitutes the maximum limit for 
the processing of the implicated elements at the focusing operation. 
The “regulatory-effect” of the FO is observable in the lexical mean and in the relation 
between alternative and focus, where the FO being the most effort demanding area reduces 
the processing effort of the other focusing constituents. These effects underlie the theoretical 
claim of FOs, namely, that the procedural value (asymmetry and rigidity property) serve as 
processing guidance and regulate the processing of the whole utterance. In the utterances un-
der consideration, alternative and focus require less processing effort than the FO during the 
whole processing. Otherwise, in unmarked structures the most effort demanding element con-
stitutes the focus area. 
 
Regarding the cross-variable IV A – Extension of the alternative results have proven that ut-
terances where the focus has to be contrasted with an explicit subset of alternatives (single or 
complex alternative condition) require slightly less processing effort than if the relation has to 
be constructed with a potential subset given in the discourse (implicit alternative condition). 
Extending or restricting the conceptual information is tied to slightly higher processing effort. 
Consequently, a base focusing operation (single alternative condition) can be defended rely-
ing on the data. In utterances with single explicit alternative the relation (either additive or 
contrastive) is balanced between the constituents. It is assumed that the reader has to perform 
a relation that consists in evaluating two explicit single elements (alternative and focus) that 
have to be resorted according to the instruction of the operator or according to the function 
that is given by the set of conceptual elements. However, extending or reducing the set of 
alternatives leads to increased processing, mainly for the unmarked focus conditions. There-
fore, the hypothesis that the insertion of more conceptual information would facilitate pro-
cessing con only partly be confirmed, i.e. only when the complex alternative co-occurs with a 
procedural mark; an acceleration effect can be attributed to the complex alternative (cfr. § 
6.1.1., partly confirmation of the hypotheses of the IV A-1a). 
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Regarding comprehension it is assumed, that the FO guides the inferential process 
conventionally by restricting the interpretation possibilities of the utterance. Consequently, 
marked utterances lead to a contrastive implicature, whereas unmarked utterances do not 
conventionally present a sufficient minimum stimulus to automatically activate an inferential 
contrastive process.  
During processing it was shown that the insertion of a FO ensures a guided processing, 
and that the construction of the assumption is conventionally controlled. The inferential route 
becomes more restricted and unambiguous. This is also reflected in the analysis of the 
comprehension test, in which both structures do not provide equally optimal stimuli that lead 
to a contrastive implicature (cfr. § 6.1.2., confirmation of the hypothesis IV B-3). These 
findings are observable in the different answer-proportions for unmarked and marked 
utterance, in which the marked structures provide the higher yes-answers proportions 
revealing a final conclusion of this independent variable (cfr. § 7.1.4.): A contrastive relation 
is not processed “by default”. The insertion of a focus operator in unmarked focus structure 
becomes indispensable if a contrastive relation is intended. The conceptual information (not 
even in the complex alternative conditions) does not constitute a sufficient minimum stimulus 
to establish a contrastive relation.  
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7.2. Position of the focus operator in relation to the focus 
 
The analysis of the IV C – Position of the focus operator in relation to the focus has at its 
objective to examine to what extent processing and comprehension varies by altering the 
distributional word order regarding the FO in marked utterances structures (cfr. § 6.1.3.). 
Thereby, two main positions are under consideration, preposition of the FO regarding the 
focus, in which incluso precedes and modifies directly its nucleus; and postposition of the FO 
regarding the focus, in which the relation is inversed. Independently of the extension of the 
alternative (IV A) it is assumed that utterances with the FO in postposition demand more 
cognitive effort, since this position constitutes the less frequent position in discourse.  
 
7.2.1. Utterances with explicit single alternative  
 
b2a2 – Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino. 
c1a2 – Ana y Marta saben inglés y chino incluso. 
 
The analysis of the IV B has shown that the processing of structures with explicit alternative 
and the presence of the FO is triggered mainly by the conventional mark, that regulates and 
minimizes the processing of utterances in comparison to utterances without FO. However, it 
is assumed that a manipulation of the FO-position in relation to the focus leads to elevated 
processing effort, since when the FO is in postposition to the focus, the focus operation 
cannot be processed ad hoc, but a posteriori, after reading all the conceptual elements 
belonging to the focusing operation. This results in the hypothesis that different positions of 
the FO activate two different processing routes. 
 
Global comparison 
The values of the cumulative reading measure (total reading time) indicate that processing a 
syntactical alteration additionally to the semantic relation of a pragmatic scale can accumulate 
higher processing effort for the whole utterance. A postposition of the FO generates slightly 
higher processing effort, reflected in the differences of the total mean (236.52 ms vs. 247.19 
ms, 4.51%, small effect, Table 27). Nevertheless, this small effect is not observable in the 
lexical mean (243.46 ms vs. 246.23 ms, 1.14%, trivial effect, Table 27), suggesting that the 
higher processing effort for the utterances with postpositional FO originates in the processing 
of the procedural mark. This is a first indicator that an utterance with a syntactically 
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postpositional FO not only demands more cognitive effort for the whole utterance, but also 
that the postpositional FO itself plays a decisive role during the processing of these structures 
(Table 30). This relevant finding reveals that although both structures have identical 
informative relations, a less common position of a FO can alter the cognitive effort of 
utterances.  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a2) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 236.52 ms 247.19 ms 10.67 ms 
4.51% 
small effect 
Lexical mean 243.46 ms 246.23 ms 2.77 ms 
1.14% 
trivial effect 
Table 27: Total reading time – global comparison – IV C with explicit single alternative 
 
The results of the first-pass reading time present analogous processing patterns at global level, 
since both utterances present the same information structure. No relevant differences are 
registered neither for the total mean (182.90 ms vs. 183.52 ms, 0.45% trivial effect, Table 28), 
nor for the lexical mean (185.14 ms vs. 186.35 ms, 0.65%, trivial effect, Table 28). Results of 
the IV B already have shown that the insertion of a FO immediately activates a contrastive 
relation and, subsequently can generate a first processing benefit by controlling early the 
processing of the focusing elements under its scope (cfr. § 7.1.). However, this immediate 
activation becomes visible in the analysis of the focusing areas, but do not trespass to the 
utterance level in the first-pass reading time. Further, the whole impact of the FOs in different 
positions should emerge during reanalysis (second-pass reading time), when redefinition and 
re-evaluation of the lexical elements (triggered by the FO) becomes apparent.  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a2) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 182.90 ms 183.52 ms 0.82 ms 
0.45% 
trivial effect 
Lexical mean 185.14 ms 186.35 ms 1.21 ms 
0.65% 
trivial effect 
Table 28: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV C with explicit single alternative 
 
During reanalysis the differences between the conditions are analogous to the findings of the 
total reading time, but become even more pertinent: At global level (total mean),  the syntac-
tically marked utterance (63.44 ms) demands 18.25% more processing effort than the utter-
ance with frequent FO-position (53.65 ms, large effect). However, the lexical means, again, 
do not differ from each other (57.95 ms vs. 59.84 ms, 3.26%, trivial effect, Table 29).  
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These findings further support, that if a distributional alteration is produced in an utterance 
with single explicit alternative the procedural mark will play a decisive role during the recov-
ery of the communicated assumption. 
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a2) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 53.65 ms 63.44 ms 9.79 ms 
18.25% 
large effect 
Lexical mean 57.95 ms 59.84 ms 1.89 ms 
3.26% 
trivial effect 
Table 29: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV C with explicit single alternative 
 
Concluding, based on the analysis of IV B the insertion of the FO generates a “check and 
reevaluate-strategy” that implies “additional regulatory effort” for the recovery of a 
contrastive relation in comparison to utterances without procedural mark (cfr. § 7.1.). Thus, in 
the two conditions under consideration of IV C, the FO exactly evokes this “check and 
reevaluate”-strategy. The reader redefines and reevaluates the lexical elements of the focusing 
operation according to the explicit instruction in order to confirm, enrich or modify the 
previous assumption during reanalysis. Since in both utterances, the focusing operation is 
semantically the same, it could have been expected, that no differences would be observable 
between the two conditions. Nevertheless, the findings have proven that a syntactically 
marked position of a FO leads to a higher global cognitive effort, not only during reanalysis, 
but also at the total processing level (total reading time, Table 27).  
The higher processing effort during the second-pass reading time for the utterance with 
postpositional FO can also be considered “additional regulatory effort”. But, this regulatory-
effort is executed differently, since the reader not only has to process the semantic relation of 
the constituents, he also has to resolve the syntactical alteration of the instruction in order to 
integrate the information in the common ground. Thus, the findings conclude that different 
syntactical positions are resolved cognitively through different processing patterns 
strengthening the claim of a cognitive preferred FO-position.  
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
The differences at global level of the utterance foreshadows that different local patterns will 
be found at the focusing areas, and, in fact, across parameters differences are found in all 
focusing areas indicating different informative distributions in both conditions.  
The values of the cumulative parameter demonstrate that the syntactical alteration 
affects mainly the FO and the direct object upon it incites. The postpositional FO (289.59 ms) 
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requires 9.96% more processing effort than the prepositional FO (263.37 ms, medium effect, 
Table 30), and the focus of the utterance with postpositional FO (294.80 ms) demands even 
19.94% more processing effort than the focus of the other condition (245.78 ms, large effect, 
Table 30). On the contrary, the results of the alternative draw an inverse pattern: The 
alternative in the utterances with postpositional FO (205.94 ms) needs 8.84% less processing 
effort than the respective alternative of the other condition (225.90 ms, medium effect, Table 
30).  
Analyzing these results jointly a relevant finding can be formulated: The position-shift 
of the FO provokes that FO and focus constitute a functional unit in which the focusing 
operation is performed. The reader dwells in the areas of FO and focus, whereas the 
alternative becomes sidelined. In other words, the distributional alteration that has to be 
resolved additionally, relativizes the semantic relation that has to be processed in order to 
interpret the contrastive pragmatic scale.  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a2) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Alternative 225.90 ms 205.94 ms -19.96 ms 
-8.84% 
medium effect 
Focus operator 263.37 ms 289.59 ms 26.22 ms 
9.96% 
medium effect 
Focus 245.78 ms 294.80 ms 49.02 ms 
19.94% 
large effect 
Table 30: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV C with explicit single alternative 
 
The results of the construction of the first assumption reveal slightly different patterns in 
comparison to the total reading time. In the analysis of the IV B it was proven that FO tend to 
display their instruction immediately upon the implicated focusing areas. However, according 
to the position of the FO, this effect is executed differently during the construction of the first 
assumption. In the utterance with preposition of the FO, the FO can immediately act upon the 
focus and redefine its informative value. This immediate contrast activation is tied to local 
higher processing effort for the FO (217.36 ms vs. 199.63 ms, -8.16%, medium effect, Table 
31), but also minimizes the processing of the focus element (182.23 ms vs. 212.22 ms, 
16.46%, large effect). Moreover, in the utterances with postpositional FO regarding the focus, 
it is assumed that the area of the FO (last element of the utterance) is abandoned quickly in 
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order to redefine and redistribute the areas implicated in the focusing operation (during 
second-pass reading time).182  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a2) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Alternative 169.30 ms 161.79 ms -7.51 ms 
-4.44% 
small effect 
Focus operator 217.36 ms 199.63 ms -17.73 ms 
-8.16% 
medium effect 
Focus 182.23 ms 212.22 ms 29.99 ms 
16.46% 
large effect 
Table 31: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV C with explicit single alternative 
 
Any focusing operation in utterances with explicit single alternative is recovered through the 
focusing areas in order to establish a contrastive pragmatic scale evoked by the FO. During 
reanalysis, a re-evaluation of the conceptual elements takes place in order to successfully 
interpret the information of the communicated assumption. Results so far argue that the 
instruction of the FO indicates how this re-evaluation has to be performed (cfr. § 7.1.), 
however, a syntactical alteration can interfere in this re-evaluation process.  
The informative distribution that becomes apparent during the total reading time 
originates mainly from the processing patterns of reanalysis. Hence, the differences are much 
more pertinent during the recovery of the former assumption. 
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a2) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 55.99 ms 43.56 ms -12.43 ms 
-22.20% 
very large effect 
Focus operator 46.01 ms 89.90 ms 43.89 ms 
95.39% 
very large effect 
Focus 44.16 ms 81.88 ms 37.72 ms 
85.42% 
very large effect 
Table 32: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV C with explicit single alternative 
 
The most relevant findings of the second-pass reading time regard the FO and the focus. Both 
elements of the utterance with postpositional FO nearly double the processing effort of the 
respective elements of the utterances with prepositional FO. The postpositional FO (89.90 
ms) demands 95.39% more processing effort than the prepositional FO (46.01 ms, very large 
                                                 
 
182 Additionally, the different positions of the FO also generate a small effect between the alternatives: The 
alternative of the utterance with prepositional FO (169.30 ms) demands 4.44% less processing effort than the 
alternative of the utterance with postpositional FO (161.79 ms). Two reasons can originate this effect: On the 
one hand, the reader detects parafoveally the FO and dwells longer at the alternative in utterances with 
prepositional FO and/or the alternative of the utterances with postpositional FO is processed with notably less 
processing effort since no conventional element is detected parafoveally. 
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effect, Table 32). Likewise, the focus of the utterance with postpositional FO (81.88 ms) 
claims 85.42% more processing effort than the focus that is preceeded by the FO (44.16 ms). 
The comparison of the alternatives show that the recovery of the background information is 
also processed differently, revealing an inverse pattern. The alternative of the utterance with 
postpositional FO (43.56 ms) gathers 22.20% less processing effort than the alternative of the 
utterances with prepositional FO (55.99 ms, very large effect, Table 32).  
In order to perform the semantic operation and to establish the contrastive relation, the 
reader activates a “check and reevaluate”-strategy, while homogenously re-reading all the 
focusing areas (“additional regulatory effort” for all areas).183 If a syntactic operation 
(induced by the position-shift of the FO) is added to this semantic operation, the strategy 
remains the same, but the additional effort is differently distributed. The postposition of the 
FO evokes that the attention of the reader remains mainly at the area of FO and focus 
(establishing a functional unit between them)184, whereas the alternative becomes 
marginalized.185 In light of these results two theoretical claims can be formulated for 
utterances with explicit single alternative under the conditions:  
 
a) A position shift evokes major global and local processing effort (Table 27 and 
Table 30). Therefore, from a cognitive perspective, a preferable FO-position 
(preposition of the FO) can be defended.  
b) The syntactical alteration is recovered mainly by the functional unit: FO + focus, 
whereas the alternative is marginalized. 
 
The results reveal that the positional variability of incluso in relation to the focus also leads to 
two different cognitive patterns for utterances with explicit single alternative: preposition 
(unmarked) and postposition (marked) of the FO. Thus, it can be argued that two theoretically 
distinguished patterns according to their different distributional order are not only differently 
                                                 
 
183 These findings are observable in the IVB where alternative and focus are the most effort demanding areas in 
the second-pass reading time.  
184 The composition of the functional unit in relation to the alternative is theoretically sustainable, since the 
adverb incluso acts as a modifier of the marked direct object. 
185 Moreover, both FOs do not demand less processing effort than the other conceptual elements of their 
respective utterances, supporting again the theoretical claim regarding the instructional character of FO. The 
properties of the procedural meaning of incluso (asymmetry and rigidity) assure a regulatory-effect that 
minimizes the processing effort of the other focusing elements independently of the FO-position and therefore, 
underlies the argument previously formulated in the analysis of the IV B: The FO constitutes the maximum 
processing limit of the utterance.  
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frequent in discourse, but, from a cognitive perspective, a preferred position can be 
assigned.186 
 
7.2.2. Utterances with explicit complex alternative  
 
b2a3 – Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso chino. 
c1a3 – Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y chino incluso. 
 
Comparing utterances with explicit complex alternative should prevail similar results than the 
analysis of utterances with explicit single alternative. Results of the IV B have shown that the 
insertion of more conceptual information can facilitate processing in utterances in which the 
FO is in preposition regarding the focus, since both, conceptual and procedural devices are 
oriented towards the contextual information. However, it is not expected that the conceptual 
enrichment constitutes an acceleration effect that relativizes the effort provoked by a 
postpositional FO in an utterance. Thus, it can be assumed that a distributional alteration 
activates more cognitive effort at global and local level independently of the lexical 
information.  
 
Global comparison 
Globally speaking, the increase of conceptual information does not provoke differences 
between the conditions under consideration. The processing of an utterances with complex 
                                                 
 
186 Studies conducted by Lopez Serena and Loureda (2013) defend that different FO-positions could encode 
slightly different communicative needs. It is argued that the insertion of a postpositional incluso triggers –
additionally to the focusing operation– an ad hoc reformulation process. Nevertheless, the conducted studies 
examined utterances in which the FO and the focus are presented as independent syntactical unit, as e.g. in Ana 
and Martha speak English, French, Italian, even Chinese. vs. Ana and Martha speak English, French, Italian, 
Chinese even. The unit {even Chinese/Chinese even} depends syntactically (juxtaposed) from the segment {Ana 
and Martha speak English, French, Italian}. Moreover, these structures present also a semantic relation in which 
the elements have to be ranged according to their informative value. In the presented utterances by Lopez Serena 
and Loureda (2013) it can be defended that in the utterances with postpositional FO a reformulation process has 
to be performed additionally. This reformulation process implies that during reanalysis a major re-evaluation 
process is conducted in order to interpret the specific informative structure (contrastive relation) in comparison 
to utterances with common FO-position. Elevated effort at total reading time is found at the area directly affected 
by the FO: the focus. The results are theoretically justified since the higher effort affects the element of the 
independent unit, in particular the element that is triggered by the instruction. Further, the results suggest that 
incluso is syntagmatically polyfunctional in order that it can activate a discursive reformulation when it appears 
in postposition of an independent unit. The utterances under consideration in the IV C share the semantic 
relation with the utterances of the other studies, but present a different syntactical pattern: The two independent 
segments are conjunctively connected and the adverbial value of the FO provokes that incluso is integrated in the 
propositional content of the utterance, that constitutes one single segment {Ana and Martha speak English and 
even Chinese/Chinese even}. Besides, the semantic relation, no syntactical dependency is established. Therefore, 
no added reformulation process should underlie the focusing operation in the conditions of the IV C. 
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alternative in which the FO is introduced postponed to the focus element is tied to higher 
global effort (225.07 ms vs. 240.57 ms, 6.89%, medium effect187, Table 33). Again, this effect 
is not found in the lexical mean (230.33 ms vs. 236.92 ms, 2.86%, trivial effect, Table 33) 
reiterating the findings of the comparison with explicit single alternative: a) a distributional 
alteration implies more cognitive effort, and b) the higher processing effort seems to originate 
in the element in which the alteration is manifested.  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a3) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 225.07 ms 240.57 ms 15.50 ms 
6.89% 
medium effect 
Lexical mean 230.33 ms 236.92 ms 6.59 ms 
2.86% 
trivial effect 
Table 33: Total reading time – global comparison – IV C with explicit complex alternative 
 
During the construction of the first assumption at global level no differences are registered 
either for the total mean (180.16 ms vs. 185.49 ms, 2.96%, trivial effect, Table 34) nor for the 
lexical mean (184.09 ms vs. 185.94 ms, 1.00%, trivial effect, Table 34) indicating that 
possible major processing effort at local level does not imply a major impact at utterance 
level, sustainable since both utterances present identical informative structures. These results 
are analogous to the results of the utterances with explicit single alternative, arguing that the 
increase of lexical information in these structures whether facilitates nor hampers the 
processing during the first construction of the assumption.  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a3) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 180.16 ms 185.49 ms 5.33 ms 
2.96% 
trivial effect 
Lexical mean 184.09 ms 185.94 ms 1.85 ms 
1.00% 
trivial effect 
Table 34: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV C with explicit complex alternative 
 
Re-reading strategies of the whole utterance provide a different picture. The whole impact of 
the procedural mark (pre- or postposition) in utterances with complex alternative emerges 
during reanalysis. The observed data presents a very large increase for the utterances with 
postpositional FO in the total mean (44.79 ms vs. 54.81 ms, 22.37%, very large effect, Table 
                                                 
 
187 The effect of the total mean is even more pertinent in utterances with complex alternative (6.89%, medium 
effect) than in the comparison with explicit single alternative (4.51%, small effect), suggesting that the concep-
tual information does not constitute an acceleration effect if the distribution is altered in the information struc-
ture.  
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35). This effect is also manifested in the lexical mean: The utterance with the distributional 
alteration (50.52 ms) demands 9.97% more processing effort than the utterance with 
unmarked position (45.94 ms, medium effect, Table 35). 
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a3) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Total mean 44.79 ms 54.81 ms 10.02 ms 
22.37% 
very large effect 
Lexical mean 45.94 ms 50.52 ms 4.58 ms 
9.97% 
medium effect 
Table 35: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV C with explicit complex alternative 
 
 In utterances, in which the reader has to fulfill the instruction of the FO (pre- or 
postposition), again a “check-and reevaluate”-strategy is effectuated. The “additional 
regulatory effort” for this strategy is heterogeneously distributed demanding more processing 
effort for the syntactical marked utterances. From a theoretical perspective, this is sustainable, 
because in utterances with postpositional FO, the reader can perform the focusing operation 
(triggered by the FO) only after reading all the lexical elements and the instruction of the FO 
(last element of the utterance). In contrast to utterances with prepositional FO, in which the 
reader can immediately execute the instruction upon the following element (marked focus, 
already during the first-pass reading time). Therefore, the “additional regulatory effort” 
during reanalysis is much slighter in the latter case while in utterances with postpositional FO, 
the reader has to redefine and reevaluate all the conceptual elements in order to fulfill the FO 
instruction, and consequently, a modification of the first assumption (that could have been a 
complex additive structure until reading the FO) must be carried out.188  
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
Analyzing the functional areas of the focusing operation between the conditions points out 
that a different distributional order in a specific information structure evokes also different 
local cognitive patterns.  
                                                 
 
188 In contrast to utterances with explicit single alternative, the conceptual enrichment in these conditions pro-
vokes a difference at global level (total and lexical mean). In utterances with single alternative the analogous 
values of the lexical mean indicate that the instruction of the FO does not influence the processing of the concep-
tual elements, and further, that the effort in the total mean of the utterances with postpositional FO is exclusively 
attributed to the procedural mark. Whereas, the higher processing effort in both global AOIs in the comparison 
of utterances with complex alternative suggest that the integration of a marked focus (that was labeled as marked 
a posteriori) in an explicit set of alternatives entails a major reanalysis for the conceptual elements of the focus-
ing operation.   
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Results of the total reading time demonstrate that the global major processing effort for the 
utterances with postpositional FO originates from the additional effort that is required for the 
conventional device and the focus in these conditions. Both elements present very large 
increases in comparison to their respective counterparts. The postpositional FO (303.93 ms) 
demands 27.15% more processing effort than the prepositional FO (239.04 ms). Likewise, the 
focus of the postpositional structure (297.75 ms) needs 21.86% more processing effort than its 
counterpart (244.33 ms, Table 36).  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a3) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 226.35 ms 218.26 ms -8.09 ms 
-3.57% 
trivial effect 
Focus operator 239.04 ms 303.93 ms 64.89 ms 
27.15% 
very large effect 
Focus 244.33 ms 297.75 ms 53.42 ms 
21.86% 
very large effect 
Table 36: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV C with explicit complex alternative 
 
Adding the results of the alternatives that do not differ from each other (226.35 ms vs. 218.26 
ms, -3.57%, trivial effect, Table 36), the findings of the analysis of the utterances with single 
alternative are reiterated189: A distributional alteration provokes a local impact at the FO and 
the focus. Both areas form a functional unit in order to recover the contrastive relation, 
whereas, again, the alternative becomes cognitively marginalized. The processing distribution 
between the areas of the focusing operation loses its balance and provokes a dislocation of the 
processing to the right side of the utterance, i.e. to the areas directly affected by the position 
shift of the FO. 
 
The elevated local processing effort for the FO and the focus observed in the total reading 
time originates already at the microstructural level of the utterance. During the construction of 
the first assumption the postpositional FO (207.74 ms) claims 9.42% more processing effort 
than the prepositional FO (189.85 ms, medium effect, Table 37). Likewise, the foci differ 
6.91% from each other (199.61 ms vs. 213.41 ms, medium effect), and, again, the alternatives 
                                                 
 
189 The insertion of more conceptual information provokes an effect in comparison to the analysis between the 
single alternatives (225.90 ms vs. 205.94 ms, -8.84%, medium effect, Table 30). Throughout processing, both 
complex alternatives are levelled out and do not present any differences (226.35 ms vs. 218.26 ms, -3.57%, trivi-
al effect, Table 36). Summarizing the results, it is argued that more conceptual information is less affected by a 
positional alteration of the FO between the conditions. Further, these results prove that independently of the 
extension of the alternative, the alternative of a structure with postpositional FO does not demand more pro-
cessing effort than an alternative in a structure with prepositional FO across parameters. 
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are processed with analogous processing times (184.71 ms vs. 181.08 ms, -1.97%, trivial 
effect, Table 37). 
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a3) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Alternative 184.71 ms 181.08 ms -3.63 ms 
-1.97% 
trivial effect 
Focus operator 189.85 ms 207.74 ms 17.89 ms 
9.42% 
medium effect 
Focus 199.61 ms 213.41 ms 13.80 ms 
6.91% 
medium effect 
Table 37: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV C with explicit complex alternative 
 
The conceptual information of the complex alternative co-oriented towards the instruction of 
the FO ensures a guided processing from the start190. However, the processing benefit 
obtained from the interplay between the conceptual and the procedural device cannot equal 
the effort produced by the distributional alteration in the utterance with postposition of the 
FO. 
 
Results of the global comparison demonstrated that a postpositional FO generates higher 
processing effort for the whole utterance in comparison to utterances with preposition of the 
FO during reanalysis (Table 35). At local level, during the informative reconstruction of the 
assumption, the postpositional FO and the focus under its scope are again the most effort 
demanding areas in comparison to utterances with prepositional FO. The postpositional FO 
(96.07 ms) nearly doubles the processing of the prepositional FO (49.23 ms, 95.15%, very 
large effect), and the focus in the utterance with postpositional FO (83.58 ms) demands 
89.52% more processing effort than the focus of the utterance with prepositional FO (44.10 
ms, very large effect. Table 38). The described dislocation of the processing effort to the right 
of the utterance (provoked by the distributional alteration) is also trespassed to the second-
pass reading time. The alternative of the utterance with postpositional FO (36.52 ms) becomes 
sidelined in contrast to the alternative of the utterance with prepositional FO (41.15 ms, -
11.25% large effect, Table 38). 
 
 
                                                 
 
190 The conceptual enrichment provokes differences in comparison to the results obtained from utterances with 
single explicit alternative (Table 31). In utterances with complex alternative the conceptual information acts as 
independent device that in relation with a FO minimizes the processing of the alternative itself and of the FO. On 
the contrary, the results given by utterances with single alternative indicate that the alternative does not consti-
tute a sufficient stimulus in order to generate a processing benefit.  
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AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a3) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a3) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 41.15 ms 36.52 ms -4.63 ms 
-11.25% 
large effect 
Focus operator 49.23 ms 96.07 ms 46.84 ms 
95.15% 
very large effect 
Focus 44.10 ms 83.58 ms 39.48 ms 
89.52% 
very large effect 
Table 38: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV C with explicit complex alternative 
 
The results of the alternative combined with the findings for the FO and focus, indicate that 
the distributional alteration triggers the “check-and-reevaluate”-strategy performed by the 
reader during the recovery of the communicated assumption. In the utterances with 
postpositional FO the recovery is dislocated to the areas of the FO and the focus, whereas in 
the position that is not altered the reader balances the processing effort between all focusing 
areas. The distributional alteration provokes a major local impact that in different ways affect 
all focusing elements and trespasses the higher processing effort to the global level of the 
whole utterance. The increase of the conceptual information can produce a processing benefit, 
but this benefit cannot compensate the processing effort that is necessary for the interpretation 
of the contrastive relation triggered by a postpositional FO.  
 
7.2.3. Utterances with implicit alternative  
 
b2a1 – Ana y Marta saben incluso chino. 
c1a1 – Ana y Marta saben chino incluso. 
 
As in utterances with explicit alternatives (cfr. §§ 7.2.1. and 7.2.2.) it is expected that a 
distributional alteration in these structures under consideration leads to two different cognitive 
patterns. The interpretation of a conventionally codified implicature by relating the marked 
focus with the mental representations that are stored in the memory and have to be activated 
by the discursive context, should, therefore, also be determined by the position of the FO. 
Utterances with a postpositional FO in relation to its scope are expected to demand more 
processing effort at global level of the utterance, as well as at the local level of the focusing 
areas.  
 
Global comparison 
In utterances, in which the alternative is not explicitly given and needs to be recovered by the 
discursive context, the distributional alteration leads to discrepancies in the cognitive effort 
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between the conditions under consideration. Both global AOIs, total and lexical mean present 
higher values for the utterances with postpositional FO-position. The impact of the 
postpositional FO implies that the whole utterance (253.71) requires 10.71% more processing 
effort than the utterance with prepositional FO (229.16 ms, large effect, Table 39). The impact 
of the postpositional FO is also observable in the other conceptual elements of the utterance 
since in the lexical mean the utterance with postpositional FO (253.98 ms) demands 10.07% 
more processing effort than the counterpart utterance (230.74 ms, large effect, Table 39).  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a1) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 229.16 ms 253.71 ms 24.55 ms 
10.71% 
large effect 
Lexical mean 230.74 ms 253.98 ms 23.24 ms 
10.07% 
large effect 
Table 39: Total reading time – global comparison – IV C with implicit alternative 
 
The results of the total reading time corroborate the findings of the analysis of the utterances 
with explicit alternative (cfr. §§ 7.2.1. and 7.2.2.). Two informative identical structures 
provide two different cognitive patterns according to the position of the FO. Thus, from a 
cognitive perspective, a preferable FO-position can be defended. Utterances in which the FO 
precedes the focus element ensures a guided processing with a minimal cognitive effort.191  
 
During the construction of the first assumption, the patterns observed during the total reading 
time are repeated. Relevant differences are registered for the total mean (172.24 ms vs. 189.43 
ms, 9.98%, medium effect, Table 40) and for the lexical mean (173.40 ms vs. 183.01 ms, 
5.54%, medium effect, Table 40).  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a1) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 172.24 ms 189.43 ms 17.19 ms 
9.98% 
medium effect 
Lexical mean 173.40 ms 183.01 ms 9.61 ms 
5.54% 
medium effect 
Table 40: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV C with implicit alternative 
 
                                                 
 
191 Nevertheless, the results of the lexical mean diverge form the findings of the utterances with explicit alterna-
tive. The results of the utterances with explicit alternative (single or complex) point out that during the whole 
processing the local impact of a postpositional FO is trespassed to the total mean of the utterances, but this does 
not become apparent in the lexical mean; cfr. 1.1.1 and 1.2.1.). These findings indicate that it is the processing 
for the FO itself that generates major processing effort for the whole utterance, but also minimizes the processing 
effort of the other focusing areas. In contrast, in utterances with implicit alternative, the instruction of the FO can 
only display its instruction upon the focus element.  
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In utterances that are semantically underdetermined in comparison to utterances with explicit 
alternative a distributional alteration provokes an early impact during the processing of the 
first assumption. The local impact triggered by the postpositional FO (Table 41) is trespassed 
to the whole utterance. 
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a1) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 172.24 ms 189.43 ms 17.19 ms 
9.98% 
medium effect 
Lexical mean 173.40 ms 183.01 ms 9.61 ms 
5.54% 
medium effect 
Table 41: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV C with implicit alternative 
 
In both structures under consideration, the reader has to draw on his mental representations 
and rely on the discursive context in order to construct a contrastive relation. Results of the 
total reading time and the first-pass reading time demonstrate that a distributional alteration is 
tied to global higher processing effort. These results are also validated during reanalysis. Re-
reading strategies reveal that a postpositional FO leads to major processing effort for the 
whole utterance in the total mean (56.78 ms vs. 63.92 ms, 12.57%, large effect, Table 42) and 
also in the lexical mean (57.05 ms vs. 70.56 ms, 23.68% very large effect, Table 42).  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a1) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference       
 % 
Total mean 56.78 ms 63.92 ms 7.14 ms 
12.57% 
large effect 
Lexical mean 57.05 ms 70.56 ms 13.51 ms 
23.68% 
very large effect 
Table 42: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV C with implicit alternative 
 
As in the utterances with explicit alternative, it can be defended that the reader performs a 
“check and reevaluate”-strategy in order to recover the contrastive relation between the focus 
element and the implicit alternative. Again, the “additional regulatory effort” for both condi-
tions is heterogeneously distributed evoking higher processing effort for the syntactically 
marked structure (Table 42) The heterogonous distribution is theoretically justified, since the 
focusing operations are performed at different stages. Whereas, the prepositional FO can dis-
play immediately its instruction upon its scope (already during first-pass reading time), in the 
utterance with postpositional FO-position, the reader has to conduct a readjustment-process 
after reading all the focusing constituents. Subsequently, this procedure leads to major reanal-
ysis effort of the utterance with postpositional FO-position.  
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Summarizing, the findings support that independently of the extension of the alternative, add-
ing a distributional alteration to the procedure of a semantic relation that establishes a contras-
tive relation produces global higher processing effort during reanalysis.  
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
As in the analysis of the utterances with explicit alternative the data obtained for utterances 
with implicit alternative reveal that a distributional alteration implies more cognitive effort for 
the focusing areas of the postpositional FO and its focus. The postpositional FO (311.10 ms) 
demands 29.44% more processing effort than the prepositional FO (240.34 ms, very large 
effect, Table 43). Furthermore, the focus in the postpositional structure (252.57 ms) requires 
19.79% more processing effort than its counterpart in the prepositional structure (210.84 ms). 
Thus, the data corroborate previous findings: The insertion of a FO in utterances with implicit 
structure provokes that the assumption is mainly processed relying on the FO. However, by 
altering the word order in informative structures the cognitive effort of FO and focus 
increases notably, supporting the claim that in these types of structures, FO and focus form a 
functional unit in order to facilitate the interpretation of the contrastive relation.  
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a1) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Focus operator 240.34 ms 311.10 ms 70.76 ms 
29.44% 
very large effect 
Focus 210.84 ms 252.57 ms 41.73 ms 
19.79% 
large effect 
Table 43: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV C with implicit alternative 
 
The results of the first-pass reading time present a slightly different pattern. Again, the FOs 
differ from each other (169.95 ms vs. 220.10 ms, 29.51%, very large effect, Table 44) 
revealing notable effort for the postpositional FO. Contrarily, the comparison of the foci does 
not register differences (171.69 ms vs. 176.17 ms, 2.61%, trivial effect, Table 44). During the 
construction of the first assumption, in utterances, in which incluso modifies directly its 
nucleus, the instruction of the FO can display immediately its function upon the focus 
element, and subsequently regulate and control its processing, whereas in utterances with 
postpositional FO, the FO cannot display its instruction until all elements are read. The reader 
abandons quickly the area of the focus and dwells longer on the postpositional FO.192  
                                                 
 
192 These results are divergent with the findings obtained in the analysis of utterances with explicit (single or 
complex) alternative, in which the focus in the structure with postpositional FO always requires more processing 
effort. Despite that, it can be theoretically defended that by absence of further conceptual information in form of 
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AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a1) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Focus operator 169.95 ms 220.10 ms 50.15 ms 
29.51% 
very large effect 
Focus 171.69 ms 176.17 ms 4.48 ms 
2.61% 
trivial effect 
Table 44: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV C with implicit alternative 
 
The major processing effort for the focusing areas of the structure with postpositional FO ob-
servable during the total reading time (Table 43) is repeated during the reanalysis. The post-
positional FO (90.92 ms) claims 29.13% more cognitive effort than the prepositional FO 
(70.41 ms, very large effect, Table 45). Moreover, the differences between the foci are more 
pertinent. The reader nearly needs twice as much processing time for the focus of the postpo-
sitional structure in comparison to the focus in the utterance with prepositional FO (38.52 ms 
vs. 75.70 ms, 96.52%, very large effect, Table 45). 
 
AOI 
preposition of 
the FO (b2a1) 
postposition of 
the FO (c1a1) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Focus operator 70.41 ms 90.92 ms 20.51 ms 
29.13% 
very large effect 
Focus 38.52 ms 75.70 ms 37.18 ms 
96.52% 
very large effect 
Table 45: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV C with implicit alternative 
 
The absence of further explicit conceptual information in these utterance structures presents a 
complexity in itself. The reader has to draw on his mental representations in order to interpret 
the contrastive relation between the focus element and the alternative given in the discursive 
context. The additional alteration of the FO-position influences notably the construction of the 
contrastive relation transforming local processing effort into effort for the whole utterance. As 
observed in utterances with explicit alternative the “check and reevaluate”-strategy performed 
in utterances in which a FO incites, is triggered by the syntactical alteration. The presented 
findings of utterances with implicit alternative underlie the previous formulated claim: A 
position-shift of a FO implies more cognitive effort leading to two different cognitive 
patterns. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
an explicit alternative the utterances become more semantically underdetermined, and thus, in utterances that 
present a distributional alteration the area of the instruction becomes more determined in order to construct the 
first assumption and to perform the contrastive relation. 
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7.2.4. Comprehension 
In both conditions (pre- and postposition of the FO) the instruction of incluso evokes a 
conventional implicature in which a contrastive relation has to be established between the 
focus element and the alternative implicitly given in the discursive context. Since the 
procedural meaning of the FO is rigid, comprehension should not be affected by the position-
shift independently of the extension of the conceptual information. The observed data reveal 
similar results for all three condition-pairs under consideration: 
 
b2a2 c1a2 
Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English and even 
Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben inglés y chino incluso. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English and Chinese 
even.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que inglés. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to know Chinese than English’) 
 
explicit single alternative yes no unable to say 
preposition of the FO 90% 7% 3% 
postposition of the FO 81% 13% 6% 
χ2 test 3.27 < 5.99; p > .05 
 
b2a3 c1a3 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English, French and even 
Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y chino incluso. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English, French and 
Chinese even.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to know Chinese than the other mentioned languages’) 
 
explicit complex alterna-
tive 
yes no unable to say 
preposition of the FO 88% 7% 5% 
postposition of the FO 83% 10% 7% 
χ2 test 1.12 < 5.99; p > .05 
 
 
b2a1 c1a1 
Ana y Marta saben incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know even Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben chino incluso. 
(‘Anne and Martha know Chinese even.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que otras lenguas. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to know Chinese than other languages’) 
 
implicit alternative yes no unable to say 
preposition of the FO 87% 9% 4% 
postposition of the FO 82% 11% 7% 
χ2 test 0.96 < 5.99; p > .05 
 
Table 46: Comprehension test results – IV C/IV A 
 
Results reveal that no major differences are observed between the conditions independently of 
the extension of the alternative. In all conditions the answer with the highest proportion was 
yes indicating that in both conditions a contrastive implicature is interpreted (Table 46); justi-
fied since both conditions have identical informative schemes. The FO introduces the same 
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instruction and obliges the reader to interpret conventionally a contrastive scale. The findings 
reveal that, even though a distributional alteration evokes two different processing patterns, 
comprehension is not determined by the position-shift in any utterance, validating the rigidity 
of the FO. 
 
7.2.5. Final Discussion  
The difference between the conditions, independently of the extension of the alternative lies 
in the position of the FO in relation to its scope. The prepositional incluso as modifier pre-
cedes its nucleus, and in the other case this relation is inverted. However, the FO evokes in 
both conditions a contrastive implicature. Upon the semantic relation that has to be estab-
lished creating a contrastive relation, a distributional alteration has to be resolved in utteranc-
es with postpositional FO. This operation implies major global and local cognitive effort dur-
ing the whole processing. Thus, the analysis of this IV C – Position of the FO in relation to 
the focus – confirms its main hypothesis (cfr. § 6.1.3., confirmation of the hypothesis IV C-1) 
and leads to a conclusion regarding the positional variability: A preposition of the focus oper-
ator in relation to the focus is the optimal position. Any positional alteration produces more 
cognitive effort. Concluding, two informative identical structures lead to two different cogni-
tive patterns. Further, from a cognitive perspective a preferable FO-position (preposition) can 
be defended. This preferable FO-position is consistent with the theoretical and descriptive 
arguments regarding the two possible positions of a FO in relation to its scope corresponding 
the most frequent and common position with the less effort demanding cognitive pattern (cfr. 
§ 4.2.).  
The different processing patterns observed during the whole processing originate 
mainly from the reanalysis, since this is the processing stage in which the impact of the FO is 
maximally displayed upon all the focusing elements. At the macrolevel of the utterance, 
results of the IV B have proven that the insertion of a FO generates a regulation and 
acceleration effect that compensates the additional effort for the insertion of the procedural 
information. This effect holds if the FO precedes its focus. (cfr. § 7.1.). However, if the 
position of the FO is altered, and the FO is postponed to the focus, the processing pattern 
changes. The “check and reevaluate”-strategy is effectuated in both conditions during 
reanalysis, nevertheless, the structure with postpositional FO does not only require major 
“additional regulatory effort”, but also that this effort is differently distributed. The findings 
lead to the conclusion that a distributional alteration provokes a dislocation of the processing 
to the right side of the utterance. In all conditions with postpositional FO, FO and focus 
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constitute a functional unit provoking a processing gap between the functional unit and the 
alternative (explicit or implicit).193 Since the distributional alteration is a manipulation at 
word order level the dislocation-effect is already observable during the construction of the 
explicature. However, the postpositional FO displays its whole function during the second-
pass reading time provoking that the dislocation-effect runs through all parameters.  
 
Regarding the cross-variable IV A – Extension of the alternative results have proven that ex-
tending or restricting the conceptual information is tied to higher processing effort. These 
findings can also be validated in the utterances with postpositional FO. Again, the structures 
with explicit single alternative present the most balanced processing. Whereas, when the con-
trastive relation has to be established between a focus and an explicit complex subset of alter-
natives, or when it has to be established with a potential subset given in the discourse (implic-
it alternative) processing increases (cfr. 6.4.1., partly confirmation of the hypotheses of the IV 
A-1a) 
Summarizing the findings reveal that although both structures have identical informa-
tive relations, a less common position of a FO can alter the cognitive effort. From a cognitive 
perspective, a preferable FO-position exists that ensures a guided processing with a minimal 
cognitive effort. Further, the differences at global level between the conditions stem from a 
dislocation-effect provoked by position-shift of the FO. However, the different processing 
patterns do not affect the comprehension process. The FO (pre- or postpositional) convention-
ally guides (due to its rigid property) the inferential process in order to recover a contrastive 
implicature. Thus, both structures provide equally optimal stimuli for the interpretation of a 
scalar implicature (cfr. § 6.1.3., confirmation of the hypothesis IVC-2).  
                                                 
 
193 This effect is primarily observable in the utterances with explicit alternative (cfr. §§ 7.2.1. and 7.2.2.). Never-
theless, it can also be defended that in order to recover a contrastive relation in structures with postpositinal FO a 
functional unit is also established between FO and focus in utterances with implicit alternative (cfr. § 7.2.3.). 
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7.3. Degree of informativity 
 
The analysis of the IV D – Degree of informativity aims to assess to what extent the cognitive 
effort varies when the information given by the conceptual and procedural elements are 
congruous or incongruous to the contextual information anchored in the common ground. 
From a theoretical point of view, accommodating incongruous utterances to a specific context 
(d1-condition) implies more cognitive effort than integrating information of utterances that 
are informatively adaptable to the common ground (b2-condition). In both conditions under 
consideration, the procedural meaning of the FO incluso conditions the conceptual meaning 
of the other elements in order to construct an evaluative pragmatic scale. According to the 
degree of informativity in an utterance and thus, their degree of adaptability to the context, it 
is expected that two different processing-strategies will be conducted during mental 
processing and comprehension (cfr. § 6.1.4.).  
 
7.3.1. Utterances with explicit single alternative  
 
b2a2 – Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino. 
d1a2 – Ana y Marta saben chino e incluso inglés. 
 
In utterances with explicit single alternative, in which a FO incites, the focus information has 
to be related directly to the background information to construct a contrastive pragmatic scale.  
In common conditions (b2a2) the presented information triggered by the instruction of the FO 
in an utterance leads to a scalar implicature which is adaptable to the mental representations 
stored in the memory (Chinese is more difficult than English). On the contrary, if the 
conceptual information is altered, i.e. the lexical elements of the alternative and the focus are 
reversed, the conceptual information presented in the utterance and the instruction of the FO 
incluso leads to a scalar implicature that contradicts the mental assumptions based on the 
world knowledge (English is more difficult than Chinese). In the latter cases the conventional 
instruction of incluso obliges the reader to readjust the information of the conceptual elements 
(single alternative and focus), and subsequently, the reader has to perform an accommodation-
process that implies more processing effort in order to construct the scalar implicature. Thus, 
two different processing patterns are expected according to the degree of informativity in an 
utterance.  
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Global Comparison  
The analysis of the total reading time does not report any relevant differences between the 
conditions, neither for the total mean (236.52 ms vs. 243.50 ms, 2.95%, trivial effect, Table 
47), nor for the lexical mean (243.46 ms vs. 241.87 ms, -0.65%, trivial effect, Table 47). 
These first results point out that in these specific information structures, to accommodate 
incongruous information to the context by adding new information to the common ground 
does not require more global processing effort. In both conditions, in which the same 
informative scheme is encoded, the instruction of the FO incluso evokes a scalar implicature. 
The reader is forced to fulfil the instruction of the FO and integrates the information to the 
context with analogous cognitive effort.  
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 236.52 ms 243.50 ms 6.98 ms 
2.95% 
 trivial effect 
Lexical mean 243.46 ms 241.87 ms -1.59 ms 
-0.65% 
trivial effect 
Table 47: Total reading time – global comparison – IV D with explicit single alternative 
 
During the construction of the first assumption both utterances also present analogous pro-
cessing patterns, in the total mean (182.70 ms vs. 183.91 ms, 0.66%, trivial effect, Table 48), 
and in the lexical mean (185.14 ms vs. 179.84 ms, -2.86%, trivial effect, Table 48). This is 
plausible, because from a syntactical and semantical perspective both utterances present iden-
tical SVO-structures, and in utterances with explicit single alternative, the reader does not 
detect the incongruency of the utterance until the focus element is processed in relation to the 
FO.194 Concluding, the possible local processing effort at the focusing areas with unexpected 
focus is not trespassed to the global utterance level during the construction of the first as-
sumption. Moreover, integration- or accommodation-processes can only be performed by tak-
ing all elements under consideration, i.e. after the construction of the first assumption. Thus, 
the whole cognitive impact of incongruous utterances is reflected in the second-pass reading 
time. 
 
 
                                                 
 
194 Before reading the FO and the focus element a congruous utterance is expected by the reader (Ana and Marta 
know Chinese and xxx), i.e. an adaptable assumption could be activated. On the contrary to utterances with ex-
plicit complex alternative where the incongruency can be detected already in the alternative element, since the 
lexical chain (Chinese, French (and even English)) itself can be interpreted as incongruous to the context.  
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AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 182.70 ms 183.91 ms 1.21 ms 
0.66% 
trivial effect 
Lexical mean 185.14 ms 179.84 ms -5.30 ms 
-2.86% 
trivial effect 
Table 48: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV D with explicit single alternative 
 
During reanalysis, the processing patterns diverge notably from the patterns in the total and 
first-pass reading time. The data observed for the total mean present a large increase for the 
utterance with unexpected focus, i.e. 10.57% more processing effort is required to accommo-
date information that is incongruous to the context (53.65 ms vs. 59.32 ms, large effect, Table 
49). The processing effort for the total mean is also reflected in the lexical mean: the concep-
tual elements of the incongruous utterance (61.57 ms) demand 6.25% more processing effort 
than those of the congruous utterance (57.95 ms, Table 49). 
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 53.65 ms 59.32 ms 5.67 ms 
10.57% 
 large effect 
Lexical mean 57.95 ms 61.57 ms 3.62 ms 
6.25% 
medium effect 
Table 49: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV D with explicit single alternative 
 
The data of the second-pass reading time reveal that even though at global level both utter-
ances are processed identical (Table 47), different processing-strategies are conducted during 
reanalysis according to their degree of informativity. While in the congruous utterance a 
“check and reevaluate”-strategy is conducted in order to confirm the first assumption and to 
integrate the information to the context; in incongruous utterances the accommodation-
process implies a modification of the assumption in order to adapt the pragmatic scale to the 
context. The reader not only has to reidentify the conceptual elements as elements of a con-
trastive relation and reevaluate them according to the instruction of the conventional mark, he 
also has to modify the whole assumption in order to add new unexpected information to the 
common ground. This accommodation-strategy entails more global reanalysis effort. Howev-
er, this higher processing effort does not transcend to the whole processing at utterance level 
(Table 47). 
From a theoretical perspective, the data of the reanalysis provides a crucial claim: The 
impact of a lexical alteration of the conceptual information that in relation to the procedural 
information is anti-oriented to the common ground becomes notably apparent during later 
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measures. The activated accommodation-process implies major processing effort supporting 
the claim that different reanalysis-strategies are performed according to the degree of in-
formativity.  
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
Results at utterance level demonstrate that two different conditions that differ in their congru-
ency regarding the context are processed with global analogous times (Table 47), but that 
does not entail that they present the same internal pattern. Analyzing the focusing areas sepa-
rately provides evidence for two different processing paths.  
In the total reading time, the FO of the incongruous utterance (296.52 ms) is the most 
effort demanding area and requires 12.59% more cognitive effort than the FO of the congru-
ous utterance (263.37 ms, large effect, Table 50). The higher processing effort for the instruc-
tion encoded in incluso that generates the contradiction between the conceptual elements and 
the context is trespassed to the focus area, where the unexpected focus (incongruous condi-
tion, 270.90 ms) demands 10.22% more processing effort than the expected focus (congruous 
condition, 245.78 ms, large effect, Table 50).  
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 225.90 ms 229.55 ms 3.56 ms 
1.62% 
trivial effect 
Focus operator 263.37 ms 296.52 ms 33.15 ms 
12.59% 
large effect 
Focus 245.78 ms 270.90 ms 25.12 ms 
10.22% 
large effect 
Table 50: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV D with explicit single alternative 
 
Thus, analyzing the focusing areas, it can be defended that two different cognitive routes are 
applied in order to integrate congruous or incongruous information to the context. If the in-
formation is expected the operator guides the reader to the correct assumption by regulating 
the processing of the other constituents (“check and balance”-strategy). However, if the in-
formation in an utterance is incongruous to the context and the rigid instruction of the FO 
obliges to construct an evaluated scale that is informatively conflictive in regard to the com-
mon ground, the processing of the conventional mark itself and the direct object under its 
scope increases. The major processing effort for the FO in incongruous utterances leads to the 
conclusion that it is the procedural mark itself that generates the conflict in the utterance. This 
conflict between procedural and conceptual information regarding the common ground is, 
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however, a local conflict that affects the main focusing areas, but not the global level of the 
utterances with explicit single alternative.  
Concluding, these findings corroborate the theoretical claim of two different inferential routes 
when it comes to integrate congruous and incongruous information to the context. However, 
they only partly confirm the hypothesis that the accommodation of incongruous information 
implies major global processing effort. Results reveal, that for utterances with explicit single 
alternative, the accommodation of incongruous information only entails local, but not global 
effort.  
 
Although, from a syntactic and semantic perspective, both utterances present the same SVO-
structure and the same informative scheme, differences in the focusing areas between the 
conditions are observable already during the construction of the first assumption. The 
conceptual alteration provokes local processing effort for the unexpected focus in contrast to 
the expected focus (182.23 ms vs. 200.96 ms, 10.28%, large effect. Table 51). Moreover, 
neither the alternatives (169.30 ms vs. 169.48 ms, 0.11%, trivial effect, Table 51) nor the FOs 
(217.36 ms vs. 213.12 ms, -1.95%, trivial effect, Table 51) present any relevant differences 
between each other.  
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 169.30 ms 169.48 ms 0.18 ms 
0.11% 
trivial effect 
Focus operator 217.36 ms 213.12 ms -4.24 ms 
-1.95% 
trivial effect 
Focus 182.23 ms 200.96 ms 18.73 ms 
10.28% 
large effect 
Table 51: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV D with explicit single alternative 
 
The informational disorder triggered by the interplay of the procedural mark and the 
conceptual elements is detected by the reader when the instruction of the FO is related to the 
lexical information of the focus during the construction of the first assumption. In both 
conditions, the FO displays the same function forwardly to control immediately the 
processing of the focus element, therefore, similar processing values are sustainable for 
incluso and the alternative. Likewise, the reader becomes fully aware of the informative 
contradiction at the focus area, supporting the claim that the integration of unexpected 
information in a first assumption is tied to early local processing effort for the focus.   
The analogous cognitive effort for the alternatives is legitimate, because, in utterances 
with explicit single alternative, the lexical information of the alternative does not contradict 
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the context information until the instruction of incluso obliges the reader to contrast the 
unexpected focus to the background information (observable in the second-pass reading time). 
The findings of the first-pass reading time verify the theoretical and empirical described claim 
that incongruencies, generated by the alteration of conceptual information and/or by 
procedural elements are detected early during processing (cfr. § 5.2.).  
 
The complexity of accommodating an assumption with incongruous information becomes 
evident during the second-pass reading time, in which the initially constructed assumption is 
reconsidered for confirmation, modification or cancelation. Results of the reanalysis refute a 
theoretical claim: The integration of unexpected information activates an accommodation-
process that implies major global and local reanalysis effort (Table 49).  
The most relevant finding concerns the FO: Incluso of the incongruous utterance (83.30 
ms) requires nearly twice as much processing effort than its counterpart of the congruous ut-
terance (46.01 ms, 81.05%, very large effect, Table 52). The rigidity of the procedural ele-
ment conditions the conceptual information by activating two different processing-strategies 
in order to readjust the information of the lexical elements towards the instruction of the FO. 
The higher processing effort for the FO of the incongruous utterance during the recovery of 
the assumption is trespassed to the total processing level of the focusing areas (Table 50) in-
dicating that if incongruous information has to be accommodated to the context, the FO, not 
only is the element that generates the conflict, it also becomes the principle axis for infor-
mation retrieval.  
The effort needed for the accommodation is also visible in the focus area where the un-
expected focus (69.94 ms) demands 58.38% more processing effort than the expected focus 
(44.16 ms, very large effect, Table 52). Likewise, the contrast between alternative and focus 
in order to create a pragmatic scale that is anti-oriented to the contextual information implies 
also more processing effort for the alternative of the incongruous utterance (55.99 ms vs. 
60.07 ms, 7.29%, medium effect, Table 52).  
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 55.99 ms 60.07 ms 4.08 ms 
7.29% 
medium effect 
Focus operator 46.01 ms 83.30 ms 37.29 ms 
81.05% 
very large effect 
Focus 44.16 ms 69.94 ms 25.78 ms 
58.38% 
very large effect 
Table 52: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV D with explicit single alternative 
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To conclude, in utterances where the assumption is adaptable to the mental representations, a 
“check and reevaluate”-strategy is conducted, with slight “additional regulatory effort” in 
order to construct the scalar implicature while confirming the previously built assumption. 
Otherwise, in utterances with incongruous information an accommodation-strategy based on 
modification of the assumption is activated. The performed strategy implies local and global 
“additional accommodation effort” in order to adapt the information to the context during 
reanalysis. The rigidity or, in other words, the capacity of the FO to impose its conditions to 
the context and the whole utterance, provokes an insertion of the adequate assumptions to 
satisfy the processing instructions at any costs.  
Summarizing, the local and global higher processing effort for incongruous utterances 
during the recovery of the assumption is only trespassed at local level to the total processing 
time (Table 50), but do not affect the entire utterance processing (Table 47), supporting the 
conclusion that the additional processing effort for the accommodation-strategy can be 
levelled out through the entire processing. In light of these results, two theoretical claims can 
be formulated for utterances with single alternative:  
 
a) Two different processing-strategies are performed in order to fulfil the instruction 
triggered by incluso. 
b) Incongruous information is detected early, but the higher processing effort 
associated with the accommodation-process displays their total impact at later 
measures (reanalysis). 
 
7.3.2. Utterances with explicit complex alternative  
 
b2a3 – Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso chino. 
d1a3 – Ana y Marta saben chino, francés e incluso inglés. 
 
It is expected that the analysis of utterances with explicit complex alternative prevails similar 
processing strategies as utterances with explicit single alternative. Thus, two different 
processing patterns between the conditions are expected: One informatively unmarked pattern 
(b2 – congruous condition), in which the conceptual enrichment of the alternative, co-oriented 
to the instruction of incluso, facilitates processing during the recovery of a scalar implicature 
(Chinese is more difficult than English and French); and another, informatively marked 
pattern (d1 – condition), in which the accommodation-process will evoke major processing 
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effort in order to establish the semantic relation between the constituents (English is more 
difficult than Chinese and French). In the incongruous condition, it is expected that due to the 
extension of conceptual information of the alternative, the additional effort for the 
accommodation-process in comparison to utterances with single explicit alternative will 
increase (cfr. § 6.1.4.). 
 
Global Comparison  
By analyzing the cumulative values of the total reading time of utterances with explicit 
complex alternative different cognitive patterns are found in contrast to the results obtained 
for utterances with single alternative. The accommodation of incongruous information 
becomes more effort demanding if the conceptual information of the alternative is presented 
as lexical chain, observable in increased global values for the utterance in which the 
information is incongruous to the context: in the total mean (225.07 ms vs. 238.73 ms, 6.07% 
medium effect, Table 53) and in the lexical mean (230.33 ms vs. 248.46 ms, 7.87%, medium 
effect, Table 53). These results reveal that a) two different processing-strategies are executed, 
and b) by extending the conceptual information the accommodation of incongruous 
information becomes more complex reporting major processing effort for the whole utterance.  
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 225.07 ms 238.73 ms 13.66 ms 
6.07% 
medium effect 
Lexical mean 230.33 ms 248.46 ms 18.13 ms 
7.87% 
medium effect 
Table 53: Total reading time – global comparison – IV D with explicit complex alternative 
 
The analysis of the utterance values during the construction of the first assumption present a 
slightly different pattern in comparison to the total reading time. The lexical alteration in the 
incongruous utterance already provokes an increased pattern for the whole utterance in the 
total mean (180.16 ms vs. 187.59, 4.12%, small effect, Table 54). However, the values of the 
lexical mean do not differ from each other (184.09 ms vs. 189.75 ms, 3.07%, trivial effect, 
Table 54). Since the difference between the total and lexical mean reports exactly the impact 
of the procedural information in the utterance the increased values for the incongruous 
utterance can be attributed directly to the FO (Table 54). Consequently, the results anticipate 
that in utterances with complex alternative the incongruency may be detected in an earlier 
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AOI than in utterances with single alternative provoking local higher processing effort that is 
trespassed to the processing of the whole utterance.195 
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 180.16 ms 187.59 ms 7.43 ms 
4.12 % 
small effect 
Lexical mean 184.09 ms 189.75 ms 5.66 ms 
3.07% 
trivial effect 
Table 54: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV D with explicit complex alternative 
 
Different re-reading strategies during the second-pass reading time between the conditions 
confirm the patterns of the total reading time. The data observed for the total mean present a 
large increase for the incongruous utterance (50.93 ms), i.e. 13.71% more cognitive effort is 
required to accommodate conflictive information to the context in comparison to the 
congruous utterance (44.79 ms, Table 55). The discrepancy between the conditions becomes 
even sharper in the analysis of the lexical mean, in which a very large effect is detected (45.94 
ms vs. 58.34 ms, 26.99%, Table 55). 
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 44.79 ms 50.93 ms 6.14 ms 
13.71% 
large effect 
Lexical mean 45.94 ms 58.34 ms 12.40 ms 
26.99% 
very large effect 
Table 55: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV D with explicit complex alternative 
 
Analyzing the results for the total and lexical mean jointly leads to the conclusion that two 
different processing-strategies are performed in order to fulfil the instruction of the FO and 
subsequently to construct a contrastive relation within a pragmatic scale.   
In utterances, in which the information is co-oriented to the common ground of the 
interlocutors, the interplay between conceptual information (lexical chain) and the procedural 
information of the FO activates an immediate “processing-benefit effect” leading to minor 
reanalysis and global effort. On the opposite, if the presented information is incongruous to 
the context, processing becomes more effort demanding. The “processing-benefit effect” 
observed in congruous utterances is disrupted. The extension of the conceptual information at 
                                                 
 
195 The results obtained for utterances with explicit single alternative do not register differences neither for the 
total mean, nor for the lexical mean indicating that the incongruency is not detected until the instruction of the 
FO is processed in relation to the focus.  
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the alternative contains in itself a sufficient stimulus to detect the informational incongruency 
in the utterance, and further, the relation between the conceptual information and the FO 
incluso makes the contradiction even more explicit during first-pass reading time.  
 The findings of the reanalysis are consistent with the analysis of the utterances with 
single alternative: During reanalysis two different processing-strategies are conducted 
according to the degree of informativity of the utterances. Furthermore, in incongruous 
utterances with complex alternative, the interplay between conceptual and procedural 
meaning does not minimize the processing effort, but increases it at all processing levels. The 
extension of the conceptual information entails higher accommodation effort that emerges 
during the construction of the first assumption, and this becomes fully apparent during the 
recovery. Finally, this higher processing effort is trespassed to the total processing level (in 
the total reading time). 
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
The analysis of the focusing areas in the total reading time corroborate the findings obtained 
for the whole utterance comparison. The global major processing effort for the utterance with 
incongruous information emerges from different processing-strategies that are conducted at 
local level between the conditions. The observed data of the total reading time reports more 
processing effort for the alternative and the FO of the incongruous utterance. The complex 
alternative of the incongruous utterance (252.41 ms) demands 11.51% more processing effort 
than the alternative of the congruous utterance (226.35 ms, large effect, Table 56)196, 
suggesting that if more conceptual information is added to the alternative and consequently 
more information has to be integrated to the context, the more relevant becomes the 
alternative during processing. The accommodation-effort for the incongruous utterances is 
also displayed at the FO area, where the FO (259.97 ms) requires 8.76% more processing 
effort than the FO of the congruous utterance (239.04 ms, medium effect, Table 56). On the 
contrary, the foci do not differ from each other (244.33 ms vs. 252.90 ms, 3.51%, trivial 
effect, Table 56) indicating that possible higher processing effort for the unexpected focus is 
levelled out through the entire processing.  
 
 
                                                 
 
196 The obtained results in the comparison of utterances with single alternative demonstrate a different picture. 
The single alternatives do not differ from each other in the total reading time (Table 50), leading to the conclu-
sion that if the alternative constitutes a minimal explicit set, the conceptual information of the alternative steps to 
the background and the recovery of the assumption is mainly derived by the areas of the FO and the focus.  
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AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 226.35 ms 252.41 ms 26.06 ms 
11.51% 
large effect 
Focus operator 239.04 ms 259.97 ms 20.93 ms 
8.76% 
medium effect 
Focus 244.33 ms 252.90 ms 8.57 ms 
3.51% 
trivial effect 
Table 56: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV D with explicit complex alternative 
 
In both conditions the FO evokes a contrastive relation between the constituents by imposing 
its instruction to the utterance and to the context. But, while in the congruous utterance, the 
information is co-oriented to the context, and a guided processing is ensured minimizing the 
processing effort of all constituents (“check and balance”-strategy), in the incongruous 
utterance conceptual and procedural information are confronted to each other. In these types 
of utterance structures a processing disruption is effectuated producing higher local (and 
global) processing effort for the accommodation-process.  
Furthermore, the analysis of the focusing areas corroborate the findings of utterances 
with single alternative: A procedural incongruency in an utterance is tied to local major 
processing effort. However, the findings present a relevant difference between utterances with 
single and complex alternative: The local processing effort required for the accommodation 
process can be transferred to the global level in utterances with complex alternative or, as in 
the cases of utterances with single alternative, can be levelled out through entire processing.  
 
The analysis of the focusing areas during the construction of the first assumption report 
similar patterns for the complex alternative and the FO as in the total reading time. The 
alternative of the incongruous utterance (200.79 ms) present a medium increase (8.71%) in 
comparison to the alternative of the congruous utterance (184.71 ms, Table 57). This finding 
verifies the theoretical claim that incongruencies are detected in the first element that inhibits 
the incongruous information. In utterances with complex alternative the lexical chain 
(Chinese, French) can provide a sufficient stimulus for detecting the incongruency in relation 
to the common ground.197 The early detection of the incongruency at the alternative provokes 
higher processing effort for the FO of the incongruous utterance (189.85 ms vs. 211.40 ms, 
11.35%, large effect, Table 57) in contrast to the FO of the congruous utterance. By relating 
                                                 
 
197 Note that in utterances with single alternative the first element that entails the contradiction during the con-
struction of the first assumption is the focus element, since the single alternative does not contradict the contex-
tual information. Until the readers relates the instruction of the FO with the focus information, the assumption 
can be adaptable to the common ground.   
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the conceptual information of the alternative with the procedural information of incluso the 
incongruency is confirmed. As a consequence, the reader abandons quickly the unexpected 
focus in order to reanalyze the whole utterance and to accommodate the information during 
the recovery of the assumption. The abandonment of the unexpected focus causes that the 
expected focus becomes slightly more effort demanding than the unexpected focus (199.61 
ms vs. 188.76 ms, -5.44%, medium effect, Table 57). 
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Alternative 184.71 ms 200.79 ms 16.08 ms 
8.71% 
medium effect 
Focus operator 189.85 ms 211.40 ms 21.55 ms 
11.35% 
large effect 
Focus 199.61 ms 188.76 ms -10.85 ms 
-5.44% 
medium effect 
Table 57: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV D with explicit complex alternative 
 
The analysis of the focusing areas during the recovery of the communicated assumption 
shows slightly different local processing patterns for utterances with complex alternative in 
contrast to utterances with single alternative. If the conceptual information of the alternative is 
extended the cognitive effort for the instruction of the FO of the incongruous utterance is 
minimized and equaled to the values of the FO of the congruous utterances (49.23 ms vs. 
48.51 ms, -1.46%, trivial effect, Table 58).  
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference       
 % 
Alternative 41.15 ms 51.10 ms 8.95 ms 
24.18% 
very large effect 
Focus operator 49.23 ms 48.51 ms -0.72 ms 
-1.46% 
trivial effect 
Focus 44.10 ms 63.55 ms 19.45 ms 
44.10% 
very large effect 
Table 58: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV D with explicit complex alternative 
 
The reversed patterns between utterances with single and complex alternative regarding the 
FO are associated with the moment in which the incongruency is detected in the respective 
utterances during the construction of the first assumption.198 In utterances with complex 
alternative, the early detection of the incongruency at the area of the alternative during the 
                                                 
 
198 Note, that in utterances with single alternative the FOs do not differ during first-pass reading time (trivial 
effect, Table 51). The reader does not detect the incongruency until the focus element is processed, thus, he has 
to reconfirm the instruction of the FO with major processing effort during the second-pass reading time (81.05%, 
very large effect, Table 52).  
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first-pass reading time (Table 57) directly activates a more attentive processing of the 
instruction of the FO entailing major processing effort. During the construction of the first 
assumption, the additional effort for the FO minimizes the reanalysis effort of the FO during 
the recovery of the assumption.  
In order to contrast the unexpected focus with the lexical chain of the alternative, and 
subsequently, to accommodate the constructed assumption to the common ground, the 
conducted accommodation-process implies the redefinition and reevaluation of the conceptual 
elements towards the procedural instruction. Process that is conducted with notable increases 
for the alternative and the focus: the alternative (51.10 ms) reports a very large effect 
(24.18%) in contrast to the alternative of the congruous utterance, (41.15 ms, Table 58), as 
well as the unexpected focus (63.55 ms vs. 44.10 ms, 44.10%, Table 58). 
In the utterances with single alternative, the reader is forced by the conventional 
instruction to readjust (if necessary) the information given by the conceptual elements. 
Further, the conceptual information of a complex alternative can act as a sufficient stimulus in 
order to detect the incongruency and thus, it activates an accommodation-process early. The 
obtained results reinforce two previous findings:  
 
a) The accommodation of incongruous information to the common ground entails a 
more effort demanding processing path, at least during the recovery of the 
assumption at local and global level. This finding leads to refute the argument of 
two different processing-strategies.  
b) Incongruencies triggered by a procedural mark and by a conceptual alteration are 
detected in the element that inhibits the incongruency (complex alternative) 
during the construction of the first assumption.  
 
7.3.3. Utterances with implicit alternative  
 
b2a1 – Ana y Marta saben incluso chino. 
d1a1 – Ana y Marta saben incluso inglés. 
 
Utterances that are semantically underdetermined require more cognitive effort in order to 
recover the ostensive communicated assumption, in contrast to utterances with explicit 
alternatives (cfr. § 7.2.5.). However, in these types of utterances the insertion of incluso also 
facilitates the construction of a contrastive relation between the focus element and a potential 
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subset given in the discourse (b2-condition). Contrarily, for the d1-condition, it is expected 
that the alteration of the conceptual information of the semantic relation will evoke a different 
inferential route based on a more effort demanding accommodation-process that has to be 
performed in order to modify or cancel the assumption.  
Additionally, since utterances with implicit alternative entail less conceptual 
information and are less restricted to interpretation possibilities in relation to the common 
ground, different processing-strategies are most likely to be performed in contrast to 
utterances with explicit alternatives. 
 
Global Comparison  
The results of the total reading time report similar global processing effort for both utterance 
types under consideration in the total mean (229.16 ms vs. 231.42 ms, 0.99%, trivial effect, 
Table 59); while the analysis of the lexical mean plots a medium decrease for the incongruous 
utterance (230.74 ms vs. 218.85 ms, -5.15%, medium effect, Table 59).  
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 229.16 ms 231.42 ms 2.26 ms 
0.99% 
trivial effect 
Lexical mean 230.74 ms 218.85 ms -11.89 ms 
-5.15% 
medium effect 
Table 59: Total reading time – global comparison – IV D with implicit alternative 
 
The differences between total and lexical mean suggest that two different processing-
strategies triggered by the instruction of incluso are conducted at local level. The instruction 
of the FO conditions the processing effort of the focus element in order to construct a 
contrastive relation between a marked focus and the mental representations activated by the 
discursive context. In particular, the results of the lexical mean indicate that the construction 
of a semantically underdetermined assumption should entail local major processing effort for 
the congruous utterance. However, these possible local effort does not lead to different global 
processing pattern at utterance level.199  
                                                 
 
199 The results of the total mean in the comparison of utterances with implicit alternative confirm the findings of 
utterances with explicit single alternative. Although, different local processing patterns are conducted, the effort 
necessary for the accommodation-process does not rise to the global processing level of the utterance. A differ-
ent processing picture is presented in the comparison of utterances with complex alternative, in which the local 
higher processing effort for the accommodation of incongruous information does transcend to the global level of 
the utterance. Analyzing these results jointly it can be argued that more additional accommodation effort is re-
quired according to the informative load of the utterance.  
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During the construction of the first assumption slightly increased patterns are detected for 
congruous utterances at the total mean (172.24 ms vs. 163.99 ms, -4.79%, small effect, Table 
60), and at the lexical mean (173.40 ms vs. 159.63 ms, -7.94%, medium effect, Table 60). In 
line with the findings of the IV B (cfr. § 7.1.5.), it can be assumed that the FO (that encodes 
the same instruction in both conditions) directly incites over the focus element and activates a 
“regulatory-effect” by minimizing the processing of the whole utterance. Although the 
processing effort for the congruous utterance in this comparison may seem contradictory, it is 
more likely that the same “abandonment-process” at the unexpected focus element is 
performed as in utterances with complex alternative. Thus, congruous utterances demand 
slightly more processing effort than utterances with incongruous information during the 
construction of the first assumption. 
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference    
 % 
Total mean 172.24 ms 163.99 ms -8.25 ms 
-4.79% 
small effect 
Lexical mean 173.40 ms 159.63 ms -13.77 ms 
-7.94% 
medium effect 
Table 60: First-pass reading time – global comparison – IV D with implicit alternative 
 
The possible “abandonment-effect” during the construction of the first assumption is endorsed 
by the results of the second-pass reading time, in which a reversed pattern is presented 
according to the first-pass reading time. The utterance that entails incongruous information 
(67.24 ms) demands 18.42% more processing effort than the utterance with congruous 
information (56.78 ms, large effect, Table 61). The result for the total mean sustains the 
conclusion formulated for utterances with explicit alternative: The accommodation-process 
performed with the aim of integrating incongruous information to the context implies major 
reanalysis effort, and thus two different processing-strategies are observed according to the 
degree of informativity in the utterances.  
Considering that the values of the lexical mean do not differ from each other (57.05 ms 
vs. 58.85 ms, 3.16%, trivial effect, Table 61), and that a large effect is presented in the total 
mean, it can be concluded that the FO must be the main actor for the recovery of the 
assumption in utterances without explicit background information. The reader performs the 
accommodation-process triggered by the FO mainly at the area of the instruction. The 
processing effort needed for the modification of the assumption and subsequently for the 
integration of the incongruous information to the common ground is tied to local higher 
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processing effort that is transferred to the utterance level during reanalysis, but are levelled 
out through the entire processing of the utterance. 
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference     
% 
Total mean 56.78 ms 67.24 ms 10.46 ms 
18.42% 
large effect 
Lexical mean 57.05 ms 58.85 ms 1.80 ms 
3.16% 
trivial effect 
Table 61: Second-pass reading time – global comparison – IV D with implicit alternative 
 
Comparison of focusing areas 
The divergences at global level of the utterance reveal that two different processing-strategies 
are performed during reanalysis. Although, the required effort for the accommodation-process 
for incongruous utterances is not trespassed to the global utterance level in the total reading 
time, the analysis of the focusing areas provides evidence of different local-strategies. 
The analysis of the FOs validates the findings of the comparison of the utterances with 
explicit alternative (cfr. §§ 7.3.1. and 7.3.2.). Incluso demands higher processing effort, when 
the presented information of the utterance is contradictory to the context (240.34 ms vs. 
268.77 ms, 11.83%, large effect, Table 62). The FO generates the conflict by imposing its 
restrictions to the utterance and context. However, with the intention to accommodate 
information independently of the degree of informativity of the utterance, the FO acts as a 
guide and is the main area from where the incongruency is resolved. Contrarily, at the area of 
the focus a reversed pattern is found. The unexpected focus (200.46 ms) require 4.92% less 
processing effort than the expected focus (210.84 ms, small effect, Table 62). The finding at 
the focus area support the claim of an “abandonment-effect” when the information of the 
utterance is incongruous to the context.200  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
200 The result found at the focus area is divergent to the findings of the comparison of utterances with explicit 
alternative, in which the unexpected focus either demands more processing effort (cfr. § 7.3.1.) or presents simi-
lar processing values than the expected focus (cfr. § 7.3.2.). Considering the results jointly, it appears that the 
“abandonment-effect” at the focus area is conducted in explicit complex and in implicit alternative structures, 
and further, that the abandonment is more rigidly executed in utterances with implicit alternative, since the read-
er has to rely on the given context to a establish a proper assumption.  
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AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Focus operator 240.34 ms 268.77 ms 28.43 ms 
11.83% 
large effect 
Focus 210.84 ms 200.46 ms 19.45 ms 
-4.92% 
small effect 
Table 62: Total reading time – focusing areas – IV D with implicit alternative 
 
During the construction of the first assumption, both FOs are processed similarly (169.95 ms 
vs. 165.88 ms, -2.39%, trivial effect, Table 63); but activate different processing-strategies for 
the focus element. While in the congruous utterance the FO activates a “regulatory-effect” 
and starts the focusing operation; in incongruous utterances the FO generates an 
“abandonment-effect” at the focus element (as in utterances with complex alternative, 
producing a shallow processing effort for the unexpected focus. These two different 
processing paths result in local higher processing effort for the expected focus (171.69 ms vs. 
149.88 ms, -12.70%, large effect, Table 63) that is also trespassed to the global utterance 
level. 
 
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Focus operator 169.95 ms 165.88 ms -4.07 ms 
-2.39% 
trivial effect 
Focus 171.69 ms 149.88 ms -21.81 ms 
-12.70% 
large effect 
Table 63: First-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV D with implicit alternative 
 
The results of the reanalysis corroborate the observed “abandonment-effect” at the focus area 
during the first-pass reading time by reporting a very large increase for the unexpected focus 
in contrast to the expected focus (38.52 ms vs. 49.96 ms, 29.70%, Table 64). Likewise, the 
FO of the incongruous utterance demands 46.07% more processing effort than the FO of the 
congruous utterance (70.41 ms vs. 102.85 ms, very large effect, Table 64).  
  
AOI 
congruous utter-
ance (b2a2) 
incongruous ut-
terance (d1a2) 
Difference 
ms 
Difference        
% 
Focus operator 70.41 ms 102.85 ms 32.44 ms 
46.07% 
very large effect 
Focus 38.52 ms 49.96 ms 11.44 ms 
29.70% 
very large effect 
Table 64: Second-pass reading time – focusing areas – IV D with implicit alternative 
 
Results reveal that the integration of new unexpected information to the common ground 
activates a more effort demanding accommodation-process during the recovery of the 
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communicated assumption. Considering the results jointly with the findings at global level 
(Table 59-61), three main conclusions can be formulated:  
 
a) Depending, if the information in an utterance is congruous or incongruous to the 
context, different processing-strategies are activated. Whereas in congruous 
utterances a confirmation is effectuated in order to verify the constructed 
assumption during the first-pass reading time, in incongruous utterances an 
immediate accommodation-process based on modification of the first assumption 
is performed, that entails major local and global reanalysis effort. However, the 
higher processing effort necessary for the accommodation-process during 
reanalysis are levelled out through the entire processing of the utterance. 
b) Accommodation-processes are effectuated during later processing stages. This 
effect is associated to the moment in which the incongruency is detected. After 
detecting the incongruency at the focus area during first-pass reading time, the 
reader abandons the focus, in order to recover the assumption by conducting an 
immediate accommodation-process triggered by the FO during second-pass 
reading time.  
c) Accommodation-processes are mainly triggered by the instruction of the FO. The 
FO constitutes the axis for information retrieval during reanalysis in both 
conditions. Moreover, if the information is incongruous to the contextual 
information, the instruction of the FO becomes more pertinent.201 
 
7.3.4. Comprehension 
The results of the comprehension test of the IV B demonstrate that the insertion of a FO con-
ditions the deduction of inferences. Conventionally marked utterances triggered by incluso 
present a sufficient stimulus to derive a contrastive implicature (cfr. § 7.1.4.). Therefore, due 
to its rigidity, it is expected that the FO will oblige to construct a contrastive implicature, i.e. 
                                                 
 
201 This is further refuted by the fact, that the FO of the utterance with implicit alternative and incongruous 
information requires the most processing effort during reanalysis in comparison to all other utterances under 
consideration in this variable: 
 
processing values FO 
second-pass reading time 
explicit single al-
ternative 
explicit complex 
alternative 
implicit alter-
native 
congruous utterance 46.01 ms 49.23 ms 70.41 ms 
incongruous utterance 83.30 ms 48.51 ms 102.85 ms 
 
The results indicate that if utterances are semantically more underdetermined the procedural impact of the FO in 
the utterance becomes more indispensable in order to derive the correct the assumption.  
 185 
the conceptual meaning has to be interpreted towards the procedural meaning, independently 
whether the conceptual meaning in relation to the procedural meaning is co-oriented (b2-
condition) or anti-oriented (d1-condition) to the common ground. Results of the IV D com-
prehension test reveal that, if the questions asks specifically towards the instruction of the FO 
in the utterance, in all conditions (regardless the extension of the alternative) the answers are 
heterogeneously distributed favoring the answer yes (Table 65), indicating that the instruction 
of incluso obliges the reader to construct a contrastive implicature, even if the conceptual in-
formation in relation to the procedural instruction becomes anti-oriented to the common 
ground (d1-condition).  
 
b2a2 d1a2 
Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English and even Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben chino e incluso inglés. 
(‘Anne and Martha know Chinese and even 
English.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que 
inglés. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to know 
Chinese than English’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber inglés que 
chino. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to 
know English than Chinese’) 
 
explicit single alternative yes no unable to say 
congruous utterance 90% 7% 3% 
incongruous utterance 85% 12% 3% 
χ2 test 1.45 < 5.99; p > .05 
 
b2a3 d1a3 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know English, French and even 
Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben chino, francés e incluso inglés. 
(‘Anne and Martha know Chinese, French and even 
English.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que 
las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to 
know Chinese than the other mentioned languages’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber inglés que 
las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to 
know English than the other mentioned languages’) 
 
explicit complex alterna-
tive 
yes no unable to say 
congruous utterance 88% 7% 5% 
incongruous utterance 79% 14% 7% 
χ2 test 3.15 < 5.99; p > .05 
 
b2a1 d1a1 
Ana y Marta saben incluso chino. 
(‘Anne and Martha know even Chinese.’) 
Ana y Marta saben incluso inglés. 
(‘Anne and Martha know even English.’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino que 
otras lenguas. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to 
know Chinese than other languages’) 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber inglés que 
otras lenguas. 
(‘According to the sentence, it is less probably to 
know English than other languages’) 
 
implicit alternative yes no unable to say 
congruous utterance 87% 9% 4% 
incongruous utterance 79% 10% 11% 
χ2 test 3.70 < 5.99; p > .05 
Table 65: Comprehension test results – IV D/IV A 
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The results of the comprehension test of the IV D seems to justify the properties of units with 
procedural value: rigidity and asymmetry. The procedural meaning of the FO imposes its 
condition to the utterance and the context, and not vice versa (Leonetti and Escandell Vidal 
2004:1729). Incluso activates the insertion of the appropriate assumption in order to satisfy 
the interpretation process (Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:81), if the reader is obliged by 
the comprehension task to fulfil the instruction of the FO.  
 
7.3.5. Final Discussion  
In both conditions the grammatical and semantical structures not only codify the relation 
between the constituents necessary to build the propositional content, they also encode (by the 
FO) the way in which the different elements have to relate to each other within the discursive 
model. The reader has to construct in relation to a topic a scalar pragmatic scale. The 
difference between the conditions in this independent variable lies in the relation between the 
conceptual und procedural information regarding the common ground: By default, for a 
Spanish speaker, it is more likely that someone who speaks foreign languages will speak 
English (b2-condition) rather than Chinese (d1-condition). 
The analysis of the IV D has shown that the integration of the mental representations 
obtained from the conceptual meaning and the instruction of the FO always leads to a scalar 
implicature even if the presented information in the utterance contradicts the assumptions 
stored in the common ground (cfr. § 6.1.4., confirmation of the hypotheses IV D-1 and IV D-
2). However, the interpretation of a scalar implicature does not mean that both conditions are 
processed with the same cognitive pattern. The results of all conditions (all alternative exten-
sions) demonstrate that the accommodation-process of an utterance in which the conceptual 
meaning and the instruction of the FO generate a conflict regarding the common ground de-
mand more cognitive effort. This cognitive overload become most notably apparent during 
the recovery of the communicated assumption that is not accepted immediately by the reader. 
These results lead to another focusing conclusion regarding the degree of informativity in an 
utterance: In an informative structure with marked focus the co-orientation of the conceptual 
meaning towards the procedural meaning assures a guided processing. Any difficulty of ac-
commodating a conceptual representation towards the instruction of the focus operator initi-
ates a conflict-resolution strategy.  
The FO demands to perform different inferential routes based on different processing-
strategies in order to confirm or to modify the assumption. However, the reported effort for 
the accommodation-process during the recovery of the communicated assumption in all con-
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ditions with incongruous information does not necessarily transcend to the total processing 
level of utterances, leading to the conclusion that accommodation-processes are mostly effec-
tuated at local level and are levelled out through the entire processing course (cfr. § 6.1.4., 
confirmation of the hypothesis IV D-1).202 
Moreover, at the macro level of the utterance, the findings verify the properties of units 
with procedural meaning. The rigidity of incluso obliges to process the conceptual elements 
according to the procedural mark in order to construct an appropriate assumption at any cost. 
The FO becomes the axis for information retrieval in both conditions demanding always more 
processing effort in the incongruous utterances. Thereby, the FO affects directly the cognitive 
effort of the elements under its scope activating different local processing patterns (cfr. § 
6.1.4., confirmation of the hypothesis IV D-2). 
Relying on the different conditions of the cross-variable IV A, the findings of the first-
pass reading time allow to formulate another claim related to focusing operations: 
Incongruencies are detected in the first element that inhibits the conflictive information. 
During the construction of the first assumption, results reveal, that in utterances with implicit 
or explicit single alternative the reader detects the incongruency by relating the instruction of 
the FO to the focus element. Whereas, in utterances with complex alternative the lexical chain 
of the alternative presents in itself a contradictory enchainment and thus, the incongruency is 
detected already at the alternative element. In accordance with the moment of the 
incongruency-detection the reader conducts two different strategies during the construction of 
the explicature: Either an integration-process is started immediately by dwelling longer at the 
focus area, as in the cases of utterances with single alternative, or an “abandonment-effect” is 
conducted. If the conceptual information of the alternative is implicitly given in the discourse 
or present as a high saturated lexical chain, the reader opts for a quick abandonment at the 
focus area in order to modify the first assumption while conducting an immediate 
accommodation-process during reanalysis. Independently of the extension of the alternative, 
the accommodation of incongruous information is always tied to more processing effort 
during reanalysis (cfr. § 6.1.1., confirmation of the hypotheses of the IV A-1b).  
Notwithstanding, the cognitive overload for incongruous utterances during processing is 
not reflected during comprehension. Results show that if the reader is asked to execute the 
                                                 
 
202 Only in the utterances with explicit complex alternative the accommodation-process entails more global effort 
(6.07%, medium effect) that emerges already during the construction of the first assumption, and is also tres-
passed to the second-pass reading time and the total processing level. These results are justified since adding 
more conceptual information means that more conflictive potential is given between the conceptual and proce-
dural information regarding the context, and thus the integration of a proper assumption becomes more effort 
demanding. 
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instruction of the FO, he fulfills the task in the same manner as in congruous utterances. 
These results corroborate the rigidity and asymmetry property of procedural devices (cfr. § 
6.1.1., rejection of the hypotheses of the IV A-2b).  
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8. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The aim of this experimental study was to examine whether different focusing structures 
(marked by the Spanish FO incluso) evoke different cognitive patterns during processing, and 
whether they trigger different comprehension strategies. More specifically, the study aimed to 
analyze: a) if there are existing correlations between the morphosyntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic properties of the FO incluso and the informative structure of the utterance, b) how 
the FO affects the implicated elements of the focusing operation, and c) to what extend the 
presence of incluso determines the recovery of inferences.  
Therefore, different linguistic variables were considered that enable to analysis to what 
extent processing patterns and comprehension strategies differ, if a FO is present or absent in 
an utterance (IV B), if the position of the FO is prepositional or postpositional in relation to 
the focus element (IV C), or if the conceptual meaning and the procedural meaning are co- or 
anti-oriented to the common ground of the reader (IV D). Additionally, these three linguistic 
variables are analyzed in three different informative structures regarding the alternative in-
formation: implicit alternative, explicit single alternative and explicit complex alternative 
(cross-variable IV A) (cfr. § 6.1.1.). In order to test the hypotheses formulated for each inde-
pendent variable (cfr. § 6.1.), a number of focusing structures based on different syntactical, 
semantic and pragmatic features were designed and analyzed by implementing two different 
experimental methods: eye tracking study and comprehension test.  
Alongside with descriptive and theoretical arguments, the obtained experimental results 
and key findings of each independent variable result in five central conclusions (cfr. § 7.): 
 
Focus marking 
1. An utterance with marked focus does not present more global processing effort than an 
utterance with unmarked focus.   
 
2.  The focus operator generates a regulation and acceleration effect that compensates the 
additional processing effort that are produced by the lexical contrast of the affected 
units (alternative and focus). The processing effort of the focus operator constitutes 
the maximum limit for the processing of the implicated elements at the focusing oper-
ation.  
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Positional variability 
3. A preposition of the focus operator in relation to the focus is the optimal position. Any 
positional alteration produces more cognitive effort.  
 
Informativity  
4. In an informative structure with marked focus the co-orientation of the conceptual 
meaning towards the procedural meaning assures a guided processing. Any difficulty 
of accommodating a conceptual representation towards the instruction of the focus op-
erator initiates a conflict-resolution strategy.  
 
Comprehension 
5. A contrastive relation is not processed “by default”. The insertion of a focus operator 
in an unmarked focus structure becomes indispensable if a contrastive relation is in-
tended 
 
In line with these five conclusions, it can be argued that different syntactical, semantical and 
informative alterations generate different processing structures. Considering the processing 
average of marked focus structures as basis for all the examined variables, general results 
reflect that a common marked focusing structure never demands more processing effort than 
the same utterance without procedural device (cfr. § 7.1.). Further, the position of the FO re-
garding the focus element is strictly correlated with the processing of focusing structures. 
This specific variable alteration presents the most effortful condition of the presented study. 
In this regard, it is argued that the more common and frequent the FO-position is, the lower 
the processing effort (cfr. § 7.2.). At last, the degree of informativity produces an impact in 
the processing of these types of structures. The co-orientation of conceptual and procedural 
information regarding the common ground accelerates processing. Any conflict between the 
two meanings result in a conflict-resolution strategy in which an accommodation attempt is 
conducted (cfr. § 7.3.). In terms of comprehension, it can be concluded that the rigidity of the 
procedural mark leads to an interpretation of a conventional scalar implicature, and that a FO 
becomes indispensable for the construction of contrastive relations.  
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8.1. Focus marking 
 
The empirical and experimental evidence gathered in the study has proven that utterances 
with unmarked and marked focus (triggered by a FO) that present different semantic and syn-
tactic properties regarding their information structure require similar global processing effort 
(always trivial effects; cfr. § 7.1.). Thus, the confirmation of the first hypothesis regarding the 
variable IV B–Focus marking (cfr. § 6.1.2.) allows the formulation of a first conclusion203:  
 
An utterance with marked focus does not present more global processing processing 
effort than an utterance with unmarked focus.   
 
From a theoretical point of view this conclusion is a key finding of the study: The specific 
information structure evoked by a FO as incluso is much more complex than the informative 
structure of an utterance with unmarked focus. The FO obliges the reader to mark an element 
of the discourse as more informative than the other elements which could be explicitly present 
in the utterance or implicitly given in the discourse (cfr. Rooth 1995, Portolés 2007, 2010, 
DPDE s.v. incluso). However, even though this implies more semantical information in the 
utterance, cognitive effort does not increase proportionally, leading to the conclusion that the 
insertion of a procedural element as incluso facilitates processing.  
The discussion of the results reveals that incluso (as also other FOs, as hasta, cfr. Torres 
Santos 2020) activates a regulatory-effect while controlling the processing of the focusing 
areas under its scope (alternative and focus, cfr. § 7.1.). The effect provokes that the possible 
additional effort exhibited for the contrastive relation is either compensated through entire 
utterance processing, i.e. utterances with unmarked and marked focus present analogous pro-
cessing times (cfr. §§ 7.1.1. and 7.1.2.), or can even activate an additional acceleration-effect 
for the processing of utterances with marked focus, i.e., utterances with marked focus require 
less processing effort than utterances with unmarked focus (cfr. § 7.1.3.).204 Thus, results pro-
vide evidence for the second formulated focusing conclusion: 
 
                                                 
 
203 This conclusion is corroborated by other similar studies conducted with the FO incluso (cfr. Loureda et al. 
2013, Loureda et al. 2014, Loureda et al. 2015, Loureda et al. in press), as well as by the study conducted with 
the FO hasta (cfr. Torres Santos 2020). Moreover, this effect is also found in studies conducted with other pro-
cedural units, as argumentative connectives, as por tanto ( cfr. Narváez García 2019, Recio Fernández 2020) and 
also counter-argumentative connectives as sin embargo (cfr. Nadal in press). In none of these studies, any evi-
dence was found that a marked utterance (triggered by a procedural element) with a greater semantic load re-
quires more total processing effort than the same utterance without the respective procedural element.  
204 Torres Santos (2020) describes similar effects for marked utterances conditioned by the FO hasta.  
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The focus operator generates a regulation and acceleration effect that compensates the 
additional processing effort that are produced by the lexical contrast of the affected 
units (alternative and focus). The processing effort of the focus operator constitutes the 
maximum limit for the processing of the implicated elements at the focusing operation.  
 
In this manner, in utterances with marked focus, the FO becomes the axis of information re-
trieval by evoking a contrastive information structure. Moreover, through the entire course of 
the utterance processing, incluso never demands less processing effort than the other impli-
cated areas in the focusing operation, i.e. the processing effort of the FO constitutes the pro-
cessing limit for the other focusing elements.205 Whereas, in utterances with unmarked focus, 
in which the contrastive relation can only be recovered conversationally, the processing effort 
is delayed to the focus element. This specific effect is justified through the different semantic 
properties of unmarked and marked foci (cfr. Rooth 1985, É. Kiss 1998, Kenesei 2006, 
Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2009, Portolés 2010). 
The fact that a structure with marked focus does not generate quantitatively different 
global processing effort in relation to a structure with an unmarked focus, does not mean that 
the utterances are processed according to the same pattern. At the macro level of the utter-
ance, fundamental differences are found between both informative structures. A first relevant 
finding is associated to the construction of the first assumption (during first-pass reading 
time). The insertion of a FO always produces a disruption in the course of processing, insofar 
that it activates immediately the focusing operation and generates an acceleration-effect upon 
the focus element (by reducing always the processing of the marked focus in contrast to an 
unmarked focus (medium and large effects, Figure 12): 
                                                 
 
205 This regulation and acceleration effect of the FO was also found for the operator hasta (cfr. Torres Santos 
2020). As observed with incluso, hasta never presents less processing effort than the other constituents of the 
utterance, supporting the conclusion of a processing limit anchored in the FO for the processing of the focusing 
operation.  
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Figure 12: Focus processing – first-pass reading time 
 
This effect is also observable with other FOs, as hasta, in which due to its culminative mean-
ing, the effect is even more pertinent (large or very large effects, cfr. Torres Santos 2020). To 
sum up, if there is a procedural mark that activates a marked focus in an utterance, the focus-
ing operation is activated at the FO, whereas in utterances with unmarked focus, the activation 
of an additive relation, i.e. the management operation of the common ground is delayed to the 
focus area. Further, the higher processing effort for the unmarked focus can generate more 
cognitive effort for the whole utterance processing.206 This effect indicates that the insertion 
of a FO produces an immediate processing-effect that leads to the conclusion that during the 
construction of the first assumption an utterance with marked focus does not demand more 
processing effort than an utterance with unmarked focus.207  
However, the effectuation of a conventionally triggered contrastive relation can only by 
accomplished by integrating all conceptual elements towards the procedural mark and by the 
integration of the assumption in the common ground. Processes that are mainly visible at later 
measures. Thus, a second finding at the macro level is concerned with the reanalysis strategies 
                                                 
 
206 Higher processing effort is observable in utterances with implicit or explicit complex alternative (medium (-
6.69%) or small (-4.38%) effects), whereas in utterances with explicit single alternative the construction of the 
explicature in an utterance with marked focus does not present differences in contrast to utterances with un-
marked focus.  
207 These findings are in line with the findings in the studies conducted by Byram-Washburn (2013:§ 2.4.), 
Gotzner (2016:§ 3.2.). They found out that FOs not only facilitate focus detection, but also influence the activa-
tion of alternative sets. The results indicate that readers, not only detect words faster when the focused element is 
marked by a FO, but also that alternatives are recalled better in utterances with focus, indicating that the FO 
activates a contrastive scale between focus and alternative.Further the findings of the IV B support the claim 
formulated by Filik et al. (2009), and Gerwien and Rudka (2019) that focusing operations are detected early 
during processing, but likewise, display their impact at later measures.  
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conducted in both structures. Incluso provokes primarily local higher processing effort for the 
areas upon it incites (alternative and focus), and insofar, activates a more effort demanding 
reanalysis-strategy in contrast to utterances with unmarked focus. The reader effectuates a 
“check and reevaluate”-strategy upon the lexical elements in order to satisfy the instruction of 
the FO. This is theoretically supported, since the FO, because of its procedural meaning, con-
ventionally affects the lexical relation of alternative and focus and therefore, more time is 
implemented on confirmation, enrichment or modification of the previous built assumption. 
However, the adaptation of the conceptual meaning towards the procedural meaning during 
reanalysis does not produce global extra effort through the entire utterance processing. On 
that account, the effort needed to establish the contrastive relation during the recovery of the 
assumption are defined as “additional regulatory effort”, since they allow to control the quali-
ty of an initial explicature and to activate a contrastive inferential route without additional 
global effort. On the opposite, by absence of a procedural mark, no above-average cognitive 
effort is required. The reader activates a “check and balances”-strategy between alternative 
and focus in order to confirm if the first assumption still holds and subsequently to integrate 
the correct assumption to the common ground.  
Summarizing, the insertion of a FO activates a different processing pattern by generat-
ing a redistribution of the semantic relation in the utterance. Therefore, two processing pat-
terns were defended: One unmarked (conceptual) pattern, in which the information is mainly 
recovered by the lexical information, in particular by the focus element, and one marked (pro-
cedural) pattern, in which the contrastive relation triggered by the FO is recovered by the ad-
aptation of the conceptual information to the procedural information.  
 
Figure 13: Processing patterns of utterances with unmarked and marked focus 
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8.2. Positional variability 
 
The findings of the IV C – Position of the FO in relation to the focus confirm that, although 
in both conditions the instruction triggered by the FO evokes the same contrastive implica-
ture, different FO-positions regarding the focus element generate two different processing 
patterns.208 Results report that the utterance in which the FO is postponed to the focus always 
requires more processing effort in contrast to utterances in which the FO precedes its nucleus 
(ranging from 5% to 11% more cognitive effort depending on the alternative extension; cfr. § 
7.2.).209 Thus, a cognitive optimal position of the FO can be defended leading to the formula-
tion of a third focusing conclusion:  
 
A preposition of the focus operator in relation to the focus is the optimal position. Any 
positional alteration produces more cognitive effort.  
 
The findings are consistent with the theoretical and descriptive arguments regarding the two 
possible positions. The preposition of the FO constitutes the most common and most frequent 
position in Spanish. Likewise, this informative word order structure represents the unmarked 
informative structure of a focusing operation, since the position allows to display the instruc-
tion of the FO in its optimal manner, while determining directly the focus element. Concisely, 
the theoretical claim that an optimal informative distribution in an utterance enables a 
processing-benefit (cfr. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986], Roberts 2012) can be corroborated. 
Considering, that the formal construction of an explicature is determined by the informative 
intention of the interlocutor, in order to present the information in its most relevant form with 
the minimal cognitive effort, the interlocutor will always opt for the most optimal word order 
in an utterance according to their communicative needs (cfr. König 1993:978, Gutiérrez 
Ordóñez 2000 [1997]:17, Fuentes 1999:9). 
                                                 
 
208 From a theoretical perspective, only two positions can be assigned to the FO incluso, in which the scope does 
not vary: one preposition, in which incluso as modifier precedes its nucleus, and another directly postposition of 
the FO in relation to the focus, in which the relation is inverted. Any other position implies that the interpretation 
possibilities vary since the information load that is directly affected by the FO differs (cfr. König 1991, Andorno 
2000, Portolés 2010, and § 4.2.). The most common and neutral position of the FO is the preposition (FO pre-
cedes the focus element), and thus it is theoretically expectable that the preposition of the FO requires less pro-
cessing effort.  
209 An acceleration-effect for the optimal FO-position refutes the arguments of studies conducted with causal 
(cfr. Narváez García 2019) or counter-argumentative (cfr. Nadal in press) connectives, in which the most com-
mon and frequent connective (initial) position is always the position with less processing effort.  
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At the macro level of the utterance it is manifested that two identical informative relations 
that globally are processed differently according to different word order distributions, present 
also different local processing patterns. A first relevant finding is related to the relation be-
tween the constituents of the focusing operation. Results of the total reading time report that a 
distributional alteration provokes a dislocation of the processing to the right side of the utter-
ance. This dislocation-effect can either a) activate a concentration of the processing at the 
procedural unit in utterances with implicit alternative (cfr. § 7.2.3., Figure 15)210,  
 
 
 
Figure 14: Processing pattern - implicit alternative 
 
or b) provoke that the focus element and the FO constitute a functional unit in order to recov-
er the information in utterances with explicit (single or complex) alternative (Figure 16).211  
 
                                                 
 
210 In order to clearly illustrate the differences between the AOIs, both conditions are presented in the same order 
(as the condition with prepositional FO).  
211 The differences between the FO and the focus are trivial (<4%), whereas the differences between the alterna-
tive and the FO or the focus present very large effects (ranging from 35% to 45%) in the total reading time. 
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Figure 15: Processing pattern - explicit alternative (single and complex) 
 
The different processing patterns between the conditions observed during the whole 
processing originate mainly from the reanalysis, in which utterances with postpositional FO 
regarding the focus demand excessive more processing effort for the areas directly affected by 
the distributional alteration (focus and FO) that is further trespassed to the global utterance 
level. In all utterances with postpositional FO (independently of the extension of the 
alternative), the areas of focus and FO demand relevant processing effort in contrast to the 
elements of the utterance with optimal FO-position (in all cases very large effects, >20%, in 
some areas the processing effort nearly doubles the processing effort of the other areas, 
>90%, Figure 17).  
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Figure 16: Processing of focusing areas – total reading time 
 
This dislocation-effect to the right side of the utterance becomes even more pertinent, since a 
processing gap is generated between the explicit alternative (single or complex) and the areas 
of the focus and FO. The alternatives of the utterances with postpositional FO never demand 
more processing effort than the alternative in the utterance in which the FO precedes the focus 
element (large and very large effects, ranging around 10% and 20%, Figure 17). Thus, these 
findings reveal that in order to recover a contrastive relation in an utterance that implies a 
distributional alteration the reader relies mainly on the focusing areas that are directly affected 
by the position-shift of the FO and that the background information becomes marginalized for 
the recovery of the contrastive relation. The local reanalysis effort for the elements of the 
utterance with postpositional FO produces an impact in the global processing of the utterance 
which always results in major reanalysis effort for the whole utterance with postpositional 
FO. 
Results have proven that in utterances with optimal FO-position, the FO can generate a 
regulation and acceleration effect that compensates the additional effort for the insertion of 
the procedural information. However, this effect only holds if the FO precedes its focus (cfr. § 
7.1.). If the position of the FO is altered, and the FO is postponed to the focus, the processing 
pattern changes, provoking major additional reanalysis effort in order to adapt the contrastive 
implicature to the context. Summarizing, the results report that: 
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a) A position-shift of the FO leads to a distributional alteration in the informative 
structure provoking a dislocation-effect of the processing to the right side of the 
utterance. The dislocation-effect generates significant local higher processing 
effort for the areas that are directly affected by the positional alteration of the FO 
(focus and FO) and backgrounds the role of the alternative. 
b) The local effort required in order to process the contrastive relation in the 
utterances with postpositional FO is also trespassed to the global utterances level 
through the entire processing course of the utterance leading to the conclusion that 
an utterance with postpositional FO always demands more processing effort than 
an utterance with preposition of the FO. Therefore, from a cognitive perspective, 
the findings allow to defend that there is an optimal FO-position (preposition) 
which ensures a guided processing with a minimal cognitive effort.  
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8.3. Informativity  
 
The integration of an assumption in the common ground or the abandonment of the assump-
tion is determined by the generated cognitive effects during processing (cfr. Sperber and 
Wilson 1995 [1986]). If the information in an utterance accomplishes the expectations of rel-
evance activating positive cognitive effects, the reader confirms or modifies the existing as-
sumptions, or, if necessary, creates a new assumption ad hoc during the communicative pro-
cess (cfr. Carston 2002, Beaver and Zeevat 2007, Escandell Vidal et al. 2011, Wilson and 
Sperber 2012). Otherwise, if the information in an utterance does not satisfy the expectations 
of relevance and no positive cognitive effects are activated, the assumption can be abandoned 
(cfr. Wilson and Sperber 2004:613). Thus, for each presented utterance in communication the 
interlocutor has to carry out a highly efficient selection process in order to recover the suitable 
information (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 2012: 271). The presented study aimed to assess how 
this efficient selection process is effectuated when in an utterance the information given by 
the conceptual and procedural elements are congruous or incongruous to the contextual in-
formation anchored in the common ground. Two main results can be isolated:  
  
a) Utterances with congruous und incongruous information present two different 
processing patterns. If conceptual and procedural information in an utterance is 
co-oriented to the assumptions stored in the common ground more positive cogni-
tive effects are generated, the information in the utterance becomes more relevant 
and less processing effort is demanded (cfr. § 7.1.). On the other hand, if the inte-
gration of the conceptual meaning towards the procedural meaning is anti-
oriented in relation to the common ground less positive cognitive effects are ex-
pected and a different processing pattern is generated (cfr. Wilson and Sperber 
2002:252, Noveck and Sperber 2004:5-6, Blakemore 2002:79, cfr. § 7.3.).  
b) Conflict detection always initiates a conflict-resolution strategy. In cases in which 
a conflict is detected between the conceptual and procedural information in rela-
tion to the common ground the reader can initiate different strategies in order to 
process the information. Which strategy is used depends on whether the reader 
considers the conflict to be reparable or not (cfr. Beaver/Zevat 2007: 5). 
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Within the attempt of a conflict-resolution-strategy (b) the results corroborate two main sub-
ordinated findings concerning focus structures. The first finding concerns the moment of con-
flict-detection (in line with the results of Filik et al. 2009). The data prove that informative 
incongruencies are detected early during processing. During first-pass reading time the reader 
detects a conflict between conceptual and procedural information at the first element that in-
hibits the incongruency.212 In relation to the extension of the alternative, the reader detects the 
incongruency either by relating the instruction of the FO incluso to the focus (in the cases of 
implicit alternative and explicit single alternative) or by connecting the elements of the com-
plex alternative, that already inhibits a contradictory enchainment.  
 The second finding concerns the different conflict-resolution-strategies after conflict 
detection that a reader can adopt. Two main processing strategies can be isolated (Figure 18):  
 
a) Accommodation-strategy (Route A or B). The reader considers the information 
repairable and attempts to accommodate the conflictive information by imple-
menting more processing effort at the affected area (focus). This higher pro-
cessing effort can be implemented during the construction of the first assumption 
and be transferred to the reanalysis and therefore to the total processing of the af-
fected area (Route A, immediate accommodation strategy) or can only occur at 
the reanalysis, but producing also more processing effort at the total processing 
(Route B, immediate reactivation strategy). In both cases the reader either then 
modifies existing assumptions or creates an assumption ad hoc in order to satisfy 
the instruction triggered by the FO (cfr. Carston 2002 Beaver y Zeevat 2007, 
Escandell Vidal et al. 2011, Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:91). This created 
assumption can a posteriori be accepted and fully integrated in the common 
ground or can also be cancelled if the cognitive effects do not yield a positive out-
come (cfr. Carston 2002, Wilson and Sperber 2004:613, Recio Fernández 2020, 
Narváez García, 2019). 
b) Abandonment-strategy (Route C). The reader considers the presented information 
not repairable and abandons quickly the affected focusing area and does not initi-
ate an accommodation process. This strategy results in less processing effort for 
the focus area across all parameters (processing breakdown). The constructed as-
                                                 
 
212 This finding confirms the theoretical and empirical described claim that incongruencies, generated either by 
the alteration of conceptual elements (cfr. Pickering et al. 2000) or by a procedural element (cfr. Köhne and 
Demberg 2013, Drenhaus et al. 2014, Nadal in press, Recio Fernández 2020, Narváez García 2019) are detected 
early during processing. 
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sumption could not be repaired and integrated in the common ground (see also 
Torres Santos 2020, Recio Fernández, 2020). 
 
 
Figure 17: Processing paths after conflict detection 
 
In cases of incluso an accommodation-strategy is always implemented that lead to the con-
struction of an assumption that entails always higher cognitive effort for the affected area (fo-
cus, at least for the reanalysis). Incluso always evokes an accommodation-strategy and obliges 
the reader to make an attempt to accommodate the conceptual information towards the proce-
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dural instruction (route A or B).213 The semantic nature of the relative FO incluso allows the 
reader to consider the accommodation of the assumption to a possible context (cfr. Schwenter 
2002:9-10). A strategy that cannot occur with other FOs, as hasta. Hasta due to its absolute 
semantic nature activates an abandonment-strategy since no positive cognitive effects are 
produced. Consequently, the assumptions are immediately cancelled (cfr. Torres Santos 
2020). 
Thus, the findings of the study corroborate the theoretical described hypothesis only for 
focus structures marked by incluso, but allow the formulation of a general focusing conclu-
sion (cfr. § 6.1.4., confirmation of the hypotheses of the IV D): 
 
In an informative structure with marked focus the co-orientation of the conceptual 
meaning towards the procedural meaning assures a guided processing. Any difficulty of 
accommodating a conceptual representation towards the instruction of the focus opera-
tor initiates a conflict-resolution strategy.  
 
The decision which strategy to adopt after detecting the conflict between conceptual and pro-
cedural information in focusing structures depends on two factors. One factor concerns the 
semantic constraintment of FOs: Different operators of the same paradigm can inhibit differ-
ent degrees of semantic constraintment, as incluso and hasta. Incluso, as relative FO entails 
less semantic constraints: its instruction is less restrictive and allows a broader interpretative 
range (accommodation-strategy), whereas hasta due to its high degree of semantic con-
straintment is more restrictive in its interpretative range. The constraints of hasta imposes to 
the utterances an early abandonment of the pursuit of relevance, which results in lower pro-
cessing effort for the focus area (abandonment-strategy, cfr. Torres Santos 2020).  
A second factors relates to the degree of informativity of the background information, 
i.e. the relation between focus and background information triggered by the FO incluso. If the 
conceptual information of the alternative itself inhibits a lexical conflict (as in the cases with 
                                                 
 
213 The higher processing effort of the reanalysis of the procedural element and the elements under its scope is 
also visible in other experimental studies with different connectives, see Nadal and Recio Fernández (2019), 
Loureda et al. (2016), Loureda et al. (in press), Nadal (2019), Narváez García (2019) and Recio Fernández 
(2020), and also with other FOs, as hasta, Torres Santos (2020) and for English FOs, as only and even see Filik 
et al. (2009). 
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explicit complex alternative) the accommodation becomes even more effort demanding trans-
ferring the local accommodation effort to global processing effort214.  
In summary, if the conceptual and procedural information is co-oriented processing can 
be accelerated. Otherwise, a conflict-resolution strategy is implemented which depending on 
different factors can adopt different processing routes ranging from the attempt to accommo-
date the assumption to its cancellation. If the reader tries to accommodate the conceptual in-
formation towards the instruction of the procedural device an accommodation-process is initi-
ated which always implies major local and global effort during the reanalysis. The results 
confirm the theoretical approach that accommodation requires more processing effort in order 
to achieve a (positive) cognitive effect (cfr. Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:98, Nadal in 
press, Recio Fernández 2020, Narváez García 2019). 
 
                                                 
 
214 Furthermore, studies with different degrees of linguistic competence of the reader that examine the processing 
of causal and counter-argumentative relations in Spanish have proven that a low degree of linguistic and discur-
sive competence can also lead to an abandonment-strategy (cfr. Recio Fernández 2020). 
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8.4. Comprehension 
 
During the construction of an assumption, the conceptual meaning of the lexical elements in 
an utterance activates mental representations that are stored in the common ground of the in-
terlocutors, and the procedural meaning of the FO introduces how these mental representa-
tions have to be processed in order to activate cognitive effects. Thereby, the procedural de-
vice restricts the accessible context and guides with its morphosyntactic, semantic and prag-
matic properties the inferences during communication evoking that the inferential route be-
comes more restrictive and unambiguous (cfr. Blakemore 1987, 2002, Portolés 2001 [1998]). 
Incluso activates a different inferential route that leads to a conventional scalar implica-
ture. The procedural meaning of the FO conventionally imposes its instruction on the concep-
tual elements of the utterance (property of rigidity) and obliges the reader to interpret the 
mental representations that are built upon the conceptual elements towards the instruction 
(property of asymmetry). The heterogenous answer proportions with a yes-answer rate at least 
above 85% for the utterance with marked focus indicate that the stimuli are highly sufficient 
to recover a contrastive implicature triggered by the FO (Figure 19). Whereas, in utterances 
with unmarked focus a more homogenous answer distribution was found leading to the con-
clusion that the presented stimulus is not sufficient to interpret a contrastive relation (cfr. § 
7.3.4.).  
 
 
 
Figure 18: Results Comprehension test IV B 
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Thus, unmarked and marked focus structures do not provide equally optimal stimuli to lead to 
a contrastive implicature (cfr. § 6.1.2., confirmation of the hypotheses of the IV B). Accord-
ing to these results the following conclusion can be formulated:  
 
A contrastive relation is not processed “by default”. The insertion of a focus operator 
in an unmarked focus structure becomes indispensable if a contrastive relation is in-
tended. 
 
Thus, FOs become indispensable, if a contrastive relation is intended. In utterances with un-
marked focus a contrastive relation is not processed “by default” if no procedural device 
evokes it.215 On the contrary, through the use of incluso, any utterance with marked focus is a 
structure directed by the interpretation of the operator and conventionally generates a con-
trast.216  
 
The alteration of the FO-position in relation to the focus element that produces a high impact 
in processing does not generate a different inferential route in comprehension (cfr. § 7.2.5.). 
The FO (pre- or postposition of the FO in relation to the focus) conventionally guides the in-
ferential process in order to interpret a scalar implicature in both conditions (again, majority 
of yes-answers, confirmation of the hypotheses of the IV C, Figure 20): 
 
                                                 
 
215 Even the extension of the conceptual information of the background information in unmarked utterances with 
complex alternative do not constitute an independent sufficient stimulus to evoke a contrastive relation support-
ing the claim that unmarked focus structures do not automatically generate a contrastive. Insofar this effect holds 
for pragmatic open scales, it could be expected that in pragmatic closed scales different comprehension patterns 
are found and it is likely to assume that the conceptual information could provide a sufficient stimulus to evoke a 
contrastive relation in cases of pragmatic closed scales.  
216 These results are further reinforced by the findings of the comprehension study of the FO hasta realized by 
Torres Santos (2020). 
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Figure 19: Results Comprehension test IV C 
 
This is theoretically sustainable, because the FO introduces the same instruction in both con-
ditions and allow the reader to establish a specific inferential route that leads to a scalar impli-
cature. In brief, a distributional alteration in an utterance affects, but does not determine com-
prehension-strategies. 
 
Findings of the eye tracking study demonstrate that in marked focus structures different de-
grees of informativity lead to an accommodation-process that is tied to major reanalysis effort 
(cfr. § 7.3.5.). However, not any accommodation-process does necessarily lead to the integra-
tion of adaptable material in the common ground. The new created assumption could not be 
acceptable a posteriori. According to the results of the comprehension test, the reader seems 
to accommodate the conceptual representations to the instruction of the FO validating the 
properties of the procedural units (Figure 21). Even though the information presented in the 
utterances contradicts the assumptions stored in the common ground, the reader fulfils the 
task by answering according to the instruction of the operator.217 The procedural meaning of 
the FO imposes its conditions to the utterance and the context and activates the insertion of 
the appropriate assumption in order to satisfy the interpretation (cfr. Leonetti and Escandell 
Vidal 2004:1729, Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 2011:81, and § 6.1.1. rejection of the hypoth-
eses of the IV A-2b). 
 
                                                 
 
217 Note that the task asks specifically about interaction between the conceptual and procedural meaning in the 
particular utterance and note also that each question of the comprehension test is initiated with “According to the 
sentence,…” 
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Figure 20: Results Comprehension test IV D 
 
However, results of an additional comprehension test reveal that the rigidity-property only 
holds if the task is based on the instruction of the FO. If the task of the comprehension test 
asks precisely about the instruction of the FO the participants fulfil the instruction and estab-
lish a contrastive relation of the utterance. However, by eliminating the initial formulation of 
the task “According to the sentence,…”, in e.g. “According to the sentence, English is more 
difficult than Chinese” the participants do not follow the instruction of the FO, but rather an-
swer according to their world knowledge presenting heterogenous answer-proportions be-
tween the conditions (Figure 22)218.  
 
 
Figure 21: Results additional Comprehension test IV D 
 
                                                 
 
218 Results χ2 test:  
comparison: b2a1 – d1a1: 365.81 > 5.99; p < .05 
comparison: b2a2 – d1a2 423.80 > 5.99; p < .05 
comparison: b2a3 – d1a3 446.02 > 5.99; p < .05 
cfr. also Appendix G. 
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The findings suggest that the mental representations built upon the conceptual elements of the 
utterance can surpass the expectations of relevance insofar that not enough positive cognitive 
effects are created and the reader cancels the integration of the assumption into the common 
ground. The different results of the additional comprehension test support the claim that the 
participants after making an attempt of accommodation during processing at the end cancel 
the created assumptions.219 The malleable conceptual elements and the rigid instruction of the 
FO can keep their properties until a certain point. This point is determined by the principle of 
relevance and thus, by the activation of positive cognitive effects and whether the expecta-
tions of relevance can be satisfied according to the world knowledge of any individual.  
 
                                                 
 
219 Same outcome as in focusing structures triggered by the FO hasta. Whereas, the relative FO incluso allows an 
attempt of accommodation in order to integrate the information in a possible adaptable context, but at the end 
cancels the assumptions. Focusing structures with hasta do not conduct an accommodation-process and cancel 
the assumption immediately.  
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8.5. Prospects of further research 
 
The aim of the experimental study of the presented PhD thesis was to provide an insight view 
on how focusing structures triggered by the FO incluso influence the processing and compre-
hension of pragmatic open scales. Thereby, the conducted experimental studies (eye tracking 
and comprehension test) constitute a complementary method to theoretical and descriptive 
approaches, which build the fundament of this thesis. The findings of the study aim to corrob-
orate or adjust theoretical principles that guide the communication and finally, enrich the de-
scription with a cognitive experimental approach of different focusing phenomena.  
This study on focusing structures constitutes a possible starting point for further re-
search. The treated independent variables basically concern three main aspects of focusing 
operations: Focus marking, position-shift of the FO in relation to the focus and the degree of 
informativity in an utterance. It could be potentially useful to extend the independent varia-
bles in different directions.  
Regarding focus marking and the position variability of FOs it is a future research op-
tion to investigate the influence of different FO-positions that allow different scope interpreta-
tions (cfr. Jacobs 1983:8-10, König 1991:10-12). It can be assumed that the wider the scope 
of the FO, the more effort demanding the interpretation of the contrastive relation of a 
focusing structure is.  
On the informative level, different aspects can be further considered that concern the set 
of alternatives. A further auspicious aspect is the limitation of different sets of alternatives 
(open vs. close set of alternatives, cfr. § 3.3.) in utterances with explicit complex alternative. 
In this regard, it can be expected that closed sets of alternatives (due to conceptual con-
straints) are processed faster in congruous conditions.  
Whereas in incongruous conditions the assumption arises that difficulties in regard to 
the realization of an accommodation-process emerge. Here, it is more likely that the reader 
opts for an abandonment-strategy due to conceptual constraints of the set of alternatives 
(route C, Figure 18). Additionally, this possible independent variable could give rise to rele-
vant findings regarding the interpretation of the relation between the alternative set and focus 
information. It is particularly interesting to investigate if readers process a complex alterna-
tive in relation to the focus as a binary division or if they consider the intern order of the al-
ternative information (cfr. Portolés 2007). Results of the presented study in this thesis have 
indicated that the binary division holds for pragmatic open scales, but it can be assumed that 
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pragmatic scales with closed sets of alternative inhibit a rigid intern order that determines the 
processing effort. 
Different aspects of the focusing phenomenon in discourse are open for further investi-
gation, as e.g. different types of scales triggered by FOs (cfr. § 3.3.). Since the presented 
study only considers pragmatic scales, it would be particularly promising to examine whether 
different types of scales lead to different processing and comprehension patterns. Specifically, 
the examination of semantic scales triggered by incluso or any other FO could be worthwhile. 
Semantic scales are expected to be processed with less processing effort, since they exist by 
default (cfr. Horn 1972, 1979, Levinson 2000 [1983]), Portolés 2007:136-137). The scalar 
value in the scales is inferred by the semantic content of the elements and thus, is faster acces-
sible. Whereas the elements of a pragmatic scale have to be ordered according to the same 
topic and according to their informative value that is anchored in the world knowledge of the 
interlocutors. This informative enrichment is tied to more cognitive effort and should present 
different in contrast to semantic scales.  
A further research aspect could concern other procedural elements that evoke a focusing 
operation, for Spanish and for other languages. The comparison with the study realized with 
the FO hasta (cfr. Torres Santos, 2020) allows to establish general focusing conclusions, even 
though both FOs present different semantic features. This leads to the conclusion that focus-
ing operations may be universal linguistic phenomena with similar processing and compre-
hension patterns independently of the type of the FO or language. Therefore, it can be promis-
ing to examine other inclusive FOs, as for Spanish e.g. también or, as counterpart, exclusive 
FOs, as solo or ni siquiera, and their equivalents in other languages. Thus, a wholesome cog-
nitive perspective of the FO paradigm and the discourse particle paradigm would allow to 
formulate solid discursive principles.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Schematic token set 
 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit 
alternative 
a2 – explicit 
single alternative 
a3 – explicit  
complex alternative 
IV B –  Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO b1 a1  b1 a2  b1 a3  
b2 – presence of FO b2 a1  b2 a2  b2 a3  
b3 – with adjective  b3 a1  b3 a2  b3 a3  
IV C – Position of the FO in relation 
to the focus 
c1 – postposition of the FO c1 a1  c1 a2  c1 a3  
IV D – Degree of informativity  d1 – incongruous information d1 a1 d1 a2 d1 a3  
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Appendix B. Counter-balancing design 
 
 
  EXP 1 
EXP 
2 
EXP 
3 
EXP 
4 
EXP 
5 
EXP 
6 
EXP 
7 
EXP 
8 
EXP 
9 
EXP 
10 
EXP 
11 
EXP 
12 
EXP 
13 
EXP 
14 
EXP 
15 
token set 1 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 
token set 2 B C D E F G H I J K L M N O A 
token set 3 C D E F G H I J K L M N O A B 
token set 4 D E F G H I J K L M N O A B C 
token set 5 E F G H I J K L M N O A B C D 
token set 6 F G H I J K L M N O A B C D E 
token set 7 G H I J K L M N O A B C D E F 
token set 8 H I J K L M N O A B C D E F G 
token set 9 I J K L M N O A B C D E F G H 
token set 10 J K L M N O A B C D E F G H I 
token set 11 K L M N O A B C D E F G H I J 
token set 12 L M N O A B C D E F G H I J K 
token set 13 M N O A B C D E F G H I J K L 
token set 14 N O A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
token set 15 O A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Participants 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Total amount participants  300                         
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Appendix C. Concrete token sets 
 
Token set 1 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Manolo y Antonio 
importan tomates. Es un 
buen negocio.  
B - Manolo y Antonio importan 
pimientos y tomates. Es un buen 
negocio.  
C - Manolo y Antonio importan 
pimientos, cebollas y tomates. Es un 
buen negocio.  
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Manolo y Antonio 
importan incluso tomates. 
Es un buen negocio. 
E - Manolo y Antonio importan 
pimientos e incluso tomates. Es un 
buen negocio.  
F - Manolo y Antonio importan 
pimientos, cebollas e incluso tomates. Es 
un buen negocio.  
b3 – with adjective  
G - Manolo y Antonio 
importan tomates italianos. 
Es un buen negocio.  
H - Manolo y Antonio importan 
pimientos y tomates italianos. Es 
un buen negocio.  
I - Manolo y Antonio importan 
pimientos, cebollas y tomates italianos. 
Es un buen negocio.  
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Manolo y Antonio 
importan tomates incluso. 
Es un buen negocio.  
K - Manolo y Antonio importan 
pimientos y tomates incluso. Es un 
buen negocio.  
L - Manolo y Antonio importan 
pimientos, cebollas y tomates incluso. Es 
un buen negocio.  
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Manolo y Antonio 
importan incluso pimientos 
Es un buen negocio.  
N - Manolo y Antonio importan 
tomates e incluso pimientos. Es un 
buen negocio. 
O - Manolo y Antonio importan tomates, 
cebollas e incluso pimientos. Es un buen 
negocio.  
 
 
Context 
Manolo y Antonio son dos importadores mayoristas de Madrid. Importan diversas hortalizas como 
pimientos y cebollas que después venden en Andalucía. 
filler item 1 Por su negocio tienen que viajar mucho. Durante los viajes conocen a muchos agricultores. 
filler item 2 A las mujeres de Manolo y Antonio les gusta cocinar. Siempre les traen frutas y verduras frescas. 
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Token set 2 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Letizia y Paola conocen 
Málaga. Les gusta viajar. 
B - Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla 
y Málaga. Les gusta viajar. 
C - Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla, 
Granada y Málaga. Les gusta viajar. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Letizia y Paola conocen 
incluso Málaga. Les gusta 
viajar. 
E - Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla 
e incluso Málaga. Les gusta viajar. 
F - Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla, 
Granada e incluso Málaga. Les gusta 
viajar. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Letizia y Paola conocen 
Málaga capital. Les gusta 
viajar. 
H - Letizia y Paola conocen 
Sevilla Málaga capital. Les gusta 
viajar.  
I - Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla, 
Granada Málaga capital. Les gusta viajar.   
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Letizia y Paola conocen 
Málaga incluso. Les gusta 
viajar. 
K - Letizia y Paola conocen 
Sevilla y Málaga incluso. Les 
gusta viajar. 
L - Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla, 
Granada y Málaga incluso. Les gusta 
viajar. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Letizia y Paola conocen 
incluso Sevilla. Les gusta 
viajar. 
N - Letizia y Paola conocen 
Málaga e incluso Sevilla. Les gusta 
viajar. 
O - Letizia y Paola conocen Málaga, 
Granada e incluso Sevilla. Les gusta 
viajar. 
 
 
 
Context 
Letizia y Paola son dos estudiantes italianas de la Universidad de Florencia. Estudian Arte e 
Historia árabe en España. Este semestre realizan un viaje de estudios por Andalucía y en muy poco 
tiempo han recorrido ya varias provincias, como Sevilla y Granada. 
filler item 1 
Durante su viaje, Letizia y Paola conocen a mucha gente. Sobre todo los chicos andaluces se 
interesan mucho por las dos estudiantes. 
filler item 2 Letizia y Paola echan de menos a sus familias en Italia y les escriben postales a menudo. 
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Token set 3 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Susana y María conocen 
Ecuador. Les gusta viajar 
mucho. 
B - Susana y María conocen 
Colombia y Ecuador. Les gusta 
viajar mucho. 
C - Susana y María conocen Colombia, 
Bolivia y Ecuador. Les gusta viajar 
mucho. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Susana y María conocen 
incluso Ecuador. Les gusta 
viajar mucho. 
E - Susana y María conocen 
Colombia e incluso Ecuador. Les 
gusta viajar mucho. 
F - Susana y María conocen Colombia, 
Bolivia e incluso Ecuador. Les gusta 
viajar mucho. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Susana y María conocen 
Ecuador entero. Les gusta 
viajar mucho. 
H - Susana y María conocen 
Colombia y Ecuador entero. Les 
gusta viajar mucho. 
I - Susana y María conocen Colombia, 
Bolivia y Ecuador entero. Les gusta 
viajar mucho.  
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Susana y María conocen 
Ecuador incluso. Les gusta 
viajar mucho. 
K - Susana y María conocen 
Colombia y Ecuador incluso. Les 
gusta viajar mucho. 
L - Susana y María conocen Colombia, 
Bolivia y Ecuador incluso. Les gusta 
viajar mucho. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Susana y María conocen 
incluso Colombia. Les gusta 
viajar mucho. 
N - Susana y María conocen 
Ecuador e incluso Colombia. Les 
gusta viajar mucho. 
O -Susana y María conocen Ecuador, 
Bolivia e incluso Colombia. Les gusta 
viajar mucho. 
 
 
 
Context 
Susana y María trabajan en una ONG. Han pasado varios años en diferentes países de América 
Latina, como Bolivia y Colombia, para realizar diversos trabajos de ayuda social. 
filler item 1 Susana y María trabajan mucho, sobre todo con niños huerfanos. Les enseñan a leer y escribir. 
filler item 2 
Las dos pasan mucho tiempo en el extranjero, pero no les importa demasiado Les gusta mucho su 
trabajo. 
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Token set 4 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Elena e Esteban 
meriendan plátanos. Les 
gusta mucho la fruta. 
B - Elena e Esteban meriendan 
manzanas y plátanos. Les gusta 
mucho la fruta. 
C - Elena e Esteban meriendan 
manzanas, naranjas y plátanos. Les gusta 
mucho la fruta. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Elena e Esteban 
meriendan incluso plátanos. 
Les gusta mucho la fruta. 
E - Elena e Esteban meriendan 
manzanas e incluso plátanos. Les 
gusta mucho la fruta. 
F - Elena e Esteban meriendan manzanas, 
naranjas e incluso plátanos. Les gusta 
mucho la fruta. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Elena e Esteban 
meriendan plátanos 
canarios. Les gusta mucho la 
fruta. 
H - Elena e Esteban meriendan 
manzanas y plátanos canarios. Les 
gusta mucho la fruta. 
I - Elena e Esteban meriendan manzanas, 
naranjas y plátanos canarios. Les gusta 
mucho la fruta. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Elena e Esteban 
meriendan plátanos incluso. 
Les gusta mucho la fruta. 
K - Elena e Esteban meriendan 
manzanas y plátanos incluso. Les 
gusta mucho la fruta. 
L - Elena e Esteban meriendan 
manzanas, naranjas y plátanos incluso. 
Les gusta mucho la fruta. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Elena e Esteban 
meriendan incluso 
manzanas. Les gusta mucho 
la fruta. 
N - Elena e Esteban meriendan 
plátanos e incluso manzanas. Les 
gusta mucho la fruta. 
O -Elena e Esteban meriendan plátanos, 
naranjas e incluso manzanas. Les gusta 
mucho la fruta. 
 
 
 
Context 
Elena e Esteban son veganos, por lo tanto comen bastante fruta. Apenas cenan porque siempre 
meriendan mucho, especialmente fruta, como manzanas y naranjas. 
filler item 1 Elena y Esteban solo compran fruta de temporada. La compran en el mercado todas las semanas. 
filler item 2 Los dos se sienten muy responsables por el medio ambiente. Por eso se han decidido ser veganos. 
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Token set 5 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Paula y Daniel beben 
leche. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
B - Paula y Daniel beben agua y 
leche. Toman mucho líquido. 
C - Paula y Daniel beben agua, zumo y 
leche.Toman mucho líquido. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Paula y Daniel beben 
incluso leche. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
E - Paula y Daniel beben agua e 
incluso leche. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
F - Paula y Daniel beben agua, zumo e 
incluso leche. Toman mucho líquido. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Paula y Daniel beben 
leche entera. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
H - Paula y Daniel beben agua y 
leche entera. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
I - Paula y Daniel beben agua, zumo y 
leche entera. Toman mucho líquido. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Paula y Daniel beben 
leche incluso. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
K - Paula y Daniel beben agua y 
leche incluso. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
L - Paula y Daniel beben agua, zumo y 
leche incluso. Toman mucho líquido. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Paula y Daniel beben 
incluso agua. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
N - Paula y Daniel beben leche e 
incluso agua. Toman mucho 
líquido. 
O - Paula y Daniel beben leche, zumo e 
incluso agua. Toman mucho líquido. 
 
 
 
Context 
Paula y Daniel se levantan todos los días muy temprano para ir a correr. Antes de hacer deporte no 
desayunan, solo se toman un vaso de algo líquido, como agua o zumo. 
filler item 1 
Paula y Daniel hacen mucho deporte para estar en forma. Quieren correr la maratón de Nueva 
York. 
filler item 2 Además de beber mucho líquido, siguen una dieta rígida. Se alimentan muy bien. 
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Token set 6 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Clara y Laura venden 
cocos. Tienen un buen 
negocio. 
B - Clara y Laura venden piñas y 
cocos. Tienen un buen negocio. 
C - Clara y Laura venden piñas, mangos 
y cocos. Tienen un buen negocio. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Clara y Laura venden 
incluso cocos. Tienen un 
buen negocio.  
E - Clara y Laura venden piñas e 
incluso cocos. Tienen un buen 
negocio.  
F - Clara y Laura venden piñas, mangos e 
incluso cocos. Tienen un buen negocio. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Clara y Laura venden 
cocos grandes.Tienen un 
buen negocio. 
H - Clara y Laura venden piñas y 
cocos grandes.Tienen un buen 
negocio. 
I - Clara y Laura venden piñas, mangos y 
cocos grandes.Tienen un buen negocio. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Clara y Laura venden 
cocos incluso. Tienen un 
buen negocio. 
K - Clara y Laura venden piñas y 
cocos incluso. Tienen un buen 
negocio. 
L - Clara y Laura venden piñas, mangos 
y cocos incluso. Tienen un buen negocio. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Clara y Laura venden 
incluso piñas. Tienen un 
buen negocio. 
N - Clara y Laura venden cocos e 
incluso piñas. Tienen un buen 
negocio. 
O -Clara y Laura venden cocos, mangos 
e incluso piñas. Tienen un buen negocio. 
 
 
 
Context 
Clara y Laura tienen a medias una frutería en el barrio de Lavapiés, en Madrid. Venden mucha 
fruta tropical, como mangos y piñas, porque entre sus vecinos hay muchos de origen ecuatoriano y 
peruano. 
filler item 1 Clara y Laura se conocen desde niñas. Siempre han querido tener una frutería juntas. 
filler item 2 
Las dos tienen muy buenas relaciones con la gente del barrio. Una vez al año organizan juntos la 
fiesta de la fruta. 
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Token set 7 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Ricardo y Fernando 
escriben poemas. Su pasión 
es la literatura. 
B - Ricardo y Fernando escriben 
ensayos y poemas. Su pasión es la 
literatura. 
C - Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos, 
novelas y poemas. Su pasión es la 
literatura. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Ricardo y Fernando 
escriben incluso poemas. Su 
pasión es la literatura. 
E - Ricardo y Fernando escriben 
ensayos e incluso poemas. Su 
pasión es la literatura.  
F - Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos, 
novelas e incluso poemas. Su pasión es la 
literatura. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Ricardo y Fernando 
escriben poemas sencillos. 
Su pasión es la literatura. 
H - Ricardo y Fernando escriben 
ensayos y poemas sencillos. Su 
pasión es la literatura. 
I - Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos, 
novelas y poemas sencillos. Su pasión es 
la literatura. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Ricardo y Fernando 
escriben poemas incluso. Su 
pasión es la literatura. 
K - Ricardo y Fernando escriben 
ensayos y poemas incluso. Su 
pasión es la literatura. 
L - Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos, 
novelas y poemas incluso. Su pasión es la 
literatura. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Ricardo y Fernando 
escriben incluso ensayos. Su 
pasión es la literatura. 
N - Ricardo y Fernando escriben 
poemas e incluso ensayos. Su 
pasión es la literatura. 
O - Ricardo y Fernando escriben poemas, 
novelas e incluso ensayos. Su pasión es 
la literatura. 
 
 
 
Context 
Ricardo y Fernando son dos periodistas famosos del principal periódico de Lima. Además de 
escribir para el periódico en su tiempo libre se dedican a su verdadera pasión, la literatura. Ya han 
escrito juntos varios relatos y un par de novelas, por ejemplo. 
filler item 1 Son dos periodistas muy famosos de Perú. A menudo también salen en la televisión. 
filler item 2 Ricardo y Fernando se conocen muy bien. Siempre han trabajado juntos. 
 250
 
Token set 8 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - José y David venden 
peces. Adoran a los 
animales. 
B - José y David venden perros y 
peces. Adoran a los animales. 
C - José y David venden perros, gatos y 
peces. Adoran a los animales. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - José y David venden 
incluso peces. Adoran a los 
animales. 
E - José y David venden perros e 
incluso peces. Adoran a los 
animales.  
F - José y David venden perros, gatos e 
incluso peces. Adoran a los animales. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - José y David venden 
peces grandes. Adoran a los 
animales. 
H - José y David venden perros y 
peces grandes. Adoran a los 
animales. 
I - José y David venden perros, gatos y 
peces grandes. Adoran a los animales. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - José y David venden 
peces incluso. Adoran a los 
animales. 
K - José y David venden perros y 
peces incluso. Adoran a los 
animales. 
L - José y David venden perros, gatos y 
peces incluso. Adoran a los animales. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - José y David venden 
incluso perros. Adoran a los 
animales. 
N - José y David venden peces e 
incluso perros. Adoran a los 
animales. 
O - José y David venden peces, gatos e 
incluso perros. Adoran a los animales. 
 
 
 
Context 
José y David tienen una tienda en la que venden muchos accesorios para mascotas. También 
venden distintos animales, como perros o gatos. 
filler item 1 
Las novias de José y David pasan también mucho tiempo en la tienda. Juntos se ocupan de los 
animales. 
filler item 2 Es un buen negocio. La gente del barrio ahora tiene más animales. 
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Token set 9 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
arroz. Quieren aprender a 
cocinar mejor. 
B - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
pasta y arroz. Quieren aprender a 
cocinar mejor. 
C - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
pasta, pizza y arroz. Quieren 
aprender a cocinar mejor. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
incluso arroz. Quieren aprender 
a cocinar mejor. 
E - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
pasta e incluso arroz. Quieren 
aprender a cocinar mejor. 
F - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
pasta, pizza e incluso arroz. 
Quieren aprender a cocinar mejor. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Francisco y Manuel 
cocinan arroz blanco. Quieren 
aprender a cocinar mejor. 
H - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
pasta y arroz blanco. Quieren 
aprender a cocinar mejor. 
I - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
pasta, pizza y arroz blanco. 
Quieren aprender a cocinar mejor. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
arroz incluso. Quieren aprender 
a cocinar mejor. 
K - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
pasta y arroz incluso. Quieren 
aprender a cocinar mejor. 
L - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
pasta, pizza y arroz incluso. 
Quieren aprender a cocinar mejor. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Francisco y Manuel 
cocinan incluso pasta. Quieren 
aprender a cocinar mejor. 
N - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
arroz e incluso pasta. Quieren 
aprender a cocinar mejor. 
O - Francisco y Manuel cocinan 
arroz, pizza e incluso pasta. 
Quieren aprender a cocinar mejor. 
 
 
 
Context 
Francisco y Manuel acaban de empezar la carrera de Física en la Universidad de Salamanca. Es la 
primera vez que viven lejos de casa. No tienen mucha experiencia en la cocina, pero en su nuevo 
piso intentan aprender poco a poco. Ya cocinan algunos platos fáciles, como los pasta y la pizza. 
filler item 1 Francisco y Manuel no tienen novia. Tienen mucho tiempo para estudiar.  
filler item 2 
Algunas veces las madres de Francisco y Manuel les llevan algo de comer. Así por lo menos 
comen algo sano. 
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Token set 10 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
álamos. Pasan mucho tiempo en 
la naturaleza. 
B - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
castaños y álamos. Pasan mucho 
tiempo en la naturaleza. 
C - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
castaños, robles y álamos. Pasan 
mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
incluso álamos. Pasan mucho 
tiempo en la naturaleza. 
E - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
castaños e incluso álamos. Pasan 
mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
F - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
castaños, robles e incluso álamos. 
Pasan mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
álamos blancos. Pasan mucho 
tiempo en la naturaleza. 
H - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
castaños y álamos blancos. Pasan 
mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
I - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
castaños, robles y álamos blancos. 
Pasan mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
álamos incluso. Pasan mucho 
tiempo en la naturaleza. 
K - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
castaños y álamos incluso. Pasan 
mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
L - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
castaños, robles y álamos incluso. 
Pasan mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
incluso castaños. Pasan mucho 
tiempo en la naturaleza. 
N - Alberto y Cristina plantan 
álamos e incluso castaños. Pasan 
mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
O - Alberto y Cristina plantan álamos, 
robles e incluso castaños. Pasan 
mucho tiempo en la naturaleza. 
 
 
 
Context 
Alberto y Cristina son dos activistas de Greenpeace que tienen un proyecto forestal. En su tiempo 
libre plantan muchos árboles, como por ejemplo castaños y robles. 
filler item 1 Sus padres están muy orgullosos. Muchas veces les ayudan a plantar los árboles. 
filler item 2 
Alberto y Cristina estudian biológia y medio ambiente. Son activistas de Greenpeace desde hace 
años.  
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Token set 11 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
euskera. Les gusta mucho dar 
clases. 
B - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
catalán y euskera. Les gusta mucho 
dar clases. 
C - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
catalán, gallego y euskera. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
incluso euskera. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
E - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
catalán e incluso euskera. Les 
gusta mucho dar clases. 
F - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán, 
gallego e incluso euskera. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
euskera básico. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
H - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
catalán y euskera básico. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
I - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán, 
gallego y euskera básico. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
euskera incluso. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
K - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
catalán y euskera incluso. Les 
gusta mucho dar clases. 
L - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán, 
gallego y euskera incluso. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
incluso catalán. Les gusta 
mucho dar clases. 
N - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
euskera e incluso catalán. Les 
gusta mucho dar clases. 
O - Mercedes y Lucía enseñan 
euskera, gallego e incluso catalán. Les 
gusta mucho dar clases. 
 
 
 
Context 
Mercedes y Lucía son dos profesores del Instituto Cervantes de Berlín. Vivieron varios años en 
Barcelona, pero ambos nacieron en Coruña, donde pasaron su infancia. Estudiaron Filología en 
Berlín y se quedaron en esta cuidad para dar clases de lenguas de España, como gallego o catalán. 
filler item 1 Mercedes y Lucía viven juntos en Berlín. Les encanta la ciudad y tienen muchos amigos. 
filler item 2 
Dos veces al año vuelven a España para pasar unos días con sus familias. En Berlín solo hablan 
con sus amigos y sus familias por el Skype. 
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Token set 12 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Ana y Marta saben chino. 
Les gusta hablar en sus lenguas 
extranjeras. 
B - Ana y Marta saben inglés y 
chino. Les gusta hablar en sus 
lenguas extranjeras. 
C - Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés 
y chino. Les gusta hablar en sus 
lenguas extranjeras. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Ana y Marta saben incluso 
chino. Les gusta hablar en sus 
lenguas extranjeras. 
E - Ana y Marta saben inglés e 
incluso chino. Les gusta hablar en 
sus lenguas extranjeras. 
F - Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés 
e incluso chino. Les gusta hablar en 
sus lenguas extranjeras. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Ana y Marta saben chino 
mandarín. Les gusta hablar en 
sus lenguas extranjeras. 
H - Ana y Marta saben inglés y 
chino mandarín. Les gusta hablar 
en sus lenguas extranjeras. 
I - Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés 
y chino mandarín. Les gusta hablar en 
sus lenguas extranjeras. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Ana y Marta saben chino 
incluso. Les gusta hablar en sus 
lenguas extranjeras. 
K - Ana y Marta saben inglés y 
chino incluso. Les gusta hablar en 
sus lenguas extranjeras. 
L - Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés 
y chino incluso. Les gusta hablar en 
sus lenguas extranjeras. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Ana y Marta saben incluso 
inglés. Les gusta hablar en sus 
lenguas extranjeras. 
N - Ana y Marta saben chino e 
incluso inglés. Les gusta hablar en 
sus lenguas extranjeras. 
O - Ana y Marta saben chino, francés 
e incluso inglés. Les gusta hablar en 
sus lenguas extranjeras. 
 
 
 
Context 
Ana y Marta son profesoras de lenguas extranjeras en Madrid, donde llevan muchos años dando 
clase. Han viajado mucho juntas y hablan distintas lenguas, como el inglés y el francés. 
filler item 1 
Ana y Marta tienen amigos por todos los países del mundo. Pasan también mucho tiempo en 
facebook hablando con todos. 
filler item 2 
En unos de sus viajes Ana y Marta conocieron a sus futuros maridos. Ahora todos trabajan en 
Madrid. 
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Token set 13 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Rocío y Natalia compran 
joyas. Se van de compras todas 
las semanas. 
B - Rocío y Natalia compran 
zapatos y joyas. Se van de compras 
todas las semanas. 
C - Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos, 
bolsos y joyas. Se van de compras 
todas las semanas. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Rocío y Natalia compran 
incluso joyas. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
E - Rocío y Natalia compran 
zapatos e incluso joyas. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
F - Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos, 
bolsos e incluso joyas. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Rocío y Natalia compran 
joyas caras. Se van de compras 
todas las semanas. 
H - Rocío y Natalia compran 
zapatos y joyas caras. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
I - Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos, 
bolsos y joyas caras. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Rocío y Natalia compran 
joyas incluso. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
K - Rocío y Natalia compran 
zapatos y joyas incluso. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
L - Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos, 
bolsos y joyas incluso. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Rocío y Natalia compran 
incluso zapatos. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
N - Rocío y Natalia compran joyas 
e incluso zapatos. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
O - Rocío y Natalia compran joyas, 
bolsos e incluso zapatos. Se van de 
compras todas las semanas. 
 
 
 
Context 
Rocío y Natalia viven en el centro de Sevilla. Sus maridos trabajan en la banca. Ellas ya no 
trabajan, y van mucho de compras. Son dos "shopping victims". Gastan mucho dinero en zapatos o 
bolsos, porque les encanta estar a la última moda. 
filler item 1 
Después de dejar los niños en la guardería se toman juntas un café para empezar el dia. Siempre 
tienen algo que contarse. 
filler item 2 
En las tiendas ya las conocen, porque solo compran las cosas más caras. Los maridos están 
disgustados. 
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Token set 14 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Carlos y Juan roban coches. 
No han tenido una vida fácil. 
B - Carlos y Juan roban bicis y 
coches. No han tenido una vida 
fácil. 
C - Carlos y Juan roban bicis, motos y 
coches. No han tenido una vida fácil. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Carlos y Juan roban incluso 
coches. No han tenido una vida 
fácil. 
E - Carlos y Juan roban bicis e 
incluso coches. No han tenido una 
vida fácil. 
F - Carlos y Juan roban bicis, motos e 
incluso coches. No han tenido una 
vida fácil. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Carlos y Juan roban coches 
nuevas. No han tenido una vida 
fácil. 
H - Carlos y Juan roban bicis y 
coches nuevas. No han tenido una 
vida fácil. 
I - Carlos y Juan roban bicis, motos y 
coches nuevas. No han tenido una 
vida fácil. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Carlos y Juan roban coches 
incluso. No han tenido una vida 
fácil. 
K - Carlos y Juan roban bicis y 
coches incluso. No han tenido una 
vida fácil. 
L - Carlos y Juan roban bicis, motos y 
coches incluso. No han tenido una 
vida fácil. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Carlos y Juan roban incluso 
bicis. No han tenido una vida 
fácil. 
N - Carlos y Juan roban coches e 
incluso bicis. No han tenido una 
vida fácil. 
O - Carlos y Juan roban coches, 
motos e incluso bicis. No han tenido 
una vida fácil. 
 
 
 
Context 
Carlos y Juan son dos delicuentes bien conocidos por la policía de Algeciras. Han estado en la 
cárcel muchas veces por robar todo tipo de vehículos, como coches y motos, que revenden luego 
en Marruecos. 
filler item 1 
Las novias de Carlos y Juan no saben nada de las actividades criminales de sus novios. Piensan que 
trabajan en un taller. 
filler item 2 Antes de robar también traficaban con drogas. Ahora ya no. 
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Token set 15 
 
Independent Variables 
  
IV A - Extension of the alternative 
a1 – implicit alternative a2 – explicit single alternative a3 – explicit complex alternative 
IV – B Focus marking 
b1 – absence of FO 
A - Luisa y Sara saben persa. 
Les encanta la filología clásica. 
B - Luisa y Sara saben latín y 
persa. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
C - Luisa y Sara saben latín, griego y 
persa. Les encanta la filología clásica. 
b2 – presence of FO 
D - Luisa y Sara saben incluso 
persa. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
E - Luisa y Sara saben latín e 
incluso persa. Les encanta la 
filología clásica. 
F - Luisa y Sara saben latín, griego e 
incluso persa. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
b3 – with adjective  
G - Luisa y Sara saben persa 
antiguo. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
H - Luisa y Sara saben latín y 
persa antiguo. Les encanta la 
filología clásica. 
I - Luisa y Sara saben latín, griego y 
persa antiguo. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
IV C – Position of the 
FO in relation to the 
focus 
c1 – postposition of 
the FO 
J - Luisa y Sara saben persa 
incluso. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
K - Luisa y Sara saben latín y 
persa incluso. Les encanta la 
filología clásica. 
L - Luisa y Sara saben latín, griego y 
persa incluso. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
IV D – Degree of in-
formativity  
d1 – incongruous 
information 
M - Luisa y Sara saben incluso 
latín. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
N - Luisa y Sara saben persa e 
incluso latín. Les encanta la 
filología clásica. 
O - Luisa y Sara saben persa, griego e 
incluso latín. Les encanta la filología 
clásica. 
 
 
 
Context 
Luisa y Sara son dos expertos en la Antigüedad Clásica. Lo saben todo de su arte, de su literatura y 
de su historia gracias a sus excelentes conocimientos de distintas lenguas, como el latín o el griego. 
filler item 1 Luisa y Sara viajan mucho juntos. El último viaje fue a Grecia para ver la Acrópolis. 
filler item 2 Pasan mucho tiempo en la biblioteca estudiando textos clásicos. Esta es su pasión. 
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Appendix D. Statistical Analysis  - Generative Additive Mixed Models 
 
 
Legend AOIs 
 
TM Total mean of the utterance per word 
LM lexical mean of the utterance per word 
ALT Alternative 
F  Focus  
FO Focus operTMor  
ADJ  Adjective  
 
 
IV B – Focus marking 
 
 
Model 1 – implicit alternTMive – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
EstimTMed 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a1 241.53 11.28 6.06 6.35 240.63 11.31 
TM_b2a1 -11.47 14.05 6.23 6.35 229.16 11.17 
TM_b3a1 -7.09 14.05 6.22 6.35 233.55 11.18 
LM_b1a1 14.05 14.11 6.24 6.35 254.69 11.3 
LM_b2a1 -9.89 14.05 6.21 6.35 230.74 11.2 
LM_b3a1 1.88 14.06 6.43 6.35 242.51 11.18 
F_b1a1 6.21 14.12 5.83 6.35 246.84 11.36 
F_b2a1 -29.79 14.05 5.8 6.35 210.84 11.26 
F_b3a1 16.29 14.05 5.78 6.35 256.92 11.27 
FP_b2a1 -0.3 14.17 7 6.35 240.34 11.23 
ADJ_b3a1 -24.85 14.14 6.9 6.35 215.79 11.29 
 
 
 
Model 1 – implicit alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a1 186.04 7.89 6.06 6.35 184.58 7.93 
TM_b2a1 -12.34 9.9 6.23 6.35 172.24 7.82 
TM_b3a1 -7 9.89 6.22 6.35 177.57 7.83 
LM_b1a1 17.93 9.94 6.24 6.35 202.51 7.92 
LM_b2a1 -11.17 9.89 6.21 6.35 173.4 7.85 
LM_b3a1 -3.28 9.9 6.43 6.35 181.3 7.83 
F_b1a1 20.6 9.95 5.83 6.35 205.17 7.97 
F_b2a1 -12.89 9.9 5.8 6.35 171.69 7.9 
F_b3a1 -8.18 9.9 5.78 6.35 176.39 7.9 
FP_b2a1 -14.63 9.98 7 6.35 169.95 7.86 
ADJ_b3a1 -1.31 9.96 6.9 6.35 183.27 7.93 
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Model 1 – implicit alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a1 55.47 7.54 6.06 6.35 55.47 7.54 
TM_b2a1 1.31 9.92 6.23 6.35 56.78 7.45 
TM_b3a1 0.38 9.92 6.22 6.35 55.85 7.45 
LM_b1a1 -3.66 9.97 6.24 6.35 51.81 7.53 
LM_b2a1 1.57 9.92 6.21 6.35 57.05 7.45 
LM_b3a1 5.79 9.93 6.43 6.35 61.26 7.45 
F_b1a1 -14.49 9.97 5.83 6.35 40.98 7.56 
F_b2a1 -16.95 9.92 5.8 6.35 38.52 7.48 
F_b3a1 24.49 9.92 5.78 6.35 79.96 7.49 
FP_b2a1 14.93 9.99 7 6.35 70.41 7.49 
ADJ_b3a1 -22.78 9.97 6.9 6.35 32.69 7.48 
 
 
 
 
Model 4 – explicit single alternative – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a2 229.44 11.02 6.16 6.35 228.54 11.06 
TM_b2a2 7.98 13.61 6.27 6.35 236.52 10.87 
TM_b3a2 3.7 13.67 6.25 6.35 232.23 10.96 
LM_b1a2 6.01 13.73 6.36 6.35 234.55 11.06 
LM_b2a2 14.92 13.61 6.31 6.35 243.46 10.9 
LM_b3a2 10.29 13.69 6.45 6.35 238.83 10.96 
ALT_b1a2 -16 13.77 6.58 6.35 212.54 11.14 
ALT_b2a2 -2.64 13.65 6.53 6.35 225.9 10.99 
ALT_b3a2 -44.12 13.71 6.52 6.35 184.42 11.06 
F_b1a2 0.59 13.74 5.84 6.35 229.13 11.12 
F_b2a2 17.25 13.63 5.81 6.35 245.78 10.96 
F_b3a2 28.78 13.69 5.8 6.35 257.32 11.04 
FP_b2a2 34.83 13.72 7 6.35 263.37 10.93 
ADJ_b3a2 45.48 13.76 6.92 6.35 274.02 11.06 
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Model 4 – explicit single alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a2 179.04 7.71 6.16 6.35 177.58 7.75 
TM_b2a2 5.12 9.59 6.27 6.35 182.7 7.60 
TM_b3a2 0.39 9.63 6.25 6.35 177.98 7.67 
LM_b1a2 4.17 9.67 6.36 6.35 181.75 7.76 
LM_b2a2 7.56 9.59 6.31 6.35 185.14 7.65 
LM_b3a2 6.45 9.64 6.45 6.35 184.03 7.68 
ALT_b1a2 -14.24 9.71 6.58 6.35 163.35 7.85 
ALT_b2a2 -8.28 9.63 6.53 6.35 169.3 7.75 
ALT_b3a2 -23.9 9.67 6.52 6.35 153.69 7.79 
F_b1a2 15.21 9.68 5.84 6.35 192.79 7.80 
F_b2a2 23.37 9.6 5.81 6.35 182.23 7.69 
F_b3a2 16.24 9.64 5.8 6.35 193.83 7.74 
FP_b2a2 39.77 9.67 7 6.35 217.36 7.65 
ADJ_b3a2 30.52 9.69 6.92 6.35 208.1 7.77 
 
 
 
 
Model 4 – explicit single alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a2 50.4 7.35 6.16 6.35 50.4 7.35 
TM_b2a2 3.24 9.61 6.27 6.35 53.65 7.23 
TM_b3a2 3.56 9.66 6.25 6.35 53.96 7.29 
LM_b1a2 1.95 9.7 6.36 6.35 52.36 7.35 
LM_b2a2 7.55 9.61 6.31 6.35 57.95 7.23 
LM_b3a2 4.21 9.66 6.45 6.35 54.61 7.29 
ALT_b1a2 -1.86 9.71 6.58 6.35 48.54 7.36 
ALT_b2a2 5.58 9.62 6.53 6.35 55.99 7.23 
ALT_b3a2 -20.4 9.67 6.52 6.35 30.05 7.29 
F_b1a2 -14.8 9.7 5.84 6.35 35.59 7.38 
F_b2a2 -6.24 9.62 5.81 6.35 44.16 7.26 
F_b3a2 12.35 9.66 5.8 6.35 62.76 7.32 
FP_b2a2 -4.39 9.67 7 6.35 46.01 7.27 
ADJ_b3a2 15.53 9.7 6.92 6.35 65.93 7.32 
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Model 7 – explicit complex alternative – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a2 235.27 10.99 6.16 6.35 234.37 11.02 
TM_b2a2 -9.3 13.66 6.26 6.35 225.07 10.97 
TM_b3a2 -1.56 13.65 6.25 6.35 232.81 10.96 
LM_b1a2 8 13.68 6.32 6.35 242.37 11.03 
LM_b2a2 -4.04 13.66 6.28 6.35 230.33 10.99 
LM_b3a2 10.67 13.65 6.42 6.35 245.04 10.96 
ALT_b1a2 1.5 13.68 6.41 6.35 235.87 11.05 
ALT_b2a2 -8.02 13.67 6.38 6.35 226.35 11.01 
ALT_b3a2 -1.5 13.66 6.4 6.35 232.87 11 
F_b1a2 28.07 13.69 5.82 6.35 262.44 11.09 
F_b2a2 9.96 13.68 5.78 6.35 244.33 11.06 
F_b3a2 11.19 13.67 5.8 6.35 245.55 11.04 
FP_b2a2 4.67 13.76 7 6.35 239.04 11.03 
ADJ_b3a2 39.24 13.72 6.89 6.35 273.61 11.05 
 
 
 
 
Model 7 – explicit complex alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a2 189.87 7.68 6.16 6.35 188.41 7.72 
TM_b2a2 -8.25 9.62 6.26 6.35 180.16 7.67 
TM_b3a2 -5.19 9.61 6.25 6.35 183.23 7.67 
LM_b1a2 8.08 9.63 6.32 6.35 196.49 7.73 
LM_b2a2 -4.32 9.62 6.28 6.35 184.09 7.71 
LM_b3a2 1.31 9.61 6.42 6.35 189.72 7.68 
ALT_b1a2 4.41 9.64 6.41 6.35 192.82 7.76 
ALT_b2a2 -3.71 9.63 6.38 6.35 184.71 7.74 
ALT_b3a2 -2.93 9.62 6.4 6.35 185.49 7.72 
F_b1a2 34.54 9.64 5.82 6.35 222.95 7.78 
F_b2a2 11.2 9.64 5.78 6.35 199.61 7.76 
F_b3a2 -1.15 9.63 5.8 6.35 187.26 7.75 
FP_b2a2 1.44 9.7 7 6.35 189.85 7.72 
ADJ_b3a2 24.09 9.67 6.89 6.35 212.51 7.76 
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Model 7 – explicit complex alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b1a2 45.53 7.33 6.16 6.35 45.53 7.33 
TM_b2a2 -0.73 9.65 6.26 6.35 44.79 7.3 
TM_b3a2 3.9 9.64 6.25 6.35 49.43 7.29 
LM_b1a2 -0.04 9.66 6.32 6.35 45.49 7.32 
LM_b2a2 0.41 9.65 6.28 6.35 45.94 7.3 
LM_b3a2 9.69 9.64 6.42 6.35 55.22 7.29 
ALT_b1a2 -3.05 9.66 6.41 6.35 42.48 7.32 
ALT_b2a2 -4.38 9.65 6.38 6.35 41.15 7.3 
ALT_b3a2 1.36 9.64 6.4 6.35 46.89 7.29 
F_b1a2 -6.75 9.67 5.82 6.35 38.78 7.35 
F_b2a2 -1.43 9.66 5.78 6.35 44.1 7.33 
F_b3a2 12.14 9.65 5.8 6.35 57.67 7.32 
FP_b2a2 3.7 9.7 7 6.35 49.23 7.34 
ADJ_b3a2 15.67 9.68 6.89 6.35 61.2 7.32 
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IV C – Position of the focus operator in relation to the focus 
 
 
Model 2 – implicit alternative – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a1 230.06 11.17 6.23 6.35 229.16 11.17 
TM_c1a1 24.55 13.88 6.15 6.35 253.71 11.08 
LM_b2a1 1.58 13.95 6.21 6.35 230.74 11.2 
LM_c1a1 24.82 14.06 6.29 6.35 253.98 11.33 
FP_b2a1 11.17 14.02 7 6.35 240.34 11.23 
FP_c1a1 81.94 14.13 7 6.35 311.1 11.35 
F_b2a1 -18.32 13.98 5.8 6.35 210.84 11.26 
F_c1a1 23.4 14.09 5.86 6.35 252.57 11.38 
 
 
Model 2 – implicit alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a1 173.7 7.81 6.23 6.35 172.24 7.82 
TM_c1a1 17.19 9.77 6.15 6.35 189.43 7.75 
LM_b2a1 1.17 9.83 6.21 6.35 173.4 7.85 
LM_c1a1 10.78 9.91 6.29 6.35 183.01 7.94 
FP_b2a1 -2.29 9.88 7 6.35 169.95 7.86 
FP_c1a1 47.87 9.95 7 6.35 220.1 7.95 
F_b2a1 -0.55 9.85 5.8 6.35 171.69 7.9 
F_c1a1 3.93 9.93 5.86 6.35 176.17 7.98 
 
 
Model 2 – implicit alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a1 56.78 7.45 6.23 6.35 56.78 7.45 
TM_c1a1 7.14 9.8 6.15 6.35 63.92 7.38 
LM_b2a1 0.26 9.85 6.21 6.35 57.05 7.45 
LM_c1a1 13.77 9.93 6.29 6.35 70.56 7.55 
FP_b2a1 13.62 9.89 7 6.35 70.41 7.49 
FP_c1a1 34.13 9.97 7 6.35 90.92 7.58 
F_b2a1 -18.27 9.86 5.8 6.35 38.52 7.48 
F_c1a1 18.91 9.94 5.86 6.35 75.7 7.57 
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Model 5 – explicit single alternative – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 237.42 10.86 6.27 6.35 236.52 10.87 
TM_c1a2 10.68 13.48 6.27 6.35 247.19 10.87 
LM_b2a2 6.94 13.47 6.31 6.35 243.46 10.9 
LM_c1a2 9.72 13.49 6.33 6.35 246.23 10.9 
ALT_b2a2 -10.62 13.52 6.53 6.35 225.9 10.99 
ALT_c1a2 -30.57 13.53 6.55 6.35 205.94 10.97 
FP_b2a2 26.85 13.54 7 6.35 263.37 10.93 
FP_c1a2 53.07 13.55 7 6.35 289.59 10.93 
F_b2a2 9.27 13.51 5.81 6.35 245.78 10.96 
F_c1a2 58.28 13.52 5.83 6.35 294.8 10.96 
 
 
Model 5 – explicit single alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 184.16 7.6 6.27 6.35 182.7 7.6 
TM_c1a2 0.82 9.49 6.27 6.35 183.52 7.61 
LM_b2a2 2.44 9.49 6.31 6.35 185.14 7.65 
LM_c1a2 3.65 9.5 6.33 6.35 186.35 7.65 
ALT_b2a2 -13.4 9.55 6.53 6.35 169.3 7.75 
ALT_c1a2 -20.91 9.55 6.55 6.35 161.79 7.73 
FP_b2a2 34.66 9.54 7 6.35 217.36 7.65 
FP_c1a2 16.93 9.55 7 6.35 199.63 7.65 
F_b2a2 18.26 9.52 5.81 6.35 182.23 7.69 
F_c1a2 29.52 9.53 5.83 6.35 212.22 7.69 
 
 
Model 5 – explicit single alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 53.64 7.23 6.27 6.35 53.65 7.23 
TM_c1a2 9.79 9.52 6.27 6.35 63.44 7.23 
LM_b2a2 4.31 9.51 6.31 6.35 57.95 7.23 
LM_c1a2 5.83 9.52 6.33 6.35 59.48 7.23 
ALT_b2a2 2.34 9.52 6.53 6.35 55.99 7.23 
ALT_c1a2 -10.09 9.53 6.55 6.35 43.56 7.23 
FP_b2a2 -7.63 9.55 7 6.35 46.01 7.27 
FP_c1a2 36.25 9.56 7 6.35 89.9 7.27 
F_b2a2 -9.48 9.53 5.81 6.35 44.16 7.26 
F_c1a2 28.23 9.54 5.83 6.35 81.88 7.26 
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Model 8 – explicit complex alternative – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 225.97 10.96 6.26 6.35 225.07 10.97 
TM_c1a2 15.5 13.55 6.27 6.35 240.57 10.87 
LM_b2a2 5.26 13.62 6.28 6.35 230.33 10.99 
LM_c1a2 11.85 13.56 6.31 6.35 236.92 10.9 
ALT_b2a2 1.27 13.63 6.38 6.35 226.35 11.01 
ALT_c1a2 -6.81 13.57 6.4 6.35 218.26 10.92 
FP_b2a2 13.97 13.7 7 6.35 239.04 11.03 
FP_c1a2 78.86 13.63 7 6.35 303.93 10.93 
F_b2a2 19.26 13.66 5.78 6.35 244.33 11.06 
F_c1a2 72.67 13.59 5.81 6.35 297.75 10.96 
 
 
Model 8 – explicit complex alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 181.62 7.66 6.26 6.35 180.16 7.67 
TM_c1a2 5.33 9.55 6.27 6.35 185.49 7.6 
LM_b2a2 3.94 9.6 6.28 6.35 184.09 7.71 
LM_c1a2 5.78 9.55 6.31 6.35 185.94 7.64 
ALT_b2a2 4.55 9.61 6.38 6.35 184.71 7.74 
ALT_c1a2 0.92 9.57 6.4 6.35 181.08 7.67 
FP_b2a2 9.69 9.65 7 6.35 189.85 7.72 
FP_c1a2 27.58 9.6 7 6.35 207.74 7.65 
F_b2a2 19.46 9.63 5.78 6.35 199.61 7.76 
F_c1a2 33.25 9.58 5.81 6.35 213.41 7.69 
 
 
Model 8 – explicit complex alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 44.79 7.3 6.26 6.35 44.79 7.3 
TM_c1a2 10.02 9.57 6.27 6.35 54.81 7.23 
LM_b2a2 1.14 9.62 6.28 6.35 45.94 7.3 
LM_c1a2 5.73 9.57 6.31 6.35 50.52 7.23 
ALT_b2a2 -3.65 9.62 6.38 6.35 41.15 7.3 
ALT_c1a2 -8.28 9.57 6.4 6.35 36.52 7.23 
FP_b2a2 4.43 9.66 7 6.35 49.23 7.34 
FP_c1a2 51.28 9.61 7 6.35 96.07 7.27 
F_b2a2 -0.7 9.64 5.78 6.35 44.1 7.33 
F_c1a2 38.78 9.59 5.81 6.35 83.58 7.26 
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IV D – Degree of informativity 
 
 
Model 3 – implicit alternative – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a1 230.06 11.17 6.23 6.35 229.16 11.17 
TM_c1a1 2.26 13.97 6.38 6.35 231.42 11.19 
LM_b2a1 1.58 13.95 6.21 6.35 230.74 11.2 
LM_c1a1 -10.31 14.01 6.58 6.35 218.85 11.25 
FP_b2a1 11.17 14.02 7 6.35 240.34 11.23 
FP_c1a1 39.61 14.05 7 6.35 268.77 11.25 
F_b2a1 -18.32 13.98 5.8 6.35 210.84 11.26 
F_c1a1 -28.7 14.03 6.55 6.35 200.46 11.3 
 
 
Model 3 – implicit alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a1 173.7 7.81 6.23 6.35 172.24 7.82 
TM_c1a1 -8.24 9.84 6.38 6.35 163.99 7.83 
LM_b2a1 1.17 9.83 6.21 6.35 173.4 7.85 
LM_c1a1 -12.61 9.87 6.58 6.35 159.63 7.9 
FP_b2a1 -2.29 9.88 7 6.35 169.95 7.86 
FP_c1a1 -6.36 9.9 7 6.35 165.88 7.88 
F_b2a1 -0.55 9.85 5.8 6.35 171.69 7.9 
F_c1a1 -22.36 9.9 6.55 6.35 149.88 7.96 
 
 
Model 3 – implicit alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a1 56.78 7.45 6.23 6.35 56.78 7.45 
TM_c1a1 10.46 9.87 6.38 6.35 67.24 7.46 
LM_b2a1 0.26 9.85 6.21 6.35 57.05 7.45 
LM_c1a1 2.06 9.88 6.58 6.35 58.85 7.47 
FP_b2a1 13.62 9.89 7 6.35 70.41 7.49 
FP_c1a1 46.06 9.91 7 6.35 102.85 7.51 
F_b2a1 -18.27 9.86 5.8 6.35 38.52 7.48 
F_c1a1 -6.83 9.88 6.55 6.35 49.96 7.47 
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Model 6 – explicit single alternative – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 237.42 10.86 6.27 6.35 236.52 10.87 
TM_c1a2 6.99 13.56 6.26 6.35 243.5 10.97 
LM_b2a2 6.94 13.47 6.31 6.35 243.46 10.9 
LM_c1a2 5.36 13.56 6.3 6.35 241.87 11 
ALT_b2a2 -10.62 13.52 6.53 6.35 225.9 10.99 
ALT_c1a2 3.79 13.6 5.8 6.35 229.55 11.06 
FP_b2a2 26.85 13.54 7 6.35 263.37 10.93 
FP_c1a2 60.01 13.63 7 6.35 296.52 11.03 
F_b2a2 9.27 13.51 5.81 6.35 245.78 10.96 
F_c1a2 16.35 13.61 6.53 6.35 270.9 11.08 
 
 
Model 6 – explicit single alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 184.16 7.6 6.27 6.35 182.7 7.6 
TM_c1a2 1.21 9.55 6.26 6.35 183.91 7.67 
LM_b2a2 2.44 9.49 6.31 6.35 185.14 7.65 
LM_c1a2 -2.86 9.56 6.3 6.35 179.84 7.71 
ALT_b2a2 -13.4 9.55 6.53 6.35 169.3 7.75 
ALT_c1a2 -3.22 9.58 5.8 6.35 169.48 7.76 
FP_b2a2 34.66 9.54 7 6.35 217.36 7.65 
FP_c1a2 30.42 9.6 7 6.35 213.12 7.72 
F_b2a2 18.26 9.52 5.81 6.35 182.23 7.69 
F_c1a2 -0.47 9.61 6.53 6.35 200.96 7.81 
 
 
Model 6 – explicit single alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 53.64 7.23 6.27 6.35 53.65 7.23 
TM_c1a2 5.67 9.57 6.26 6.35 59.32 7.3 
LM_b2a2 4.31 9.51 6.31 6.35 57.95 7.23 
LM_c1a2 7.93 9.57 6.3 6.35 61.57 7.3 
ALT_b2a2 2.34 9.52 6.53 6.35 55.99 7.23 
ALT_c1a2 6.43 9.59 5.8 6.35 60.07 7.33 
FP_b2a2 -7.63 9.55 7 6.35 46.01 7.27 
FP_c1a2 29.65 9.62 7 6.35 83.3 7.34 
F_b2a2 -9.48 9.53 5.81 6.35 44.16 7.26 
F_c1a2 16.29 9.58 6.53 6.35 69.94 7.3 
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Model 9 – explicit complex alternative – total reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 225.97 10.96 6.26 6.35 225.07 10.97 
TM_c1a2 13.66 13.56 6.26 6.35 238.73 10.89 
LM_b2a2 5.26 13.62 6.28 6.35 230.33 10.99 
LM_c1a2 23.39 13.57 6.31 6.35 248.46 10.91 
ALT_b2a2 1.27 13.63 6.38 6.35 226.35 11.01 
ALT_c1a2 27.34 13.58 6.04 6.35 252.41 10.93 
FP_b2a2 13.97 13.7 7 6.35 239.04 11.03 
FP_c1a2 34.9 13.64 7 6.35 259.97 10.95 
F_b2a2 19.26 13.66 5.78 6.35 244.33 11.06 
F_c1a2 27.83 13.61 6.54 6.35 252.9 11 
 
 
Model 9 – explicit complex alternative – first-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 181.62 7.66 6.26 6.35 180.16 7.67 
TM_c1a2 7.43 9.55 6.26 6.35 187.59 7.62 
LM_b2a2 3.94 9.6 6.28 6.35 184.09 7.71 
LM_c1a2 9.59 9.56 6.31 6.35 189.75 7.65 
ALT_b2a2 4.55 9.61 6.38 6.35 184.71 7.74 
ALT_c1a2 20.63 9.56 6.04 6.35 200.79 7.66 
FP_b2a2 9.69 9.65 7 6.35 189.85 7.72 
FP_c1a2 31.24 9.61 7 6.35 211.4 7.66 
F_b2a2 19.46 9.63 5.78 6.35 199.61 7.76 
F_c1a2 8.6 9.61 6.54 6.35 188.76 7.75 
 
 
Model 9 – explicit complex alternative – second-pass reading time 
AOI 
condition 
Estimated 
value 
Standard 
Error 
nLetters-
word_obs 
nLetters-
word_fix 
Predicted 
value 
Pred. Std. 
Error 
TM_b2a2 44.79 7.3 6.26 6.35 44.79 7.3 
TM_c1a2 6.14 9.58 6.26 6.35 50.93 7.24 
LM_b2a2 1.14 9.62 6.28 6.35 45.94 7.3 
LM_c1a2 13.54 9.58 6.31 6.35 58.34 7.24 
ALT_b2a2 -3.65 9.62 6.38 6.35 41.15 7.3 
ALT_c1a2 6.3 9.58 6.04 6.35 51.1 7.25 
FP_b2a2 4.43 9.66 7 6.35 49.23 7.34 
FP_c1a2 3.72 9.62 7 6.35 48.51 7.28 
F_b2a2 -0.7 9.64 5.78 6.35 44.1 7.33 
F_c1a2 18.76 9.59 6.54 6.35 63.55 7.25 
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Appendix E. Pre-test – Norming study 
 
Norming study 1 
 
Ordene los elementos, según su conocimiento del mundo. 
(Rango: 1=menos presente en el conocimiento del mundo - 5=más presente en el conocimiento del 
mundo) 
 
Inglés francés chino italiano alemán 
     
 
 
pimientos cebollas acelga berenjena tomates 
     
 
 
Sevilla  Granada  Jaén Córdoba  Málaga 
     
 
 
Colombia  Bolivia Ecuador Venezula Perú 
     
 
 
menzanas  naranjas fresas peras plátanos 
     
 
 
agua  zumo leche refresco té 
     
 
 
piña  coco  mango lima  kiwi 
     
 
 
ensayos  novelas  relatos  poemas 
    
 
 
perro  gato  pez conejo hámster 
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pasta  pizza  arroz hamburguesa  
    
 
 
castaños  robles  arce nogal  álamo 
     
 
 
catalán  gallego  euskera español  
    
 
 
zapatos  bolso vestido joyas  
    
 
 
bici  moto  coche quad  
    
 
 
latín  griego persa hebreo  
    
 
 
salsa  merengue samba mambo tango 
     
 
 
lavar  peinar teñir cortar  
    
 
 
Santiago  Montevideo Brasilia Bogotá  Caracas 
     
 
 
cabra  cerdo  oveja llama  caballo 
     
 
pato  gallina ganso codorniz paloma 
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cuchillo  tenedor  cuchara 
   
 
 
merluza  rape lenguado bacalao lubina 
     
 
 
girasol  rosa  margarita tulipán  dalía 
     
 
 
almendra  anarcado  avellana cacahuete castaña 
     
 
 
ajedrez  cartas domino damas parchís 
     
 
 
lima  martillo sierra tijeras 
    
 
 
granito  pizarra arenisco caliza mármol 
     
 
 
cristianismo  judaísmo hinduísmo islam budísmo 
     
 
 
bogavante  langostino  ostras vieiras mejillón 
     
 
 
blues  soul rock  metal funk 
     
 
algodón  seda  lino encaje franela 
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Norming study 2 
 
Ordene los elementos: Ana y Marta son profesoras de lenguas extranjeras en Madrid, donde llevan 
muchos años dando clase. Han viajado mucho juntas y hablan distintas lenguas como… 
 
Inglés chino francés 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Manolo y Antonio son dos importadores mayoristas de Madrid. Importan 
diversas hortalizas que después venden en Andalucía, como… 
 
pimientos cebollas tomates 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Letizia y Paola son dos estudiantes italianas de la Universidad de Florencia. 
Estudian Arte e Historia árabe en España. Este semestre realizan un viaje de estudios por Andalucía y 
en muy poco tiempo han recorrido ya varias provincias, como… 
 
Granada Sevilla Málaga 
   
 
Ordene los elementos: Susana y María trabajan en una ONG. Han pasado varios años en diferentes 
países de América Latina, como… 
 
Bolivia Ecuador Colombia 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Elena e Esteban son veganos, por lo tanto comen bastante fruta. Apenas cenan 
porque siempre meriendan mucho, especialmente fruta, como… 
 
manzanas plátanos naranjas 
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Ordene los elementos: Paula y Daniel se levantan todos los días muy temprano para ir a correr. Antes 
de hacer deporte no desayunan, solo se toman un vaso de algo líquido, como… 
 
zumo leche  agua 
   
 
Ordene los elementos: Clara y Laura tienen a medias una frutería en el barrio de Lavapiés, en 
Madrid. Venden mucha fruta tropical, como… 
 
piñas mangos cocos 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Ricardo y Fernando son dos periodistas famosos del principal periódico de 
Lima. Además de escribir para el periódico en su tiempo libre se dedican a su verdadera pasión, la 
literatura. Ya han escrito juntos … 
 
ensayos  novelas poemas 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: José y David tienen una tienda en la que venden muchos accesorios para 
mascotas. También venden distintos animales, como… 
 
perros gatos peces 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Francisco y Manuel acaban de empezar la carrera de Física en la Universidad 
de Salamanca. No tienen mucha experiencia en la cocina, pero en su nuevo piso intentan aprender 
poco a poco. Ya cocinan algunos platos fáciles, como… 
 
pizza pasta  arroz 
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Ordene los elementos: Alberto y Cristina son dos activistas de Greenpeace que tienen un proyecto 
forestal. En su tiempo libre plantan muchos árboles, como… 
 
robles álamos castaños 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Mercedes y Lucía son dos profesores del Instituto Cervantes de Berlín. 
Vivieron varios años en Barcelona, pero ambos nacieron en Coruña, donde pasaron su infancia. 
Estudiaron Filología en Berlín y se quedaron en esta cuidad para dar clases de lenguas de España, 
como… 
 
Gallego catalán euskera 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Rocío y Natalia viven en el centro de Sevilla. Sus maridos trabajan en la 
banca. Ellas ya no trabajan, y van mucho de compras. Son dos "shopping victims". Gastan mucho 
dinero en… 
 
bolsos zapatos joyas 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Carlos y Juan son dos delicuentes bien conocidos por la policía de Algeciras. 
Han estado en la cárcel muchas veces por robar todo tipo de vehículos, como… 
 
coches motos bicis 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Luisa y Sara son dos expertos en la Antigüedad Clásica. Lo saben todo de su 
arte, de su literatura y de su historia gracias a sus excelentes conocimientos de distintas lenguas, 
como… 
 
griego  persa latín 
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Ordene los elementos: Juana y Maribel son dos apasionadas de las flores, en su jardín tienen… 
 
girasol  rosa margarita 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Francisca y Pedro son dos bailarines profesionales, sobre todo bailan música 
latina, como… 
 
salsa  merengue samba 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Daniel y Elisa tiene una granja en el que crían distintos tipos de ave, como… 
 
gallina ganso codorniz 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Anselmo y Salvador se juntan todos los domingo en el bar y juegan al… 
 
ajedrez domino parchís 
   
 
 
Ordene los elementos: Héctor y Diego son dos cocineros especializados en mariscos, cocinan sobre 
todo… 
 
bogavante  langostino  ostras 
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Appendix F. Comprehension test – Results per condition 
 
b1a1 b2a1 
Manolo y Antonio importan tomates.  Manolo y Antonio importan incluso tomates.  
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que otras hortalizas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que otras hortalizas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 14 5 13 4 3 
Letizia y Paola conocen Málaga.  Letizia y Paola conocen incluso Málaga.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que otras provincias andaluzas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que otras provincias andaluzas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 14 5 14 4 2 
Susana y María conocen Ecuador.  Susana y María conocen incluso Ecuador.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que otros países. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que otros países. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
3 15 2 15 4 1 
Elena y Esteban meriendan plátanos.  Elena y Esteban meriendan incluso plátanos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que otras frutas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que otras frutas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 9 9 16 4 0 
Paula y Daniel beben leche. Paula y Daniel beben incluso leche.  
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que otras bebidas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que otras bebidas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
6 9 5 16 2 2 
Clara y Laura venden cocos.  Clara y Laura venden incluso cocos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que otras frutas tropicales. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que otras frutas tropicales. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 11 7 18 1 1 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben poemas.  Ricardo y Fernando escriben incluso poemas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que otros textos literarios. 
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que otros textos literarios. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 10 10 18 1 1 
José y David venden peces.  José y David venden incluso peces.  
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Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que otros animales. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que otros animales. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 9 10 18 2 0 
Francisco y Manuel cocinan arroz.  Francisco y Manuel cocinan incluso arroz.  
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que otras cosas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que otras cosas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 18 2 18 2 0 
Alberto y Cristina plantan álamos.  Alberto y Cristina plantan incluso álamos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que otros árboles. 
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que otros árboles. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 17 2 20 0 0 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan euskera.  Mercedes y Lucía enseñan incluso euskera. 
Según la frase, es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que otras lenguas de España. 
Según la frase, es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que otras lenguas de España. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 18 1 19 0 1 
5% 90% 5% 95% 0% 5% 
Ana y Marta saben chino.  Ana y Marta saben incluso chino. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que otras lenguas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que otras lenguas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
4 9 7 18 1 1 
Rocío y Natalia compran joyas.  Rocío y Natalia compran incluso joyas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que otras cosas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que otras cosas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 11 7 18 2 0 
Carlos y Juan roban bicis. Carlos y Juan roban incluso bicis.  
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que otros vehículos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que otros vehículos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
3 10 7 19 1 0 
Luisa y Sara saben persa.  Luisa y Sara saben incluso persa. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que otras lenguas antiguas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que otras lenguas antiguas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
6 7 7 20 0 0 
38 180 82 260 28 12 
13% 60% 27% 87% 9% 4% 
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b1a2 b2a2 
 Manolo y Antonio importan pimientos y 
tomates.  
Manolo y Antonio importan pimientos e incluso 
tomates.  
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que pimientos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que pimientos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 10 8 18 1 1 
Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla y Málaga.  
Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla e incluso 
Málaga. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que Sevilla. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que Sevilla. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
3 14 3 18 2 0 
Susana y María conocen Colombia y Ecuador.  
Susana y María conocen Colombia e incluso 
Ecuador.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que Colombia. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que Colombia. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 16 3 17 2 1 
Elena y Esteban meriendan manzanas y plátanos.  
Elena y Esteban meriendan manzanas e incluso 
plátanos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que manzanas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que manzanas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 20 0 17 3 0 
Paula y Daniel beben agua y leche.  Paula y Daniel beben agua e incluso leche.  
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que agua. 
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que agua. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 15 3 19 0 1 
Clara y Laura venden piñas y cocos.  Clara y Laura venden piñas e incluso cocos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que piñas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que piñas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 13 5 18 1 1 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos y poemas.  
Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos e incluso 
poemas.   
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que ensayos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que ensayos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 12 5 19 1 0 
José y David venden perros y peces.  José y David venden perros e incluso peces.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que perros. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que perros. 
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sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 14 6 18 2 0 
Francisco y Manuel cocinan pasta y arroz.  
Francisco y Manuel cocinan pasta e incluso 
arroz.  
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que pasta. 
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que pasta. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 8 12 17 1 2 
Alberto y Cristina plantan castaños y álamos.  
Alberto y Cristina plantan castaños e incluso 
álamos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que castaños. 
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que castaños. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 17 3 19 1 0 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán y euskera.  
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán e incluso 
euskera.  
Según la frase es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que catalán. 
Según la frase es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que catalán.   
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 20 0 20 0 0 
0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Ana y Marta saben inglés y chino.  Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino.  
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que inglés. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que inglés. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 18 1 17 1 2 
Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos y joyas.  Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos e incluso joyas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que zapatos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que zapatos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
3 14 3 18 2 0 
Carlos y Juan roban coches y bicis.  Carlos y Juan roban coches e incluso bicis. 
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que coches. 
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que coches. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 12 6 17 3 0 
Luisa y Sara saben latín y persa.  Luisa y Sara saben latín e incluso persa.  
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que latín. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que latín. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 15 3 18 1 1 
20 218 61 270 21 9 
7% 73% 20% 90% 7% 3% 
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b1a3 b2a3 
Manolo y Antonio importan pimientos, cebollas 
y tomates.  
Manolo y Antonio importan pimientos, cebollas 
e incluso tomates.  
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que otras hortalizas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que las otras hortalizas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 9 10 18 0 2 
Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla, Granada y 
Málaga.  
 Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla, Granada e 
incluso Málaga.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que las otras provincias mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que las otras provincias mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 12 7 17 2 1 
Susana y María conocen Colombia, Bolivia y 
Ecuador.  
Susana y María conocen Colombia, Bolivia e 
incluso Ecuador.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que los otros paises mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que los otros paises mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 17 2 17 1 2 
Elena y Esteban meriendan manzanas, naranjas y 
plátanos. 
Elena y Esteban meriendan manzanas, naranjas e 
incluso plátanos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que las otras frutas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que las otras frutas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 18 1 15 4 1 
Paula y Daniel beben agua, zumo y leche. Paula y Daniel beben agua, zumo e incluso leche.  
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que las otras bebidas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que las otras bebidas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 18 2 17 1 2 
Clara y Laura venden piñas, mangos y cocos.  
Clara y Laura venden piñas, mangos e incluso 
cocos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que las otras frutas tropicales mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que las otras frutas tropicales mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 17 3 17 3 0 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos, novelas y 
poemas.  
Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos, novelas e 
incluso poemas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que los otros textos literarios 
mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que los otros textos literarios 
mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 16 3 18 1 1 
José y David venden perros, gatos y peces.  
José y David venden perros, gatos e incluso 
peces.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que los otros animales mencionados 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que los otros animales mencionados 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
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0 17 3 17 1 2 
Francisco y Manuel cocinan pasta, pizza y arroz.  
Francisco y Manuel cocinan pasta, pizza e 
incluso arroz.  
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que los otros platos mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que los otros platos mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 15 4 17 3 0 
Alberto y Cristina plantan castaños, robles y 
álamos.  
Alberto y Cristina plantan castaños, robles e 
incluso álamos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que los otros árboles mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que los otros árboles mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 18 2 18 1 1 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán, gallego y 
euskera.  
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán, gallego e 
incluso euskera.  
Según la frase, es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  Sin respuesta sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 19 0 18 2 0 
5% 75% 20% 75% 20% 5% 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y chino.  
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso 
chino.  
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 20 0 20 0 0 
Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos, bolsos y joyas.  
Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos, bolsos e 
incluso joyas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que las otras cosas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que las otras cosas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
0 20 0 18 1 1 
Carlos y Juan roban coches, motos y bicis.  
Carlos y Juan roban coches, motos e incluso 
bicis.  
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que los otros vehículos mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que los otros vehículos mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
2 18 0 18 1 1 
Luisa y Sara saben latín, griego y persa.  Luisa y Sara saben latín, griego e incluso persa. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
1 16 6 19 1 0 
10 250 43 264 22 14 
3% 83% 14% 88% 7% 5% 
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c1a1 c1a2 
Manolo y Antonio importan tomates incluso.  
Manolo y Antonio importan pimientos y tomates 
incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que otras hortalizas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que las otras hortalizas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 1 3 17 1 2 
Letizia y Paola conocen Málaga incluso.  
Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla y Málaga 
incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que otras provincias andaluzas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que Sevilla. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 15 5 0 
Susana y María conocen Ecuador incluso. 
Susana y María conocen Colombia y Ecuador 
incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que otros países. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que Colombia. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
15 5 0 17 0 3 
Elena y Esteban meriendan plátanos incluso.  
Elena y Esteban meriendan manzanas y plátanos 
incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que otras frutas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que manzanas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 1 3 16 4 0 
Paula y Daniel beben leche incluso.  Paula y Daniel beben agua y leche incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que otras bebidas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que agua. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
13 5 2 17 3 0 
Clara y Laura venden cocos incluso. Clara y Laura venden piñas y cocos incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que otras frutas tropicales. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que piñas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 15 4 1 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben poemas incluso.  
Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos y poemas 
incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que otros textos literarios. 
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que ensayos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
14 4 2 13 5 2 
José y David venden peces incluso.  José y David venden perros y peces incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que otros animales. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que perros. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
20 0 0 15 3 2 
 283 
Francisco y Manuel cocinan arroz incluso.  
Francisco y Manuel cocinan pasta y arroz 
incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que otras cosas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que pasta. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 1 3 16 2 2 
Alberto y Cristina plantan álamos incluso.  
Alberto y Cristina plantan castaños y álamos 
incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que otros árboles. 
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que castaños. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 4 0 16 3 1 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan euskera incluso.  
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán y euskera 
incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que otras lenguas de España. 
Según la frase es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que catalán. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 3 1 18 2 0 
80% 15% 5% 90% 10% 0% 
Ana y Marta saben chino incluso.  Ana y Marta saben inglés y chino incluso. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que otras lenguas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que inglés. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 1 0 18 1 1 
Rocío y Natalia compran joyas incluso.  Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos y joyas incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar 
joyas que otras cosas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que zapatos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 3 1 16 3 1 
Carlos y Juan roban bicis incluso.  Carlos y Juan roban coches y bicis incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que otros vehículos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que coches. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 0 3 16 2 2 
Luisa y Sara saben persa incluso.  Luisa y Sara saben latín y persa incluso.  
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que otras lenguas antiguas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que latín. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 18 0 2 
245 34 21 243 38 19 
82% 11% 7% 81% 13% 6% 
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c1a3 d1a1 
Manolo y Antonio importan pimientos, cebollas 
y tomates incluso.   
Manolo y Antonio importan incluso pimientos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
tomates que otras hortalizas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
pimientos que otras hortalizas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 1 2 17 1 2 
Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla, Granada y 
Málaga incluso.  
Letizia y Paola conocen incluso Sevilla.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Málaga que las otras provincias mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Sevilla que otras provincias andaluzas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 1 1 16 3 1 
Susana y María conocen Colombia, Bolivia y 
Ecuador incluso.  
Susana y María conocen incluso Colombia.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Ecuador que los otros paises mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Colombia que otros países. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 17 2 1 
Elena y Esteban meriendan manzanas, naranjas y 
plátanos incluso.  
Elena y Esteban meriendan incluso manzanas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
plátanos que las otras frutas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
manzanas que otras frutas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 1 2 17 1 2 
Paula y Daniel beben agua, zumo y leche 
incluso.  
Paula y Daniel beben incluso agua.  
Según la frase, es menos probable beber leche 
que las otras bebidas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable beber agua 
que otras bebidas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 2 2 16 3 1 
Clara y Laura venden piñas, mangos y cocos 
incluso.  
Clara y Laura venden incluso piñas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender cocos 
que las otras frutas tropicales mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender piñas 
que otras frutas tropicales. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 3 1 14 4 2 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos, novelas y 
poemas incluso.  
Ricardo y Fernando escriben incluso ensayos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
poemas que los otros textos literarios 
mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
ensayos que otros textos literarios. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 3 0 13 6 1 
José y David venden perros, gatos y peces 
incluso.  
José y David venden incluso perros.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender peces 
que los otros animales mencionados 
 
 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender perros 
que otros animales. 
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sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
15 3 2 17 3 0 
Francisco y Manuel cocinan pasta, pizza y arroz 
incluso.  
 Francisco y Manuel cocinan incluso pasta.  
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar arroz 
que los otros platos mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar pasta 
que otras cosas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 16 2 2 
Alberto y Cristina plantan castaños, robles y 
álamos incluso.  
Alberto y Cristina plantan incluso castaños.  
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
álamos que los otros árboles mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
castaños que otros árboles. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 2 2 15 1 4 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán, gallego y 
euskera incluso.  
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan incluso catalán.  
Según la frase, es menos probable enseñar 
euskera que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable enseñar 
catalán que otras lenguas de España. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
14 3 3 15 1 4 
70% 25% 5% 75% 10% 15% 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés y chino 
incluso.  
Ana y Marta saben incluso inglés.  
Según la frase, es menos probable saber chino 
que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber inglés 
que otras lenguas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 1 2 16 2 2 
Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos, bolsos y joyas 
incluso.  
Rocío y Natalia compran incluso zapatos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que las otras cosas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar 
zapatos que otras cosas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 1 1 15 0 5 
Carlos y Juan roban coches, motos y bicis 
incluso.  
Carlos y Juan roban incluso coches.  
Según la frase, es menos probable robar bicis 
que los otros vehículos mencionados. 
Según la frase, es menos probable robar coches 
que otros vehículos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 1 1 17 0 3 
Luisa y Sara saben latín, griego y persa incluso. Luisa y Sara saben incluso latín.  
Según la frase, es menos probable saber persa 
que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber latín 
que otras lenguas antiguas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 3 0 17 1 2 
250 29 21 238 30 32 
83% 10% 7% 79% 10% 11% 
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d1a2 d1a3 
Manolo y Antonio importan tomates e incluso 
pimientos.  
Manolo y Antonio importan tomates, cebollas e 
incluso pimientos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
pimientos que tomates. 
Según la frase, es menos probable importar 
pimientos que las otras hortalizas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 1 1 17 2 1 
Letizia y Paola conocen Málaga e incluso 
Sevilla.  
Letizia y Paola conocen Málaga, Granada e 
incluso Sevilla.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Sevilla que Málaga. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Sevilla que las otras provincias mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
14 4 2 17 1 2 
Susana y María conocen Ecuador e incluso 
Colombia.  
Susana y María conocen Ecuador, Bolivia e 
incluso Colombia.  
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Colombia que Ecuador. 
Según la frase, es menos probable conocer 
Colombia que los otros paises mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
14 6 0 14 5 1 
Elena y Esteban meriendan plátanos e incluso 
manzanas.  
Elena y Esteban meriendan plátanos, naranjas e 
incluso manzanas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
manzanas que plátanos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable merendar 
manzanas que las otras frutas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 3 0 12 8 0 
Paula y Daniel beben leche e incluso agua.  
Paula y Daniel beben leche, zumo e incluso 
agua.  
Según la frase, es menos probable beber agua 
que leche. 
Según la frase, es menos probable beber agua 
que las otras bebidas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 18 1 1 
Clara y Laura venden cocos e incluso piñas. 
Clara y Laura venden cocos, mangos  e incluso 
piñas.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender piñas 
que cocos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender piñas 
que las otras frutas tropicales mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 18 0 2 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben poemas e incluso 
ensayos.  
Ricardo y Fernando escriben poemas, novelas e 
incluso ensayos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
ensayos que poemas. 
Según la frase, es menos probable escribir 
ensayos que los otros textos literarios 
mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 16 2 2 
José y David venden peces e incluso perros.  
José y David venden peces, gatos e incluso 
perros.  
Según la frase, es menos probable vender perros 
que peces. 
Según la frase, es menos probable vender perros 
que los otros animales mencionados 
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sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 2 0 12 4 4 
Francisco y Manuel cocinan arroz e incluso 
pasta.  
Francisco y Manuel cocinan arroz, pizza e 
incluso pasta.  
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar pasta 
que arroz. 
Según la frase, es menos probable cocinar pasta 
que los otros platos mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 1 1 17 3 0 
Alberto y Cristina plantan álamos e incluso 
castaños.  
Alberto y Cristina plantan álamos, robles e 
incluso castaños. 
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
castaños que álamos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable plantar 
castaños que los otros árboles mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 3 0 18 2 0 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan euskera e incluso 
catalán.  
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan euskera, gallego e 
incluso catalán.  
Según la frase es menos probable enseñar 
catalán que euskera. 
Según la frase, es menos probable enseñar 
catalán que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 3 0 16 2 2 
50% 35% 15% 80% 10% 10% 
Ana y Marta saben chino e incluso inglés.  
Ana y Marta saben chino, francés e incluso 
inglés.  
Según la frase, es menos probable saber inglés 
que chino. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber inglés 
que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 3 1 18 1 1 
Rocío y Natalia compran joyas e incluso zapatos.  
Rocío y Natalia compran joyas, bolsos e incluso 
zapatos.  
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar joyas 
que zapatos. 
Según la frase, es menos probable comprar 
zapatos que las otras cosas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 1 0 14 2 3 
Carlos y Juan roban bicis e incluso coches. 
Carlos y Juan roban bicis, motos e incluso 
coches.  
Según la frase, es menos probable robar coches 
que bicis. 
Según la frase, es menos probable robar coches 
que los otros vehículos mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 3 1 17 2 1 
Luisa y Sara saben persa e incluso latín.  Luisa y Sara saben persa, griego e incluso latín. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber latín 
que persa. 
Según la frase, es menos probable saber latín 
que las otras lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 0 1 14 6 0 
254 36 10 238 41 20 
85% 12% 3% 79% 14% 7% 
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Results χ2 test 
 
comparisons χ2 test 
b1a1 – b2a1 312.9 > 5.99; p < .05 
b1a2 – b2a2 309.5 > 5.99; p < .05 
b1a3 – b2a3 307.47 > 5.99; p < .05 
b2a1 – c1a1 0.96 < 5.99; p > .05 
b2a2 – c1a2 3.27 < 5.99; p > .05 
b2a3 – c1a3 1.12 < 5.99; p > .05 
b2a1 – d1a1 3.70 < 5.99; p > .05 
b2a2 – d1a2 1.45 < 5.99; p > .05 
b2a3 – d1a3 3.15 < 5.99; p > .05 
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Appendix G. Additional Comprehension test – Results per condition 
 
b2a1 d1a1 
Manolo y Antonio importan incluso tomates.  Manolo y Antonio importan incluso pimientos.  
Es menos probable importar tomates que otras 
hortalizas. 
Es menos probable importar pimientos que otras 
hortalizas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
14 2 4 3 16 1 
Letizia y Paola conocen incluso Málaga.  Letizia y Paola conocen incluso Sevilla.  
Es menos probable conocer Málaga que otras 
provincias andaluzas. 
Es menos probable conocer Sevilla que otras 
provincias andaluzas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 4 0 0 18 2 
Susana y María conocen incluso Ecuador.  Susana y María conocen incluso Colombia.  
Es menos probable conocer Ecuador que otros 
países. 
Es menos probable conocer Colombia que otros 
países. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 4 16 0 
Elena y Esteban meriendan incluso plátanos.  Elena y Esteban meriendan incluso manzanas.  
Es menos probable merendar plátanos que otras 
frutas. 
Es menos probable merendar manzanas que 
otras frutas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
15 5 0 3 15 2 
Paula y Daniel beben incluso leche.  Paula y Daniel beben incluso agua.  
Es menos probable beber leche que otras 
bebidas. 
Es menos probable beber agua que otras 
bebidas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 2 16 2 
Clara y Laura venden incluso cocos.  Clara y Laura venden incluso piñas.  
Es menos probable vender cocos que otras frutas 
tropicales. 
Es menos probable vender piñas que otras frutas 
tropicalEs. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 0 1 1 15 4 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben incluso poemas.  Ricardo y Fernando escriben incluso ensayos.  
Es menos probable escribir poemas que otros 
textos literarios. 
Es menos probable escribir ensayos que otros 
textos literarios. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
20 0 0 1 18 1 
José y David venden incluso peces.  José y David venden incluso perros.  
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Es menos probable vender peces que otros 
animales. 
Es menos probable vender perros que otros 
animales. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 1 3 1 19 0 
Francisco y Manuel cocinan incluso arroz.   Francisco y Manuel cocinan incluso pasta.  
Es menos probable cocinar arroz que otras 
cosas. 
Es menos probable cocinar pasta que otras 
cosas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 3 17 0 
Alberto y Cristina plantan incluso álamos.  Alberto y Cristina plantan incluso castaños.  
Es menos probable plantar álamos que otros 
árboles. 
Es menos probable plantar castaños que otros 
árboles. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 0 17 3 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan incluso euskera. Mercedes y Lucía enseñan incluso catalán.  
Es menos probable enseñar euskera que otras 
lenguas de España. 
Es menos probable enseñar catalán que otras 
lenguas de España. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 1 3 1 19 0 
Ana y Marta saben incluso chino. Ana y Marta saben incluso inglés.  
Es menos probable saber chino que otras 
lenguas. 
Es menos probable saber inglés que otras 
lenguas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 0 1 1 18 1 
Rocío y Natalia compran incluso joyas.  Rocío y Natalia compran incluso zapatos. 
Es menos probable comprar joyas que otras 
cosas. 
Es menos probable comprar zapatos que otras 
cosas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 1 3 4 16 0 
Carlos y Juan roban incluso bicis.  Carlos y Juan roban incluso coches.  
Es menos probable robar bicis que otros 
vehículos. 
Es menos probable robar coches que otros 
vehículos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 2 17 1 
Luisa y Sara saben incluso persa. Luisa y Sara saben incluso latín.  
Es menos probable saber persa que otras 
lenguas antiguas. 
Es menos probable saber latín que otras lenguas 
antiguas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 3 0 1 17 2 
253 27 20 27 254 19 
84% 9% 7% 9% 85% 6% 
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b2a2 d1a2 
Manolo y Antonio importan pimientos e incluso 
tomates.  
Manolo y Antonio importan tomates e incluso 
pimientos.  
Es menos probable importar tomates que 
pimientos. 
Es menos probable importar pimientos que 
tomates. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 2 18 0 
Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla e incluso 
Málaga. 
Letizia y Paola conocen Málaga e incluso 
Sevilla.  
Es menos probable conocer Málaga que Sevilla. Es menos probable conocer Sevilla que Málaga. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 1 0 1 19 0 
Susana y María conocen Colombia e incluso 
Ecuador.  
Susana y María conocen Ecuador e incluso 
Colombia.  
Es menos probable conocer Ecuador que 
Colombia. 
Es menos probable conocer Colombia que 
Ecuador. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 3 1 3 17 0 
Elena y Esteban meriendan manzanas e incluso 
plátanos.  
Elena y Esteban meriendan plátanos e incluso 
manzanas.  
Es menos probable merendar plátanos que 
manzanas. 
Es menos probable merendar manzanas que 
plátanos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 1 1 0 18 2 
Paula y Daniel beben agua e incluso leche.  Paula y Daniel beben leche e incluso agua.  
Es menos probable beber leche que agua. Es menos probable beber agua que leche. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 2 0 2 17 1 
Clara y Laura venden piñas e incluso cocos.  Clara y Laura venden cocos e incluso piñas. 
Es menos probable vender cocos que piñas. Es menos probable vender piñas que cocos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 2 17 1 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos e incluso 
poemas.   
Ricardo y Fernando escriben poemas e incluso 
ensayos.  
Es menos probable escribir poemas que ensayos. Es menos probable escribir ensayos que poemas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 1 2 3 16 1 
José y David venden perros e incluso peces.  José y David venden peces e incluso perros.  
Es menos probable vender peces que perros. Es menos probable vender perros que peces. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 0 2 0 19 1 
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Francisco y Manuel cocinan pasta e incluso 
arroz.  
Francisco y Manuel cocinan arroz e incluso 
pasta.  
Es menos probable cocinar arroz que pasta. Es menos probable cocinar pasta que arroz. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 1 0 3 17 0 
Alberto y Cristina plantan castaños e incluso 
álamos.  
Alberto y Cristina plantan álamos e incluso 
castaños.  
Es menos probable plantar álamos que castaños. Es menos probable plantar castaños que álamos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 0 1 0 16 4 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán e incluso 
euskera.  
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan euskera e incluso 
catalán.  
Es menos probable enseñar euskera que catalán. Es menos probable enseñar catalán que euskera. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 2 0 2 17 1 
Ana y Marta saben inglés e incluso chino.  Ana y Marta saben chino e incluso inglés.  
Es menos probable saber chino que inglés. Es menos probable saber inglés que chino. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
20 0 0 2 17 1 
Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos e incluso joyas.  Rocío y Natalia compran joyas e incluso zapatos.  
Es menos probable comprar joyas que zapatos. Es menos probable comprar joyas que zapatos. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 2 0 1 19 0 
Carlos y Juan roban coches e incluso bicis. Carlos y Juan roban bicis e incluso coches. 
Es menos probable robar bicis que coches. Es menos probable robar coches que bicis. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 1 1 2 18 0 
Luisa y Sara saben latín e incluso persa.  Luisa y Sara saben persa e incluso latín.  
Es menos probable saber persa que latín. Es menos probable saber latín que persa. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
20 0 0 0 17 3 
272 18 10 23 262 15 
91% 6% 3% 8% 87% 5% 
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b2a3 d1a3 
Manolo y Antonio importan pimientos, cebollas 
e incluso tomates.  
Manolo y Antonio importan tomates, cebollas e 
incluso pimientos.  
Es menos probable importar tomates que las 
otras hortalizas mencionadas. 
Es menos probable importar pimientos que las 
otras hortalizas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 0 1 3 17 0 
 Letizia y Paola conocen Sevilla, Granada e 
incluso Málaga.  
Letizia y Paola conocen Málaga, Granada e 
incluso Sevilla.  
Es menos probable conocer Málaga que las 
otras provincias mencionadas. 
Es menos probable conocer Sevilla que las otras 
provincias mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 1 2 1 18 1 
Susana y María conocen Colombia, Bolivia e 
incluso Ecuador.  
Susana y María conocen Ecuador, Bolivia e 
incluso Colombia.  
Es menos probable conocer Ecuador que los 
otros paises mencionados. 
Es menos probable conocer Colombia que los 
otros paises mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 1 1 1 18 1 
Elena y Esteban meriendan manzanas, naranjas e 
incluso plátanos.  
Elena y Esteban meriendan plátanos, naranjas e 
incluso manzanas.  
Es menos probable merendar plátanos que las 
otras frutas mencionadas. 
Es menos probable merendar manzanas que las 
otras frutas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 1 17 2 
Paula y Daniel beben agua, zumo e incluso 
leche.  
Paula y Daniel beben leche, zumo e incluso 
agua.  
Es menos probable beber leche que las otras 
bebidas mencionadas. 
Es menos probable beber agua que las otras 
bebidas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 0 1 2 18 0 
Clara y Laura venden piñas, mangos e incluso 
cocos.  
Clara y Laura venden cocos, mangos  e incluso 
piñas.  
Es menos probable vender cocos que las otras 
frutas tropicales mencionadas. 
Es menos probable vender piñas que las otras 
frutas tropicalEs mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 1 2 1 19 0 
Ricardo y Fernando escriben ensayos, novelas e 
incluso poemas.  
Ricardo y Fernando escriben poemas, novelas e 
incluso ensayos.  
Es menos probable escribir poemas que los otros 
textos literarios mencionados. 
Es menos probable escribir ensayos que los 
otros textos literarios mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 0 2 2 18 0 
José y David venden perros, gatos e incluso 
peces.  
José y David venden peces, gatos e incluso 
perros.  
Es menos probable vender peces que los otros 
animales mencionados 
Es menos probable vender perros que los otros 
animales mencionados 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 1 0 2 18 0 
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Francisco y Manuel cocinan pasta, pizza e 
incluso arroz.  
Francisco y Manuel cocinan arroz, pizza e 
incluso pasta.  
Es menos probable cocinar arroz que los otros 
platos mencionados. 
Es menos probable cocinar pasta que los otros 
platos mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 1 3 1 16 3 
Alberto y Cristina plantan castaños, robles e 
incluso álamos.  
Alberto y Cristina plantan álamos, robles e 
incluso castaños. 
Es menos probable plantar álamos que los otros 
árboles mencionados. 
Es menos probable plantar castaños que los 
otros árboles mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 2 0 1 19 0 
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan catalán, gallego e 
incluso euskera.  
Mercedes y Lucía enseñan euskera, gallego e 
incluso catalán.  
Es menos probable enseñar euskera que las 
otras lenguas mencionadas. 
Es menos probable enseñar catalán que las 
otras lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
19 1 0 0 20 0 
Ana y Marta saben inglés, francés e incluso 
chino.  
Ana y Marta saben chino, francés e incluso 
inglés.  
Es menos probable saber chino que las otras 
lenguas mencionadas. 
Es menos probable saber inglés que las otras 
lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
17 2 1 0 19 1 
Rocío y Natalia compran zapatos, bolsos e 
incluso joyas.  
Rocío y Natalia compran joyas, bolsos e incluso 
zapatos.  
Es menos probable comprar joyas que las otras 
cosas mencionadas. 
Es menos probable comprar zapatos que las 
otras cosas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
16 2 2 0 17 3 
Carlos y Juan roban coches, motos e incluso 
bicis.  
Carlos y Juan roban bicis, motos e incluso 
coches.  
Es menos probable robar bicis que los otros 
vehículos mencionados. 
Es menos probable robar coches que los otros 
vehículos mencionados. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
18 2 0 3 17 0 
Luisa y Sara saben latín, griego e incluso persa. Luisa y Sara saben persa, griego e incluso latín. 
Es menos probable saber persa que las otras 
lenguas mencionadas. 
Es menos probable saber latín que las otras 
lenguas mencionadas. 
sí  no  no puede saberse sí  no  no puede saberse 
20 0 0 0 20 0 
268 16 16 18 271 11 
89% 5% 5% 6% 90% 4% 
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Results χ2 test 
 
comparisons χ2 test 
b2a1 – d1a1 365.81 > 5.99; p < .05 
b2a2 – d1a2 423.80 > 5.99; p < .05 
b2a3 – d1a3 446.02 > 5.99; p < .05 
 
 
